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The 1982 Falklands Conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina has 
generated significant debate regarding its utility and lessons.  Indeed, some analysts 
would infer that this Cold War sideshow offers little insight into lessons for the future 
operating environment.  Consequently, many of the Conflict’s established positions are 
contested and appear to be beyond reproach.  Yet, there are a number of the Conflict’s 
narratives that are often directly competing against each other.  For example, one 
perspective suggested that the Argentine air arms contained skilled, heroic individuals 
that relentlessly pressed home their attacks against the British.  In contrast, there is a 
counter-narrative that informed that the Sea Harrier force was utterly dominant over its 
Argentine nemesis.  In an attempt to articulate the veracity of the various narratives, 
this thesis re-evaluates the use of air power during the Conflict by using recently 
released primary source material.  Moreover, the thesis views the campaign through 
the contemporary lens of the operational level of warfare and analyses the elements 
that each participant was endeavouring to defend and attack in order to achieve 
campaign success.  By developing a view of what should have occurred and 
comparing it with a view of what actually happened, the subsequent analysis and 
deductions break many of the enduring myths generated by the Conflict.  As a result, 
this thesis will demonstrate that the Conflict has continued relevance today and in the 
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‘One captured A4 [Skyhawk] pilot admitted to being turned back three times by 
Sea Harriers before eventually penetrating the AOA [Amphibious Operating Area] and 
getting shot down on his 4th sortie.’ 
 
Lieutenant Commander Nigel Ward 
Commanding Officer 801 Naval Air Squadron.1 
 
Ward used the above example in his official post-Falklands Conflict report to highlight 
the Sea Harrier’s dominance throughout the campaign.2  Although Ward did not name 
the pilot nor the cause of his demise, the only Argentine fast jet pilot to be captured 
during the Conflict was Teniente Ricardo Lucero, an A-4C Skyhawk pilot from Grupo 4 
de Caza.  On 25 May 1982, Lucero was indeed shot down during his fourth mission.3  
However, Lucero was successfully engaged not by a Sea Harrier but by a combination 
of land and maritime-based anti-aircraft weapons as he approached the British 
beachhead at San Carlos.4  While he recovered from his injuries in the British field 
hospital at Ajax Bay, Lucero spoke to a British journalist via an interpreter.  Ian Bruce, 
the Glasgow Herald correspondent, reported that Lucero said, ‘I was shot down in my 
fourth attempt to attack your beachhead … three previous attempts were aborted when 
your Harriers intercepted us over the sea.’5  Research from a variety of British and 
Argentine sources confirmed that Lucero failed to drop any weapons during his first 
three missions on 1, 9 and 24 May respectively.  However, the missions were aborted 
due to an inability to find targets, poor weather and, despite avoiding a Sea Harrier 
combat air patrol, the weight of ground fire.6		Consequently, and contrary to Ward’s 
assertion, not one of Lucero’s missions failed due to Sea Harrier intervention.		Was this 
																																																								
1 The National Archives (TNA), DEFE 69/836.  Operation Corporate, Falklands Conflict: 801 Naval Air Squadron, HMS 
Invincible; flight report. 
2 The actual name of the Conflict is contested.  While the Argentines prefer the term ‘Malvinas War’ the term used 
throughout this thesis will be the Falklands Conflict.  The use of the British term is not meant to be divisive but provides 
a simpler narrative and a term that English-speaking readers will be more familiar with. 
3 Unless otherwise stated, the dates shown within the thesis are 1982. 
4 C. Hobson, Falklands Air War.  (Hinkley: Midland Publishing, 2002), 94. 
5 UPI Archives, ‘Argentine pilot shot down and captured over the Falkland Islands.’  
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/05/28/An-Argentine-pilot-shot-down-and-captured-over-the/4718391406400/ 
(accessed 29 January 2019).  Additionally, two further unusual comments are attributed to Lucero in the article.  Given 
the fact that his third mission, conducted the day prior and in the same location, was aborted due to ground fire, the 
following comment questions the veracity of Lucero’s interview, ‘I was immensely surprised on the fourth raid to find all 
kinds of missile and gunfire rising to meet me and my three fellow pilots.'  Lastly, and a point that will be analysed later 
in the thesis, Lucero exaggerated the attrition faced by his squadron when he suggested that, ‘half his squadron failed 
to return from missions against the British force over the past six days’. 
6 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 119, 120 and 123, R.A. Burden et al, Falklands – The Air War (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1986), 111 and 112 as well as Hobson, Falklands Air War, 50, 61 and 92.	
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incident unique or was it indicative of a much broader issue where success was falsely 
attributed to the Sea Harrier in order to enhance its reputation?	
 
In addition to the perceived Sea Harrier dominance during the air campaign, both 
protagonists have generated several other air power-related myths.  As a result, there 
remains confusion surrounding the air power lessons of the operation.  Indeed, many 
of the perceived lessons now appear to be beyond reproach.  However, the steady 
release and access to new primary source material creates an opportunity to review 
and challenge many of the enduring and entrenched views regarding the Conflict. 
 
However, the utility of further research into the Conflict must be considered.  Sir 
Michael Howard disparaged the quality of the historiography of late 20th century 
conflicts.  In particular, Howard suggested that the military history of the Gulf and 
Falklands War reaching the public domain was akin to ‘scrapings from barrel bottoms.’7  
Howard’s statement is a damning, if harsh, indictment.  In addition to the issue of 
quality, Williamson Murray warned that not everyone embraces the benefits of military 
history:  
 
‘Throughout history, leaders and institutions have repeatedly manifested an 
almost wilful ignorance of the past.’8  
 
For example, in the early 20th century, Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher suggested that ‘every 
condition of the past is altered.’9  Fisher’s dismissal of military history as a learning 
mechanism was reinforced two decades later by Montgomery who suggested ‘those 
who think that because they have read a little military history, everyone else is an 
ignoramus.’10  It could be argued these legacy views have been overtaken by a 
generation of military officers who have been exposed to military history in a more 
routine and formal manner.  However, the contemporary position is also disputed.  
Citing Vietnam, Panama and Iraq as examples, Murray claims that ‘few current civilian 
and military leaders seem willing to indulge in systematic reflection about the past.’11  
Consequently, and in order to avoid perpetually failing to learn from the mistakes of 
previous campaigns, there is an enduring utility in the study of military history.  
Nevertheless, military history acolytes must be wary of how to use their reflections.  
Michael Howard warned that one of the characteristics of military history ‘is its 
																																																								
7 M. Howard, “Military History and the History of War.” In The Past as Prologue – The Importance of History to the 
Military Profession edited by W. Murray and R.H. Sinnreich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14. 
8 W. Murray and R.H. Sinnreich, “Introduction.” In The Past as Prologue – The Importance of History to the Military 
Profession edited by W. Murray and R.H. Sinnreich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2. 
9 J.P. Kiszely, “The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: A British View.”  In The Past as Prologue – The 
Importance of History to the Military Profession.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 26. 
10 Ibid., 24. 
11 Murray, Introduction, 1.   
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parochialism.  It has all too often written to create and embellish a national myth, and to 
promote deeds of derring-do among the young.’12  Therefore, and perpetuated by 
ambivalence, enduring myths and a desire to maintain reputations, there is an 
apparent reluctance to challenge the established narrative.    
 
In order to offer something better than ‘scrapings from barrel bottoms’, this thesis has 
adopted a revisionist approach.  Consequently, the thesis will demonstrate that the 
established positions from both participants are an eclectic mix of tales that are overly 
optimistic, partially correct or misleading.  As a result, this thesis will demonstrate that 
the operational outcome was determined by Argentine failings rather than British 
successes.  However, there are a number of common failings that impacted both sides 
during the prosecution of their respective air campaigns such as ineffective air 
command and control.  In order to assess the campaign from an Argentine perspective, 
the campaign will be broken down into three distinct phases that reflect the changing 
British campaign priorities.  A similar approach is then adopted to view the British 
prosecution of the Argentine operational centre of gravity.  Three research questions 
have been posed to assess the air campaign.  First, the thesis reviews the Falklands 
Conflict operational centres of gravity, both from a British and Argentine perspective.  
Second, the thesis analyses the effectiveness of Argentine and British air power in 
attacking and defending the stipulated operational centres of gravity.  Lastly, the thesis 
examines the factors affecting the prosecution of both the Argentine and British air 
campaigns and reviews how these factors impacted on the extant myths of Operation 
Corporate – the name given to the Falklands Conflict by British military planners.  
 
The Established Position  
 
On 27 May, John Nott, the British Secretary of State for Defence, informed his fellow 
Cabinet colleagues that ‘British air defences, both the Harriers and the missiles, were 
performing with great effectiveness.’13  Nott’s statement following the successful 
completion of Operation Sutton, the amphibious assault at San Carlos, sets the tone 
and direction for what would become one of the enduring legacies of the Conflict.  
Buoyed by the recent success of the amphibious assault, Nott, perhaps unwittingly, 
exaggerated the utility of British air defence capabilities during the crucial phase of the 
Falklands Conflict.  Reinforcing his point, conceivably, to offset the recent loss of the 
Type 42 destroyer, HMS Coventry, and the supply ship MV Atlantic Conveyor, Nott 
also suggested that over 50 Argentine combat aircraft had been shot down.14  Although 
the total figure is accurate, the cause of their demise is more complex.  Eleven aircraft, 
																																																								
12 Howard, Military History, 13. 
13 TNA, CAB/128/73/30. Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers 27 May 1982. 
14 Ibid.  
16 
including non-combat aircraft, were destroyed during the Special Air Service raid on 
Pebble Island, further aircraft were wrecked during airfield attacks at Stanley and 
Goose Green as well as helicopters that were strafed on the ground.15  In contrast, his 
assessment at the Cabinet meeting two days previously was more subdued, but 
arguably more accurate, and reflected the extensive usage rather than utility of the 
deployed British air defence capabilities.  Nott told Cabinet that ‘the Sea Harrier and 
the Rapier surface-to-air missile had proved effective in combat, and the Sea Harrier 
had shown a remarkably high rate of operational readiness.’16  There is no doubt that 
the Sea Harrier and Rapier played an important role in the British campaign but there 
appears to be a level of ambiguity regarding their actual performance and decisive 
contribution to the campaign outcome.  However, the British were not the only 
participants to benefit from campaign-related myths. 
 
From an Argentine perspective, they also received flattering praise for their 
performance, particularly during the battle for San Carlos.  Aided and abetted by the 
first narratives of the Conflict, the lore was quickly established that the Argentine pilots 
were worthy and competent opponents who, if it were not for bad luck, had the 
potential to defeat the British.  Although ultimately vanquished in battle, at the end of 
the campaign Argentine air power was rightly considered to be the primus inter pares 
of the Argentine military components.  The Argentine air arms intervention during 
Operation Sutton ensured a lasting reputation, both nationally and globally, as a 
credible force.  This was a significant change from their position during the planning 
stages of Operation Azul/Rosario, the Argentine operation to invade the Falkland 
Islands, when the Fuerza Aérea Argentina were excluded from initial campaign 
planning by its army and naval counterparts.17  However, Argentine pilots were 
considered to be ‘capable and well trained’ as well as ‘professional and proficient’ by 
some commentators.18  Others suggested that the pilots were merely ‘the cream of 
Argentine polo-playing aristocracy, and had nerve, honour and the traditional macho 
image to maintain to the full.’19  Nevertheless, the robustness of Argentine air power 
has now become the established norm.  However, was this perception truthful or 
merely a polite but inaccurate platitude to mollify a defeated foe?  Alternatively, did the 
positive reflection on the Argentine pilots obscure the real deficits in the other 
components of their military capability which, when combined, demonstrated the true 
																																																								
15 H. Bicheno, Razor’s Edge.  (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2006), 132. 
16 TNA, CAB/128/73/29. Cabinet Conclusion: Minutes and Papers 25 May 1982. 
17 The name of the Operation was changed in the prelude to its execution from Azul to Rosario.  Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 
56; R. Higham and S.J. Harris, Why Air Forces Fail – The Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2006), 237. 
18 J.C. Murguizur, “The South Atlantic Conflict: An Argentine Point of View.”  International Defence Review.  Number 2. 
(1983), 139;  C. Parry, Down South (London: Penguin, 2012), 41 
19 Fursdon, Falklands Aftermath (London: Leo Cooper, 1988), 83. 
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capability of Argentine air power?20  Ultimately, was Argentine air power effective and 
efficient in its ability to deliver the required effects against the British deployed force? 
 
Some commentators have suggested that the Conflict has already been extensively 
documented.21  Therefore, what benefit does this thesis add to the extensive library of 
Falklands air war narratives?  This proposition will suggest that one critical area of 
research is missing.  The vast majority of the Falklands Conflict narratives focus on the 
tactical level outputs of the campaign rather than reviewing the joint and operational 
level outcomes – the ability of each side to strike the decisive blow against their 
opponent and achieve a military victory.  The Gulf War Air Power Survey’s authors 
articulated the outputs and outcomes concept in a seminal analysis of Operation 
Desert Storm.  Their contention was that campaigns should be measured by their 
outcomes, or effectiveness, rather than merely reporting their outputs such as the 
number of sorties flown, the number of targets attacked or bombs dropped.22  
Therefore, this thesis aims to understand the linkages between force structure, outputs 
and outcomes during the Falklands Conflict.  By conducting this form of analysis, the 
veracity of a number of the Conflict’s myths can be addressed.  For example, and as 
suggested by Admiral Sir ‘Sandy’ Woodward, the British Carrier Battle Group 
Commander during the Conflict, did the introduction of the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air 
missile tip the balance of the air war in favour of the Sea Harriers?23  Or, as posited by 
Cordesman and Wagner, were the Argentine unexploded bombs a significant burden 
to British maritime operations?24  Also, was the perception that Argentine Mirage IIIs 
were diverted from the Falklands operation in order to defend Buenos Aires from 
potential Vulcan raids, a claim which subsequently infuriated ‘Sharkey’ Ward,  
correct?25  
 
The consequence of these apparent myths is that they have become the established 
position and beyond reproach, a point reiterated by Woodward, ‘in the years since, 
opinions and assessments have been considerably refined, and some “facts” have 
been cast in stone when they should have been cast on the rubbish tip.’26  However, 
Woodward was himself culpable of generating one of the key myths of the campaign 
that would also become the origin for this thesis. 
																																																								
20 In contemporary British military doctrine the elements which when combined create military capability are defined as 
the Defence Lines of Development and are referred to by the acronym TEPIDOIL that equates to: Training, Equipment, 
People, Infrastructure, Doctrine, Organisation, Information and Logistics.  Acquisition Operating Framework, “Defence 
Lines of Development.”  http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/strategic/guide/sg_dlod.html (accessed 11 February 2015). 
21 Including H. D. Train, “An Analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands Campaign.”  Naval War College Review.  Winter 
(1988), 49.  Also, Parry. Down South, xiii. 
22 E. A. Cohen et al, Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume 1 – Planning and Command and Control (Washington D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1993), Command and Control, 3. 
23 J. Woodward, One Hundred Days (London: Harper Collins, 2003), xix. 
24 A. Cordesman, A. and Wagner, A.  The Lessons of Modern War Volume 3.  (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 319. 
25 N. Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands.  (London: Cassell, 2005), 247. 
26 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 359. 
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The Centre of Gravity Argument  
 
The genesis of this thesis surrounds the debate of what actually constituted the British 
operational centre of gravity during the Conflict.  Today, the centre of gravity concept is 
a key component of military doctrine, specifically used in campaign planning and 
execution.27 	However, neither participant explicitly used the centre of gravity term and 
construct during the 1982 Falklands Conflict.  Moreover, the Conflict ‘was fought 
without the benefit of two factors today taken for granted – formal doctrine and 
institutionalised jointery.’28  As highlighted by Sheffield, British Cold War military 
doctrine was deemed to be, ‘semi-formal at best; was centred around one individual 
commander or existed in a specific set of circumstances, and was not necessarily 
easily transferable elsewhere, and in some cases it was more honoured in the breach 
than the observance.’29  Although Sheffield’s comments were land-centric, the air 
domain was equally poorly placed with regard to military doctrine.  ‘Doctrine in the RAF 
went into hibernation from 1968 when the fourth edition of AP1300 RAF War Manual 
was last amended and then subsequently withdrawn as “obsolete” in the early 1970s; 
doctrinal thinking did not re-emerge until 1990.’30  Consequently, the British were guilty 
of failing to embrace the last element of Holmes’ edict that suggested ‘doctrine is not 
just what is taught, or what is published, but what is believed.’31  So what doctrine or 
methodology was used to plan and execute the Falklands Conflict?   
 
Post World War Two, two warfighting cultures emanated from the British Army – 
Montgomery’s attrition and tidy battlefield philosophy and Slim’s manoeuvrist 
approach.32  Sheffield highlighted that ‘in practice, Montgomery cast a long shadow 
over the Army in Europe.  Many of his protégés were placed into important positions, 
and the Monty method prevailed until the 1980s.’33  In 1982, with the operational level 
of war yet to be embraced by NATO, the commander’s flair was deemed to be a key 
determinant in how wars were planned and executed.  Today, that philosophy remains 
valid but it supports rather than drives the formal doctrinal science that is routinely 
employed in current (2019) operational-level planning.   
 
																																																								
27 United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence.  Allied Joint Publication 5-00: Allied Joint Publication for Operational Level 
Planning.  (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2013); Professor Richard Holmes defined 
doctrine as, ‘an approved set of principles and methods, intended to provide large military organisations with a common 
outlook and a uniform basis for action.’  United Kingdom.  British Army.  Army Doctrine Publication: Army Doctrine 
Primer.  (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2011), 1-1. 
28 G. Sheffield and J.A. Crang, “From San Carlos to Stanley: The Falklands Land/Air Operations.”  International 
Relations, Volume 20, Issue 3 (2006), 370. 
29 United Kingdom.  British Army.  Army Doctrine Publication: Operations.  (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre, 2010), E-2. 
30 P. Gray, Air Warfare – History, Theory and Practice.  (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 19. 
31 United Kingdom, Army Doctrine Primer, 1-1.	
32 United Kingdom, Army Doctrine Publication: Operations, E-18. 
33 Ibid. 
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British planning for the Falklands Campaign was initially focussed on the complex task 
of getting the force embarked and deployed.34  The more detailed campaign planning 
was subsequently conducted and refined during the passage south.  The 1982 product 
of the British planning effort, and in line with their established planning processes, was 
the Appreciation of Situation.35  Many of the activities identified in the British 
Appreciation of Situation have commonality with the contemporary operational-level 
planning methodology.  However, in contrast to the contemporary approach, the 
Appreciation of Situation placed greater emphasis upon the Commander’s judgement 
and intuition.  Additionally, the relative importance, vulnerability and sequencing of the 
various tasks is less well understood when using the Appreciation of Situation 
methodology.  Consequently, the Conflict has been retrospectively mapped to the 
centre of gravity theory.  The use of modern doctrine in the thesis is not meant to 
critique the 1982 commanders.  They were guilty of no more than implementing the 
established procedures of that time.  Ultimately, the key benefit of using current 
doctrine is that it enables a significantly greater depth of understanding and analysis.   
This approach provides clarity on the campaign execution by articulating what might 
have been defended or attacked, rather than limiting the analysis to the more narrow 
construct in use in 1982.  
 
Contemporary British doctrine uses the Falklands Conflict as a mechanism to explain 
the centre of gravity concept.  The doctrinal example also reinforces Woodward’s view, 
in his book One Hundred Days, that the aircraft carriers were the British operational 
centre of gravity.  However, this thesis will suggest that the British operational centre of 
gravity is more complicated than merely simply focussing on the British aircraft carriers.  
In order to develop this alternative proposal, a deeper understanding of the campaign’s 
centres of gravity has been developed using Professor Joe Strange’s work at the 
United States Marine Corps University.36  The centre of gravity concept is not new.  
Over two centuries ago, Clausewitz explained that the centre of gravity was the ‘hub of 
all power and movement, on which everything depends.’37  The centre of gravity 
principle came to military prominence once again, nearly a decade after the Falklands 
Conflict.  Colonel John Warden of the United States Air Force, informed by his earlier 
thinking from his book, The Air Campaign, used the term extensively during the early 
																																																								
34 J. Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic.  (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1985), 31. 
35 Defined as a 'logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the 
military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission.’  
Land Warfare Centre, “A Guide to the Tactical Appreciation” 
https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/a_guide_to_tactical_appreciation_1987_0.pdf (accessed 10 February 
2019).  
36	J. Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can 
All Speak The Same Language. (Quantico: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996).	
37 C. Von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-596. 
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planning phases ahead of the 1991 Operation Desert Storm.38  As part of the 
Checkmate organisation in the Pentagon, Warden identified three centres of gravity as 
part of his Instant Thunder campaign plan that aimed to strike decisive blows against 
the Iraqi regime.39   
 
Following Operation Desert Storm, Strange developed the centre of gravity construct 
further.  Frustrated by the eclectic mix of definitions and interpretations for centre of 
gravity across the American military fraternity, he introduced a process to identify the 
centre of gravity as well as introducing the concept of a number of related supporting 
terms: critical capabilities and critical requirements, as shown and defined in Table 
1A.40  It is important to understand the relationship between the four component parts 
in order to comprehend what element of the enemy must be attacked.  Freedman 
reinforced Strange’s views when he stated that ‘hitting an enemy system in exactly the 
right place would cause it to crumble quickly, as the impact would reverberate and 
affect all the interconnected parts.’41  Strange informed that the ‘right place’ are the 
critical vulnerabilities; as they are: 
 
‘Weaknesses which can be exploited to undermine, neutralize and/or defeat an 
enemy center of gravity.  By definition, a center of gravity cannot also be a 
critical vulnerability.’42   
 
Therefore, if planners identified and negated the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities while 
they protected their own critical vulnerabilities, then campaign success would follow.  
As Freedman suggested, ‘by the late 1980s, these various strands came together to 
form a distinct doctrinal form embedded in Western military establishment.’43  Today, 
Strange’s work continues to provide the backbone for NATO’s planning doctrine and it 
is used to ensure that the ‘determination of one single, overarching enemy centre of 
gravity at each level of war remains an ideal, but not always a practical goal.’44   
 
However, the centre of gravity concept is not without its critics.  For example, 
Freedman suggested that ‘for a simple, symmetrical shape finding its centre of gravity 
was straightforward.  Once an object had moving parts or changes its composition the 
																																																								
38 J. Warden, The Air Campaign.  (Washington: Pergamon: Brassey’s, 1989).	
39 As part of the United States Air Force’s Warfighting Concepts Directorate, the Checkmate Division specialised in 
Soviet and Allied analysis of warfighting problems and scenarios.  R.G. Davis, On Target (Washington D.C.: Air Force 
History and Museum Program, 2002), 60; Following refinement, the three centres of gravity used during Operation 
Desert Storm were: Leadership, Military Forces and the Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capability.  Cohen, Volume 1, 
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centre would be constantly shifting.’45  Consequently, Freedman believed that the 
Clauswitzian schwerpunkt mantra is an overly simplistic model that fails to comprehend 
that the enemy and the situation have the ability to adapt and change.46   
 
Term Contemporary Doctrine Definition 
Centre of Gravity The actor’s primary element of power. 
Critical Capabilities The capabilities on which the centre of gravity depends. 
Critical Requirements 
Those conditions, resources or means that are essential to the 
realisation of critical capabilities. 
Critical Vulnerabilities 
The weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies through which the centre of 
gravity may be influenced or neutralised. 
 
Table 1A – Contemporary Centre of Gravity Definitions.47 
 
Despite the criticism, the centre of gravity construct has enduring value as a military 
planning tool.  With the contemporary trend of ever reducing military force sizes, 
Strange’s construct offered the military commander the opportunity to maximise the 
efficiency of his military force against the opponent’s weaknesses.  However, if the 
concept is not embraced then a long, expensive and bloody battle of attrition becomes 
the likely consequence.  If used correctly, the centre of gravity analysis could achieve 
the nirvana that the attacker strives for: to quickly identify and effectively prosecute an 
exposed and valuable critical vulnerability.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
attacker’s folly is to waste its finite and precious resources on a strongly defended 
target that adds limited value to defeating the opposition.  Adolf Galland, the World War 
Two Luftwaffe ‘ace’ and Fuerza Aérea Argentina advisor in the late 1940s to the mid-
1950s, suggested that ‘he who wants to protect everything, protects nothing.’48  
Looking at Galland’s assertion through the lens of ‘critical vulnerability’ and by 
replacing the word ‘protect’ with the word ‘attack’ shows that the contrary position is 
also true.  The latter position is, arguably, a more applicable view to the 1982 context. 
 
The contemporary doctrinal view of the British centre of gravity during the Falklands 
Conflict, as shown in Figure 1.1, reflected Woodward’s view that the aircraft carriers 
were fundamental to the success of the campaign.	 However, Woodward later 
contradicted himself on the importance of both aircraft carriers.  His initial proposition 
suggested that major damage to either aircraft carrier ‘would probably cause us to 
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abandon the entire Falkland Islands operation.’49 Nevertheless, he later stated that the 
loss of [HMS] Invincible would mean that the ‘operation is at least jeopardised.  Lose 
[HMS] Hermes and the operation is over.’50  Although Woodward’s latter view 
undermined his earlier statement regarding the loss of a single aircraft carrier would 
ultimately lead to defeat, he reinforced the perception that the aircraft carriers were the 
British centre of gravity.  It would appear that the argument for the aircraft carriers to be 
the centre of gravity was due to their ability to furnish control of the air via the Sea 
Harrier capability.  Moreover, the key advantage that HMS Hermes had over HMS 
Invincible was that it had the ability to carry Woodward’s command team, and a larger 
number of Sea Harriers.51  However, during a 2002 seminar, Woodward refined his 
views further by suggesting that, ‘lose one aircraft carrier before the landing, before we 
got a strip ashore, which was 6 June’ and the operation was over.52    
 
Critically, Woodward’s immediate superiors back in Britain had a different perspective 
on the importance of the aircraft carrier throughout the campaign.  Admiral Sir Henry 
Leach, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, agreed with Woodward’s most recent view by 
suggesting that the issue was more complex than a simple binary response:  
 
‘It depended so much on the timing, did the loss or damage occur to one or to 
both, permanent or temporary, before, during or after the initial assault landing 
and so on ... If both carriers had gone before the landing, then I think that 
serious consideration to cancelling the operation would have been given.  If it 
had been after the landing … I think we would have pressed on and taken the 
risk.’53   
 
Supporting Leach’s statement is the fact that on 2 April, the Prime Minister was briefed 
on the suspected casualties and losses that the British could face during the campaign.  
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Woodward’s immediate superior as Commander-in-Chief 
Fleet, suggested that the losses could be as high as up to 3000 people, four to six 
escorts and an aircraft carrier.54  However, it appeared that Fieldhouse’s risk appetite 
was not as robust as that of his own superior, Leach.  Leach would have tolerated the 
loss of twice as many escorts.55  Moreover, Fieldhouse suggested that he would not 
have recommended going ahead with [Operation] Sutton if a carrier was lost before D-
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Day.56  Woodward was unsighted on the details of the debate discussed at meetings 
back in Britain as he had deployed south with the Task Force.  Consequently, 
Woodward’s view that the operational centre of gravity was the aircraft carriers 
throughout the campaign reflected elements of information provided to him by his 
immediate superior rather than the more comprehensive views of the Chief of the 
Naval Staff.  It is intriguing that three senior military officers who were inextricably 
linked in the events in the South Atlantic generated three different perspectives on the 
risk appetite associated with the loss of one or both British aircraft carriers.  However, 
statements by individuals who are neither accountable nor responsible for the 




Figure 1.1 – Doctrinal View on the British Centre of Gravity during the Falklands 
Conflict.57 
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Centre of Gravity in the South Atlantic 
 
Argentinean forces invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982.  Britain responded 
rapidly by dispatching a task force to reoccupy the Islands. 
 
The Argentinean armed forces had 220 jet aircraft.  The British Task Force had 34, all of 
which were Harriers.  Control of the air was vital to enable amphibious landings and 
provide freedom of manoeuvre for surface forces.  Initial planning showed that even after 
a successful reoccupation of the Islands, the Royal Navy would have to retain two aircraft 
carriers in the South Atlantic for several weeks, and probably longer.  The only hard 
surface runway in the Falklands, at Stanley, was not long enough to operate fast jet 
aircraft and could not be easily extended. 
 
The Royal Navy had two aircraft carriers:  HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible.  HMS 
Illustrious had been launched but was not yet operational.  The deduction was simple: for 
control of the air, the Task Force could not afford to lose a carrier. 
 
That premise shaped the naval campaign.  The Falklands lie 300 miles east of Argentina. 
Placing two carriers east would keep them out of range of enemy aircraft.  That had 
implications for the availability of air cover; the Harriers had to make relatively long transits 
to and from station.  Because relatively few aircraft were available, they could not keep on 
station for only short periods.  It was planned to build a forward operating base to 
accommodate 12 Harriers once land operations got underway.  However, the loss of 
much of the stock of perforated steel planking on the Atlantic Conveyor limited the 
capability to only four aircraft. 
 
HMS Illustrious joined the task force later in the year, but only after the Falkland Islands 
had been reoccupied.  Using today’s campaign planning tools, two functioning carriers 
would arguably have been the Task Force centre of gravity.  The Argentineans knew how 
important the carriers were and repeatedly tried to find and sink them. 
24 
At the strategic level, how much political will did the British Prime Minister have for the 
campaign and what level of risk would she have tolerated?  Thatcher’s biographer 
suggested that: 
 
‘Throughout the crisis, Clive Whitmore had made it his business to remind Mrs 
Thatcher that she needed to make some sort of private calculation, grim though 
it was, of how many British deaths the government could sustain.  She refused 
to put a figure on it, but was interested in his answer.  He told her a maximum of 
a thousand.’ 58  
 
Although her Private Secretary’s response was significantly less than her senior 
military advisors’ view on casualties, Thatcher’s own private calculation was never 
made public.   
 
Margaret Thatcher’s reputation as the ‘Iron Lady’ was renowned.  Her political drive 
was reinforced during United States Secretary of State’s diplomatic negotiations in 
April.  However, she felt that Al Haig’s shuttle diplomacy between Argentina and Britain 
was ultimately futile as she ‘never really believed that a military government could 
withdraw.’59  Unpopular in the polls at home, untested in major military operations and 
unsure of her own, never mind national, risk appetite on casualties; Thatcher was 
potentially vulnerable.  Nevertheless, she was seized by the need to do what she 
perceived to be the right thing – ‘to restore the freedom of the Falkland Islanders.’60 
She admitted to being ‘desperately anxious about casualties’ particularly during the 
early stages of the campaign.61  Thatcher’s emotions during Operation Paraquet, the 
British operation to recover South Georgia in late April, ranged from, ‘near despair to 
confident reassurance.’62  Thatcher’s latter emotion reflected the safe recovery of 
special forces personnel following two Wessex helicopter crashes on Fortuna Glacier. 
However, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse wanted the Prime Minister to realise that the 
campaign ‘wasn’t going to be risk-free.’63  As a result, and as noted by Freedman, the 
grim benefit of the loss of HMS Sheffield and the deaths of twenty sailors was that ‘the 
country at large now realised the seriousness of the situation and the meaning of 
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war.’64  Moreover, it blooded, tested and hardened the resolve of the Prime Minister.  
Nonetheless, she was never immune to the concerns of potentially large-scale British 
casualties.  For example, in the planning for Operation Sutton, she expressed that ‘the 
prospect of losing a ship carrying large number of troops was terrible.’65  In addition to 
the support from the Service Chiefs, who had all served during World War Two, her 
Cabinet contained a significant number of individuals with military experience from 
World War Two as well as National Service commitments.  Indeed, two of her Cabinet 
had been decorated for gallantry.66  Even though she was being mentored by an 
experienced group of former and current military personnel, there was a fleeting 
opportunity for the Argentines to exploit Thatcher’s concerns over casualties.  Yet, as 
the campaign matured and the desired British end-state became increasingly assured, 
the consequences of significant casualties were likely to reduce.    
 
So what actually constituted the British and Argentine operational centres of gravity 
during the Conflict?  In its simplest form, NATO doctrine calls for a single centre of 
gravity at each level of warfare – a single centre of gravity at the operational level and 
a further centre of gravity at the strategic level.67  This thesis will focus on the 
operational centres of gravity.  Space has precluded the inclusion of detailed strategic 
centre of gravity analysis into this thesis, which may be an area for fruitful research in 
future. 
 
Due to its static, defensive and reactive nature, the Argentine operational centre of 
gravity for the entirety of the campaign was the Argentine fielded forces that 
surrounded and protected the campaign’s vital ground – Stanley, the capital of the 
Falkland Islands.  In contrast to the Argentines, the British had to build, sustain and 
operate their force at range prior to conducting offensive and contested land operations 
for the vital ground.  As a result, a number of British operational centres of gravity can 
be identified during the campaign.  From a NATO doctrinal perspective, multiple 
centres of gravity are an acceptable proposition.68  In contrast to Warden’s three 
centres of gravity that ran in parallel during Operation Desert Storm, it is the contention 
of this thesis that there were three sequential British operational centres of gravity 
during the Falklands Conflict. 
 
Contemporary UK doctrinal analysis of the Falklands Conflict centre of gravity rightly 
identifies the importance of control of the air, the primus inter pares of the four enduring 
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air power roles, in delivering campaign success.69  This position is based on the 
assumption that the British were facing a competent opponent who understood air 
power and would employ its assets in the same manner as any other modern air power 
protagonist.  However, if the Argentines did not approach the air campaign through the 
expected course of action, the British could, in theory, win an uncontested victory in the 
air but face the prospect that the Argentines still controlled the vital ground around 
Stanley.  Ultimately, in the Falklands Conflict, control of the air could not deliver the 
required military end-state as it is an enduring supporting, rather than a decisive, effect.  
The critically important activity that control of the air delivers is the freedom of 
manoeuvre to the action it supports.  Therefore, the operational centre of gravity must 
be capable of taking and securing the vital ground of Stanley.  Consequently, once the 
decisive force was in the operating area, control of the air became a critical 
requirement and not an operational centre of gravity.  Likewise, the aircraft carriers 
were a critical vulnerability that enabled the control of the air critical requirement. 
 
Consequently, it could be argued that the aircraft carriers constituted the operational 
centre of gravity during the initial phase of the campaign prior to the arrival of the 
amphibious assault force.  Moreover, it can also be argued that the aircraft carriers 
formed part of the British strategic centre of gravity construct – political will.  However, 
in order to preserve the strategically important political will at home, it was imperative 
that mass British casualties were avoided.  With the aircraft carriers carrying a 
significant number of personnel on board both HMS Hermes and the smaller HMS 
Invincible, public opinion on the British endeavour may have wavered if either vessel 
was destroyed in action.70  Sensitivity regarding the impact of mass British casualties 
also percolated into how the amphibious assault plan would be conducted.  The 
transfer of personnel between ships prior to Operation Sutton also highlighted the 
importance of preserving the critical land forces – the force which would be needed to 
contest, defeat and retain the decisive Argentine-held ground in and around Stanley.   
 
In order to deliver the UK’s stipulated end-state of ‘bring[ing] about the withdrawal of 
Argentine Forces from the Falkland Islands and dependencies, as quickly as possible,’ 
the UK military forces would need to undertake an action to re-take the Argentine-held 
ground in the Falkland Islands, particularly around Stanley.71  In order to deliver the 
required outcome against a demanding timeline, the UK had limited viable options to 
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project military force ashore.  The only realistic option available to the British was to 
conduct an amphibious assault.  The British had considerable experience in 
amphibious assault operations to assist in their planning to re-take the Falkland 
Islands.  Consequently, the enduring amphibious operation lessons from Gallipoli, 
Dieppe, Normandy and Suez, in rank order, were [control of the air] during the assault, 
[control of the air] after the assault, logistical support, intelligence as well as command 
and control at the operational level.72  As a result, the importance of control of the air as 
a critical requirement during the prelude and execution of Operation Sutton is 
reinforced. 
 
With the arrival of the amphibious force in the South Atlantic, the British operational 
centre of gravity switched to the British amphibious force.  However, once the 
beachhead at San Carlos was secured and the break out commenced, it can be 
determined that the British operational centre of gravity transferred for the last time.  
Up until the Argentines eventually capitulated on 14 June, the final operational centre 
of gravity compromised the fielded British land forces as they moved from San Carlos 
to Stanley.  With the British operational centres of gravity now clarified, there is a need 
to understand the strategic air power context that each participant faced during the 
prelude to the Conflict. 
 
Strategic Air Power Context 
 
From a British perspective, 1982 saw their air arms focused on the vital North Atlantic 
Alliance, a point reiterated in the 1981 Nott Defence Review.  Naval aviation was 
focused on keeping the North Atlantic sea lanes open with particular emphasis on anti-
submarine warfare.  In contrast, the RAF was fixated on home-based operations from 
large, well-supported hardened facilities in the UK and RAF Germany to support 
operations within North West Europe.  Consequently, retention of existing and 
procurement of new air defence interceptors allowed the RAF to continue to contribute 
to British and European air defence; the attack role also received significant 
investment: the Jaguar was retained, the Tornado GR1 was being introduced into 
service and the new Harrier variant was to be purchased.73  However, this philosophy 
was to the detriment of expeditionary air warfare that was now limited to small-scale 
but frequent deployments such as those conducted by the Harrier and Jaguar to 
support NATO’s flanks.74  The emerging concept of UK air operations in 1982 appears 
to be remarkably similar to that employed during the Korean War – a Cold War proxy 
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conflict requiring air expeditionary operations.  As Stephens suggests, air power during 
the Korean War faced similar challenges where ‘air force commanders tended to focus 
on the war they thought they would have to fight – namely, a massive confrontation 
with the Soviet Union on the plains of Western Europe.’75  Consequently, Grove argued 
that the RAF ‘was neither mentally nor physically prepared for the operations in the 
South Atlantic.’76  As a result, flawed command and control arrangements were one of 
many lessons that emanated from the campaign.77  These lessons chimed with the 
Korean campaign.  As Stephens again highlighted, ‘Korea marked the point at which 
the command and control of air assets became the central challenge for the effective 
conduct of joint warfare.’ 78  
 
The Argentine air power context is perhaps less well documented and understood.  
However, Hobson suggested that ‘the armed forces were in a better state of readiness 
and had more operational experience than most in the region, as conflict with Chile 
was never far from the surface and guerillas within Argentina had been active in recent 
years.’79  Therefore, it could be perceived that the Argentines were well equipped and 
practiced in operations in southern Argentina.  Access to the Buenos Aires-based 
British Defence Attachés’ files prior to the Conflict provides a more telling perspective.  
In his December 1981 report, the Defence Attaché observed:  
 
‘All told one gets a picture of a very alert national defence trying to make up in 
enthusiasm what it lacks in modern equipment and skill.  Whilst one can only 
guess at its overall effectiveness if called upon to fight, it is certain that its 
capability will increase year by year.  The speed of the process will largely 
depend upon the money.’80   
 
The Defence Attaché’s view is reinforced by Burden who suggested that the Argentine 
configuration and effectiveness was sub-optimal at the start of the Conflict.  Indeed, the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina ‘began by establishing a revised command structure to meet 
the circumstances of the emergency.’81  Ultimately, it would appear that neither 
participant’s air power capabilities were funded, configured, equipped nor trained for 
the battle that it was about to face.  The ability to rapidly adapt their nation’s air power 
capabilities would be a key determinant in the successful outcome of the Conflict. 
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There is a vast array of literature concerning the Falklands Conflict and its associated 
air war, with narratives spanning tactical to the grand strategic.  In order to develop a 
cogent argument and methodology for the thesis, it was imperative to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various key document sets that enabled the thesis.   
 
One of the challenges in generating the hypothesis for this thesis was developing a 
methodology to compare and contrast the success or otherwise of the various combat 
air missions.  Most narratives discussed sortie rates as a measure of success.  
However, the metric was not consistently applied across all the aircraft involved in the 
campaign.  Most narratives looked at the campaign from a single Service, unit or 
aircraft type perspective rather than applying the mechanism across the totality of each 
nation’s air power capability.  Moreover, the ability to launch a sortie does not have a 
direct correlation to mission success.  Many commentators identified this factor and 
consequently mapped the aircraft’s location as an indicator of mission effectiveness.  
This methodology remains flawed, as the physical location of the aircraft still does not 
ensure mission success.  Also, some aircraft are more capable than others due to 
factors such as payload, range, speed, avionics and aircrew experience.  Therefore, 
the quandary was to identify a mechanism that demonstrated that the required 
operational effect was delivered.  Most narratives fall into the trap of measuring 
outputs, such as sortie rates, rather than analysing the outcome or effect that the 
attack missions were trying to achieve.  In order to destroy the various operational 
centres of gravity, air power had to understand the sequencing of priority targets 
throughout the campaign, find and identify the targets before physically attacking them 
in order to deliver the required effects.  Therefore, the journey of the weapons, rather 
than the attack aircraft carrying them, had to be mapped in order to understand the 
effect or outcome.  Consequently, the literature needed to provide a robust and 
credible data set of the weapon’s journey that could be subsequently analysed.  So, 
what documents were available?  What level of fidelity did they provide?  And, what 
was their veracity? 
 
At the strategic level, both sides conducted high-level reviews in the post-Conflict 
period.  In July, the British Prime Minister directed a committee under the chairmanship 
of Lord Franks ‘to review the way in which the responsibilities of Government in relation 
to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies were discharged in the period leading 
up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April, taking account of all 
30 
such factors in previous years as are relevant; and to report.’82  When the Franks 
Report was published in ‘January 1983, it was widely seen to let the Government off 
the hook, but also spared the previous Labour Government embarrassment.’83  The 
Argentine equivalent of the Franks Report was the Informe Rattenbach.84  Of note, the 
report was released into the public domain in 2012 but has yet to be translated into 
English.  Nevertheless, both reports are of limited value to this thesis as they both deal 
with the strategic causal factors rather than reviewing the operational prosecution of 
the Conflict. 
 
Both nations produced official histories of the Conflict.  However, the utility of official 
histories has long been debated.  Christina Goulter suggested that ‘all good military 
historians go through a rite de passage the point at which they realise that the official 
histories are not necessarily gospel.’85  Jeffrey Grey went even further as he described 
official histories as ‘frequently synonymous with “cover up”, where not indeed with 
official lying.’86  Peter Gray provided a more nuanced position when he described the 
challenges faced by the author of an official history as the balance between the much-
vaunted lack of academic freedom and independence to meet a master’s intent versus 
the privileged access to files, documents and other materials that are denied to other 
researchers.87  From a British viewpoint, Freedman’s two-volume The Official History of 
the Falklands Conflict provides a broad insight into the military campaign as well as the 
diplomatic and strategic issues.88  Although Freedman’s work has been described as a 
‘tour de force’ that rectified many of the errors contained within the 23-year old initial 
official government report, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, it was not beyond 
reproach.89  While it is recognised that Freedman’s aim was to primarily focus on, 
‘British policy and strategy’ this approach was to the detriment of the land and air 
campaigns that were dealt with in ‘modest proportion.’90  Consequently, the military 
campaign narrative was concise and ‘sparing on the tactical detail.’91  Moreover, in 
contrast to other official histories, Freedman deliberately avoided the inclusion of the 
impact individuals had on events.  Freedman justified this approach on the grounds 
that he felt that ‘it has expressly not been my task to highlight the failures of 
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individuals.’92  However, Sheffield commented that ‘it would be instructive to know the 
rationale behind the decision … whether this is the result of official policy, or a self-
denying ordinance on the part of the author.’93  Nevertheless, Sheffield also praised 
Freedman for tackling areas of controversy and contention.  From an air perspective, 
the challenges included command and control issues as well as Rapier’s woeful 
performance that was in sharp contrast to its exalted status in the immediate post-
Conflict aftermath.94  Ultimately, Sheffield commended Freedman’s work ‘as an 
essential text, which is both bold and authoritative, to which future generations of 
historians will surely be indebted.’95 
 
In contrast, the Argentine official history was split along Service lines when the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina and the Comando de Aviación Naval both generated independent 
narratives in their native Spanish.  In contrast to the British publication, both Services 
produced detailed tactically orientated narratives that were devoid of the higher level 
strategic thinking.96  From the perspective of developing the thesis, the Argentine 
official histories provided significant mission detail that assisted the refinement of the 
hypothesis.  However, it became apparent that the documents suffered from a few 
notable omissions.  Consequently, both participants’ official histories accurately 
reflected Robin Higham’s comment that ‘official histories are best understood as the 
first word, not the final word.’97  As a result, the official histories make an excellent 
starting point.  However, the documents lacked detail, either through policy, accidental 
oversight, editorial decisions or classification.  Consequently, any detailed analysis on 
the Falklands air war had to be supported by alternative, credible data such as the 
seminal research conducted by Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic as well as 
Burden et al’s Falklands Air War.98  With access to Argentine pilots and combat 
reports, their work in the mid-eighties challenged the British Government’s initial 
optimistic claims regarding enemy aircraft losses.  There were also a number of more 
recent books that were equally engaging and further bolstered the academic position.  
Notably, Cordesman and Wagner’s The Lessons of Modern War Volume III, Bicheno’s 
Razor’s Edge and Hobson’s The Falklands Air War all provided a rich source of 
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information on the air war.99  Nevertheless, their narratives were all subtly different but 
all added value to the thesis.    
 
Beyond the academic realm, there were also a number of Falklands Conflict veterans 
who have been engaged in the subject matter.  At the higher command level, large 
anniversary-related events provided a rare opportunity to reunite key players to discuss 
events.  For example, in 2002, a major conference was held at the Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst that re-examined the events of 1982.  Given the passage of time 
and the perceived need to preserve legacies, events such as these usually 
perpetuated the extant position.  Indeed, Woodward informed the audience that he 
attended ‘less in the hope of learning anything new than to try to ensure that history did 
not get changed in order to drive “new” lessons.’100  Nevertheless, the opportunity to 
gather such an eminent and broad group of individuals and have their perspectives 
captured was invaluable.101  
 
One of the first of the practitioners’ accounts to be released post-Conflict was 
Lieutenant Commander Nigel ‘Sharkey’ Ward’s narrative, Sea Harrier over the 
Falklands:  A Maverick at War.102  The book contained an insight into the exploits and 
issues associated with his tenure as the commanding officer of 801 Naval Air 
Squadron on board the smaller of the two British aircraft carriers, HMS Invincible.  The 
book also contained several bold proclamations regarding the Sea Harrier’s 
performance during the campaign.  Further Harrier pilot memoirs were to follow, but 
over a decade after Ward’s account, as the Conflict approached its 25th anniversary.  
Squadron Leader Jerry Pook’s book, RAF Harrier Ground Attack – Falklands, provided 
a vociferous viewpoint on the integration of the Harrier GR3 force onto HMS 
Hermes.103  A more balanced perspective of Harrier operations in the South Atlantic 
was produced by Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan, a Royal Air Force exchange officer 
flying with 800 Naval Air Squadron on board HMS Hermes, in his book, Hostile 
Skies.104  From the three books written from a British operator’s perspective, there is 
ambiguity regarding the utility of Harrier operations in the South Atlantic.  Each 
individual flew a different aircraft type or operated from a different ship during the 
Conflict.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that their perspectives were markedly different.  
Although the narratives of individuals who were at the heart of the action can be 
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compelling this must be balanced against the fact that these individuals may have been 
too close to the activity to be truly objective.  Nevertheless, by virtue of the timing of its 
publication, Ward’s book had primacy in the historiography and public perception.  As a 
result, many of his views are now the established position and appear sacrosanct and 
echo Whitmarsh’s comment that ‘once lodged it is difficult to shake out a myth.’105  
 
From an Argentine viewpoint, there are a limited number of articles written in English to 
counter the dominant British narrative.  Indeed, many of the Argentine accounts of the 
Conflict are written by British authors, such as Middlebrook’s book, The Argentinean 
Fight For The Falkland Islands.106  Consequently, these documents could be 
construed, incorrectly, as aiding the British cause.  Nevertheless, there are a small 
group of native Spanish-speakers that have written in English on the subject matter.  At 
one extreme, Moro, a Falklands Conflict veteran himself, wrote, The History of the 
South Atlantic Conflict.107  Moro’s book is an interesting take on the Conflict.  Many of 
his opinions and views are unique, unsupported by a full range of evidence, and 
contrast sharply with the British view of the Conflict.  A more balanced and credible 
approach to the Conflict was taken by a number of native Spanish-speakers such as 
Huertas, Briasco, Hafes, Cicalesi and Rivas in their numerous articles and books such 
as Tabanos at War, Falklands – Witness of Battles and The Fight for ‘Las Malvinas.’ 108  
Although the Spanish-speaking authors work provided a detailed insight into the 
various units’ activities during the Conflict their work had a tendency to focus on the 
tactical level and show limited analysis at the operational level.  Nevertheless, their 
extensive data can be used to verify and bolster the official Argentine narratives.  
Indeed, Rivas’ book, Wings over the Malvinas, provided the trigger for this thesis’ 
methodology.  Rivas provided a near comprehensive picture of the number of aircraft, 
aircraft type, weapon loads, locations and results of Argentine sorties.109  Written in 
English, Rivas’ book was based on the Argentine official histories but bolstered by 
interviews with participants that added additional detail and insight into the more 
sensitive and recently declassified missions.110  A further benefit of Rivas’ narrative is, 
after interviewing the aircrew involved, he identified a number of missions that were 
erroneously omitted from the original official histories.  
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A number of online resources have also been exploited during the thesis research.  In 
particular, three websites were particularly noteworthy.  First, the Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation provides an extensive online cache of documents relating to the British 
Prime Minister’s tenure.111  The documents pertaining to the Falklands Conflict range 
from digitalised documents from The National Archives to Thatcher’s handwritten 
account of the Conflict.  Second, the RAF Historical Society web pages offered a wide 
range of data from those at the tactical, operational and strategic levels during the 
lead-up and prosecution of the Conflict.112  From an Argentine perspective, the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina website provided a useful insight into the air force’s activities on a 
day-by-day basis.113  Although the website was not exhaustive in its detail, it remains a 
complementary tool to the Argentine official history narrative as well as the other 
secondary source perspectives on the Argentine air battles.   
 
The rising popularity of the podcast has added to the oral history portfolio.  However, 
and as pointed out by Gray, when dealing with oral histories, ‘care has to be taken to 
analyse critically the story that unfolds for the veracity of the account, any exaggeration 
(not that aircrew in particular are prone to this), self-justification or self-depreciation.’114  
Indeed, analysis of interviews with various Falklands Conflict veterans highlighted that 
their positions vary wildly with the passage of time, perhaps reflecting that they are now 
released from the constrained tether that was once their senior military position.  Also, 
it was evident that oral histories made individuals prone to potentially make careless 
assertions that did not have the benefit of the editor’s pen.  Nevertheless, access to the 
Imperial War Museum oral history catalogue provided a gateway to a broad spectrum 
of veterans over an extensive post-Conflict period.  Of note, a number of individuals 
who have not written about their experiences were included in the Imperial War 
Museum’s oral history catalogue; these include Moore and Curtiss, the British Land 
and Air Commanders during the Conflict. 
 
Understanding air power’s contribution to the broader campaign including its support to 
the other environments was a fundamental part of the research for this thesis.  From 
the maritime perspective, and in particular the amphibious assault viewpoint, the 
number, types, dates and names of the ships used during the campaign are well 
documented.  In particular, the maritime force used to protect and convey the British 
assault forces to San Carlos is well established in the vast majority of the key books 
covering the Conflict.  Likewise, the spearhead infantry forces and the ships they were 
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hours of the assault.  However, a number of ships with their embarked cargo and 
personnel remained in San Carlos for a number of days awaiting disembarkation.  An 
effective Argentine air attack against these vessels could have had a detrimental, if not 
disastrous, effect on the campaign.  However, a clear picture of what actually 
constituted the critical second wave of forces and what these ships carried is less 
readily available in secondary source material.  Surprisingly, neither Clapp and 
Southby-Tailyour in Amphibious Assault Falklands nor Thompson in his 3 Commando 
Brigade in the Falklands narrative provided a comprehensive solution.115  Although the 
follow on forces were predominantly embarked on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, there 
are few books and little detail on Royal Fleet Auxiliary activities beyond the initial 
offload at San Carlos.  Neither Johnson-Allen’s They Couldn’t Have Done It Without Us 
nor Puddlefoot’s No Sea Too Rough were able to provide the required level of detail of 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary activities.116  Therefore, reversion to primary source material was 
used to explain the situation.  Consequently, the 3 Commando Brigade files held at 
The National Archives clarified which units were embarked upon which ship during the 
amphibious assault. 
 
From a British land forces stance, significant secondary source material has been 
written on their journey south, the amphibious assault and the battles at Goose Green 
and the hills surrounding Stanley.  The views of those who were there were the most 
compelling of these.  Consequently, the works by Vaux, Gardiner, Van der Bijl and 
Southby-Tailyour all provide very useful insights into the impact of British and 
Argentine air power on the progress of the land campaign.117  However, there is little 
insight from two of the key British protagonists: the Land Component commander, 
Major General Jeremy Moore and the commander of 5 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Tony 
Wilson, neither of whom wrote memoirs.  Consequently, access to primary source 
material such as their Record of Proceedings, War Diaries and oral histories helped to 
fill this void. 
 
Many of the elements required to develop and build this thesis’ methodology were 
available through secondary sources.  The missing elements had to be retrieved from 
British primary source material.  Gray suggests, ‘that primary source materials are the 
lifeblood of original research’, but caution must be applied.118  To a novice researcher, 
it might appear that primary source material is the nirvana that will answer the full 
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gamut of research questions.  The reality is somewhat different.  It can be a ‘time-
consuming and frustrating occupation’ conducting research in an archive.119  However, 
unexpected opportunities do arise, seldom used files, such as the air attaches’ annual 
reports from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, were available.  The attaches’ files, 
spanning 30 years prior to the Conflict, provided a rare insight into the culture, ethos 
and problems of the developing Fuerza Aérea Argentina.120  Nevertheless, seeking a 
full set of documents that provided all the answers associated with the thesis is a 
forlorn hope.  For example, documents associated with the Conflict are still slowly 
being released into the public domain; others remain redacted.  Those documents that 
are available may have elements that are missing or simply do not provide the 
anticipated level of detail. 
 
By way of example, in order to understand the work of the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 
squadrons during the period of Operation Corporate, a comprehensive understanding 
of the aircraft sortie rates was needed beyond that established in the secondary 
sources.  Consequently, access to primary source material was required to attempt to 
clarify the position.  Unfortunately, the primary source information at the Fleet Air Arm 
Archives was disappointingly limited.  Elements of the Sea Harrier Squadrons’ Flight 
Authorisation Sheets, Record of Proceedings and Fair Flying Logs were accessible.121  
However, not all of the desired documents were available.  Some were incomplete, 
with key pages missing, or simply lacked the desired degree of detail.  As a result, it 
was not possible to build up the required level of information in order to build a more 
comprehensive picture of Sea Harrier operations.  As a result, research on the Sea 
Harrier squadrons had to be put in abeyance until several key files were released at 
The National Archives that allowed the vast majority of the voids to be filled.  Of note, 
the 801 Naval Air Squadron report was particularly detailed and insightful.122 
 
As with the Sea Harrier files, the 1 (Fighter) Squadron combat reports were also 
released into the public domain during the period of research.123  However, the reports 
appear to have been written significantly after the events in the South Atlantic.  As a 
result, the documents added confusion rather than clarity to the Squadron’s activities.  
The rapid Harrier GR3 deployment, on a high tempo and unusual contingent operation 
may account for the apparent reverse-engineered combat reports.  This may leave the 
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researcher at risk of confusion through using a non-contemporaneous set of 
information about 1 (Fighter) Squadron’s mission performance and its operational 
narrative rather than being able to rely upon a timely, raw, but accurate source of 
mission reporting.  Complicating the issue further is the fact that there are two versions 
of 1 (Fighter) Squadron’s combat reports that are subtly different and contain, 
contradictory information.  The first version resides at the National Archives, while the 
second version is part of the Scientific Evaluation Team’s report.124  Consequently, and 
rather surprisingly, building the picture of British combat air mission outputs and 
outcomes was achievable but significantly more difficult than generating the Argentine 
equivalent.  However, generating the Argentine version was not without its challenges. 
 
Due to time, cost and distance constraints, this thesis could not make use of or access 
Argentine primary source material.  In mitigation, the Argentine official histories were 
translated from Spanish into English.  Any ambiguity, nuance or technical detail was 
clarified and verified using secondary source material and the support from two 
Argentine military historians.125  Consequently, the amalgamation of a number of 
sources allowed the Argentine data set to be corroborated.  As a result, a unique and 
unified picture across all the Argentine attack platforms and their weapons could be 
developed and the Argentine outcomes achieved or otherwise could be established.  
Consequently, the thesis is based on a logical and auditable process that provides an 
arbitrated, rather than clear, picture of the causal factors for success and failure during 
the defence and attack of the various operational centres of gravity in the South 
Atlantic. 
 
Despite the extensive writing on the campaign, there remain a number of further gaps 
in the air campaign that need to be addressed in the future once the information 
becomes available.  For example, several elements of the air campaign remain 
classified and subject to much speculation.  The participation of the Nimrod R1 from 51 
Squadron and the Canberra PR9s of 39 Squadron during the Conflict are both cases in 
point.  Both units appear on the Conflict’s roll of honour but little has been written on 
their actual contribution.  However, once access to the units’ role, basing, activities and 
support to the British campaign are released into the public domain, it would be 
beneficial to review the air campaign with a better understanding of the how the 
strategic and photographic reconnaissance roles were integrated into and added value 
to the wider British military campaign. 
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Admiral Harry Train (United States Navy), the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in 
1982 questioned the relevance of the Conflict.  He believed that the campaign was a 
‘failure of deterrence’ and that the ‘the strategic dynamics of the Falkland Islands 
conflict were more of two ships passing in the night than a head-to-head politico-
military confrontation.’126  Nevertheless, this thesis will demonstrate that there are a 
significant number of tactical and operational level air power lessons that remain 
relevant today and in the future.  Moreover, in the enduring dilemma of balancing the 
ends, ways and means associated with United Kingdom Defence, it is imperative that 
the correct lessons are drawn from campaigns in order to ensure that future capability 
investments are coherent and balanced.  This thesis is a unique opportunity to review 
the efficiency and effectiveness of a small cadre of combat air assets to strike and 
defend a broad spectrum of targets under demanding conditions, both environmental 
and at the extremities of its support chain, while utilising new weapon capabilities.  
Consequently, identifying the true causal factors behind inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness are paramount for any future air arm to consider.  In order to conduct 
the necessary campaign analysis, the following chapter articulates the methodology 
used to scope the remainder of the thesis.
																																																								
126 Train, Falklands/Malvinas Islands Campaign, 50. 
39 






‘One of the guiding principles of fighting with an air force is the assembling of weight, 
by numbers, of a numerical concentration at decisive spots.’  
 
Lieutenant General Adolf Galland, 
Luftwaffe World War Two fighter pilot with 104 victories  
and Fuerza Aérea Argentina Advisor 1948-1955.1 
 
In order to analyse the Falklands Conflict effectively and understand if Galland’s 
acolytes and their opponents subsequently adhered to his principle then a clear 
articulation of the timing, location, participants, desired outcomes and measures of 
success for the operation must be established.  This Chapter will articulate the various 
‘where, when, who, what, why, and how’ factors that will be analysed further in the 
subsequent chapters.   
 
Where and When? 
 
Although Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands and South Georgia on 2 April 
and Operation Paraquet, the successful British operation to recapture South Georgia, 
was concluded on 28 April, the thesis will focus on the military campaign on the 
Falkland Islands themselves and review the campaign from the start of British combat 
air operations on 1 May until the Argentine surrender on 14 June.2  Within that 
timeframe, there are three distinct phases to the British campaign to recover the 
Falkland Islands.  Each phase is analysed separately and in greater depth in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five respectively.  The campaign fulcrum or tipping point of the British 
campaign occurred during the second, and arguably the most critical, of the three 
phases.3  Therefore, by defining the timeframe of Operation Sutton, the amphibious 
assault, the first and last phases of the operation can also be defined. 
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H-Hour, the time of the physical landing of British military forces on the Falkland 
Islands was in the early hours of 21 May.  However, 0900 Greenwich Mean Time on 20 
May was in effect the amphibious assault force’s first point of vulnerability.4  It was at 
this point, the amphibious assault force left its loitering position 140 nautical miles 
northeast of Stanley.  The British force moved towards the landing site via a circuitous 
northerly route in order to avoid detection by Argentine aircraft in the vicinity of Stanley 
and from the suspected submarine operating off the north coast of the Falkland 
Islands.5  Operation Sutton culminated on 26 May when Brigadier Julian Thompson, 
the Commanding Officer of 3 Commando Brigade during the Conflict, declared he had 
sufficient force and support to break out from the beachhead.6  Although it would take 
another three weeks for the amphibious group to land the divisional headquarters and 
5 Infantry Brigade, the British operational centre of gravity switched from the 
amphibious forces to the British fielded land forces as the troops started to disperse 
from their concentrated location at San Carlos and dilute as they dispersed eastwards 
towards Stanley.7  This transfer of the British operational centre of gravity occurred on 
the evening of 26 May as the Second Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) 
left its positions on the high ground of Sussex Mountains, overlooking the secured 
beachhead at San Carlos, and headed south towards Goose Green, the first land 
battle of the campaign.8  The implications for combat air during Operation Sutton are 
discussed in Chapter Four whereas the lessons learned during the land campaign are 
highlighted in Chapter Five. 
 
With the operational centres of gravity established for the last two phases of the British 
campaign articulated, the first phase of the British operation must also be considered.  
Spanning the period 1 - 19 May, the British Task Force’s roles were to blockade the 
Total Exclusion Zone, conduct special forces reconnaissance and direct action tasks.9  
By enforcing the self-proclaimed 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland 
Islands, and by definition achieve the desired level of control of the air and ensure sea 
control, the British Task Force could create the conditions that would facilitate a 
successful amphibious assault.  Consequently, the key force elements that could 
deliver the task were the two British aircraft carriers.  Therefore, the British operational 
centre of gravity for the first phase of Operation Corporate was HMS Hermes and HMS 
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Invincible.  The decisive force, the amphibious assault ships, did not arrive in the 
vicinity of the Falkland Islands until 18 May.10   
 
Who and What? – The British Combat Air Protagonists.   
 
Inter-Service rivalry, the introduction of new weapons and roles, missions conducted at 
significant range from normal operating bases and the adaption of their military 
capabilities to meet the emerging challenges were all factors that both Argentines and 
the British air arms had to contend with during the Conflict.  Before discussing the three 
British combat air capabilities deployed during Operation Corporate, it is important to 
understand the strategic context that the British units were operating in during 1982. 
 
Reflecting the extant policy of the ‘East of Suez’ retrenchment, the British military was 
focused on supporting NATO in a European Cold War context.  Defence expenditure 
was 5.2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a comparatively luxurious position 
in comparison to contemporary levels of Defence funding but still less than the 6.5 per 
cent of GDP in 1964 in the prelude to Denis Healey’s series of Defence Reviews.11  
However, the reality was that the recently elected Conservative government inherited 
an unbalanced and unaffordable Defence programme from its predecessors and 
realised that ‘we can not go on as we are.’12  The causal factors for the 1981 Defence 
Review conducted by John Nott were enduring.  In his memoirs, Healey suggested that 
‘ever since the [Second World] war, Defence had been under exceptional economic 
pressure, since technology increased the cost of new equipment much faster than the 
increase in the nation’s wealth.’13  In a similar vein to Nott in 1981, Healey blamed 
previous incumbents for the difficult decisions he was forced to make in his own 
Defence Reviews.14  The 1981 Defence Review determined that Defence had, ‘four 
main roles: an independent element of strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed 
to the [NATO] Alliance; the direct defence of the United Kingdom homeland; a major 
land and air contribution on the European mainland; and a major maritime effort in the 
Eastern Atlantic and Channel.’15  Although military operations beyond the NATO area 
were considered and in particular the Falkland Islands, it is limited to a simple and 
weak one-liner; ‘our Forces will also continue as necessary to sustain specific British 
responsibilities overseas, for example in Gibraltar, Cyprus, Belize and the Falkland 
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Islands.’16  Nevertheless, this vision for sustaining interests overseas, specifically the 
Falkland Islands, was compromised by two major decisions.  First, the plan to phase 
out the specialist amphibious ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid, by 1982 and 1984 
respectively, would have had longer-term consequences for the recovery of the 
Falkland Islands if implemented.17  Also, the Falkland Islands-based ice patrol ship, 
HMS Endurance, was due to be decommissioned and not replaced – a further signal to 
Argentina that the British had disinvested in the Falkland Islands.  In an endeavour to 
mitigate the decisions, the Defence Review suggested that it intended ‘to resume from 
1982 onwards the practice of sending a substantial naval task group on long 
detachment for visits and exercises in the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean or 
further east.’18  However, the scale, tempo and duration of these operations were not 
specified.  Therefore, it is no surprise, and as stated by Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss, 
the Air Commander for Operation Corporate, that ‘no one had envisaged a UK out-of-
NATO-area operation, indeed it had been ruled out by successive Defence White 
Papers.’19  Consequently, the limited number of British combat air assets available and 
suitable to conduct Operation Corporate is a reflection of the European-centric British 
Defence Policy.  In contrast to the eclectic mix of Argentine combat air assets, which 
will be discussed later, there were only three British combat air platforms that were 
capable of operating in the remote, and challenging South Atlantic – the Fleet Air Arm’s 
Sea Harrier as well as the RAF’s Harrier GR3 and the Vulcan.   
The most numerous of the British combat air assets was the Sea Harrier.  Initially, and 
in contrast to the RAF’s viewpoint, the Fleet Air Arm had little interest in the Harrier 
capability.  During the 1960s, the Royal Navy ‘stuck determinedly to their requirement 
for a two-seat, radar-equipped, supersonic, all-weather fighter to be catapult-launched 
from their carriers, [HMS] Victorious, Eagle, Ark Royal and the projected new 50,000-
ton attack carrier CVA01.’20  In particular, the Fleet Air Arm wanted to order the 
American McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom to equip the Royal Navy’s aircraft 
carriers.21  However, as part of Denis Healy’s 1966 Defence White Paper, the CVA01 
programme was cancelled as it did not give ‘sufficient operational return for our 
expenditure.’22  Consequently, much to the chagrin of the Royal Navy, and in particular 
the Fleet Air Arm, it was decided ‘that the tasks for which carrier borne aircraft might be 
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required in the late 1970s can be more cheaply performed in other ways.  Our plan is 
that, in the future, aircraft operating from land bases should take over the 
strike/reconnaissance and air defence functions of the carrier on the reduced scale 
which we envisage that our commitments will require after the middle of the 1970s.’23  
As a result of the CVA01 cancellation, the F-4 Phantom would be limited to service on 
board HMS Ark Royal and HMS Eagle.  Consequently, only 48 F-4K Phantoms were 
ordered for the Fleet Air Arm rather than the original plans for 140.24  However, when 
the refit to HMS Eagle was cancelled in 1972, 22 F-4K Phantoms initially intended for 
the Royal Navy were transferred directly to the RAF.25  The net result was that the 
Fleet Air Arm was left with a single operational squadron of F-4K Phantoms to embark 
on the aged HMS Ark Royal which was rapidly approaching its out of service date.  
With no new aircraft carrier investment, there was a palpable fear within the Fleet Air 
Arm that British embarked fixed wing aviation was about to wither and die when 892 
Naval Air Squadron’s F-4K Phantoms, and their Buccaneer counterparts from 809 
NAS, were transferred to the RAF after HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned in 
1979.26  This transfer of capability did not help to soothe the inter-Service rivalry that 
already had a reputation of being, ‘truly poisonous’ during the CVA01 debacle.27  
Indeed, the former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Gerald 
Templer in his 1965 report on the rationalisation of air power, described the 
relationship in equally appalled terms: ‘we believe the present state of feeling between 
these two Services at the Whitehall level is deplorable.’28 
In the eyes of the Royal Navy and the Fleet Air Arm, the net winner of Healy’s 1966 
Defence White Paper decisions was the RAF.  The demise of British carrier aviation in 
lieu of Healy’s decision to invest in the RAF’s aspirations to purchase 50 General 
Dynamics F-111 long-range, multi-role aircraft created an enduring friction between the 
Fleet Air Arm and the RAF.29  However, the RAF’s perceived victory over the senior 
Service was short lived.  Due to continued financial pressures, a series of further 
defence expenditure reviews were undertaken ‘in July 1967 and finally the most 
fundamental changes of all in December 1967 and January 1968 when the decisions to 
leave East of Suez and to cancel the F-111 were taken.’30  As a consequence, and with 
a direct bearing on the 1982 Falklands Conflict, the Avro Vulcan was retained in 
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service in order to fill the long-range attack role until the eventual replacement for the 
F-111, the Panavia Tornado, could enter service.31 
The retirement of HMS Ark Royal in the late 1970s with its embarked combat air 
capability and enablers left a significant capability gap for the Royal Navy to attempt to 
backfill.  Consequently, the Royal Navy was forced to review its manned fighter 
capability and embrace the Harrier as a self-funded, low-cost, low-risk solution to 
meets the combat air demands of the new generation of Royal Navy’s deliberately 
ambiguously titled ‘through deck cruisers.’  The RAF was not averse to the concept of 
embarked fixed wing combat air power.32  Indeed, following company and military test 
pilots trials on board HMS Blake and Eagle, 1 (Fighter) Squadron conducted a 
deployment on board HMS Ark Royal in the early 1970s.33  However, the RAF’s 
concerns over the Sea Harrier related to the relative cost and priorities rather than the 
‘philosophy’ of the platform.34 
 
In early 1970, Naval Staff Requirement 6451 stipulated the need for a force of 25 
aircraft to fulfil the emerging task.35  The object of the new platform was to provide the 
Royal Navy with an organic capability for air intercept, reconnaissance and limited 
surface attack based on the Harrier aircraft.  With the Royal Navy ‘concentrated on 
anti-submarine warfare in the high priority area of the Eastern Atlantic and Channel,’ it 
was imperative that the Fleet maintained its freedom of manoeuvre in order to deliver 
the required deterrence effect, in concert with or without United States Navy support.36   
As a result, there was a need to deny Soviet aircraft from gathering intelligence on the 
Fleet’s disposition.  Therefore, the Maritime Harrier’s focus was to counter the threat 
posed by the large, long-range, fast, but subsonic, Tupolev Tu-95 reconnaissance 
aircraft (or more commonly known by the NATO reporting name of Bear D) operating at 
medium to high altitudes.37  The then Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Denis 
Spotswood ‘was never convinced of the operational effectiveness of the Maritime 
Harrier, although he recognised that the aircraft could just meet the limited requirement 
that had been stated.’38  At the same meeting, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff 
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(Intelligence) representative reinforced the Maritime Harrier’s narrow requirement set 
by stipulating that ‘the wider aspects of the totality of the Soviet air threat had not been 
considered.’39  In response, Vice Admiral John Treacher, a former Fleet Air Arm pilot 
and captain of the recently decommissioned aircraft carrier HMS Eagle, informed the 
group that he ‘was confident that the Harrier could meet the requirements of the Navy 
and would provide a proper balance of forces within the Fleet.’40  Nevertheless, the Sea 
Harrier was recognised by its own Service during its inception as a limited platform.41  
However, the Royal Navy was also cognisant of the lessons of history that 
demonstrated the folly of operating a maritime force with inadequate air support.  As a 
result, the Sea Harrier was seen as ‘a good all-rounder with one pre-eminent virtue – it 
is there.’42  The acrimonious relationship that existed between the RAF and Royal Navy 
during the mid-1960s and early 1970s concerning carrier aviation would have 
consequences in the South Atlantic in 1982 and generate a number of the Conflict’s 
myths. 
 
The Sea Harrier design and force size would be constrained by the size of its operating 
platform – the aircraft carrier.  As a result, and in comparison to the Phantoms and 
Buccaneers that it supplanted, the Sea Harrier was slower, carried a smaller payload 
and had a reduced operating range.  Additionally, the second order effects of the 
diminutive new class of aircraft carrier meant that there was insufficient space to field 
either organic air-to-air refuelling or airborne early warning enabling capabilities.  Both 
of these enabling capabilities, previously available on the now de-commissioned HMS 
Ark Royal, would be key in delivering persistence and situational awareness to the Sea 
Harrier.  Devoid of the key enablers, a small force of embarked manned fighters was 
likely to find the effective and efficient delivery of control of the air challenging.  
Nevertheless, the new aircraft also had a few benefits.  For example, as the Sea 
Harrier was a development of the RAF’s existing Harrier GR3 aircraft, it was perceived 
to be a low-risk technical solution.  Moreover, the Sea Harrier’s key sensor, the 
Ferranti-manufactured Blue Fox radar, was based on the existing Sea Spray radar 
planned for the Lynx helicopter and was also deemed to be a low-risk proposition.43  
However, the proposed radar performance ‘would have a capability not dissimilar to the 
Lightning’ – the aircraft that the F-4 Phantom had replaced in RAF service, and thus a 
downgrade in capability.44  The point was reiterated by one of the deployed Sea Harrier 
pilots who remarked that the radar’s actual performance was akin to the De Havilland 
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the F-4K Phantom.45  Nevertheless, for an anticipated 1 per cent of its budget, the Sea 
Harrier was imperfect but an affordable and low-risk solution to the problem of 
protecting the Royal Navy in the Eastern Atlantic against the Soviet Bears into the 
1980s.46   
 
The Sea Harrier first flew in August 1978 and entered front-line service with 800 Naval 
Air Squadron on 31 March 1980.47  The second front-line squadron, 801 Naval Air 
Squadron formed on 28 January 1981.48  By the end of March 1982, both front-line 
squadrons and the training squadron, 899 Naval Air Squadron, were operational and 
operated the vast majority of the now extended purchase of 34 aircraft.49  However, not 
all aircraft were available to the front line units.  One aircraft was lost in a flying 
accident pre-Conflict and two were yet to be manufactured.  Additionally, four of the 
remaining Sea Harrier fleet were allocated to critical clearance and trials work.  The 
Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment at RAF Boscombe Down 
retained three Sea Harriers, while British Aerospace operated one aircraft at 
Dunsfold.50  Consequently, an initial force of twenty Sea Harriers was mustered for 
deployment to the South Atlantic.  800 Naval Air Squadron embarked twelve aircraft on 
board the larger of the two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes, whereas 801 Naval Air 
Squadron took eight Sea Harriers onto the smaller HMS Invincible.  A further eight 
replacement Sea Harriers eventually joined the Task Force prior to Operation Sutton 
on board MV Atlantic Conveyor.51 
 
During the Conflict, the key air defence weapon of the new Sea Harrier was the latest 
variant of the United States-designed Sidewinder air-to-air missile – the AIM-9L 
Sidewinder.  The development of this, the third-generation Sidewinder, ‘was shaped by 
air-to-air missile problems in the Vietnam War.’52  In 1977, the Raytheon-built AIM-9L 
Sidewinder beat competition from the French-manufactured Matra 1 missile and a 
British development missile to meet the British military requirement for a stockpile of 
1370 short-range air-to-air missiles with an introduction to service by 1980/81.53  The 
new missiles would allow the RAF to bring its stockpile up to 2500 short-range air-to-air 
missiles thus enabling the RAF F-4 Phantom squadrons to deliver six days of intensive 
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flying rates in wartime.54  The AIM-9L Sidewinder stockpile would be later expanded to 
2500 missiles in order to replace the existing AIM-9G Sidewinder stockpile and 
encompass RAF attack aircraft; the Royal Navy requirement for 264 AIM-9L missiles 
would also be incorporated into the order.55  The fielding plan for the Sea Harrier would 
see a first tranche of 74 missiles delivered by mid-1980 in order to enable the first 
embarked Sea Harrier operations from HMS Hermes.  The second tranche of 90 
missiles was required by 1981 to meet the deployment schedule of HMS Invincible.56  
However, and in order to offset the impact of procuring a United States-manufactured 
weapon, it was decided that the missile would be built under licence by a European 
weapons consortium headed by BGT (Bodenseewerke Gerätetechnik) who had 
experience in the manufacture of earlier Sidewinder variants.57  As early as 1977, 
concerns were raised to the Chief Scientific Advisor over the ability of BGT to deliver 
the missiles on time.58  Therefore, a parallel process was looked at which would see 
the British approach the United States directly in order to procure an early batch of 
missiles.59  The risk materialised in 1982, and the mitigation plan failed to deliver the 
required stockpile in time.  As a result of the limited British AIM-9L Sidewinder 
inventory, the Sea Harrier force left Portsmouth on 5 April with a stockpile consisting 
solely of the older and less capable AIM-9G Sidewinders. 
 
The weapons were split between the two carriers; HMS Invincible held 30 weapons 
whereas HMS Hermes stored 40 missiles, with the remaining 33 missiles held on 
board RFA Resource.60  The limited British stockpile of AIM-9L Sidewinders was 
initially transferred to HMS Hermes as it transited past Ascension Island over the 
period 16-18 April.61  Consequently, the British task Force departed south from 
Ascension Island with 160 AIM-9G [Sidewinders] and 109 AIM-9L [Sidewinders].62  
HMS Invincible belatedly received its AIM-9L Sidewinder stockpile on 21 April and 
conducted missions with the missiles six days later.63  Nevertheless, the initial upload 
of missiles was perceived to be insufficient to meet the longer-term needs of the Task 
Force.  Consequently, British concerns led to requests to the United States for 300 
AIM-9L Sidewinders from their own stockpiles.64  Therefore, following United States 
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May.65  Subsequently, a long-range C-130 Hercules mission was flown to airdrop a 
number of the missiles to the Fleet in the South Atlantic prior to 23 May.66  Ultimately, 
the Sea Harrier community had introduced a new weapon onto the platform, albeit an 
evolution of an existing and known system.  As a result, the Sea Harrier force’s initial 
tactics, training and doctrine reflected its legacy weapon system.  The Sea Harrier’s 
ability to adapt to the new weapon system would be critical to the outcome of 
Operation Sutton.  However, the two deployed Sea Harrier squadrons took an 
individualistic, rather than a collegiate, approach to their tactics.67 
 
Delivery of control of the air through manned fighters is not merely a function of the 
platform’s capability.  The aircraft must be supported by a number of enabling 
functions.  For example, the ability to see, understand and react rapidly to an enemy 
approach was a critical factor in the successful outcome of the Battle of Britain.  The 
RAF used the Chain Home radars to provide sufficient early warning to the finite 
Fighter Command resource in order to concentrate the small force at the right place 
and at the right time.68  However, over four decades later, the Task Force deployed to 
the South Atlantic with limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, in 
particular without an airborne early warning capability.  The previous naval airborne 
early warning capability, the Fairey Gannet, was retired at the same time as HMS Ark 
Royal.69   
 
In addition to the seven pilots seconded to the Fleet Air Arm to fly the Sea Harriers, 
which was broadly in line with the policy of having one third of the Sea Harrier 
squadrons manned by RAF pilots, the junior Service’s contribution to carrier-based 
combat air came in the guise of the Harrier GR3s of 1 (Fighter) Squadron commanded 
by Wing Commander Peter Squire.70  During routine operations, the Squadron was 
‘declared to ACE Mobile Force (Air) and SACEUR’s Strategic Reserve (Air) with 
deployment options ranging from north Norway to eastern Turkey.’71  Consequently, all 
three Harrier GR3 front line squadrons were familiar with operating in austere and 
remote conditions, both in the field and from deployed operating bases.  However, they 
had no recent experience of operating from aircraft carriers.72  Nevertheless, on 8 April, 
1 (Fighter) Squadron was tasked by Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) for ‘details 
of operational requirements needed to prepare the squadron for possible involvement 
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in the South Atlantic.’ 73  Moreover, the RAF Harriers were specifically designed to 
operate in the attack and reconnaissance roles.  Yet, they were to deploy to the South 
Atlantic as attrition replacements for the anticipated Sea Harrier losses, operating in an 
air defence role for which they were not designed, nor their pilots trained.74  
 
On reflecting on the efforts to prepare his Squadron for Operation Corporate, Squire 
noted the considerable support required from a multitude of agencies to enable the 
ambitious expedition, including the Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive, the 
Ministry of Defence, RAF Germany and Industry.75  However, he also highlighted his 
frustrations regarding the initial ambiguous command and control arrangements.  
Squire informed that the squadron was ‘reacting to inputs from four sources, Ministry of 
Defence, Strike Command, 18 Group and the Navy, with 38 Group kept very much in 
the dark.’76  Nevertheless, the efforts to turn an expeditionary land-based attack 
squadron into an embarked air defence capability in a tight timeframe were impressive.  
Aircraft were rapidly modified in order to ensure that they could operate from an aircraft 
carrier.  Modifications included ‘the fitting of shackles to the outriggers for lashing down 
purposes, a modification to allow active nosewheel steering and an engineering design 
to provide a means of aligning the aircraft’s INAS (Inertial Navigation and Attack 
System) on a moving deck.’77  Additional modifications involved the fitment of ‘an I-
Band transponder for bad weather recoveries, hardened limiters for the engine control 
system and an anti-corrosion treatment.’78   
 
Harrier GR3 flying training prior to the deployment included ski jump training at Royal 
Naval Air Station Yeovilton between 14 and 23 April.79  Additionally, air combat training 
was conducted against RAF Lightnings and Hunters as well as French Armee de l’Air 
Mirage IIIs and Aeronavale Super Etendards in order to give the Harrier pilots an 
insight into the capabilities of the Argentine aircraft they would face in the coming 
weeks over the South Atlantic.80  Moreover, an effective end-to-end test of the new 
control of the air capability was conducted when five of the six AIM-9G Sidewinders 
were launched successfully at the Aberporth weapons range, off the west coast of 
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Wales, on 30 April. 81  However, the control of the air role was not the sole focus of the 
squadron’s work-up.  Ultra low-level flying down to 100 feet was conducted and 28 
cluster bombs were also dropped against a splash target.82  Further expansion of the 
Harrier GR3 capability was also reviewed.  In particular, options to introduce an anti-
radiation missile and precision attack capability were instigated.  Additionally, 
measures to provide the aircraft with a self-protection capability against enemy air and 
ground threats were also progressed.83  The latter capabilities would be available in the 
latter stages of Operation Corporate but not in time to support the initial Harrier GR3 
deployment or Operation Sutton. 
 
On 19 April, the Squadron received its initial deployment order.  They were tasked with 
deploying nine aircraft; six aircraft would join the Task Force with the three remaining 
Harriers to be retained at Ascension Island in order to conduct air defence duties.84  
Over the period 2 - 6 May, the nine aircraft deployed from their home base at RAF 
Wittering to Ascension Island and used a combination of air-to-air refuelling as well as 
refuelling stops at RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall and Banjul in Gambia to reach their 
destination.85   
 
Planning assumptions suggested that after 21 days of operations the Sea Harrier force 
could be as low as 14 aircraft.86  As a result of the need to replace only the aircraft (and 
pilot) rather than the total capability meant that 1 (Fighter) Squadron deployed with a 
skeleton engineering staff of only eighteen personnel.  Although 38 engineers had 
been initially prepared for the deployment, this figure is still some way short of the 
manning levels required to support the aircraft during normal operations.  Of note, the 
ten Harrier GR3 aircraft detachment based in the Falkland Islands post-Conflict would 
require 200 support staff, ie twenty personnel to cater for a single airframe.87  However, 
due to a command edict to limit sleeping quarters to above the water line, living space 
was at a premium on board HMS Hermes.88  Consequently, and despite the limited 
number of RAF engineering personnel, they were still forced to ‘sleep in hammocks 
and camp beds erected in passageways where some routine movement continued 
throughout the quiet hours.’89  The net result was additional pressure on the extant Sea 
Harrier engineering staff to support a similar, but different, aircraft type.   
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The third and last aircraft to consider as part of the British combat air contribution to 
Operation Corporate is the Avro Vulcan.  At the start of the Conflict, the aircraft was in 
its last few months of military service.  The operational conversion unit, the squadron 
responsible for training Vulcan aircrew, closed in August 1981 and three operational 
squadrons had retired within the previous three months.90  The three remaining 
operational squadrons based at RAF Waddington were due to be disbanded by 30 
June.91   
 
The origins of the Vulcan date back to the 1947 B 35/46 requirement for a new 
medium-range bomber.  In response to the need for a bomber capable of 500 knots at 
50 000 feet with a range of over 3350 nautical miles while carrying a 20 000 pound (lb) 
payload, Avro’s chief designer and creator of the iconic Lancaster bomber, Roy 
Chadwick, created the futuristic delta-wing design.92  Initially known as the Avro 698, 
the Vulcan first flew in 1952 and the B1 variant entered RAF service in May 1957 as 
part of what became the V-Force triad alongside the Handley Page Victor and Vickers 
Valiant bombers.93  
 
For the vast majority of its career, the Vulcan was a nuclear-armed bomber.  The 
Vulcan’s initial role was to act as Britain’s first line of defence as part of the 
independent nuclear deterrent capability.  In order to meet this task, a pre-determined 
number of Vulcan crews and their nuclear-armed aircraft were kept at very high 
readiness 24 hours per day, 365 days of the year.  The Vulcan B2 variant was initially 
armed with either the Yellow Sun or Red Beard free-fall nuclear weapon.94  In an 
attempt to give the aircraft greater stand-off and survivability against increasingly 
dense and sophisticated Soviet defences, an air-launched ballistic missile was to be 
carried under each wing on a weapons pylon.  Following the termination of the Anglo-
American Skybolt programme, three Vulcan squadrons from February 1963 fielded the 
less ambitious Avro-built Blue Steel missile.95 
 
However, Blue Steel’s front line tenure was short-lived as ‘the medium bomber force 
was formally stood down from QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) at midnight on 30 June 
1969.’96  As a result, and due to the introduction of Polaris-armed submarines, 
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‘responsibility for the strategic deterrent passed from the RAF to the Royal Navy.’97		
With the loss of its primary role, some might have questioned the Vulcan’s continuing 
utility to Britain’s defence.  However, the Vulcan received a reprieve when the F-111 
programme was cancelled.  With minor airframe modifications, a new weapon, minimal 
investment and change from high to low altitude operations, the Vulcan, along with 
surplus Fleet Air Arm Buccaneers, would provide a cost-effective solution to the 
capability gap generated from the lack of a new long-range nuclear attack capability 
until the Panavia Tornado entered service.  Consequently, until the Vulcan retired it 
was envisaged that it would be a low-level tactical nuclear bomber using the WE177C 
free-fall nuclear weapon.  With no ‘East of Suez’ commitment in place, there was no 
requirement for the Vulcan to continue air-to-air refuelling nor, from 1976, the need to 
continue to train for the secondary conventional bombing role.98  After nearly a quarter 
of a century dedicated to the nuclear attack role against a known Warsaw Pact threat, 
the Vulcan force was tasked to prepare for a long-range conventional attack against 
Argentine-held territory – a role that was beyond the comprehension of most British 
military planners.  As a result, the Vulcan force was neither trained nor equipped to 
cater for a long-range conventional attack on the Falkland Islands.   	
 
Of note, all three British combat air platforms used during the Falklands Conflict were 
at one time considered for export to Argentina.  The issue of exporting military 
equipment to Argentina was ‘not without political delicacy.’99  At its inception the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina was ‘largely British equipped, standards are British and doctrine Royal 
Air Force.’100  However, this was not necessarily through choice but due to the fact that 
‘Great Britain owed Argentina a huge debt for its continuous supply of food during the 
[Second World] War.  Unable to offer a full financial settlement, the United Kingdom 
offered to pay it with weapons, offering its more modern systems.  Among the material 
thus received from 1947 were 100 Gloster Meteor F Mk 4 fighters, thirty Avro Lincoln 
and fifteen Avro Lancaster bombers, fifteen Bristol 170 Freighter and twenty-four 
Vickers Viking transports, twelve Airspeed Consul and seventy De Havilland Dove light 
transports, and 100 Percival Prentice trainers.’101  However, throughout the 1950s and 
until the mid-1960s, the fledgling independent air arm struggled to carve its niche within 
the Argentine military construct.  According to the British Air Attaché’s report, and as a 
result of struggling to maintain obsolete aircraft, the ramifications of a failed coup and 
holding limited sway with its two more senior Services ‘at the end of 1955 the air force 
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is clearly in an unhappy and disturbed state.’102  Five years later the position was no 
better: ‘it is difficult to see how the Argentine Air Force can ever acquire the self-
confidence and prestige which it must acquire in order to hold its own on a footing of 
equality with the two longer established services.’103  By 1963, due to the ‘parlous state 
into which the Argentine Air Force had fallen’ as well as a national budget which ‘is in a 
state of continuous deficit’ the Air Attaché held the view that ‘the Argentine Air Force in 
its present state cannot be considered as an operational force of any consequence.’104 
 
However, two years later, in 1965 there was a ray of hope.  The arrival of a United 
States Air Force Mission which was set up in October 1956 with the intent ‘to co-
operate with the Argentine Air Force in an advisory capacity with a view to increasing 
its technical and functional efficiency’ paved the way for the procurement of the first 
batch of second-hand A-4 Skyhawks nearly a decade later.105  However, the Air 
Attaché noted presciently that ‘the re-equipment with US material will put the Argentine 
Air Force in a position of having to support US policies or go short of spares and 
replacements.’106  As a result, the Argentines came to regret their procurement 
decision some 17 years later during the Conflict.   
 
Much to the dismay of the British Air Attaché, the French were also becoming 
influential in Argentina.  With the local manufacture of ‘a small French jet trainer and 
communications aircraft,’ it was clear that the British domination of supply of military 
aircraft to the Fuerza Aérea Argentina was beginning to wane.107  The British were also 
partially culpable in their own downfall by initially offering over-priced, second-hand 
Canberra and Hunter aircraft.108  Additionally, this promising period of re-equipping the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina ‘was clouded as a result of our ban on meat imports from 
countries where foot and mouth disease was endemic … the Reed Report (which 
pointed a finger at Argentine mutton as the probable cause) touched Argentine pride to 
the quick and caused some hysterical outbursts of wrath.’109  Ultimately, the Argentine 
military aircraft inventory would be modernised and become more internationally 
diverse.   
 
From a British export perspective, both the Embassy in Buenos Aires and the British 
Defence Industry actively pursued further sales to Argentina but defence export policy 
became increasingly restrictive.  As noted by the Defence Sales Organisation: 
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‘…throughout the period successive [British] Governments have tried to strike a 
balance between the economic benefits to be expected from Defence sales, the 
need to maintain good relations with Argentina, concern over human rights and 
the possibility of a direct military threat to the Falkland Islands.’110   
 
Reflecting on the frictions existing between Argentina and Chile, Lord Chalfont, a 
minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, felt an ‘ineradicable distaste for a 
policy that involves selling weapons of an advanced type in an area like Latin America 
– especially to two countries involved in territorial disputes.’111 
 
Elements of the Argentine Navy showed interest in procuring up to a fleet of 12 of the 
fledgling Harrier aircraft in early 1970.112  However, the requirement was met by the 
significantly cheaper, more numerous but second hand American A-4 Skyhawks.  
Nevertheless, the aged Skyhawk was seen as a temporary solution with an expected 
life span of five years.113  From a Defence Sales Organisation perspective, ‘the 
indications are, however, that a purchase of Harrier has been postponed rather than 
cancelled.’114  As a result, the British saw an opportunity to sell the yet to be built Sea 
Harrier to Argentina.   However, after initial Embassy and Defence Sales Organisation 
staffing in late 1981, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded with,  
 
‘Although it is clear that neither an aircraft carrier nor Sea Harrier would have 
any implications for internal repression in Argentina, it is equally clear that both 
would be capable of use against the Falkland Islands.  They would fall foul of 
our second guideline for arms sales to Argentina.’115   
 
The adoption of a more restricted defence sales policy by both the United Kingdom and 
the United States in the prelude to the Conflict meant that the Argentines would 
eventually purchase the French Super Etendard rather than the Sea Harrier.116  
Consequently, and as highlighted by the Defence Sales Organisation, ‘if the Argentine 
Navy were to purchase Sea Harrier we would have some considerable hold over them 
in that the aircraft could only be kept flying with logistic support from the UK.’117  The 
net result was that the British had to invest considerable time and diplomatic efforts in 
an endeavour to constrain the Super Etendard capability during the Conflict. 
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In a similar timeframe to the Sea Harrier enquiries, the Argentines also considered the 
purchase of Vulcan aircraft.  In early 1982, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina were ‘firmly 
interested acquiring Vulcan in 1983 despite recent publicity about cuts in defence 
expenditure.  They require between six and twelve aircraft which would form a new unit 
which would be additional to present strengths.’118  The Defence Attaché in Buenos 
Aires, perhaps naively, added that he had ‘been unable to identify a specific role for 
these aircraft but is convinced that they would be inappropriate for use in any 
adventure against the Falkland Islands.  We can only assume, therefore, that the 
Vulcan would be purchased either as a deterrent or for operations to the West.’119  
However, it was an industrial decision that eventually scuppered the potential sale of 
Vulcans to Argentina.  On 3 February, less than two months before the Argentine 
invasion, and ‘despite earlier interest, BAe [British Aerospace] have now decided at 
Aircraft Group Board level that, for commercial reasons, they do not wish to become 
involved in the modernisation and on going support of this type of aircraft.’120 
 
So, cost, British export policy and industrial interests ensured that only one British 
combat air platform was fielded by the Argentines during the 1982 Conflict.  So what 
was the Argentine air power situation in 1982? 
 
Who and What? – The Argentine Combat Air Protagonists 
 
In order to understand the fighting components of the Argentines’ combat air capability, 
it is important to comprehend how the force was developed and configured.  The inter-
Service rivalry between the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm is well documented.  However, 
the antagonistic relationship between the two British Services was contained, mostly, 
within the corridors of Whitehall.  In sharp contrast, the battles between the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina and the Comando de Aviación Naval were, at times, physical and 
lethal.  In his 1960 report, the British Air Attaché noted that, 
 
‘Although the Argentine Air Force has so far had little success in re-equipping 
itself with modern aircraft, it has largely succeeded in preventing its bitter rival, 
the flying arm of the Argentine Navy, from doing any better.  The rivalry 
between these two arms has also so far stultified any attempt to set up an Air 
Force equipped and trained to deal with submarines, although it is now the 
determined policy of the Navy to concentrate chiefly upon that role.  The 
Argentine Air Force will not agree to the Navy taking responsibility for maritime 
																																																								




air defence and the Navy for their part have so far succeeded in blocking 
aspirations of the Air Force to set up something akin to the Royal Air Force’s 
Coastal Command.’121    
 
However, the Argentine national strategy changed between 1955 and 1962 when the 
emphasis moved from national defence to national security.  The key concern became 
the need to counter any internal communist growth.  Consequently, ‘counterinsurgency 
was the policy the air force had to adopt to survive in the new hostile environment.’122  
With the loss of the counter-maritime capability to the Comando de Aviación Naval, the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina acquired assets that were suitable only for ‘short-ranged 
ground support missions.’123 
 
The dilemma faced by the Argentines in the 1960s echoes with those faced by the 
United Kingdom.  However, it appears that the Argentines fell for the demands of 
furnishing their short-term needs rather than adopting a more pragmatic and balanced 
force that would meet their long-term requirements.  The consequences of an 
Argentine decision to generate a niche combat air arm would prove to be a flawed 
strategy in the South Atlantic some two decades later.  As a result, it could be argued 
that Argentines lost the war due to this doctrinal change some two decades before the 
war was actually fought.   
 
The divisive relationship between the two Argentine air arms can be traced back to 
June 1955 when the two Services were predominantly on opposing sides of a failed 
coup d’état to overthrow President Juan Peron.124  The most notorious element of the 
revolution occurred on 16 June 1955, with a Comando de Aviación Naval air raid on a 
pro-government rally in Plaza de Mayo in central Buenos Aires and home of the 
Presidential palace, Casa Rosada.  The raid was conducted by 30 Argentine naval 
aircraft and accounted for over 300 civilian deaths.  The attack remains the largest 
aerial bombing ever faced by the Argentine mainland.  The Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
participation can be summarised as follows:  
 
‘Air Force action was confined to the fighter base at Moron on the outskirts of 
Buenos Aires.  In the first phase Meteors from this Base operated on the 
Loyalist side in defence of the Capital, and actually shot down one of the 
attacking Naval planes.  Later in the day Moron was captured by junior officers 
of the Base who defected to the rebel side ... a small number of Meteors 
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subsequently operated with the rebel forces and shot up various targets in the 
city.’125   
 
During the 1970s, and as highlighted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
issue continued,  
 
‘The armed forces have remained under a Ministry of Defence since the coup of 
1976.  Despite an outward show of unity, there is considerable inter-service 
rivalry for political influence particularly between the Army and the Navy.  The 
Army greatly resents the increased power and influence gained by the Navy in 
particular at the time of the [1976] coup.’126   
 
In 1982, Argentine combat air capability encompassed ten different platform types 
spread across the Fuerza Aérea Argentina and the Comando de Aviación Naval.  
British assessments suggested that Argentine squadrons were well manned at a ratio 
of three pilots per airframe.127  Additionally, the aircrew were considered to be ‘well 
motivated, and skilled, with high levels of skills and experience in squadron 
commanders and operations officers.  Flying hours in peacetime were considered 
compatible with maintaining aircrew efficiency.’128  However, in the thirty years 
preceding the Conflict, the British Air Attaches in Buenos Aires provided alternative 
insights into the flying discipline and morale issues of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina.  In 
1952 it was reported that ‘there is a general lack of “guts”, esprit de corps, and 
enthusiasm for the Service.’129  In the 1960 report, it was noted that two civilians were 
killed and a further five injured due to ricochets during an Air Week firepower 
demonstration.  The Air Attaché was shocked that ‘nobody seemed perturbed, 
however, over this blatant example of bad flying discipline.’130  The 1965 report did not 
hold back on its criticism, which was couched in terms based on stereotyping as much 
as rational analysis:  
 
‘As a body of fighting men the Air Force comes fairly low down in the World 
scale.  The Argentines, with their strong intermixture of Italian blood, are not a 
warrior race.’131   
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In the 1968 and 1971 versions, the tone avoided gross stereotyping, but the message 
was equally damning, ‘flying skill is generally of a high standard in the AAF [Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina] but airmanship would be better if more self-discipline could be 
imposed.’132  Approaching the Conflict, the 1977 report reiterated that ‘too many pilots 
were irresponsible and exceeded the limitations of either themselves or their aircraft.’133  
Nevertheless, in the final annual report prior to the Conflict, the British Embassy in 
Buenos Aires appositely noted that the Fuerza Aérea Argentina performance, ‘despite 
equipment weaknesses, indicates that they would make dangerous enemies.’134  
Ultimately, the historical and the post-Conflict views of Argentine pilots were 
inconsistent, although the immediate pre-Conflict narrative should have raised 
concerns. 
 
The backbone of the Argentine combat air capability was the McDonnell Douglas A-4 
Skyhawk.  Initially, 50 former United States Navy A-4B Skyhawks were procured for the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina between 1966 and 1970 in order to generate Grupo 5 de Caza 
of the V Brigada Aérea based at San Luis, near Cordoba.135  The initial force build-up 
was compromised due to the Vietnam War.  The supply of weapon racks and 
gunsights were prioritised for the United States Navy’s Skyhawks rather than 
Argentina’s.  As a result, the A-4B Skyhawks were initially unable to perform their 
primary attack role.136  This would not be the last time that the Skyhawk capability 
would be limited due to the lack of logistical support.  Nevertheless, the issue was 
remedied and a further 16 refurbished A-4Bs, designated as A-4Q Skyhawks, were 
delivered to the Comando de Aviación Naval in 1971 and 1972 and formed Tercera 
Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque.137  Although normally operated from Base 
Aeronaval Commandante Espora, at Bahia Blanca, the A-4Q Skyhawks were also 
capable of being deployed from the sole Argentine aircraft carrier, ARA Veinticinco de 
Mayo.   
 
The last tranche of 25 refurbished A-4C Skyhawks were delivered to Argentina in 1976 
to create Grupo 4 de Caza of the IV Brigada Aérea based at Mendoza.138  The A-4C 
Skyhawks were superior to the A-4B Skyhawk variant as they incorporated ‘five 
weapon stations, in lieu of three, [a] better gunsight, and a somewhat more complete 
avionics fit.’139  However, by May 1982 attrition had reduced the now ageing and 
increasingly obsolete force down to 24 A-4B Skyhawks, 17 A-4C Skyhawks and 8 A-
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4Q Skyhawks.140  Indeed, the British assessment of the Argentine Skyhawks 
suggested that ‘despite the simplicity of the aircraft, the Argentines have been unable 
to maintain an adequate spares back-up with the result that half of the aircraft remain 
unserviceable; however, some of these could be pressed into service in a wartime 
situation.’141   
 
The Argentine A-4 Skyhawk force was limited to the use of ‘dumb’ free-fall weapons.  
The Comando de Aviación Naval Skyhawks exclusively used the American-built Mark-
82 500lb bomb.  In contrast, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina aircraft used the Explosivos 
Alaveses (Expal) 250-kilogramme bomb, either with conventional or parachute-
retarded tails, the latter for low-level weapons delivery.142  However, as of 11 May 
1982, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina Skyhawks were also cleared to use the larger British 
Mk 17 1000lb bomb, which was normally used by their Canberra force.143  Additionally, 
the Grupo 4 de Caza aircraft with their additional wing hard-points were cleared to use 
the Israeli-provided Shafrir 1 infra-red air-to-air missile, which was limited to a stern 
sector engagement due to its seeker sensitivity and similar in capability to the AIM-9G 
Sidewinder.144  Moreover, the three Skyhawk variants were scattered over three 
different operating bases for the majority of the campaign.  Consequently, from the 
outset of the campaign, their scarce logistics network was being stretched needlessly. 
 
In numerical terms, the second largest Argentine attack force was the Israel Aerospace 
Industry Dagger - a copy of the French-designed Mirage V.  The fighter-bomber was 
originally known as the Nesher during its brief operational career in the Middle East.  
However, the aircraft was re-named as the Dagger for the export market.  The Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina acquired 39 Daggers in 1978 with the last aircraft being delivered in 
February 1982.145  One observer suggested that the aircraft’s brief appearance in 
Israeli service ‘reflects its pedigree – a development design towards the definitive 
Kfir.’146  However, from an Argentine perspective the key advantage of the Dagger, and 
unlike the more numerous Skyhawk, was that it was not subjected to the problems of 
‘embargoed spare parts and shortages of operational equipment’ from the United 
States.147  Although in technically excellent condition the aircraft was new in service 
with ‘several pilots on strength with little experience of the new aircraft’ and austerely 
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equipped for its primary and secondary roles of air defence and ground attack.148 
However, the problem of using inexperienced pilots on South Atlantic operations was 
not unique to the Argentines.  Godden noted that ‘one pilot was only one-third of the 
way through his Sea Harrier training’ before being deployed to the South Atlantic.149  
The 37 remaining Daggers in service were integrated into two squadrons and formed 
Grupo 6 de Caza as part of VI Brigada Aérea at Tandil Air Base near Buenos Aires.150  
Following the invasion, the Daggers deployed south and operated from two separate 
locations: San Julian and Rio Grande.151   
 
The smallest fleet of air combat air assets available to the Argentines was the French-
built Dassault Super Etendard.  However, the aircraft, when paired with the Exocet 
anti-ship missile, was also the most potent as it was the sole precision attack weapon 
available to the Argentines.  The Comando de Aviación Naval ordered the aircraft in 
late 1979 to replace its ageing A-4Q Skyhawk fleet.152  The Argentines intended to form 
a ten-aircraft squadron, Segunda Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque based at Base 
Aeronaval Commandante Espora alongside the A-4Q Skyhawk squadron, with the 
remaining four aircraft to be held in reserve.153  However, the second batch of five 
aircraft and five missiles which were due to be delivered in April 1982 were curtailed 
when, following extensive British diplomatic pressure, the ‘French ceased all military 
related activities once hostilities broke out.’ 154  By this stage, the first five aircraft had 
been delivered in November 1981 along with five Exocet missiles but the latter were 
not yet integrated with the aircraft.155  While the Super Etendard pilots and support 
personnel trained in France between November 1980 and August 1981, the pilots had 
limited time on the aircraft and no tactical training on the use of the Exocet missile. 156  
Nevertheless, the French assessed the Argentine pilots to be good.157  Extensive 
British diplomatic pressure meant that as ‘spare parts for the [Super] Etendards were 
cut off by the NATO arms embargo, the [Comando de Aviación Naval] decided to hold 
one of the five fighters in reserve and use it for spares to support the remaining four 
aircraft.’158  The key question was whether a small, niche, but inexperienced force be 
able to find and strike the British operational centre of gravity using its modern, 
precision stand-off capability and tip the balance of the Conflict in Argentina’s favour? 
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Following a 1952 Canberra Goodwill Flight commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Dermot 
Boyle, the Argentines showed initial interest in procuring Canberra bombers in 1955.159  
However, the Argentine proposal caused significant debate in the United Kingdom.  
The Defence Sales Organisation suggested that ‘it is most unlikely that the Argentines 
contemplate the use of these aircraft against us in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.’160  In contrast, the Foreign Office highlighted that the ‘Canberra are 
pretty devastating weapons – and with their great range and bomb-load they are an 
even greater menace than an aircraft carrier – and they would greatly increase local 
Argentine military superiority over us in the Antarctic area.’161  Despite the concerns, 
twelve second-hand Canberras were eventually procured from the United Kingdom in 
the early 1970s.162  The Canberra procurement appears to be at odds with the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina mission of focussing on counter-insurgency activities and, perhaps, 
shows an attempt to procure a more balanced, rather than a niche, force.  However, 
and since 1947, the Argentines had always fielded a long-range attack capability in the 
guise of the Avro Lancaster and Lincoln bombers.163  Archive evidence suggests that 
British officials thought that Argentine interest in the Canberra may have reflected 
internal and external prestige needs; Argentina was keen to be seen as a leading state 
within Latin America and a mechanism for the government to keep favour with the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina.164   
 
In early 1982, the ten surviving Canberras were part of Grupo 2 de Bombardero, II 
Brigada Aérea and operating from Parana Air Base in the north of Argentina.165  
Although an aged platform, the key advantages that the Canberra had over its smaller 
and nimbler combat air brethren were its considerable range and ability to carry a 
significantly larger, albeit non-precision, payload.  Due to its extended range capability, 
the Canberra force was able to operate from a base located a considerable distance 
away from the operational area.  Therefore, and prior to the start of the Conflict, eight 
Canberras deployed to Trelew.166  Consequently, valuable ramp space was freed up at 
the forward operating bases closest to the Falkland Islands in order that the fuel-critical 
Daggers, Mirages, Super Etendards and Skyhawks could reach the Falkland Islands 
unassisted.  Nevertheless, concerns were raised about operating such a large, slow 
and obsolete aircraft against a sophisticated opponent.167  
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Building on the French influence that started with the procurement of the jet trainer and 
communications aircraft in the early Sixties, Argentina selected the French Mirage III 
as its new air defence fighter.  From 1972, the Mirage III force, Grupo 8 de Caza of VIII 
Brigada Aérea was based near Buenos Aires and deployed 12 of its 16 available 
aircraft in support of the Argentine operation.168  The assets retained at their home 
base of Mariano Moreno were used for alert duties in order to protect the mainland 
from a possible Vulcan strike against important strategic targets.169  Three aircraft were 
deployed to Comodoro Rivadavia in southern Argentina and were also used only for 
homeland defence.  The remaining nine fighters were based at Rio Gallegos and were 
used to support Falkland Island operations.170  Of note, the Mirage IIIEA variant used 
by the Argentines was not capable of conducting attack missions.  Consequently, the 
aircraft was employed solely in the control of the air role.  As the aircraft could not carry 
out strikes against the aircraft carriers, amphibious assault force or British land forces, 
the Mirage III sorties have been discounted from the analysis associated with missions 
launched against the various British operational centres of gravity. 
 
The North American Sabre, famed for its performance with the United States Air Force 
over MiG Alley during the Korean War, was in its twilight years of service with the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina.  The Argentines procured 28 second-hand F-86F Sabres with 
deliveries commencing in September 1960.171  However, two decades later only 11 
aircraft remained in service with Grupo 4 de Caza.172  Due to their limited utility in a 
modern war, the F-86 Sabres were not deployed during the Conflict, thus the F-86 
Sabre has not been included in this analysis. 
 
Of the three Argentine combat air assets deployed to the Falkland Islands, the most 
capable aircraft was the indigenously designed and built Fábrica Militar de Aviones 
Pucara.  The two-seat turboprop entered service with the Fuerza Aérea Argentina in 
the late 1970s and was employed in the counter-insurgency role.  In 1980, and in an 
effort to secure a contract for his company to supply the aircraft with upgraded machine 
guns, Douglas Bader, the former World War Two RAF fighter pilot, opined that the 
Pucara’s primary role would preclude its use if a Falkland Islands adventure were 
contemplated.173  In reality, the Pucara’s close air support capability as well as its 
ability to operate from rough, semi-prepared operating surfaces meant that the 
opposite was true.  Although 60 Pucaras had been built at the Fábrica Militar de 
Aviones plant at Cordoba, 35 aircraft were in active use or under overhaul on the 
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charge of Grupo 3 de Ataque at Reconquista.174  The remaining aircraft can be 
attributed to the export market, attrition, test and evaluation requirements or awaiting 
acceptance.  Grupo 3 de Ataque elected to deploy south and retained mainland 
operating bases in southern Argentina at Comodoro Rivadavia and Santa Cruz, which 
allowed for easier access to the Pucara contingent based on the Falkland Islands.175  
The Falkland Islands-based Pucaras, due to the lack of protection shelters, were left 
out in the open and subsequently suffered heavily during shelling by the Task Force, 
and from airfield attacks.  Moreover, the boggy Falkland Islands terrain proved 
troublesome for Pucara ground operations and a number of the fleet were damaged 
during take-off and landing incidents.176  With a limited logistical support capability 
forward deployed to the Falkland Islands, many of the damaged aircraft were unable to 
return to service.  Despite some notable performances, the Pucara missions have been 
removed from the analysis due to their limited outputs and effects on the British 
operational centres of gravity.177   
 
The Comando de Aviación Naval procured ten Aermacchi MB-339s that entered 
service over the period 1980-1981 and were operated by 1 Escuadrilla de Ataque at 
Base Aeronaval Punto Indio.178  The unit was dual-tasked both as a light attack and an 
advanced flying training unit and was still engaged in development work with the 
aircraft at the outbreak of the war.  Although capable of carrying 250 and 500lb bombs, 
there were concerns that the ‘aircraft’s unsophisticated bomb release mechanism was 
considered potentially dangerous.’179  As a result, the six Aermacchi MB-339s that 
were deployed to Stanley used machine gun pods and Zuni rockets as their default 
weapons during Falkland Island operations.180 Although an Aermacchi MB-339 was the 
first aircraft to find and attack the amphibious assault force on 21 May, the Aermacchi 
MB-339s limited effect has removed it from further consideration in this thesis.181 
 
The last and least capable combat air platform to consider is the Beech T-34 Mentor.  
The Comando de Aviación Naval had a fleet of fifteen aircraft, which were used for 
basic and intermediate pilot training and co-located with the Aermacchi MB-339 
squadron at Base Aeronaval Punto Indio.  Although initial plans called for the eleven 
serviceable aircraft to be deployed to the Falkland Islands, only four aircraft arrived at 
Pebble Island after the proposed operating base at Goose Green was deemed 
																																																								
174 Burden, The Air War, 95. 
175 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 103. 
176 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 45.	
177 A Pucara was responsible for the only Argentine air-to-air kill of the Conflict when it shot down a Scout helicopter on 
28 May.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 113. 
178 Burden, The Air War, 29. 
179 Ibid., 45. 
180 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 165. 
181 Burden, The Air War, 31. 
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inadequate.182  The aircraft were to be used in the counter-land role.  Consequently, 
the aircraft were lightly armed and capable of carrying machine gun pods as well as 
rocket launchers on four under-wing hard-points.183  However, the pilots had no 
previous weapons experience on the aircraft.184  Moreover, following the Special Air 
Service Raid at Pebble Island on 15 May, all four aircraft were destroyed.185  Therefore, 
the T-34 Mentor’s limited outputs and effects on the British operational centres of 
gravity have forced its elimination from the campaign analysis. 
 
Why and How? - Measuring the Outcome not the Output 
 
With the timeframe and the constituent parts of the various combat air capabilities 
established, the scale and success of their effectiveness in striking their opponent’s 
centres of gravity must be addressed.  Many historians and participants of the Conflict 
make some form of reference to the number of Argentine missions flown during the 
period of interest.186  Most narratives focus on the days of major aerial activity rather 
than take a more holistic perspective.  Alternatively, a number of articles focused solely 
on a specific aircraft type or squadrons activities during the Conflict.  In particular, 
many narratives are centred on the outputs of the unit involved such as missions flown, 
numbers of bombs dropped or percentage of aircraft arriving in the target area.  The 
data contained within a few reports resonated with those used in this thesis but they 
failed to analyse the data or demonstrated the process behind their generation.  
Consequently, there is no single document that measured the totality of the effect 
delivered across the panoply of air assets.  This thesis aims to fill that void by 
articulating the resources associated with missions: planned, that were subsequently 
launched, that successfully arrived in the target area, that penetrated the British 
defences, that were employed against the target and those that delivered the required 
effects against the various operational centres of gravity.  In order to measure the 
operational outcome, this case study has adopted a different measure of effect from 
the traditional output-based measure of using sortie rates.   
 
It is the contention here that the aircraft is merely the delivery platform and does not 
create the operational effect.  The required effect is usually produced by the success or 
otherwise of the weapon carried by the delivery platform.  Therefore, this thesis aims to 
articulate the journey of each air-to-ground weapon during the Conflict.  It is assumed 
that each weapon delivered the same level of effect.  While it is recognised that this 
																																																								
182 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 233. 
183 Burden, The Air War, 45. 
184 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 233. 
185 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 111. 
186 For example, Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 193. 
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approach is somewhat binary due to the fact that the four weapons used by the 
Argentines spans both precision weapons as well as different types and weights of 
‘dumb’ bomb.  Nevertheless, evidence from the Conflict suggested that there was only 
one case where the detonation of a weapon in the target vessel caused significant 
casualties but did not cause the destruction of the intended target.187  Therefore, and in 
addition to measuring the journey of each weapon, the thesis will explore the causal 
factors behind the success or failure of the delivery of the weapon.  The thesis 
deductions are supported by a series of annexes that show the detailed evidence and 
its source.  Where conflicting evidence occurs, and there are several cases where this 
happens, driven by different viewpoints of a tactical action, over zealous accounting, 
deliberate manipulation of the events or memory fade caused by the passing of time, 
the different viewpoints are articulated and arbitrated in the associated footnotes within 
each annex.  Likewise, on the rare occasion where there is no primary or secondary 
source data detailing the weapon load, the issue is highlighted.  Moreover, an assumed 
weapon load is used and explained in the footnotes.  The assumed weapon load is 
based on typical weapon loads carried by the aircraft type and its operating location.   
 
The net results of the analysis, shown in the various annexes, provide a unique insight 
and deliver an, as yet unseen, perspective of the Falklands Conflict as well as 
providing a compelling argument for the operation’s outcomes.  With the methodology 
for the thesis now articulated, the following chapter reviews the opening moves of both 
sides' combat air power during the Falklands Conflict. 
																																																								
187 On 13 June, a ground-launched Exocet struck HMS Glamorgan.  Although damaged and with the loss of 13 sailors, 










‘Vulcan aircraft refuelled by Victor tankers attacked the Port Stanley airfield during the 
night.  Subsequently at dawn Sea Harriers carried out further attacks.  Both operations 
were successful.  All aircraft and personnel involved have now returned.  There are no 
casualties.’ 
 
Ministry of Defence Press Statement, 
1 May.2  
 
The British gambit in the early hours of 1 May heralded a new phase in the South 
Atlantic campaign.  However, this was not the Argentines’ first experience of the Avro 
Vulcan.  The initial Vulcan attack on Stanley airport also coincided with the 24th 
anniversary of a twin Vulcan flypast over Buenos Aires as part of the inauguration 
ceremony for the newly elected Argentine President, Doctor Arturo Frondisi.3  Two 
years later, two Vulcans from 101 Squadron, the same unit that would go on to conduct 
the Black Buck 1 raid, also participated in a multi-national flypast over Buenos Aires to 
mark the 150th anniversary of Argentine independence.4 The symbolism of Black Buck, 
and the possible threat presented by the Vulcan, were not lost on the Argentine 
government. 
 
With the arrival of the British naval force off the Falkland Islands, and following a 
successful repossession of South Georgia during Operation Paraquet, any hope of a 
diplomatic solution between the two nations had dwindled rapidly.  However, the British 
Task Force poised off the Falkland Islands, at that time, lacked the key military 
elements in sufficient scale to seize and hold the vital ground of Stanley.  On 1 May, 
the British amphibious force that contained the required assets to achieve the 
recapture of the Falkland Islands was located in the vicinity of Ascension Island and 
scheduled to arrive off the Falklands on 16 May.5  The initial British force was therefore 
																																																								
1 Trans: ‘baptism of fire.’ 
2 TNA, PREM 19/623. Relations with Argentina Position of the Falkland Islands, 1982. 
3 TNA, AIR 27/2799.  No 83 Squadron: Operations Record Book. With appendices. 
4 TNA, AIR 27/2807.  No 101 Squadron: Operations Record Book. 
5 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 118; The amphibious force’s departure from Ascension Island was 




required to blockade the 200-mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands.  
By enforcing the blockade the British aimed to achieve control of the air and sea in 
order to reduce the risk to an amphibious assault.6 
 
The attacks on the airfields at Stanley and Goose Green were merely the signal of the 
start of the military campaign ‘to repossess the Falkland Islands as quickly as 
possible.’7  Neither the Vulcan nor the subsequent Sea Harrier raids were intended to 
be a decisive, campaign-winning move.  The British motive for the attacks was to 
generate an early and decisive battle for control of the air and remove the numerical 
advantage of Argentine air power.8  Nevertheless, the Argentines had a choice of 
where and when they contested their battles.  The Argentine options ranged from 
aggressive counterattacks, or deliberately avoiding a battle of attrition and simply 
preserving and concentrating their assets in order to strike where, as Clausewitz 
described, the opposition ‘mass [was] concentrated most densely’ - the critical 
amphibious assault.9  The Argentine response in their first military campaign, their 
bautismo de feugo, would determine the outcome of the first phase of the Conflict.    
 
The Argentine response was accurately assessed by the British planners in their 
outline concept of air operations for the repossession of the Falkland Islands.  In the 
document, it was suggested that the Argentines would ‘in the short term, maintain the 
recce [reconnaissance] effort and to nibble at the UK TF [Task Force] while maintaining 
attack and fighter aircraft for committal at the most opportune moment most probably 
as the landing commences.  This course will include attempts to identify a relatively 
soft target, for example a resupply ship, with a view to a disruptive pre-landing attack.’10  
This chapter articulates the key British and Argentine combat air participants; identifies 
the British operational centre of gravity; Argentine and British combat air outputs; the 
level of Argentine success achieved during their attack against the British operational 





6 Control of the air is defined as freedom, over a given period of time, to use a volume of airspace for our own purposes 
while, if necessary, denying or constraining its use by an opponent.  United Kingdom.  UK Air and Space Doctrine, 3-3.  
Sea control is defined as the condition that exists when there is freedom of action to use an area of the sea for one’s 
own purpose for a period of time, and if necessary, deny its use to an opponent.  United Kingdom.  Ministry of Defence.  
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10: British Maritime Doctrine.  (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre, 2011), 2-10. 
7 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 118.  Prior to 12 May, the British military aim was rather ambiguous, ‘prepare to 
land with a view to repossessing the Falkland Islands.’ Admiral Sir John Woodward, in “The Falklands War’, seminar 
held 5 June 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British History, 2005, http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witnness/falklands,), 49.	
8 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 435.	
9 Clausewitz, On War, 485-486.	
10 TNA, DEFE 58/258.  HQ 11 Group: Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict); operations / training aspects. 
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The Key Participants of the Bautismo de Fuego  
 
Argentine Combat Air Participants.  Despite gaining knowledge of his fellow Junta 
leaders’ plans for Operation Azul/Rosario, the Argentine invasion of the Falkland 
Islands, in late December 1981, Brigadier General Lami Dozo was able to conceal 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina preparations for the upcoming operation.11  For example, up 
until 6 April British technicians, working for Marconi Avionics and installing Dagger 
modifications at the Rio Cuarto air base, ‘had not seen any indication in the 
maintenance unit concerning preparation for conflict.’12  Grupo 4 de Caza deployed five 
A-4C Skyhawks, as part of a routine exercise - Operativo Gélido II, at Rio Gallegos in 
southern Argentina during the period of the invasion.13  However, the unit and the other 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina combat air assets played no direct part in the invasion of the 
Falkland Islands.  The remainder of April was a frantic period for the eclectic mix of 
Argentine combat air assets as they prepared, trained and deployed their fleets of 
aircraft from the various bases around Buenos Aires and northern Argentina to the 
austere forward operating bases approximately 1200 nautical miles away in Patagonia.  
The scale of the initial deployment reflected the capacity at the forward operating 
bases and the difficulties in generating the full complement of aircraft due to the limited 
spares pool as well as knowledge of recently acquired aircraft such as the Super 














Rivas14 14 12 8 12 11 8 4 
Freedman15 24 8 6 18 14 12 5 
Ethell & Price16 26 16 9 76 5 
Hobson17 19 8 7 12 12 8 4 
Burden18 24 8 6 18 14 8 4 
 
Table 3A – Argentine Order of Battle as at 1 May. 
 
Analysis of the array of secondary sources highlighted, as shown in Table 3A, that 
there is a debate regarding the number of deployed Argentine combat air assets on 1 
May.  Although most commentators simply state the figures, Rivas provides additional 
																																																								
11 J. Burns, The Land That Lost Its Heroes.  (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 130. 
12 TNA, FCO 7/4087.  Armed forces of Argentina. 
13 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 118. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 286. 
16 The figures appear to reflect the total fleet size rather than the deployed force.  Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 20. 
17 Hobson, Falklands Air War. 
18	Burden, The Air War, 21, 34 and 39.	
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detail by identifying the airframe movements on a daily basis.  Rivas has created a 
clear audit trail for the vast majority of Argentine combat air movements and progress 
throughout the campaign, thus his figures are used as the baseline for the Argentine 
combat air order of battle during the Conflict. 
 
The reality is that the figures also reflected that the deployed force size ebbed and 
flowed throughout the campaign as aircraft deemed unserviceable at the start of the 
campaign became available and deployed south, while some were lost in combat while 
other aircraft were returned to their home units to undergo battle damage repair.  The 
key benefit of the Argentine strategy was that they were able to replace their losses 
and maintain their deployed force size in order to meet the expected amphibious 
assault by the British.  Consequently, there was a steady flow of air traffic between 
north and south Argentina.  The implications of the continuous flow of aircraft could be 
misinterpreted as aircraft being removed from the South Atlantic operating area in 
order to defend key elements of national infrastructure.  This would become one of the 
enduring myths of the campaign, not helped by the British Air Commander who 
believed that the Vulcan raids caused ‘the Argentines to withdraw their Mirage III 
aircraft back to Buenos Aires to defend the capital against a perceived attack.’19   
 
While this was an exaggeration, in reality the Argentines retained a small cadre of 
Mirage III and Dagger aircraft at their home bases near Buenos Aires throughout the 
campaign in order to mitigate against such a British attack.20  Nevertheless, the 
Argentines had a finite resource of aircraft and the implications of running out of 
available assets would have a detrimental effect during the latter stages of the 
campaign. 
 
Once fielded in southern Argentina, the various combat air units conducted some form 
of joint training, albeit with limited success. 21  For example, and contrary to its agreed 
concept of operations, Fuerza Area Argentina A-4B Skyhawks practiced anti-shipping 
attacks with unguided bombs, colloquially known as ‘dumb’ bombs (in contrast to 
guided, ‘smart’ weapons).  However, the ship was beached, unable to manoeuvre 
defensively and not firing back at its attackers – a very different prospect to what the 
Argentine pilots would face in the coming weeks.22  Daggers planned sweep, escort 
and attack training missions alongside their naval counterparts but they failed to find 
																																																								
19 TNA, DEFE 58/262.  HQ 18 Group: Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict); lessons learned. 
20 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 165 and 206.	
21	Hobson, Falklands Air War, 40.	
22 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 132. 
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the designated targets or suffered from aircraft serviceability issues.23  If the Argentines 
could have developed these nascent training missions into successful attack sorties 
during the Conflict then the massed raids would have proven problematic for the British 
fleet to deal with effectively.   
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Combat Air Dispositions as at 1 May. 
 
As part of their training programme prior to the Conflict, several Argentine combat air 
sorties were flown over the Falklands.24  However, these familiarisation missions 
appear to have been planned on an ad hoc basis and designed for morale and 
propaganda purposes rather than as mandated area familiarisation sorties, which 
would have been of greater value.  Therefore, only a few pilots had the opportunity to 
become acquainted with the terrain and operational procedures.  There is little 
available evidence to support the view that there were Argentine plans to use the 
Stanley airport for fast jet operations.  Ethell and Price suggest that the Super Etendard 
force looked at using Stanley airport but discovered that in a war-fighting configuration 
the aircraft could land and take off from the diminutive airfield in dry, but not wet, 
conditions.25  The Argentines were widely criticised following the Conflict for not 
attempting to extend the runway at Stanley airport and therefore make it available to 
their range-limited combat air assets.  The lack of up-to-date intelligence on the 
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resources based at Stanley airport meant that the British would be forced into 
constantly attacking the airfield at Stanley for the duration of Operation Corporate. 
 
The basing of Argentine aircraft in southern Argentina appears to be have been on a 
first-come, first-served basis and centred on Service and unit lines rather than the 
logistical challenges that the aircraft faced.  For example, the Dagger and Mirage III 
forces were both divided between two bases, whereas the A-4 Skyhawks were 
distributed over three bases.26  Although the logic for the Mirage III basing reflected its 
dual tasking of protecting the deployed Fuerza Aérea Argentina headquarters at 
Comodoro Rivadavia as well as meeting the demands of conducting escort missions 
over the Falkland Islands, the rationale behind the division of the attack units is less 
clear.  As a result, the limited spares pool, bespoke to type weapons as well as 
engineering experience would have to be shared across the airfields of southern 
Argentina.  The incoherent fielding plan degraded the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Argentine combat air assets.  This was a missed opportunity by the Argentines to 
concentrate and sustain their force and was ultimately a poor application of one of the 
key principles of war.27  Nevertheless, and based on Rivas’ figures, Figure 3.1 shows 
the disposition of British and Argentine combat air assets as of 1 May. 
 
British Combat Air Participants.  On 1 May, the deployed Sea Harrier units were 
limited to a force of 20 aircraft with no prospect of an uplift in aircraft and pilot numbers 
until the arrival of 809 Naval Air Squadron on board MV Atlantic Conveyor on 18 May.  
Therefore, the force had to conduct the first phase of Operation Corporate within its 
current resource.  There was considerable angst that the outnumbered Sea Harrier 
force could lose a significant number of aircraft in the heavily anticipated battle for 
control of the air.  Nevertheless, and unlike their Harrier GR3 and 809 Naval Air 
Squadron counterparts, the aircraft carrier-embarked Sea Harriers had the luxury of 
conducting training flying during their passage south thus enabling them to hone their 
air defence and attack skills.  Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer, a RAF officer serving on 
801 Naval Air Squadron, commented that during the passage south ‘we trained a lot, 
planned attacks on various targets like vessels and airfields.  We dropped a few bombs 
and did lots of intercept work.’28  The latter skill set would be critical in achieving the 
desired level of control of the air prior to the amphibious assault.  The task should have 
unified the Sea Harrier community.  However, there appeared to be a disparity in how 
																																																								
26 The A-4Q Skyhawk force disembarked from ARA Veinticinco de Mayo to join its Comando de Aviación Naval 
counterparts at Rio Grande on 9 May.  Burden, The Air War, 20. 
27 The contemporary Principles of War are stated in United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence.  Joint Defence Publication 0-
01: UK Defence Doctrine.  (Shrivenham: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2014), 30. 
28 M. Bilton and P. Kominsky, Speaking Out (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989), 91. 
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each aircraft carrier was planning and conducting Sea Harrier operations.29  As a 
result, and prior to the start of combat operations, there was a level of friction that 
existed between both aircraft carriers with little opportunity or desire to harmonise their 
outputs and tactical procedures.  Complicating the issue further was the debate within 
the Ministry of Defence of how to make best use of the Sea Harrier.  Some suggested 
that the Sea Harrier should focus on the defensive counter air role.  However, other 
commentators claimed that this was too narrow a perspective.  For example, the Chief 
of the Air Staff, Sir Michael Beetham, was an advocate of offensive counter air 
operations and ‘expressed his frustration at the Royal Navy’s planned use of the Sea 
Harrier or, indeed, the apparent lack of any air plan.’30  
 
On 1 May, the Harrier GR3s of 1 (Fighter) Squadron were still located at their home 
base of RAF Wittering.  However, the groundcrew deployed that day to Ascension 
Island via RAF Brize Norton while the aircraft started their deployment to Ascension 
Island the following day.31  Following the arrival of MV Atlantic Conveyor at Ascension 
Island on 5 May, the Harriers flew onto the converted MV Atlantic Conveyor on 6 May 
in calm conditions.  Nevertheless, Wing Commander Squire noted that ‘most pilots 
approached their first VL (vertical landing) onto a deck with some apprehension.’32  The 
Harrier GR3s were not the sole occupants of the MV Atlantic Conveyor; they would be 
joined on the journey south by the eight Sea Harriers of the newly-commissioned 809 
Naval Air Squadron as well as four Chinook and six Wessex helicopters.33  After a 12-
day transit, four of the six Harriers were flown from MV Atlantic Conveyor to HMS 
Hermes on 18 May, a mere two days prior to the start of Operation Sutton, with pilots 
who were unfamiliar with aircraft carrier operations.34  The remaining two aircraft joined 
their compatriots over the following two days.35  Ultimately, the Harrier GR3s would not 
take an active participation in the first of the three phases of the operation to repossess 
the Falkland Islands.  However, significant activity had taken place in order to plan, 
prepare, deploy and sustain the force. 
 
Unlike the much smaller Sea Harrier force that deployed en-masse, the larger Harrier 
GR3 community was not fully committed to the Falklands Conflict.  Although 1 (Fighter) 
Squadron was earmarked as the lead Harrier GR3 squadron for Operation Corporate, 
it was not a full squadron deployment.  Nevertheless, the deployment still had 
ramifications across the whole Harrier community.  The two remaining operational 
																																																								
29 Ward, Sea Harrier, 179. 
30 P. Jacobs, Staying the Distance.  (London: Frontline Books, 2011), 235. 
31 TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Burden, The Air War, 224 and 387. 
34 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 1. 
35 RAF Historical Society, Journal 30, 180. 
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Harrier GR3 squadrons, 3 (Fighter) and 4 Squadron, were based at RAF Gutersloh in 
West Germany.  Both squadrons maintained their normal routine wherever possible in 
support of their main effort – NATO operations in Central Europe.  Consequently, the 
Harrier GR3 squadrons participated in the four-week Tactical Leadership Programme 
in West Germany and Exercise Maple Flag 9, a major multi-national exercise in 
Canada, conducted the critical NATO Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) assessment, 
practiced field deployments and sent two pilots on a significant post-graduate training 
programme – the Harrier Qualified Weapons Instructor course.36  Moreover, the Harrier 
GR3 detachment conducting a deterrent role in Belize was unaffected during Operation 
Corporate.37 
 
Nevertheless, the RAF Germany Harrier squadrons and the Harrier Operational 
Conversion Unit, located alongside 1 (Fighter) Squadron at RAF Wittering, provided 
extra pilots and aircraft to support the 1 (Fighter) Squadron deployment.38  Also, the 
RAF Germany Harrier squadrons provided pilots with previous air defence experience 
to rapidly convert to the Sea Harrier.39  Additionally, 4 Squadron deployed three pilots 
to Ascension Island over the period 17 - 26 May in order to provide a limited air 
defence capability.40  The Harrier GR3s were replaced in the Ascension Island air 
defence role on 26 May by Phantom FGR2s of 29 (Fighter) Squadron.41  April and May 
were an exceptionally busy period for the Harrier GR3 force as it prepared for its own 
baptism of fire but it demonstrated that the Harrier force had sufficient resilience and 
depth to meet both its long-term enduring and short-term emerging tasks.  
 
Defining The British Operational Centre of Gravity during the Bautismo de Fuego  
 
With the combat air capability stipulated for both sides at the start of the military 
confrontation, consideration must be given to the targets that the Argentines needed to 
strike in order to achieve a decisive military victory.  Argentine intelligence gathering 
assets allowed the timing and composition of the British fleet to be ascertained.  
Argentine merchant vessels, including the Rio de la Plata, passed within four miles of 
																																																								
36 Due to Operation Corporate, 1 (Fighter) Squadron participation in Exercise Maple Flag 9 was cancelled following its 
deployment to Canada.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; Although 3 (Fighter) Squadron did partake in Exercise Maple 
Flag, 4 Squadron only completed the work-up phase and did not deploy.  TNA, AIR 27/3527.  No 3 (Fighter) Squadron) 
and TNA, AIR 27/3528.  No 4 Squadron; The squadron commander, Wing Commander Holland, was killed in a flying 
accident during one of these practice field deployments in early June 1982.  Ibid. 
37 Marston, Harrier Boys Volume One, 76. 
38 TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
39 Both RAF Germany Harrier squadrons provided two pilots each to convert to the Sea Harrier.  3 (Fighter) Squadron 
pilots, Flight Lieutenants Brown and Leeming, were selected on 19 April and both deployed with 809 Naval Air 
Squadron on board MV Atlantic Conveyor.  TNA, AIR 27/3527.  3 Squadron.  In contrast, the 4 Squadron pilots, 
Squadron Leader Thomas and Flight Lieutenant Gibbons, were selected on 2 June for conversion to the Sea Harrier.  
TNA, AIR 27/3528.  4 Squadron.	
40 TNA, AIR 27/3527.  3 Squadron. 
41 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 93.	
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Ascension Island over the period 25 – 27 April.42  Additionally, Argentine Air Force 
Boeing 707s shadowed the British ships as they sailed south from Ascension Island 
towards the Falkland Islands.  The initial Boeing 707 reconnaissance missions were 
conducted over the period 21 - 25 April and made regular contact with both aircraft 
carriers and between six and eight escorts.43  As a result of the Boeing 707 missions, 
the Argentines should have had a good understanding of the British force composition 
and capabilities.  However, there appears to be some confusion amongst Argentine 
commentators regarding the British intentions on 1 May.  For example, Moro believed 
that the Argentines repelled several British attempts at a direct landing against 
Stanley.44  However, Table 3B below shows the constituent parts of the British Task 
Force 317 as it sat poised off the Falkland Islands.  Of note, the Task Force had 
sufficient resource to deal with the repossession of South Georgia against an Argentine 
occupying force of 137 personnel.  However, the initial British maritime force was not 
configured to repossess the Falkland Islands where 13 000 Argentine soldiers, sailors 
and airmen were ensconced.45  The British Task Force of aircraft carriers, destroyers 
and frigates as well as Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels was constructed to deliver sea 
control and control of the air as its primary outputs.  Moreover, the British force did not 
contain the required amphibious assault ships and troops to project a ground force 
ashore.  Task Force 317 would not be bolstered until the arrival of the amphibious 
force on 18 May, which included six Landing Ship Logistics as well as both Landing 
Platform Docks.46  Additionally, the British force had yet to secure control of the air or 
sea control.  To conduct all three activities concurrently would have been an ambitious 
and fraught affair and contrary to prudent doctrine.  Therefore, Moro’s claims regarding 
repelling the landings on 1 May are flawed.  
 
Aircraft  
Carriers Destroyers Frigates 
Royal Fleet 
Auxiliaries 
HMS Hermes HMS Glasgow HMS Alacrity RFA Resource 
HMS Invincible HMS Coventry HMS Arrow RFA Olmeda 
 HMS Sheffield HMS Plymouth  
 HMS Glamorgan HMS Yarmouth  
  HMS Broadsword  
  HMS Brilliant  
 
Table 3B – British Task Force 317 as at 1 May.47 
 
																																																								
42 K.L. Privratsky, Logistics in the Falkland Islands.  (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2014), 78. 
43 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 59. 
44 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 113. 
45 Privratsky, Logistics in Falklands War, 83; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 564. 
46 The six Landing Ship Logistic comprised: RFAs Sir Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percivale, Sir Galahad, Sir Tristram and 
Sir Bedivere; The Landing Platform Docks were HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 42. 
47 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 42.	
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Task Force 317 was assigned to enable the amphibious assault not to conduct it.  In 
order to do so, they had approximately three weeks in which to deliver the required 
levels of control of the air and sea control prior to the amphibious assault.  Of the 14 
vessels deployed, and as shown in Table 3B, the key vessels were the two aircraft 
carriers.  Each carrier had an embarked force of Sea Harriers and Sea King anti-
submarine warfare helicopters.  Both assets would be key to the delivery of the control 
of the air and sea control task.  However, they were not the sole means of delivering 
and enabling sea control and control of the air.   
 
Developing a timely and accurate assessment of what was happening in the air around 
the operating area was essential if the limited number of British aircraft were to be used 
efficiently to deliver control of the air.  The previous generation of British aircraft 
carriers had their own organic airborne early warning capability in the guise of the 
Fairey Gannet.  The new generation of aircraft carriers, designed to operate Sea 
Harriers and helicopters had no means of launching or recovering conventional take-off 
and landing carrier aircraft such as the Gannet; even had some improvised solution 
been found for the larger HMS Hermes to operate Gannets, this would have been at 
the cost of a number of Sea Harriers.  
 
The task of providing a localised air picture for the Task Force fell predominantly to the 
three Type 42 destroyers (HMS Glasgow, Cardiff and Sheffield).  The destroyers’ 
surveillance radars were able to produce a credible situational awareness picture.  
When coupled with the destroyers’ long-range Sea Dart surface-to-air missile 
capability, the ships’ radar could, in theory, deliver a potent level of control of the air for 
the British Task Force.  However, the limited number of sea-based surveillance radars 
could not provide the comprehensive wide area air picture that an airborne early 
warning asset could deliver.  As the destroyers’ radar was based on the host ship, 
rather than thousands of feet in the air, its ability to produce a long-range, low-level 
detection capability was curtailed by the curvature of the earth.  As a result, the sea-
based radar’s line of sight was limited.  Moreover, the Type 42s’ radar also had a 
limited over-land detection capability.  The technical shortcomings had operational 
consequences.48  In order to maximise detection range and reaction time, the Type 42 
destroyers were forced to conduct their air surveillance task closer to the threat than 
perhaps was prudent.  As a result, the Type 42 destroyers were vulnerable and at an 
increased risk to attack from Argentine air power, in particular the Exocet-armed Super 
Etendards.  Moreover, the Argentine Navy had also procured two Type 42 destroyers.49  
																																																								
48 D. Hart-Dyke, Four Weeks in May.  (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), 147. 
49 ARA Hercules and ARA Santisima Trinidad.  Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 148. 
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Therefore, the newly acquired Argentine Super Etendards had practiced attack 
missions against their own Type 42 destroyers and knew how to avoid the Type 42 
destroyer’s strengths and exploit its weaknesses.50 
 
Although the Type 42 destroyers provided the critical outer layer of defence with its 
Sea Dart long-range, surface-to-air missile capability, each of the frigates and the 
remaining destroyer had its own self-protection capability that would aid the control of 
the air task.51  However, the older vessels were armed with first generation surface-to-
air missiles that were of questionable utility.  Nevertheless, the most capable frigates 
were the two modern Type 22 ships armed with the short-range Sea Wolf surface-to-air 
missile.52  The Type 22 frigates were held in such high regard that they were 
predominantly tasked as the aircraft carriers’ ‘personal bodyguards’ during the early 
stages of the Conflict.  However, close protection of the aircraft carriers was not the 
Type 22 frigates’ sole task during the campaign, they would also work in combination 
with the Type 42 destroyers as well as act as the personal protection for the 
amphibious assault force.   
 
The Type 22 Frigate was designed from the outset, not as an air defence asset but as 
a specialist anti-submarine warfare vessel.  Consequently, the loss of a Type 22 frigate 
would have had an impact across the spectrum of operations in the run-up to the 
amphibious assault.  In contrast, the Amazon-Class Type 21 frigates, HMS Alacrity and 
HMS Arrow, were designed as relatively cheap, general-purpose escort vessels.  
However, they were armed with the increasingly obsolete Sea Cat surface-to-air 
missile.  The Type 21 frigate’s utility was in its ability to exploit its multi-role capabilities.  
As a result, the Type 21 frigates became increasingly used in the naval gunfire support 
role that saw them support a number of operations throughout the campaign and put 
them in harm’s way on a number of occasions. 
 
In order to sustain the fleet at sea, the two Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships were utilised to 
provide a Fleet Oiler and Fleet Replenishment capabilities.53  Both vessels conducted 
multiple replenishment at sea tasks each day and exploited their embarked helicopters 
to ferry stores in order to keep the deployed British fleet topped up with fuel, stores and 
weapons throughout the campaign.54   
 
																																																								
50 Burden, The Air War, 34. 
51 The aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was also armed with the Sea Dart surface-to-air missile. 
52 HMS Broadsword and Brilliant. 
53 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 774. 
54 Johnson-Allen, Without Us, 214. 
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Building on the narrative of the component parts of the British Task Force 317, Table 
3C presents the hypothesis that the British operational centre of gravity prior to 
Operation Sutton was the aircraft carriers.  The corresponding boxes, containing the 
critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities, breaks down the centre of 
gravity’s supporting elements into their constituent parts.  Prior to the amphibious 
assault, it was critical that the British enabled and protected their critical vulnerabilities.  
In contrast, how effective would Argentine air power be at striking these targets?   
 
Centre of Gravity 
 
 




1.   The ability to enforce blockade. 
2.   The ability to contest control of the air. 
3.   The ability to establish sea control. 
4.   The ability to endure in location. 
Critical Vulnerabilities 
 
1.1.1.  Robust and timely communication links. 
1.1.2   A clear chain of command. 
2.1.1.  Limited number and capability of Sea 
Harriers. 
2.1.2   Maritime Force Air Defence limitations. 
2.2.1   Lack of Airborne Early Warning. 
2.2.2   Type 42 Destroyers in Picket Role. 
2.3.1.  Robust and timely communication links. 
3.1.1  Sufficient Anti-Surface and Anti-
Submarine Warfare helicopters. 
3.1.2  Sufficient Anti-Surface and Anti-
Submarine Warfare Frigates. 
3.1.3  Sufficient Anti-Surface and Anti-
Submarine Warfare submarines. 
3.2.1  Lack of persistent intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance capability. 
4.1.1  Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships. 




1.1.  Effective command and control.   
2.1.  A high-readiness and capable air 
defence force. 
2.2.  A robust Recognised Air Picture 
2.3.  Effective Command and Control. 
3.1.  A high-readiness and capable Anti-
Surface and Anti-Submarine Warfare force. 
3.2.  A robust Recognised Surface Picture. 
4.1  The need to replenish frequently. 
 
Table 3C – British Operational Centre of Gravity prior to Operation Sutton. 
 
The change of the operational centre of gravity as Operation Sutton was initiated is not 
a reflection on the diminished importance of control of the air, or for that matter sea 
control.  Controlling both the sea and air environments were enduring campaign 
requirements but their demotion reflects that their relative importance reduced the 
closer the British forces got to their desired end-state.  For example, the dwindling 
importance of the aircraft carriers is reflected in that their traditional bodyguards, both 
Type 22 frigates, were used to protect the amphibious force during its transit into the 
amphibious operating area around San Carlos during the critical amphibious assault.55  
Indeed, HMS Invincible was also used in the initial stages of Operation Sutton to 
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protect the transit of the amphibious assault force with her long-range Sea Dart 
surface-to-air missile capability.56  
 
Both aircraft carriers were critical to the enabling phase of Operation Corporate. 
Although they remained important throughout the campaign, their relative importance 
to the success of the British campaign reduced as the campaign reached its latter 
stages.  Nevertheless, would the Argentines comprehend the importance of the aircraft 
carrier during the initial stages of the Conflict and target it appropriately?  Equally 
important, would the Argentines understand the changing British priorities as the 
campaign matured and adapt their targeting accordingly? 
 
Bautismo de Fuego Outcomes 
 
The opening air attacks of the campaign on 1 May as well as the loss of ARA General 
Belgrano on 2 May and the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield two days later created 
global headlines.  However, these tactical events are rarely put into the wider context 
of the phase or the Conflict.  By way of example, there were a number of less well-
known events during the first weeks of the Conflict that generated cumulative effect 
and pressure on both participants.  As a result, the operational outcome is, perhaps, 
less well understood.  For example, on 12 May, another of the Type 42 destroyers, 
HMS Glasgow, was forced to withdraw from the campaign after it was damaged by an 
unexploded bomb.57  Although the operational impact of losing HMS Glasgow was the 
equivalent of losing HMS Sheffield, the event did not generate the same level of global 
media interest as the ship remained afloat and the only casualty on board HMS 
Glasgow was one man who suffered from shock.58  Nevertheless, the net result was 
that a single Type 42 destroyer, HMS Coventry, was left to fill the role once filled by 
three air defence ships.  Fortunately, the British had resilience in their force structure 
and two further Type 42 destroyers, HMS Cardiff and HMS Exeter, as well as the 
bespoke Type 82 destroyer HMS Bristol were en-route to the South Atlantic.  However, 
the replacement destroyers would not arrive in theatre until after the initial amphibious 
assault, on 22 and 26 May respectively.59  To exacerbate the situation further three, or 
15 per cent, of the Sea Harrier force were lost in the first week of the campaign.  One 
aircraft was lost to ground fire during an airfield attack at Goose Green on 4 May and a 
further two Sea Harriers were lost in what appeared to be a mid-air collision on 6 
May.60  More importantly, all three pilots were killed and the constant operational 
burden would have to be shared amongst the remaining cadre of Sea Harrier pilots.  
																																																								
56 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 133. 
57 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 135. 
58 TNA, PREM 19/647.  Handling of the Falklands. 
59 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 473 and 57. 
60	Hobson, Falklands Air War, 56; Ward, Sea Harrier, 224.	
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As a result, and with only minimal activity from the Argentines, gaps were starting to 
appear in the British ability to deliver control of the air.   
 
From an Argentine air power perspective, they lost a number of aircraft during the first 
three weeks of combat operations, including six A-4 Skyhawks, two Mirage IIIs, a 
Dagger and a Canberra as well as expending 40 per cent of their precious Exocet 
stockpile.  However, what had Argentine air power achieved in order to compensate for 
its material losses.  More importantly, did the Argentine activities impact on the British 
centre of gravity or its opposition’s desire to achieve an effective blockade prior to the 
inevitable amphibious assault? 
 
Although the key events on the major days of air operations are well documented, the 
quality and depth of reporting on the scale, participants, role and the success of 
Argentine air power during its bautismo de fuego is more varied.  As shown in Annex 
A, the Argentine combat air assets flew a total of 130 missions over the period 1 – 19 
May, an average of fewer than seven sorties per day.  However, the daily sortie rate 
was sporadic, with just less than half of the total missions for the 19-day phase being 
flown on 1 May.  The Argentine outputs were significantly less than those anticipated 
by the British who expected the Argentines to generate 60 per cent aircraft 
serviceability for their fighter aircraft during the Conflict, deliver three sorties per day 
per airframe and up to 150 missions per day.61  In mitigation, and as shown in Annex A, 
the weather did have a detrimental impact on Argentine air operations.  Over the period 
2 – 11 May, the daily weather was assessed to be poor at either the southern 
Argentine airfields or over the Falkland Islands.  Consequently, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Argentine outputs were inconsistent during this period.  However, in the 
week prior to the British amphibious assault, the Argentines only flew a total of six 
combat air sorties despite the weather being assessed as poor only on the afternoons 
of 18 and 19 May.  Therefore, it can be deduced that the Argentines were preserving 
its combat air capability in order to counter the inevitable amphibious assault.  
However, was this a prudent measure or a missed opportunity to apply greater 
pressure on the British Task Force given the damage inflicted upon the control of the 
air capability? 
 
In order to assess the success, or otherwise, of the Argentine combat air capability, it is 
important to understand the number of attack missions planned and executed during 
the lead up to the amphibious assault.  However, the actual number of missions 
																																																								
61 TNA, DEFE 58/273.  Actions against UK Forces. 
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planned and flown by the Argentines on the first day of battle is unclear.  Freedman, 
Burden as well as Ethell and Price suggest that 56 missions were planned comprising 
16 A-4B Skyhawks, 12 A-4C Skyhawks, 6 Canberras, 12 Daggers as well as 10 Mirage 
III sorties.62  In contrast, Cordesman states that ‘54 attack sorties out of 72 sorties were 
flown against the task force.’63  Complicating the issue even further is the Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina website which suggests that 58 sorties were launched on 1 May.64  However, 
each narrative focused solely on the activities of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina and 
omitted the activities of its sister Service – the Comando de Aviación Naval.  Moreover, 
and beyond the activities of 1 May, few commentators discuss the Argentine flying 
activities prior to the start of Operation Sutton in any depth.   
 
Rivas provides a more comprehensive picture for Argentine combat air activity on 1 
May.  Analysis of his work, the basis for the data contained within Annexes A, C and D, 
shows that there were 64 combat air sorties planned by the Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
and the Comando de Aviación Naval on 1 May.  However, only 60 missions were 
launched successfully from the Argentine mainland.65  Of the 60 missions flown, 32 
were allocated to attack missions and the remaining 28 to control of the air tasks.  
Therefore, and as shown in Figure 3.2 below, it can be deduced that Argentine combat 
air was apportioned 53 per cent towards attack and 47 per cent to control of the air 
tasks.  Rivas’ figures contradict Cordesman’s view that the weighting was significantly 
biased towards the attack role.  The disparity between Rivas’ and Cordesman’s 
position may be attributed to the fact that, unusually, several Daggers, A-4C and A-4Q 
Skyhawks were allocated to control of the air missions on 1 May.  Post the initial 
action, the number of Argentine aircraft that conducted control of the air missions 
rapidly dwindled to such an extent that between 7 May and the start of Operation 
Sutton no control of the air missions were flown over the Falkland Islands.  The 
Daggers and A-4 Skyhawks became dedicated attack platforms and control of the air 
missions became the sole responsibility of the Mirage III force.  However, after a 
disappointing debut on 1 May, where two Mirage IIIs were destroyed as a 
consequence of a Sea Harrier engagement, the Mirage III subsequently played a minor 
role during the Conflict even when it returned to operations on 21 May.66  The Mirage 
III’s failure to influence the campaign and compete against the Sea Harriers for control 
of the air was due, in part, to their inability to remain in the operating area.  The 
																																																								
62 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 286; Burden, The Air War, 21 and Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 72. 
63 Cordesman, Volume 3, 253. 
64 Argentine Air Force Website,  “Air Operations 1 May 1982.”  http://www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may01.html 
(accessed 5 January 2015). 
65 By combining the total planned missions contained within Annexes C and D it can be ascertained that 64 mainland 
combat air missions were planned for 1 May.  However, analysis of Annex A shows that 60 missions were launched 
successfully.  The difference between the two figures reflects the ground aborts by two Daggers and two cancelled 
Super Etendard sorties. 
66 See Annex J Serials 1 and 2 for further details. 
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Mirage’s limited endurance was compromised further by its inability to conduct air-to-air 




Figure 3.2 – Argentine Combat Air Apportionment during Operation Corporate.67 
 
As mentioned previously, there is a misconception that following the initial raids 
Argentine Mirage III aircraft withdrew from operations in order to protect Buenos Aires 
from a potential Vulcan raid.68  However, Rivas alluded to an event that may be the 
causal factor for the misunderstanding and the generation of one of the enduring myths 
of the Falklands Conflict.  On the evening of 29 April, A-4C Skyhawk and Dagger 
aircraft were rapidly scrambled from their San Julian deployed operating base and flew 
north relocating to Comodoro Rivadavia in order to protect the aircraft after a radar 
contact was seen approaching the airfield. 69  The scare was a false alarm and the 
aircraft returned in time to respond to the British air raids on 1 May.70   
 
In contrast to Freedman’s information which simply stated that 35 of the combat air 
missions arrived in the vicinity of the target area, the break down of Argentine combat 
air resource between attack and control of the air missions provided the ability to 
clearly analyse the success, or otherwise, of the attack or control of the air missions.71   
Moreover, and as shown in Figure 3.2, the apportionment between attack and control 
of the air changed as the campaign matured.  By increasing their focus on the attack 
mission to the detriment of control of the air without establishing the required level of 
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60 Combat Air Sorties Flown 
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air superiority was a critical mistake.  As the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s former mentor, 
Adolf Galland, suggested, ‘to use a fighter-bomber when the strength of the fighter arm 
is inadequate to achieve air superiority is putting the cart before the horse.’72  
Ultimately, the lack of Argentine investment in gaining an ability to achieve control of 
the air handed a gratis advantage to the British that the Argentines struggled to recover 
from. 
 
The British would not achieve their desired air superiority prior to Operation Sutton.  
However, it was not for the lack of trying.  In contrast to its Argentine counterparts, and 
as shown at Annex B, the much smaller Sea Harrier force flew 386 sorties over the 
same period, an average of over twenty sorties per day and a near 300 per cent 
increase in outputs when compared with its Argentine counterparts.  Granted, the 
British assets operated much closer to the combat area than their opponents, which 
allowed reduced transit times and aircraft to be re-generated for subsequent missions 
significantly quicker.  However, the Sea Harriers without the benefit of airborne early 
warning, air-to-air refuelling or a forward operating base had limited situational 
awareness, endurance and time on task.73  Therefore, the small Sea Harrier pilot cadre 
spent a considerable number of hours either on patrol, transiting to and from the 
carriers or sat in their cockpits on alert.  As a result, the HMS Hermes-based pilots flew 
an average of 57 operational missions each during the 45-day period of the 
deployment.74  On 801 Naval Air Squadron, Ward informed his Commander that most 
of his pilots had ‘60 war missions under their belt.’75  However, it appears that Ward 
overstated his Squadron’s performance.  In his post-Conflict report to the Captain of 
HMS Invincible, Ward stated that the original and surviving pilots of 801 Naval Air 
Squadron flew an average of 53.25 operational missions during the Conflict, only Ward 
flew 60 missions.76  Nevertheless, with each mission lasting over an hour, the pilots 
were flying at over twice the rate envisaged when the capability was procured – 225 
hours per annum.77  Moreover, the airborne time does not include the mental and 
physical demands of sitting hours on end in the Sea Harrier cockpit conducting quick 
reaction alert duty.  Consequently, the cumulative effect of their efforts started to take a 
toll on the pilots and accounted for a number of aircrew errors that started to creep into 
later air operations.  For example, one senior pilot inadvertently released an AIM-9L 
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Sidewinder instead of dropping a bomb.78  Although the previous incident was 
embarrassing, it was not fatal.  However, Ward suggested that fatigue was ‘a definite 
contributory factor’ for the death of another pilot on 23 May on his thirtieth operational 
mission.79  The demise of an invaluable aircraft and its experienced pilot after crashing 
into the sea immediately after a night carrier launch vividly demonstrated the 
consequences of having insufficient pilots.  Reflecting on the campaign, the Captain of 
HMS Invincible suggested that ‘in this type of operation a ratio of no less than 1.5 
aircrew to aircraft is the minimum required to sustain efficiency.  1.75 to 1 would have 
been ideal.’80  801 Naval Air Squadron was initially manned at a ratio of 1.375 to 1.81  
As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, the Argentines were at the other end of the 
experience/fatigue spectrum. 
 
As the campaign progressed, the lack of airborne early warning and the reduction in 
the Type 42 destroyer fleet would be mitigated, to a certain extent, by non-traditional 
methods.  For example, the use of Chilean air traffic control radars at Punta Arenas 
provided timely information of Argentine assets launching from their bases in southern 
Argentina.82  Additionally, and as part of Operation Fingent, a British Type 95 radar and 
personnel were deployed in May to the Chilean airfield at Balmaceda, located on the 
Argentine border and 180 nautical miles west of Comodoro Rivadavia, to provide 
additional radar coverage.83  Moreover, British special forces and submarines operating 
around Argentine coastal airfields provided a similar detection and warning capability.84  
With the scale of operations undertaken by both participants now understood, it is now 
time to understand how effective Argentine attack missions were and the causal factors 
behind the relative success of these missions. 
 
Analysing the Outcomes of the Bautismo de Fuego  
 
As shown in Figure 3.3 below, the data contained within Annex C shows that of the 93 
weapons that were planned to be used during the Argentine attack sorties on 1 May 
not one was employed against (never mind strike, detonate or sink) the British 
operational centre of gravity – the aircraft carriers.  Moreover, although a few of the 
fourteen ships that made up Task Force 317 were attacked, not one British ship was hit 
by an Argentine bomb during the raids of 1 May.  Nevertheless, not all commentators 
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82 S. Edwards, My Secret Falklands War.  (Sussex:  Book Guild Publishing, 2014), 41. 
83 TNA, AIR 20/13102.  Operation Fingent. 
84 E. Southby-Tailyour, Exocet Falklands. (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2014), 88; Freedman, Official History 
Volume 2, 611. 
84 
 
agreed with this position.  For example, Juan Carlos Sapolski, a Dagger squadron 
commander, asserted that ‘the English pilots shunned combat’ and ‘after getting back 
to base, we agreed that it was almost easy.  There was no resistance, we dropped our 
ordnance without any problem.’85  Furthermore, Moro suggested that, specifically, a 
British Type 42 destroyer was heavily damaged during the naval action on 1 May.86  
The British version of events highlighted that there were no Type 42 destroyers 
involved in the action of 1 May.  The Argentine mis-identification of HMS Glamorgan for 
a Type 42 destroyer is perhaps unsurprising given the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s lack 
of exposure to the maritime environment.  This would not be the last time that this 
issue would occur during the Conflict. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.3 below, the 1 May raids started well for the Argentines with most 
of the planned Argentine weapons successfully launched from the mainland.  Only two 
of the planned 93 weapons failed to get airborne from the Argentine airfields.  During 
the transit to the Falkland Islands, the number of weapons reduced further to 83, which 
equated to 89 per cent of those planned and 91 per cent of those weapons that 
managed to get airborne.  However, breaching the British defences caused a 
significant reduction in capability with only 23 weapons successfully avoiding the 
layered defences (equating to 25 per cent of those bombs that were launched 
successfully and 28 per cent of the weapons that reached the Islands).  In the target 
area, only six weapons were employed (6 per cent of the planned weapons and 7 per 
cent of those launched from the mainland) and targeted against HMS Glamorgan, HMS 
Alacrity and HMS Arrow.87  Although the bombs registered a few near misses, and 
contrary to some Argentine claims, the bombs failed to hit any of the British ships.88  
 
The analysis of Argentine combat air activities on 1 May would suggest that it was a 
dismal performance.  When coupled with the loss of four aircraft, the lack of a tangible 
return from the attack missions was disappointing.  Freedman described the Argentine 
response as ‘inadequate.’89  However, Moro claims that the Argentine performance on 
1 May was ‘a great victory.’90  Nevertheless, the analysis shown here tells a stark story 
- the Argentine aircraft allocated to control of the air missions jettisoned more of their 
external fuel tanks than their attack aircraft counterparts dropped bombs on 1 May.91  
 
																																																								
85 TNA, AIR 20/13030.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Argentine combat reports. 
86 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 112. 
87 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 287. 
88 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 106. 
89 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 286. 
90 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 116. 





Figure 3.3 – The Utility of Argentine Weapons on 1 May. 
 
The results of the 1 May attacks would infer that the British perception that Argentine 
pilots were ‘professional, proficient and pretty gutsy when it comes to flying and fighting 
the aircraft, prepared to take risks’ was not necessarily the case.92  From a British 
perspective, the initial analysis is more gratifying.  Of the 83 bombs that arrived over 
the Falkland Islands, only 23 weapons eluded British defences.  The Sea Harrier 
deserves much of the credit as 32 of the 93 Argentine weapons failed to reach their 
target due to the mere presence of Sea Harrier combat air patrols with a further four 
weapons failing to reach their intended targets due to the loss of a Canberra to the Sea 
Harrier/AIM-9L Sidewinder combination.  However, although dominant in protecting the 
British ships on 1 May, would the Sea Harrier be able to deliver the same level of 
performance for the remainder of the phase and throughout the campaign? 
Endeavouring to answer these questions by merely looking at the activities of 1 May in 
isolation is flawed.  Although 1 May was the most active day of the opening phase of 
Operation Corporate, it could be argued that any deductions drawn from these events 
will be distorted as they do not demonstrate how the Argentines adapted following an 
inauspicious start.   
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Figure 3.4 – The Utility of Argentine Weapons over the period 1 - 19 May. 
 
As a result, Figure 3.4 above, and derived from data contained within Annexes C and 
E, shows the complete Argentine attack picture over the period 1 - 19 May.  During the 
period of activity prior to Operation Sutton, the Argentines managed to launch an 
impressive 204 out of the planned 206 weapons (or 99 per cent).  During the transit to 
the Falkland Islands, the number of weapons reduced to 170, which equates to 83 per 
cent of those planned and those weapons that managed to get airborne (a reduction of 
seven per cent and eight per cent respectively when compared with the same activities 
on 1 May).  The diminished performance, albeit small, driven by increasingly 
unserviceable aircraft was a potentially worrying trend that would have to be monitored 
as the campaign progressed.  Nevertheless, 107 weapons managed to breach the 
British defences (equating to 52 per cent, a significant increase on the 25 per cent 
figure attributed to 1 May activities, of those bombs that were launched successfully 
and 63 per cent of the weapons that reached the Islands).  In the target area, 15 
weapons were employed against the fleet (seven per cent of the weapons planned, 
seven per cent of the bombs that managed to get airborne, these figures are 
comparable with similar activities on 1 May) with only two hitting the target (less than 
one per cent of those planned and 13 per cent of those dropped).  Table 3D below 
breaks down the journey of each Argentine weapon even further by articulating the 
causal factors, and their relative importance, behind the success or failure of the 
weapon.  As a result, 13 causes can be identified and quantified.   




206 Weapons Planned 
Weapons Airborne 
Weapons Reach Islands 
Weapons Employed Against UK Fleet 
Weapons Hit Targets 
107 Weapons Breach Defences 
1 Weapons Detonates 
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The top five causal factors will now be reviewed in order to understand the activities, or 
lack of, that influenced their impact on the first few weeks of the Falklands campaign.  
The most significant causal factor, and by a considerable margin, is the fact that 
Argentine attack sorties failed to drop their weapons.  This is not a statement on 
weapon serviceability but reflected the Argentine inability to find and attack one of the 
fourteen vessels that made up Task Force 317.  The inefficient use of 45 per cent of 
the weapons was a result of the lack of effective Argentine intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance platforms.  The Argentines did have a limited number of maritime 
patrol aircraft.  However, only two P-2 Neptune remained airworthy at the start of the 
Conflict.  Moreover, both aircraft were withdrawn from operational use on 15 May due 
to reliability issues as well as concerns over its vulnerability and obsolete status in a 
modern battle.93  Five S-2E Trackers were subsequently transferred from the now 
redundant aircraft carrier, ARA Vienticinco de Mayo, to Rio Grande in an endeavour to 
mitigate the capability gap but they were found to be unsuitable to support attack 
missions, in particular Super Etendard missions.94  Another problem to contend with 
was that both the P-2 Neptune and S-2E Trackers were owned, and operated by, and 
trained exclusively with the other assets from the Comando de Aviación Naval in 
accordance with the national doctrine that determined responsibility for sea warfare 
rested solely with naval forces.  Consequently, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina, who 
owned the majority of the attack platforms, had limited opportunity to integrate with the 
Comando de Aviación Naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.  
As the campaign progressed this aspect would be mitigated to a certain extent and will 
be covered in the next chapter.  Nevertheless, Argentine reconnaissance and attack 
assets were unable to discern which target was being attacked.  As a result, the 
Argentine ability to strike the British aircraft carriers was down to a matter of luck rather 
than diligent planning and execution. 
 
Although the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms were the key 
mechanism to cue attack platforms onto their prey, they were not the sole mechanism.   
A few Argentine platforms had their own on board sensors such as the Agave radar on 
the Super Etendard.  Although the capability of the Agave radar was fully exploited in 
the Exocet attacks of 4, 25 and 30 May, Super Etendards needed intelligence from an 
external source in order to know where to look and enable a covert low-level approach 
in order to maximise the surprise of their attack.  Without such a cue, the success of 
the attack was likely to be limited as was the case on 23 May when a pair of Super 
																																																								




Etendards launched but were unable to find the British fleet.95  Moreover, even when 
they could find a target the Super Etendard’s radar could not discern what type of 
vessel it was about to attack.   
 
Ranking Causal Factor 
Scale 
(out of 206) 
Percentage 
1 Weapons not dropped 90 44 
2 Sea Harrier – Soft Kill96 32 16 
3 Mission Cancelled 24 12 
4 Serviceability – Air Abort 22 11 
5 Weapon Employment – Missed Target 13 6 
6 Maritime Force Air Defence – Soft Kill 12 5 
7 Crashed before dropping Weapon97 2 <1 
8 Sea Harrier – Hard Kill98 4 2 
=9 Serviceability - Ground Abort 2 <1 
=9 Target Mis-Identified 2 <1 
=11 Weapon Employment – Unexploded Bomb 1 <1 
=11 Maritime Force Air Defence – Hard Kill 1 <1 
=11 Successful – Hit and Detonates 1 <1 
 Total 206 100 
 
Table 3D – Causal Factors for Failure to Deliver Weapons during 1 - 19 May. 
 
Consequently, poor doctrine, inadequate equipment, a lack of joint approach to the air 
war and an inappropriate balance of air power roles were all drivers in the Argentines’ 
inability to drop weapons on the British Task Force during the opening weeks of the 
Falklands Conflict.  However, and although it was the main cause, it was not their only 
deficit. 
 
The second most relevant factor is the Sea Harrier’s ability to deter the attacking force.  
Accounting for 16 per cent, the Sea Harrier’s ‘soft kill’ capability is still some way short 
of the 44 per cent of the main causal factor.  Nevertheless, was the outcome a 
																																																								
95 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 245.   
96 A ‘soft kill’ occurred when, due to air defence action, the attacking aircraft jettisoned its weapons and was forced to 
return to base without completing its mission.   
97 Not included in these figures are the three attack aircraft that were shot down after dropping their weapons.  On 12 
May, three A-4B Skyhawks were lost in two separate attacks on HMS Glasgow.  A Sea Wolf missile fired by HMS 
Brilliant destroyed one aircraft, another flew into the sea in an attempt to evade another missile and Argentine air 
defences at Goose Green shot down the last aircraft.  Hobson, Falklands, 65-66. 
98	A ‘hard kill’ occurred when the air defences successfully engaged and shot down the attacking aircraft.	
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measure of a successful Sea Harrier defence or a reflection of an inexperienced force 
that gave its opposition too much respect?  Alternatively, did the Argentines 
deliberately adopt a low-risk approach in order to preserve their force for easier or 
more critical missions in the future?  The latter point is at odds with the commonly held 
view that ‘Argentine pilots earned the respect of their enemies and most of the world 
with their skill and bravery.’99  Therefore, the former rather than the latter point is a 
more likely conclusion.  This view is reinforced when the figures are analysed further.  
For example, the evidence proved that Sea Harrier was highly successful and 
influential during its activities on 1 May.  However, that level of success is not 
sustained over the period 1 - 19 May.  As a result, it can be seen that the Sea Harrier 
had limited influence on Argentine combat air power over the period 2 - 19 May.  This 
assessment is at odds with the popular perception that the Sea Harrier was dominant 
throughout the campaign.  In mitigation, Argentine activity levels were low during the 
latter stages of the opening phase of the campaign.  However, one day of successful 
activity does not assure campaign success but it can create the genesis of a myth and 
an enduring legacy. 
 
The third most influential factor reflects the 12 per cent of missions that were planned 
but cancelled.  On 3 May, two flights of four A-4B Skyhawks were tasked with an anti-
shipping mission.  However, en-route to the target area it was discovered that the ships 
were actually Argentine and the mission was subsequently cancelled.100  Once again 
the lack of an effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability had 
hindered Argentine air power.  Compounding the factor further is that the aircraft, due 
to their limited range, are unlikely to be capable of being re-tasked onto another target, 
even if one was identified. 
 
The fourth most influential causal factor to contend with is the number of air aborts, 
accounting for 11 per cent of the total weapons planned during the phase.  Factors 
influencing air aborts included technical failures of the attack aircraft themselves or with 
their enabling asset.  Highlighting limited exposure or experience in the task, some 
attack assets struggled to complete air-to-air refuelling successfully.  On another 
mission, a fuel leak on board the KC-130 Hercules air-to-air refuelling aircraft 
compromised the mission.101  Another area of concern was that attack aircraft were 
misidentified by their controlling agency as control of the air assets and vectored 
																																																								
99 B.W. Watson and P.M. Dunn, Military Lessons of the Falklands War – Views from the United States (London: Arms 
and Armour Press), 38. 
100 Ibid., 133.  
101 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 243. 
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towards a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.102  With insufficient range and endurance to 
return to their original anti-shipping mission, the pilots were forced to abort their 
mission.  The attack missions were reliant on their enablers to achieve mission 
success.  However, and as demonstrated by the number of air aborts, the enablers can 
also become a significant constraint if they are unavailable or if the attack pilots have 
limited exposure to their utility. 
 
The last of the causal factors that will be reviewed reflects the six per cent of bombs 
that were dropped, but missed, their intended target.  Other than the Super Etendard 
with its Exocet missile, the remaining Argentine combat air aircraft were constrained to 
non-precision attacks through the use of ‘dumb’ bombs.  As a result, Argentine attack 
aircraft mitigated their lack of precision by dropping multiple weapons in a single attack 
against a single target in order to increase their probability of success.  Although an 
inefficient use of its weapon stockpile, it was a practical solution to the Argentine’s lack 
of precision.  Indeed, a British Defence Intelligence assessment of Argentine air power 
was broadly accurate when it stated that ‘aircraft delivering free fall bombs are likely to 
achieve less than a five per cent chance of achieving major damage against the range 
of ships deployed.’103  The lack of precision during attack missions was not solely 
constrained to the Argentines.  During the Black Buck missions against Port Stanley 
airfield, the Vulcan conducted its bombing run thirty degrees off the runway heading in 
order to maximise the chances of successfully hitting the runway.  Even with a bomb 
load of 21 weapons, the probability of dropping a single bomb on the runway was 90 
per cent with a 75 per cent probability of hitting the runway twice.104   
So what did the Argentine air activities achieve prior to Operation Sutton?  The initial 
surge of activity on 1 May was described by Burden as ‘a bad day for the [Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina] in virtually all respects with none of the combat units having achieved 
any significant success but suffering losses and, in certain cases, some considerable 
embarrassment.’105  Although Argentine combat air activity for the remainder of the 
phase could be described, at best, as moderate it did achieve some notable success 
despite the best endeavours of the South Atlantic weather systems to hinder its 
progress.  However, the lack of effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
meant that Argentine forces were unable to neither find nor strike the British 




102 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 182. 
103 TNA, AIR 8/3109. Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): air intelligence and assessments. 
104 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 281. 
105 And, arguably, the Comando de Aviación Naval; Burden, The Air War, 117. 
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The subsequent, but infrequent, harassing raids had an impact on the British fleet.  The 
loss of two of their three Type 42 destroyers was a significant blow.  However, it could 
be argued that the British ships were merely the first vessels that the attacking aircraft 
found rather than being specifically targeted to negate the British control of the air 
capabilities.  Frustrating the British planners further was that although the Sea Harrier 
was very effective on 1 May, its ability to influence the campaign in the weeks prior to 
the amphibious assault was extremely limited.  However, the Sea Harrier’s impact was 
not a self-induced limitation but driven by the Argentine refusal to conduct the decisive 
air battle prior to an amphibious assault that the British desired.  By preserving their 
force and waiting to contest the important amphibious assault, Argentine air 
commanders not only bought themselves time to think and plan for future operations 
but they could create much angst and apply significant pressure upon British planners 
at all levels. 
 
In contrast to their Fuerza Aérea Argentina and Comando de Aviación Naval 
counterparts, the maritime surface fleet became a fleet-in-being in the run-up to 
Operation Sutton.  Chastened by the loss of ARA General Belgrano on 2 May, the 
Argentine Navy avoided direct confrontation with the British fleet and elected to remain 
in littoral waters for the remainder of the Conflict.  As a result, de facto sea control was 
yielded to the Royal Navy with minimal effort.  At the strategic level, the removal of his 
key force elements from the Conflict suggested that the commander-in-chief of the 
Argentine Navy, and the most hawkish member of the Junta when it came to the 
Falkland Islands issue Admiral Jorge Anaya, was thinking long term and ensuring he 
remained prominent in the post-Conflict power struggle.  Operationally, the implications 
were that the Falklands garrison would have to be sustained using air power alone.  
Despite the air embargo, Argentine transport aircraft including C-130 Hercules, Fokker 
F-28 Fellowships and Lockheed Electras flew 45 sorties, predominantly at night, to 
provide 470 tons of supplies and over 500 passengers into the Falkland Island garrison 
while returning over 300 personnel back to the mainland.106  These re-supply missions 
would be conducted up to and including the last night of the Conflict.107  However, and 
although the air transport cargo and passenger numbers vary marginally between 
commentators, it is apparent that the level of resupply was insufficient to maintain the 
garrison in the longer term.108  Brigadier General Mario Menendez, the Argentine 
																																																								
106 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 137.	
107 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 208. 
108 O’Connell’s and Rivas’ figures are broadly similar to those stated by Hobson.  O’Connell suggested that 435 tonnes 
of cargo were flown into the Islands with 264 wounded evacuated.  J.F. O’Connell, The Effectiveness of Air Power in the 
Twentieth Century, Part 3 (1945-2000) (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2006), 120.  In contrast, Rivas suggested that the C-130 
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Governor of the Falkland Islands estimated that his garrison’s daily requirement to be 
17 tonnes of food and 9.5 tonnes of fuel.109  Ultimately, Argentine air transport only 
delivered ‘41 per cent of the requirement.’110  With the Austral winter fast approaching, 
the British simply could not wait for the blockade to take full effect and starve the 
Argentine garrison into submission.   
 
In many respects, the military activities of the first three weeks of May in the South 
Atlantic were a phoney war, merely a series of opening moves prior to the arrival of the 
key players that would determine the outcome of the Conflict.  Despite the Argentine 
swing towards attack missions to the detriment of contesting control of the air, neither 
side won the opening round outright.  Both participants were blooded and damaged 
but, critically, both had survived in sufficient strength to contest the critical phase of the 
campaign – Operation Sutton and the amphibious assault. 
 
																																																								












‘Perhaps the most important task of a commander is to identify and strike 
appropriate enemy centres of gravity.’ 
 
Colonel John A. Warden III, 
United States Air Force.1 
 
Warden’s observation demonstrated the seemingly simple task confronted by 
Argentine air power during Operation Sutton.  Facing them was a fleeting opportunity 
to mass its husbanded combat air power and strike the British operational centre of 
gravity.  The amphibious force was confined to a defined fleet of ships in a 
concentrated space, advancing slowly to a point that would represent its closest point 
of approach to the South American mainland.  In order to exploit this opportunity, and 
given the ambivalent approach taken by its army and maritime counterparts, Argentine 
air power had to find and strike the enemy with the full force of its air power 
capabilities.  In order to articulate the effectiveness of Argentine air power against the 
amphibious force, it is important to understand the condition of both air power 
protagonists as they approached the critical phase of the campaign.  Additionally, the 
timeframe of the operation will be clarified as well as identifying the vessels and their 
cargo that constituted the British amphibious force.  The net result of this analysis is a 
deeper and auditable understanding of the causal factors that affected the Argentine 
air power response to the British landings. 
 
The Key Participants of Operation Sutton 
 
Although the embarked Sea Harrier force had dwindled from its original 20 aircraft to 
17 aircraft including the loss of all three pilots, the embarked combat air power of the 
British fleet was rejuvenated and reached its peak prior to the start of Operation 
Sutton.2  The arrival of MV Atlantic Conveyor on 18 May allowed the Sea Harrier force 
																																																								
1 Warden, Air Campaign, 7. 
2 The force also lost the use of a fourth Sea Harrier pilot during the first phase of the campaign.  Flight Lieutenant 
Penfold was removed from operations after being deeply affected following his Dagger engagement on 1 May.  Morgan, 
Hostile Skies, 182.  
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to be bolstered by a further eight aircraft.3  The aircraft from the hastily re-formed 809 
Naval Air Squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Tim Gedge, were split 
equally between the two aircraft carriers and integrated into the existing Sea Harrier 
squadron structures.4  In addition to the new aircraft, a new tranche of Sea Harrier 
pilots also joined the force thus creating a total of thirty-four Sea Harrier pilots, with the 
majority, twenty-one, embarked on board HMS Hermes.5  However, the new cadre of 
Sea Harrier pilots had a mixed experience level.  Although some of the pilots had 
previous Sea Harrier or embarked air operations experience, few were fully qualified on 
type as they had been drawn from exchange tours, staff appointments or rapidly 
converted from Harrier GR3 units.  Consequently, the increase in manpower was 
exacerbated further by the fact that there was no opportunity to fly during the long 
transit south.  Indeed, one rapidly converted RAF pilot, Flight Lieutenant Steve Brown, 
nearly crashed his Sea Harrier during the take-off from MV Atlantic Conveyor prior to 
transferring the aircraft to one of the aircraft carriers.6   
 
Also on board the MV Atlantic Conveyor were the six Harrier GR3s and eight pilots of 1 
(Fighter) Squadron.7  The Harrier GR3s, unlike 809 Naval Air Squadron, remained a 
formed unit on board HMS Hermes.  Initially planned as an attrition replacement for the 
Sea Harrier in the air defence role, the Harrier reverted to its traditional attack role due 
to fewer Sea Harrier losses than anticipated.  However, the integration and tasking of 
the Harrier GR3s in conducting the attack role caused enduring friction throughout the 
campaign between the unit and its embarked command chain.8  Although the 1 
(Fighter) Squadron pilots were experienced on the Harrier GR3, their exposure to 
maritime operations was extremely limited.  Again, and in a similar vein to the 
additional Sea Harriers, the operational benefit of the extra Harrier GR3s had to be 
offset with an increased operating risk.   
 
The Sea Harriers and Harrier GR3s would be protecting and supporting the British 
operational centre of gravity, the amphibious force, during the landing phase of 
Operation Corporate.  Following its hasty assembly in the United Kingdom, the 
amphibious force departed Ascension Island on 7 May to join the Task Force.9  
Throughout the journey, frantic efforts were made to ensure that the ships were loaded 
																																																								
3 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 71-72. 
4 Ward, Sea Harrier, 255. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 34. 
7 Ibid., 23.	
8 Air Historical Branch, CTTO/26/2/Ops.  Tactical Lessons. 
9 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 95. 
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correctly.  Even so, when the amphibious force joined the carrier battle group on 18 
May, the transfer of manpower and equipment had not been completed.10  
 
Nevertheless, the British operational centre of gravity for Operation Sutton had arrived 
off the Falkland Islands.  The British military objectives for Operation Sutton were 
stipulated in Operation Order 3/82 and released on 12 May by Admiral Sir John 
Fieldhouse.11  The instructions to the military commanders were ‘to repossess the 
Falkland Islands as quickly as possible.’12  However, as a precursor to the amphibious 
assault, local sea control and air superiority had to be achieved before the main 
amphibious assault was carried out.  If unsuccessful, the initial landings would have to 
be conducted at night.  The relative lack of activity by the Argentine combat air assets 
during the first few weeks of the Conflict meant that the required level of control of the 
air could not be guaranteed during the landings.  However, the mitigation plan to offset 
any control of the air deficit reflected the fact that the Argentines had an extremely 
limited night attack capability.13  Consequently, the ability to conduct the initial assault 
during the hours of darkness was a subtle mitigation factor that is missed by most 
commentators.  Nevertheless, British politicians and senior military officials were 
understandably uncomfortable with the prospects of conducting a week-long 
amphibious assault without an assured level of control of the air.   
 
During the War Cabinet meeting on 18 May, the Service Chiefs were unified in their 
views.14  Along with his fellow Service Chiefs, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham 
‘was in full support of an immediate landing.’15  However, and along with the 
Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Frank Cooper, Beetham was concerned about the 
‘weakness of the air defence of our ships.’16  Moreover, Beetham acknowledged the 
risk that the Argentine air force had not been neutralised and losses could be 
expected.17  His naval counterpart, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, was also worried about 
the lack of air superiority but judged it to be an acceptable risk.18  Fieldhouse had also 
previously expressed concerns regarding ‘the limitations of the Sea Harrier in air 
combat at low levels.’19  Nevertheless, time was pressing.  Applying further pressure to 
the situation was the rapidly approaching austral winter and the embarked amphibious 
assault force that had already spent two weeks at sea with minimal training 
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15 Jacobs, Stay The Distance, 242. 
16 TNA, PREM 19/647.  Handling of the Falklands. 
17 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 457. 
18 Ibid. 
19 TNA, PREM 19/647.  Handling of the Falklands. 
96 
 
opportunities.  Consequently, at 1145 on 18 May, ‘the authority to execute Operation 
Sutton was given by the Chief of Defence Staff.’20  
 
With their land forces fixed in static defences around the vital ground of Stanley and 
the fleet confined to territorial waters, air power was the sole mechanism available to 
the Argentines to counter the British amphibious assault.  The ambivalent attitude of 
the Argentine maritime and land components during the amphibious assault was in 
sharp contrast to that of the Argentine air services.  Indeed, Margaret Thatcher 
commented that ‘enthusiasm for a fight turned out to be in inverse proportion to fighting 
spirit.’21  This lack of coherency between the Argentine armed forces did not augur well 
for joint operations in the next and key phase of the campaign.  The importance of the 
impending phase would be reflected in the level of effort expended by the Argentines.  
Indeed, and as shown at Annex A, the Argentine combat air response to the landings 
on 21 May produced its highest number of sorties for a single day during the whole 
campaign.  However, could the Argentines turn their outputs into the desired 
outcomes?   
 
Attack on Landing Platforms and troops 
Troop Transports 
Active Air Defence against aircraft and helicopters 
Aerial coverage of air transport aircraft 
Attack beachhead and/or columns of troops 
 
Table 4A – Fuerza Aérea Argentina Combat Air Priorities.22 
 
The Fuerza Aérea Argentina had planned its response to a potential British amphibious 
assault and articulated its aims and priorities for the use of its combat air assets as part 
of Operation Plan 2/82 – Mantenimiento de la Soberania as early as 7 April.23  Moro 
suggested that the document stated that the priority targets were the landing craft and 
troops on the beach with troop transports as a secondary priority.24  As an alternative, 
and where intelligence on the location of targets was lacking, formation leaders were 
given a broad initiative to select targets as they appeared.25  However, as shown in 
Table 4A, Operation Plan 2/82 actually stipulated five combat air priorities.  Although 
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Moro identified the first two elements, he failed to capture both control of the air 
requirements, the need to attack the beachhead area as well as troops breaking out 
from the landing area. 
 
The effectiveness of the Operation Plan 2/82 would not only be in its thorough 
dissemination but also the level of understanding by those executing the Operation 
Plan over a month later.  However, as will be seen later, the Comando de Aviación 
Naval adopted its own unique targeting priorities that bore little similarity with those 




Figure 4.1 - Combat Air Participants at the start of Operation Sutton. 
 
Analysis of Rivas’ work suggests that rather than reducing their combat air footprint in 
southern Argentina post the initial air battles, the Argentines were able to increase the 
number of their deployed combat air assets.  By comparing Figure 4.1 and its 
equivalent in the previous chapter, it can be seen that despite the loss of seven aircraft 
and aircrew, Argentine combat air capability in southern Argentina increased from 70 to 
at least 73 aircraft.26  The reason for the slow build-up and increase in capability was 
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the time taken to bring long-term unserviceable aircraft up to operational readiness and 
deploy them to the airfields in southern Argentina.  The net result was that Argentine 
air power had survived its bautismo de fuego, increased its force size, achieved some 
success and frustrated British plans due to its inability to achieve the desired levels of 
control of the air and sea control prior to Operation Sutton and all generated with 
relatively minor levels of effort.    
 
Defining The British Operational Centre of Gravity during Operation Sutton 
 
With the entry standards to Operation Sutton of both participants now understood, the 
next stage is to appreciate the constituent parts of the British operational centre of 
gravity during Operation Sutton – the amphibious force.  The critical capabilities and 
critical vulnerabilities incorporated within Table 4B below have been developed from 
Professor Strange’s reviews of the United States Marine Corps Pacific Island 
campaigns during World War Two.27  Additionally, contemporary British amphibious 
doctrine and applied military judgement have been utilised in order to create a British 
operational centre of gravity analysis for Operation Sutton.28 
 
Comparison of Table 4B with the Argentine Operational Plan 2/82 highlights that three 
of the most important critical requirements have been captured by the primary and 
secondary target sets – troops, landing craft and troop ships.  However, it could be 
argued that the Argentine plan contained a superficial level of analysis as well as 
ambiguous direction and guidance to the tacticians that had to implement the plan. 
 
With the British operational centre of gravity for Operation Sutton now outlined, it was 
now in the hands of the Argentine military to find and attack the British fleet that, if 
successful, would significantly contribute to the outcome of the Falklands Conflict.  In 
order to quantify how effective the Argentines were in their quest, there is a need to 
ascertain the vessels that constituted the amphibious force and their precious cargo.  
The British operational centre of gravity during Operation Sutton constituted a fleet of 
12 ships, as shown in Table 4C.29  The amphibious force was escorted by seven Royal 
Navy destroyers and frigates that would protect them during its approach to San Carlos 
																																																								
27 Strange, Centers of Gravity. 
28 The author is grateful for the assistance provided by Brigadier Ewen Murchison DSO MBE, Royal Marines in 
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Royal Navy, 210.  Also, the MV Atlantic Conveyor planned to arrive in San Carlos Water on 26 May.   Johnson-Allen, 
Without Us, 87.  
99 
 
as well as act as its last line of defence throughout the remainder of Operation 
Sutton.30 
 









1.   The ability to select targets. 
2.   The ability to project power at range. 
3.   The ability to parry enemy threats en-route 
to and in the target area. 
4.   The ability to project power from ship to 
shore. 
5.   The ability to suppress/destroy enemy 
defensive firepower. 




1.1.1    Timely and accurate intelligence 
disseminated to and from decision-makers. 
2.1.1    Sufficient assault ships available. 
3.1.1    Persistent and effective Sea Harrier 
capability. 
3.1.2    Effective ground-based air defence. 
3.1.3    Robust maritime force air defence. 
3.1.4    An enduring aircraft carrier 
capability. 
3.2.1    Sustainable anti-surface/submarine 
warfare capability. 
4.1.1    Landing craft availability. 
4.2.1    Sufficient landing craft crews.  
4.3.1    A capable land combat force in 
sufficient strength. 
5.1.1    Frigate and Destroyer availability. 
5.2.1    Timely and accurate response from 
Harrier GR3 force. 
6.1.1    Rapid and sustainable distribution 
capability.  
6.2.1    Sufficient support helicopters. 
Critical Requirements 
 
1.1   Intelligence on enemy capability and intent. 
2.1   Long-range troop ships. 
3.1   Control of the air in the area of interest. 
3.2   Sea control in the area of interest. 
4.1   Sufficient, suitable landing craft. 
4.2   Trained landing craft crews. 
4.3   Trained assault troops in sufficient strength. 
5.1   Naval Gunfire Support. 
5.2   Close Air Support. 
6.1   Ship-to-shore logistical support. 
6.2   Rapid manoeuvre capability. 
 
 
Table 4B – British Operational Centre of Gravity during Operation Sutton. 
 
With the British amphibious force structure, its contents and defence now articulated, it 
is important to understand how the British intended to project their amphibious 
capability ashore.  The plan saw the assault force come ashore in three waves.  The 
first two waves contained the spearhead assault troops of 3 Commando Brigade 
bolstered by two battalions from the Parachute Regiment.  Led by the Landing Platform 
Docks, HMS Fearless and Intrepid, the troops were projected ashore using smaller 
organic landing craft.  During the second wave, the landing craft were used once again 
to offload the assault troops from MV Norland and SS Canberra.  Of note, the first two 
waves were completed before Argentine air power could respond to the landing.  
																																																								
30 The seven escorts were HMS Antrim, Argonaut, Ardent, Plymouth, Yarmouth, Brilliant and Broadsword.  Freedman, 
Official History Volume 2, 469. 
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However, with the assault troops ashore, the third wave was vulnerable to attack.  The 
third and last wave included the fleet of Landing Ships Logistic vessels that were 
tasked to bring key enablers and supplies to sustain the force ashore.  Of note, the 
third wave would also take significantly longer to disembark than the first two.   
 
 
Table 4C – British Amphibious Force Composition.31 
 
																																																								
31 The data is sourced from TNA, ADM 202/816/2. Commanders Diary: Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade – Operation 
Corporate, June 1982 – March 1984. 
Ship  Role Embarked Force 
HMS Fearless Landing 
Platform Dock  
Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade 
3 Commando Brigade Signal Squadron 
3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron 
D Squadron, 22 Special Air Service 
RL Detachment, 30 Signal Regiment 
47 Air Despatch Squadron, Royal Corps of 
Transport 
Air Defence Troop, Royal Marines 
Y Troop, Royal Marines 
RAF Special Forces Detachment 
8 Commando Battery 
40 Commando 
HMS Intrepid 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment 
RFA Sir Galahad 
Landing Ship 
Logistic  
59 Commando Engineer Regiment 
First Raiding Squadron 
Landing Ship Logistics Detachment 
Echelons of 3 Commando Brigade Signals 
Squadron 
RFA Sir Geraint 
T Battery, 12 Air Defence Regiment, Royal 
Artillery 
29 Commando Regiment 
Air Maintenance Group 
Landing Ship Logistics Detachment 
RFA Sir Lancelot Commando Logistics Regiment Landing Ship Logistics/Mexeflote Detachment 
RFA Sir 
Percivale 
Headquarters Company 45 Commando 
7 Commando Battery, Royal Artillery 
8 Commando Battery, Royal Artillery 
Landing Ship Logistics/Mexeflote Detachment 
RFA Sir Tristram 
X and Y Company, 45 Commando 
Elements of Headquarters Company 45 
Commando 
Landing Ship Logistics/Mexeflote Detachment 
RFA Stromness Fleet Stores Ship 
45 Commando 
3 Special Boat Squadron 
Echelons of 3 Commando Brigade Signals 
Squadron 




Anti-Submarine Role with embarked Sea Kings. 




MV Europic Ferry 29 Battery, Royal Artillery 
MV Norland 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment 
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Commodore Mike Clapp, Commander Amphibious Warfare and the individual 
responsible for the planning and execution of the amphibious landing, intended to 
offload the third wave as quickly as possible in order to minimise their exposure to 
Argentine air power.  His view was ‘that one bomb into a logistics ship could ruin 
thousands of tons, whilst one bomb into a dispersed Beach Support Area would have 
less of an adverse effect.’32  Indeed, the five Landing Ships Logistic were specifically 
designed with this concept in mind.  The ships ‘could land equipment and vehicles 
directly on to beaches through a bow door.’33  However, only one of the Landing Ship 
Logistic Masters had ever carried out a beach landing and the crews lacked recent 
practice in this type of offload.34  As a result, the unloading of supplies would be slower 
than anticipated and complicated even further as the ships were loaded with the higher 
priority items stowed, incorrectly, to facilitate a bow discharge directly onto the 
beaches.35  
 
The intent was to provide the land component with two days of supplies ashore and 
create a floating supply base within San Carlos where two Landing Ships Logistic, 
RFAs Sir Galahad and Sir Percivale, would be configured ‘with two days of supplies for 
the brigade, consisting mainly of ammunition, packed fuel and rations.  Another four 
days of supply would be on [RFA] Stromness, with sixteen additional days on [MV] Elk.  
These two ships would keep reserve supplies available at the edge of the Total 
Exclusion Zone for re-stocking [Landing Ships Logistic] as required.’36   Consequently, 
after the initial assault, the plan was to have supplies distributed between the 
beachhead, afloat in the Amphibious Operating Area and in bulk at the edge of the 
Total Exclusion Zone.  The plan mitigated the threat of having a single large stockpile 
of stores ashore that could be easily targeted and negated by a successful Argentine 
attack.  Moreover, the plan meant that supplies could be fed into the landing area 
quickly and when required.  The plan suggested that it would take two days to get 
immediately required stores ashore, and seven to eight days to complete the 
amphibious assault. 37  However, there were several factors that affected the timing of 
the offload.  The Landing Ships Logistic re-supply run to MV Elk on the edge of the 
Total Exclusion Zone would take twenty hours to complete the transit one-way and the 
Masters of the slow-moving ships preferred to conduct each transit at night in order to 
minimise their exposure to the threat of an air attack.38  Following concerns over the 
vulnerability of ships in San Carlos, Fieldhouse directed that SS Canberra, MV Norland 
																																																								
32 Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, 148. 
33 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 466. 
34 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 80. 
35 Privratsky, Logistics in Falklands War, 98. 
36 Ibid., 76. 
37 Ibid., 105; Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 81. 
38 Privratsky, Logistics in Falklands War, 115. 
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and RFA Stromness sail towards the safer waters outside of the Total Exclusion Zone 
on the evening of 21 May.39  Although a prudent measure, the ships sailed with 
significant supplies remaining on board.  For example, the SS Canberra contained 90 
000 rations, enough to feed the Brigade for 18 days.40  Ultimately, the supply ships 
were always planned to be present in the landing area throughout the period of the 
assault and vulnerable to attack, particularly in the first few days of the amphibious 
assault.  However, would Argentine air power be able to exploit this opportunity? 
 
Most commentators limit their analysis of Operation Sutton to looking at activities 
starting on the morning of 21 May but, as stated previously, Operation Sutton started at 
0900 on 20 May.41  The first detection of the amphibious force by the Argentine forces 
occurred 26.5 hours after it set sail and by a ground patrol in the immediate vicinity of 
the landings.  Consequently, after a number of false alarms, the mainland-based 
Argentine air commander realised that the amphibious assault was underway at San 
Carlos.  The first Argentine strikes from the mainland left Rio Grande at 1225 and 
entered the [Falkland] Sound near Swan Island at 1325 – six hours after the initial 
landings and over twenty-eight hours since the start of the operation.42  Argentine 
intelligence assets had failed to detect the amphibious assault force and strike it when 
it was at its most vulnerable.  As a result of failing to deploy a timely and effective 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability that could find and track the 
amphibious assault force, the Argentines were unable to send their most capable 
asset, the Exocet-armed Super Etendards, to strike the amphibious force in open and 
the most vulnerable of waters.  Moreover, by failing to understand their local 
environment, the Argentines handed the British twenty-eight hours of advantage and 
allowed them to progress unmolested to the intended landing area.  Thus, the British 
were able to exploit freedom of manoeuvre in all three environments, maintain their 
initiative and dictate the tempo of future operations.   
 
By failing to understand British intentions, the Argentines were doomed to a reactive 
strategy dictated by British decisions for the remainder of the campaign – all for the 
sake of an effective intelligence gathering capability.  The causal factor behind this 
situation can be traced back to the 1969 decision to give ‘exclusive jurisdiction to 
defend Argentina from sea attack to the Navy.’43  Therefore, intelligence gathering at 
sea was a naval task and the air force ‘was specifically prohibited from developing or 
																																																								
39 Ibid., 109. 
40 Thompson, No Picnic, 78.	
41 For example, Cordesman, Volume 3. 
42 S. Huertas, “San Carlos: Insights into an Intense Battle.”  Air Enthusiast.  (September/October 1988): 21.  Freedman. 
Official History Volume 2, 471. 
43 Higham, Why Air Forces Fail, 234. 
103 
 
acquiring any capability suitable for operations over sea.’44  This decision would have 
wide-ranging implications on the campaign, particularly the air force’s ability to strike 
maritime targets successfully.  However, the retirement of the two remaining P-2 
Neptunes meant that the task fell to the much smaller and shorter range S-2E Tracker, 
a carrier-based intelligence gathering asset.  After the Argentine aircraft carrier 
withdrew from the campaign in early May, ‘five of its S-2E Trackers deployed to Rio 
Gallegos in order to continue reconnaissance and anti-submarine duties.’45  The 
Trackers flew three missions on 20 May and were operating to the northwest of the 
Falkland Islands.  However, their only success was on one of the missions where radar 
emissions from the British fleet were intercepted but nothing definitive was detected on 
radar due to the Tracker’s limited range.46   
 
Of note, and in order to enhance their intelligence capability, two Embraer EMB-111A 
Banderiante patrol aircraft were supplied to Comando de Aviación Naval by Brazil in 
early May.  Although they had greater range than the Tracker, the Banderiante was 
limited to a fleet of two aircraft, with minimal crew training and flew its first mission on 
22 May.47  Therefore, the Banderiante capability arrived too late to inform or influence 
the outcome of Operation Sutton and ‘provided no true substitute for the long-range 
mission profile of the Neptune.’48  With the amphibious assault force taking a 
convoluted route to avoid detection from the ground-based radars at Stanley, the 
Argentines opportunity to exploit the transit of the amphibious force was completely 
missed.  Consequently, the Argentines were now reliant on successfully striking the 
amphibious force as it landed ashore. 
 
Operation Sutton Outputs 
 
The amphibious force was initially escorted by HMS Invincible with its Sea Dart 
surface-to-air-missile capability.  However, the aircraft carrier peeled away from the 
amphibious assault group at 1415 on 20 May in order to return to the safer waters of 
the eastern Total Exclusion Zone.49  Despite concerns regarding the location of the 
Argentine submarine ARA San Luis, the amphibious force’s approach to San Carlos 
remained undetected and uncontested.50  Due to a navigational error and a technical 
issue on board HMS Fearless, the lead vessel, the force arrived at its landing point at 
																																																								
44 Ibid. 
45 Burden, The Air War, 50. 
46 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 272. 
47 Ibid., 276. 
48 Burden, The Air War, 48.	
49 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 133. 
50 Ibid., 127.  In reality, ARA San Luis and its sister Type 209 submarine, ARA Salta, were operating outside the Total 
Exclusion Zone during Operation Sutton due to technical defects.  Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 552. 
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0730 on 21 May, one hour later than the planned H-Hour.51  Nevertheless, the last of 
the assault troops, the Third Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA), landed at 
1130.52  The amphibious assault ships were arrayed around San Carlos Water and 
protected by the surrounding high ground.  In contrast, the seven escort ships, and 
RFA Fort Austin, were located further west in the more open waters of Falkland Sound 
and acted as the inner defensive screen.53  Three Sea Harrier combat air patrols were 
located up threat by a further fifty miles to act as the outer screen.54  A further layer of 
defence was occasionally added when a Type 42 destroyer operated to the north of the 
Islands.  The Sea Dart-armed destroyer worked alongside a Type 22 frigate that acted 
as the destroyer’s protector with its Sea Wolf short-range surface-to-air missile. 
 
Despite the fact that the British combat air assets were outnumbered by over three to 
one, as shown in Figure 4.1, they were able to deliver a significantly greater number of 
sorties than their opposition.  Although the British aircraft operated much closer to their 
aircraft carriers than the four hundred nautical mile radius transits faced by their 
Argentine counterparts, this does not fully explain the quantum difference in outputs 
between the two forces.  Nevertheless, and as shown in Annexes A and B, would the 
British near 250 per cent advantage in outputs over their foe during the period of 
Operation Sutton provide the British forces with the outcomes they desired?  
 
Annex F articulates the various Argentine attacks of 21 May, the largest Argentine 
combat air contribution of the whole Conflict.  In contrast, Annex G reviews the 
remaining period of Operation Sutton, 20 and 22-26 May.  Both Annexes look at the 
Argentine mainland-based combat air assets, their weapon load and their ability to get 
their weapons from the planning stage, airborne, into the operating area, breach British 
defences and strike their intended targets successfully.  One area that has not been 
included in the annexes are the missions that were planned but not flown due to 
weather constraints at the forward operating bases.   
 
Weather has always been a significant constraint in military air operations.  Moreover, 
the South Atlantic weather patterns can be unforgiving to the unwary aviator.  Jorge 
Columbo, the commanding officer of the Super Etendard squadron in 1982, stated that 
‘May, June, July and even August are the worst months of the year in Rio Grande as 
far as flying is concerned: 90 per cent of the time it is cloudy, rainy, foggy and icy with a 
low or very low cloud base and visibility usually below one hundred feet or (at the best) 
																																																								
51 Ibid., 470. 
52 Thompson, No Picnic, 68. 
53 Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 147.   
54 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 123. 
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a quarter of a mile, not to speak of strong cross winds that were always present in Rio 
Grande.’55  Columbo’s views, although limited to his own forward operating base at Rio 
Grande, provided a pessimistic view of the typical winter weather patterns that not only 
impact Patagonia but also the Falkland Islands and its surrounding waters.  An 
alternative perspective is provided by Southby-Tailyour; he suggested that the weather 
in the Falkland Islands is akin to ‘Dartmoor surrounded by the sea’ or ‘the Hebrides but 
sunnier and windier.’56  Moreover, Southby-Tailyour highlighted that the wind was the 
‘single most dramatic difference’ with the average wind speed over four times the 
British norm.57  The weather was more demanding than the British faced at home and 
certainly more extreme than the Argentine aircrew were accustomed to at their home 
bases in northern Argentina.  The weather would have a significant influence on air 
operations throughout the campaign.  
 
The British military analysis of the weather forecasts over the period of Operation 
Sutton, as shown in Annexes A and B, suggested that apart from the morning of 25 
May, the weather was assessed as no worse than ‘fair’ for both participants.58  
However, although the British report is comprehensive, detailed and covers the full 
campaign it is, at times, optimistic in its assessment of the weather at the southern 
Argentine airfields.  For example, Argentine air power employment on 22 May was 
particularly poor and had dropped from the previous day’s high of 72 sorties down to a 
mere 14 sorties.59  Analysis of the British meteorological archive evidence would 
suggest that the weather in Southern Argentina was no worse than ‘fair’ and as a 
result, it could be deduced that the causal factor for Argentina air power poor 
performance was not the weather.  In contrast, Ethell, Burden, Rivas, Moro and the 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina website all provided a significantly more pessimistic viewpoint 
and indicated that the weather was the driving factor behind the low level of activity on 
mainland airbases on 22 May.60  A similar issue arose on 23 May where air operations 
were hampered, but not grounded, by the weather on the mainland.61  However, 
beyond the disparities associated with mainland weather on 22 and 23 May, there is a 
general consensus that the weather was suitable for air operations for the majority of 
Operation Sutton.   
 
																																																								
55 Southby-Tailyour, Exocet Falklands, 57. 
56 Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, 126. 
57 Ibid., 112. 
58 TNA, DEFE 67/128.  Operation Corporate, Falklands Conflict: Meteorological Records, October 1982. 
59 See Annex A for details. 
60 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 130, Burden.  The Air War, 120 and 135, Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 138 and 178.  
Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 229 and Argentine Air Force Website, “Air Operations 22 May 1982.”  
http://www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may22.html (accessed 9 February 2016). 
61 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 232. 
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The rationale for the lower quality weather assessments at the Argentine airfields can 
be traced back to the fact that British meteorologists had the benefit of actual weather 
observations to support their assessments of the weather over the Falkland Islands 
and the British fleet.  In contrast, weather observations for the large number of 
Argentine airfields scattered over several hundred of miles were not available.  The net 
result is that the British assessment of the weather over Argentine airfields was less 
accurate than those stated for the Falkland Islands and British fleet.  Consequently, 
with the weather factor and the need to preserve the force removed, deficits in the 
Argentines’ ability to generate and deliver air power outputs were starting to 
materialise.  Ultimately, the fast-moving and volatile weather systems in the South 
Atlantic did have an influence on air activities but it was not the driver that some may 
have suggested.  As a result, the Argentines averaged 24 sorties per day during 
Operation Sutton.  
 
Although the British aircraft operated in the same volatile weather conditions as the 
Argentines, the weather impact on embarked Sea Harrier operations was less of a 
limitation to British air operations.  Ward highlighted that the unique operating 
characteristics of the Sea Harrier aircraft allowed the aircraft to operate in conditions 
that were beyond the capabilities of a conventional carrier-based aircraft.62  In fact, 
despite the high tempo and rapidly changing weather systems, the Sea Harriers and 
Harrier GR3s increased their outputs from 61 sorties on 21 May to 66 the following day 
and averaged 57 sorties per day over the totality of Operation Sutton.63  The average 
figure is all the more impressive, given the fact that there was minimal flying conducted 
on 20 May in order to prepare the force for the upcoming surge in flying associated 
with protecting the amphibious assault.  
 
Analysing the Outcomes of Operation Sutton 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2 below, the data shows that of the 172 weapons that were 
planned to be used by the Argentines on 21 May not one was employed against any of 
the 12 amphibious assault ships that made up the British operational centre of gravity.  
Moreover, only 128 out of the planned 172 weapons (or 74 per cent) managed to get 
airborne from mainland Argentina.  During the transit to the Falkland Islands, the 
number of weapons reduced further to 73, which equated to 42 per cent of those 
planned and 57 per cent of those weapons that managed to get airborne.  63 weapons 
breached British defences (equating to 50 per cent of those bombs that were launched 
																																																								
62 Ward, Sea Harrier, 318.	
63 See Annex B for further details. 
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successfully and 87 per cent of the weapons that reached the Islands).  In the target 
area, 45 weapons were employed against the British warships with only eight hitting a 
target (five per cent of the weapons planned, six per cent of the bombs that managed 
to get airborne and 18 per cent of those dropped).  Of the eight weapons that hit a 
target, four bombs (50 per cent) failed to detonate but caused significant damage to 
HMS Antrim and HMS Argonaut.  Both warships were conducting escort duties in the 
northern approaches to the Falkland Sound and the mouth of San Carlos Water 
respectively; HMS Antrim was hit by a single bomb while two weapons struck HMS 
Argonaut.  The fourth unexploded bomb hit HMS Ardent, which was the most southerly 
of the escort ships and was tasked with naval gunfire support against Goose Green in 
support of Operation Tornado, the deception plan to mask the true location of the 
British landings.  However, all four weapons that detonated struck HMS Ardent.  With 
the loss of twenty-two sailors, HMS Ardent eventually succumbed to her mortal wounds 




Figure 4.2 – The Utility of Argentine Weapons on 21 May. 
 
While one bomb of every four planned was dropped, only one weapon in every 11 
dropped struck and detonated against a target.  Moreover, only one weapon in every 
																																																								
64 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 372.	







172 Weapons Planned 
Weapons Airborne 
Weapons Reach Islands 
Weapons Employed Against UK Fleet 
Weapons Hit Targets 
Weapons Detonate 
Weapons versus CoG 63 Weapons Breach Defences 
108 
 
43 struck and detonated against a British warship.  The results associated with 21 May 
suggest that the perception that Argentine pilot cadre was highly capable is 
questionable, if not a fallacy.  From a British perspective, the initial analysis is no more 
gratifying.  Of the 73 bombs that arrived over the Falkland Islands during the initial 
landing period of Operation Sutton, 63 weapons managed to elude British defences, 
which equated to 87 per cent of the weapons that made it to the Islands evaded 
combat air patrols as well as negating maritime and land-based air defences.  This 
figure notably contradicts Ward’s perception that the Sea Harriers ‘enjoyed command 
of the skies over the Islands.’65  However, by solely focussing on 21 May, the most 
active day of Operation Sutton, it could be argued that the results are skewed and 
ignore the possibility that performance could improve while in contact with the enemy 
or captured the lessons from a high intensity and focused campaign conducted over an 
extended period.  Consequently, Figure 4.3 below shows the complete picture 




Figure 4.3 – The Utility of Argentine Weapons over the period 20 - 26 May. 
 
In response to Operation Sutton, the Argentines managed to launch 333 out of the 
planned 390 weapons (or 85 per cent), an 11 per cent improvement over the activities 
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of 21 May.  The improved response is a reflection of a more effective and reliable 
command and control capability.  Or put more simply, the ‘fog of war’ had now been 
removed and the location of the amphibious assault was by this stage known.  Even 
so, and highlighting their lack of familiarity with the Falkland Islands, several Argentine 
attack formations were unable to find and attack targets in the days immediately 
following the amphibious assault.66    
 
During the transit to the Falkland Islands, the number of weapons reduced to 237, 
which equated to 61 per cent of those planned and 71 per cent of those weapons that 
managed to get airborne (an improvement of 19 per cent and 14 per cent respectively 
when compared with the same activities on 21 May).  The improved performance is, 
again, a result of improved command and control.  180 weapons managed to breach 
the British defences (equating to 54 per cent, a minor improvement in comparison to 21 
May, of those bombs that were launched successfully and 76 per cent of the weapons 
that reached the Islands).  In the target area, 108 weapons were employed against the 
fleet with only 19 hitting the target (five per cent of the weapons planned, six per cent 
of the bombs that managed to get airborne and 18 per cent of those dropped).  These 
figures are, again, comparable with similar activities on 21 May.  Of the 19 weapons 
that hit targets, 11 bombs (57 per cent, compared with fifty per cent on 21 May) failed 
to detonate but caused damage to three of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, which 
notionally constituted 25 per cent of the original British operational centre of gravity.  By 
this stage, Operation Sutton was now four days old.67  Therefore, it is perhaps not 
surprising that one of the two supply vessels attacked, ‘had almost finished 
unloading.’68  Nevertheless, it took time before the damaged ships were operationally 
capable again.  As Freedman highlighted, ‘it took [RFA Sir] Galahad until 28 May 1982 
before it became fully operational while [RFA Sir] Lancelot was not ready until 7 June 
1982.’69   
 
During Operation Sutton, the Argentines planned to use a total of 390 weapons, with 
21 May accounting for 44 per cent of their activity.  Of note, not one of the weapons 
was able to destroy a member of the initial amphibious assault force.  However, and in 
addition to the loss of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope, Coventry and MV 
Atlantic Conveyor were lost to Argentine air attack.  The common perception of the 
British landings was that it was a simple battle of attrition, where Argentine combat air 
																																																								
66 Analysis of Rivas’ data showed that, and unlike their British counterparts, many Argentine aircrew flew infrequently 
during the Conflict.  As a result, they were less familiar with procedures and the topography of the Islands.   Rivas, 
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67 See Annex G for further details. 




losses are balanced against British shipping losses.  In many respects the perception 
is correct – the Argentines lost 19 mainland-based aircraft during the period of 
Operation Sutton, whereas, the British lost four ships with a number of other ships 
damaged.  The loss of the Royal Navy ships and members of the ship’s company, 
while damaging to the British effort, was not a significant loss in the overall campaign 
as the Royal Navy had sufficient resilience to have all three warships replaced.  
However, by simply measuring outputs without recourse to the outcomes delivered can 
lead to a skewed perspective of the Operation.  For example, the loss of MV Atlantic 
Conveyor did have consequences on the wider campaign’s prosecution.  Although the 
intended target was one of the British aircraft carriers, effective countermeasures 
defeated the Exocet.  However, the decoyed missile was able to re-acquire another 
large surface target and struck MV Atlantic Conveyor, which was loaded with ‘six 
Wessex, one Lynx and three Chinook helicopters, tents for five thousand troops and 
the material to build a mobile airstrip for the Harriers.’70   
 
Indeed, the loss of MV Atlantic Conveyor was, arguably, the most significant British 
loss during Operation Sutton, if not the whole campaign.  Twelve personnel, including 
the ship’s Master, were killed in the Exocet attack and the material loss had a 
significant impact on the British scheme of manoeuvre.71  So much so, that some 
Argentine commentators have suggested that MV Atlantic Conveyor, rather than an 
aircraft carrier, was the intended target.72  From a British point of view, the loss of the 
helicopters, one of the critical requirements, meant that British commanders had to 
adapt their plan for the breakout from San Carlos.73 
 
So, are the Argentine air operations of 21 May reflective of the wider Operation Sutton 
timeframe?  Barring the issue regarding ineffective command and control on 21 May, 
there appears to be a broad similarity in Argentine success rates over the two periods.  
Having mapped the various journeys of Argentine weapons, the next section will review 
and analyse the causal factors that influenced the prosecution of Argentine air power.   
 
As shown, the vast majority of Argentine weapons were able to breach British 
defences.  Therefore, was the Sea Harrier the scourge of the Argentines as many 
analysts suggest?  Ward argued that the platform was so successful that it was feared 
by its opponents and gained the nickname of ‘Muerte Negra’.74  In contrast, Rivas 
suggested that the British misinterpreted the Argentine communications and the Sea 
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Harrier was actually known by the significantly less endearing sobriquet of ‘Los 
Moscardones (the botflies).’75  This dichotomy of views can be addressed by 
articulating the causes and their relative importance in the prosecution of the Argentine 
attack of the British amphibious force.  
 
Ranking Causal Factor 
Scale 
(out of 390) 
Percentage 
1 Mission Cancelled 91 23 
2 Weapon Employment – Missed Target 88 23 
=3 Serviceability - Air Abort 52 13 
=3 Weapon Employment – No Drop 52 13 
5 Navigation Errors 21 5 
6 Serviceability – Weapon Employment 20 5 
7 Serviceability - Ground Abort 13 3 
8 Sea Harrier – Hard Kill 12 3 
=9 Sea Harrier – Soft Kill  11 3 
=9 Weapon Employment – Unexploded Bomb 11 3 
11 Weapon Employment – Hit and Detonates 8 2 
12 Ground-Based Air Defence – Soft Kill 7 2 
13 Target Mis-Identified 3 <1 
14 Maritime Force Air Defence – Hard Kill 1 <1 
 Total 390 100 
 
Table 4D - Causal Factors for Failure to Deliver Weapons during Operation 
Sutton. 
 
Analysis of Table 4D above shows that the top five causal factors for the Argentines 
failing to deliver the required effects against the British operational centre of gravity 
are: weapons that missed their intended target, missions cancelled during execution, 
aircraft serviceability, failure to drop their weapons and serviceability issues when 
endeavouring to drop the weapon.  Of note, there are two notable attributes that are 
missing from the leading five causes - the Sea Harrier and unexploded bombs.  Both 
attributes are commonly associated with British success and Argentine failure during 
the Conflict.  However, the Sea Harrier capability, generated by combining both Sea 
Harrier ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ kills, would reside in fifth position on the list with a score of 23 
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(or six per cent).  As for the unexploded bombs, it is assessed as the joint ninth most 
influential factor with a score of 11.  The top five causes will now be reviewed in priority 
order. 
 
The most significant factor for the failure of Argentine weapons being used was the 
cancellation of attack missions.  Although weather cancellations prior to take-off have 
been discarded from this analysis, evidence shows that 91 (or 23 per cent) of the total 
Operation Sutton weapons and their associated missions were cancelled during the 
execution phase of the mission.  Of note, the two platforms that could carry the largest 
number of weapons, the Canberra and A-4Q Skyhawk, accounted for 88 of the 91 
weapons that suffered due to mission cancellations.  Moreover, all of the mission 
cancellations occurred on 21 May, the first and most significant day of combat 
operations.   
 
The mission cancellations highlight the confusion in the Argentine command and 
control function regarding the location of the British amphibious assault and the targets 
that needed to be struck.  The source of the ‘fog of war’ can not only be traced to the 
lack of effective intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to detect and 
track the British fleet but also to the distinct lack of jointery between the Argentine 
Services.  This inter-Service enmity percolated down to the operational level where 
joint planning was the responsibility of an organisation colloquially known as the 
‘Pantheon’, a perceived retirement home for senior officers who were not competitive 
for further promotion but too young to be retired.76  As a result, the endorsed plan 
appeared to lack credibility with the individual Services.  During the Conflict, the 
deployed Fuerza Aérea Argentina assets were commanded by the Fuerza Aérea Sur 
at Comodoro Rivadavia, which was located closer to San Carlos than it was to its 
Comando de Aviación Naval counterpart at Rio Grande.  Despite repeated requests 
from the Fuerza Aérea Argentina, there would be no co-located air component 
headquarters and the flow of information was subsequently compromised by a lack of 
unity of effort and command.   
 
Following the attacks of 1 May, Argentine air power outputs were meagre as they were 
prudently preserving its force until the critical British assault on the Falkland Islands 
took place.  Moreover, the Argentine Operation Plan 2/82, which was written six weeks 
before Operation Sutton, was distributed to all units but it was either misunderstood or 
ignored.  Even the Fuerza Aérea Argentina official history fails to correctly capture all 
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five of the priority tasks.77  At the tactical level, the confusion was clear.  One captured 
A-4 Skyhawk pilot informed his hosts that he had been ‘specifically ordered to attack 
the warships.’78  In contrast, and on 21 May, the other Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
Skyhawk unit was tasked to ‘execute bomb and gun attacks on landing ships and 
transport vehicles, and on warships as second [priority].’79  Another pilot from the same 
Skyhawk unit, Ernesto Ruben Ureta, noted that his attack priorities were: aircraft 
carriers, logistical support (aircraft and ships), ships close to land, other 
aircraft/helicopters and warships.80   
 
From an Argentina Armada perspective, its operational directive stipulated a generic 
and broad naval mission and execution for all of its units.  Consequently, it failed to 
identify specific target priorities for its air arm.81  However, the Comando de Aviación 
Naval targeting priorities were articulated in the lower level document - Plan de 
Operaciones de la Fuerza de Tareas 80.  The Comando de Aviación Naval were 
required to neutralize the amphibious assault capacity of the enemy naval force; 
priority targets included aircraft carriers, transport and logistics vessels as well as 
missile-equipped vessels.82  Nevertheless, at the tactical level, the Comando de 
Aviación Naval pilots believed that their priority was a straightforward one.  One A-4Q 
Skyhawk pilot informed that ‘our primary objective was to look for the aircraft carriers, 
of course.’83  Ultimately, none of the Argentine operators’ views accurately reflected the 
Argentine operational plans.  Consequently, confusion reigned and Argentine air power 
lacked the required focus to be truly effective.  To some British observers, it appeared 
‘that no clear aim had been given to the attacking pilots, except (with very limited time) 
to engage the first target they saw.’84  Freedman says that ‘while conserving for [the 
Operation Sutton] battle, the Argentine Air Force did not appear to have planned for 
it.’85  In contrast, it appeared that the operational plans existed but there was 
inadequate coordination and poor communication between the operational and tactical 
levels.  Moreover, the continual desire by the Argentines to prosecute the British 
aircraft carriers highlighted that they were unable to comprehend the fluid and agile 
nature of the Conflict and the relative importance of the various targets as the 
campaign matured.  Consequently, it is unsurprising that Argentine air power was 
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unable to exploit its numerical advantage during the early, and critical, stages of 
Operation Sutton. 
 
The second most influential factor affecting the delivery of Argentine weapons during 
Operation Sutton was weapons that were dropped but missed their intended target.  
With 23 per cent (or 88 of the 390 weapons planned) missing their intended targets, 
the Argentines were rueing its lack of investment in a precision capability.   
 
Compounding the issue even further was the lack of exposure to the demands of anti-
ship attack missions.  With the Fuerza Aérea Argentina constitutionally restrained from 
conducting the maritime attack role, anti-shipping training conducted prior to the start of 
Operation Corporate was of limited benefit in the restricted time available.  Moreover, it 
may also account for the fact that ‘many bombs hit the water aft of the ship suggesting 
that the Argentine pilots aimed for the middle of their targets without compensating for 
the vessel’s forward speed.’86  Argentine attacks were compromised by limited training 
against a niche target set, the lack of precision weapons and a contested battle space 
that forced the Argentine pilots to employ their weapons from a less than ideal attack 
profile.  Therefore, it is inevitable that a large number of Argentine weapons missed 
their intended targets. 
 
The joint third most influential cause for the Argentine failure to deliver the required 
effect against the British amphibious force was aircraft serviceability rates and failure to 
drop weapons.  When ground abort, air abort and technical failures during weapon 
release are combined it comprises 52 (or 13 per cent) of the 390 weapons planned 
during the period of Operation Sutton.  There are three key factors influencing this 
predicament: sanctions, ageing equipment and the location of assets.  The only new 
aircraft in the Argentine fast jet inventory was the Super Etendard with the remainder 
being made up of ageing, second-hand and increasingly obsolete British, American, 
French and Israeli-manufactured aircraft.  Due to human rights concerns during the 
Carter administration, the United States had imposed the ‘Humphrey/Kennedy 
Amendment that involved an embargo on the sale of warlike equipment to Argentina.’87  
The sanctions affected all three Skyhawk variants used by the Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
and the Comando de Aviación Naval.  The aspiration to procure a fourth tranche of 29 
A-4B Skyhawks and 32 spare J65 engines in the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
initially stalled by the embargo on new deliveries and spare parts.88  However, the 
thawing of American and Argentine diplomatic relations during the early days of the 
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Reagan presidency raised new hope.  However, the burgeoning relationship between 
the two nations was quickly quashed at the outbreak of hostilities, much to the surprise 
of the Argentines.  Indeed, the procurement of United States-supplied A-4 Skyhawk 
engines received British Prime Ministerial attention during the Conflict.89  As a result, 
the lack of spares in the Skyhawk force had forced Argentina to manufacture its own 
spare parts for the aircraft.  However, the indigenously produced components were 
‘blamed for two known Argentine Air Force A-4 Skyhawk losses in late 1981.’90    
 
The sanctions meant that the A-4 Skyhawk force was constrained to using ‘time 
expired ejection seat rocket boosters.’91  Consequently, the fatality rate amongst A-4 
Skyhawk pilots ejecting from their aircraft was significantly higher than that of their 
more modern and Israeli-supported Dagger compatriots.  The aircraft’s weapon system 
was also affected by the weapons embargo; the twin 20mm cannons fitted to the A-4 
Skyhawks suffered from a ‘twelve per cent probability of working properly without 
jamming.’92  The poor aircraft availability rate of the A-4 Skyhawks meant that, coupled 
with financial constraints, pilots had limited flying hours.93  The parlous state of the A-4 
Skyhawk capability is at odds with Fursden’s view that ‘the Argentines certainly did not 
lose the war because of bad equipment.’94  
 
Although not assisted by its late introduction into the Operation Azul/Rosario plans, the 
Fuerza Area Argentina was reliant on external support in order to maintain its 
capability.  With aircraft sourced from a number of nations, the Argentines needed 
assured access to spare parts and weapons in order to sustain their outputs.  While the 
United States continued their embargo, Argentina’s neighbour, Peru, provided Mirage 
fuel tanks and eventually a squadron of Mirage Vs to offset the Dagger attrition.95  
Likewise, Libya provided additional missiles and other spares that were delivered by 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina Boeing 707 during the Conflict.96  Despite extensive lobbying 
from the British, ‘there was an overwhelming amount of evidence that the Israeli 
government was involved in arms negotiations with Argentina throughout the crisis.’97 
The Israeli position perhaps was not a surprise as ‘Israel’s Prime Minister, Menachem 
Begin [was] a known Anglo-phobe.’98  Consequently, Israel delivered fuel tanks and 
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fuses to the Argentines.99  Nevertheless, the British were more successful in securing 
French support against military sales to Argentina, in particular the access to the 
remaining five Exocets ordered prior to the Conflict.100  President Francois Mitterand’s 
‘staunch’ support throughout the campaign particularly pleased Margaret Thatcher.101  
The lack of assured access to a sustainable capability compromised Argentina’s ability 
to deliver outputs and outcomes.  Therefore, one of the major lessons of the Conflict is 
the need to maintain operational sovereignty of your own capabilities.   
 
In equal third position, also accounting for 52 (or 13 per cent) of the 390 weapons, 
serviceable aircraft breached the British defences and arrived in the target area but for 
reasons other than technical failure were unable to drop their weapons.  Factors 
affecting the prosecution of the target include poor target selection during the planning 
phase or the inability to positively identify the target.  The first issue harks back to 
understanding what constitutes the enemy’s centre of gravity.  Once understood, the 
full weight of the attacking force should be channelled against striking the centre of 
gravity.  However, any ambiguity or misunderstanding of what constitutes the critical 
target set will lead to the attacking force striking targets which have limited or no 
connection to the centre of gravity.  The Argentine attacks on suspected, but spurious, 
radar sites and troop concentrations located a significant distance away from the 
amphibious landing areas are an excellent example of their confusion over what 
constituted the critical targets.102  The second issue highlights the fact that the 
Argentines were a day, good weather attack force.  Due to a lack of sensors, either on 
board the attacking aircraft or carried by a supporting intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance asset, the ability to prosecute a target at night or in poor weather was 
extremely limited.  The key lessons here are to understand and strike the enemy’s 
centre of gravity, use the enabling air power assets to cue the attacking force into the 
target area and then use the attacking aircraft's on board sensors to further refine the 
attack in order to deliver a precision strike capability.   
 
In fifth place, were the 21 (or five per cent) of the 390 weapons that failed to be 
delivered due to navigation errors.  Despite the use of the Fenix Squadron 
communications aircraft to act as pathfinders for the attack aircraft, there remained a 
number of occasions when the Argentines lacked the ability to find the target area, their 
designated tanker or pathfinder aircraft.103  As a result, many missions had to be 
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aborted.  The vast majority of Argentine attack aircraft were simple platforms that 
lacked the required precision navigation systems or sensors required to find, intercept 
and fly alongside other aircraft in poor weather conditions.  Although some aircraft had 
recently been modified to carry the Omega navigation system, it was not a fleet-wide 
embodiment.104  In terms of lessons, future capabilities must be equipped and trained 
to function in all environments that it is envisaged to operate in.  
 
Comparing the causal factors during Operation Sutton with the period 1 – 19 May 
shows that four out of the five major causal factors are common between both phases.  
Air aborts, cancelled missions, weapons missing their intended targets and not 
dropping the weapon are included in both lists as the key causal factors.  However, the 
Sea Harrier’s influence on the Argentine pilots’ ability to employ their weapons 
successfully waned during Operation Sutton.  After a strong showing in the first phase 
of Operation Corporate, the Sea Harrier’s performance dropped from a respectable 
second place down to joint seventh during Operation Sutton.  The Sea Harrier’s actual 
performance brings into question Ward’s assertion that ‘air superiority was achieved’ 
during the Conflict.105  Consequently, the Sea Harrier is replaced by lack of weapon 
serviceability in the top five most influential factors during Operation Sutton.  The high 
tempo of operations and an increase in the number of Argentine weapons appears to 
be applying pressure to the Argentine’s ability to sustain their force.  However, as the 
campaign approached its culminating phase would these trends continue? 
 
With a bridgehead secured on East Falkland as well as the move of the 2 PARA from 
Sussex Mountains towards Goose Green, Operation Sutton culminated on 26 May.106  
As a result, Argentina’s fleeting opportunity to strike the concentrated British military 
force located in and around San Carlos closed.  Following the successful completion of 
the amphibious assault, the British aspiration to achieve their desired end-state of 
repossessing the Islands was becoming increasingly viable.  However, the lack of air 
manoeuvre capability, the austral winter and a larger enemy force sitting in wait on the 
high ground in prepared defensive positions around Stanley meant that Operation 
Corporate’s outcome was by no means assured.  The next chapter reviews both 
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‘We’ll have to bloody well walk!’ 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Whitehead, Royal Marines 




At the conclusion of Operation Sutton, 5500 British military personnel had been 
projected ashore at San Carlos.2  During the period of the assault, the British lost one 
destroyer and two frigates from their outer ring of defences with several others 
damaged.  Critically, Argentine air power failed to penetrate the British inner sanctum, 
where the landing ships were offloading the spearhead forces and critical support 
infrastructure, early enough in the operation or with sufficient conviction.  However, the 
loss of MV Atlantic Conveyor in the latter stages of Operation Sutton with its cargo of 
helicopters adversely impacted the tempo of the last phase of Operation Corporate – 
the British advance to Stanley.  The amphibious assault was located 45 nautical miles 
west of Stanley and the British planners were aware that as they were ‘at the end of a 
long logistics pipeline, the force cannot afford to get bogged down in protracted 
operations.  The only prudent course is to plan for a short, sharp, decisive campaign.’3  
Devoid of the necessary helicopters to move their force rapidly towards Stanley, the 
British troops faced a march across difficult terrain made all the more arduous when 
burdened with carrying their own equipment as well as a rapidly approaching austral 
winter.  Consequently, could Argentine air power influence the outcome of the final 
phase of the Conflict? 
 
With the perception that political pressure was building in Britain to break out from the 
beachhead at the earliest opportunity, the senior military leaders felt compelled to seek 
quick wins.  Consequently, Admiral Fieldhouse ordered Brigadier Thompson ‘to re-
activate the Goose Green raid and move out of San Carlos.’4  Thompson faced the 
dilemma of meeting his superiors’ demands that ‘more action was required all round’ 
while balancing these needs against the backdrop of a new superior who was 
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incommunicado.5  The Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands, Major General 
Jeremy Moore, was still traveling to the South Atlantic and had not yet released his 
plans for the forthcoming investment of Stanley.  Concurrently, Thompson had to deal 
with the need to build sufficient resilience ashore and generating contingency plans to 
mitigate the helicopter deficit – a plan that was succinctly articulated by a member of 
his command team, as noted in the introduction to this Chapter.   
 
Although Thompson was responsible for the amphibious assault and securing the 
beachhead, he was not responsible for the planning or execution of the remainder of 
the land campaign.  Thompson had been directed by Moore on 12 May to ‘push 
forward from the bridgehead area so far as the maintenance of its security allows, to 
gain information, to establish moral and physical domination over the enemy, and to 
forward the ultimate objective of repossession.’6  Thompson’s offensive options were 
constrained by his remit and available forces.  Consequently, the task of planning and 
executing the repossession of the Falkland Islands fell to Moore.  However, at the start 
of the third and final phase, Moore was still with the 3000 men of 5 Infantry Brigade on 
board SS Queen Elizabeth II.  Moreover, the recently and rapidly installed secure 
satellite communication suite on board SS Queen Elizabeth II was ineffective.7  As a 
result, communication between Moore and Thompson was limited and meant that 
understanding any emerging ideas and issues was problematic.  In order to build 
communications with his new command team as quickly as possible Moore transferred 
from SS Queen Elizabeth II to HMS Fearless on 29 May, via a 2-day stint on board 
HMS Antrim.  Moore subsequently took control of the land battle on 30 May.8   
 
In order to reduce the exposure of the luxury liner to enemy action, the follow-on British 
forces would transfer from SS Queen Elizabeth II to SS Canberra, MV Norland and 
RFA Stromness in the safer waters at South Georgia and come ashore at San Carlos 
over the period 31 May to 2 June.9  As a result, there was an apparent hiatus in British 
land operations that led to further exposure of troops and equipment to air attack at 
San Carlos.  The frustration over the lack of progress while subject to air attack was 
palpable amongst the ground troops at the beachhead.  Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux, 
the Commanding Officer of 42 Commando, commented that ‘the only time morale 
became a worry were when we waited impatiently for the breakout at San Carlos.’10  
So, with the land forces in varying degrees of disorder, what was the condition of both 
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British and Argentine air and maritime components at the start of the last phase of the 
Conflict? 
 
The Key Participants Post-Operation Sutton  
 
As with the previous phase, the Argentine navy’s input during the last part of the 
Conflict was minimal.  The major Argentine surface vessels remained within territorial 
waters and played no role in the remainder of the Conflict.  However, the Royal Navy 
was unable to locate the Argentine submarine force.  As a result, the high tempo and 
focus of anti-submarine warfare were maintained for the remainder of the campaign.  
Despite the Royal Navy’s expertise in the anti-submarine warfare field honed by years 
of live training against a capable Soviet Cold War era threat, the British were unable to 
find or fix the Argentine submarine capability.  However, it was not for the lack of effort.  
The deployed anti-submarine force of twenty Sea King helicopters flew a near constant 
three aircraft anti-submarine screen totalling over 2253 hours for the period of 
Operation Corporate.11  When coupled with the surface fleet contribution to the anti-
submarine role, the effort was considerable.  However, from an air power perspective, 
the lack of a persistent maritime patrol aircraft capability was notable.  The Ascension 
Island-based Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft had rapidly introduced an air-to-
air refuelling capability in order to allow them to operate in the South Atlantic.  Despite, 
flying 111 Operation Corporate-related missions, the Nimrod’s influence on the anti-
submarine, and for that matter the anti-surface, warfare battle was limited.12   
 
Consequently, the small Argentine submarine force had the potential to cause 
significant damage to the British deployed force if the Argentine Naval commanders 
were so inclined.  In reality, the Argentine submarine force comprised only three 
submarines.  After the harrying by a number of Fleet Air Arm helicopters and ultimate 
scuttling of ARA Sante Fe at Grytviken in South Georgia on 25 April, the Argentine 
submarine force was limited to two modern, German-built boats that were fast and very 
quiet.13  However, the torpedo armament of ARA Salta and San Luis was very 
unreliable.14  Despite the Royal Navy’s best efforts to deter the Argentine submarine 
threat, the Type 21 frigate HMS Alacrity was attacked, albeit unsuccessfully, by a 
torpedo fired from ARA San Luis during the Type 21 Frigate’s high speed run through 
the Falklands Sound prior to Operation Sutton on 11 May.15  The ARA San Luis 
returned to port immediately after the event.  Moreover, the sole remaining Argentine 
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submarine, ARA Salta, was reported to have ‘experienced torpedo fire-control 
problems as well as noise problems and undertook no operational patrols’ during the 
period of the Conflict.16  Despite the minor activity levels of the Argentine submarines, 
the British maintained sea control for the remainder of the campaign.  However, control 
of the air was by no means assured for the British as the Fuerza Aérea Argentina and 
the Comando de Aviación Naval continued to play an active role in the campaign. 
 
From a British perspective, their depth of defence capability was about to be tested and 
ably demonstrated.  The loss of four frigates and destroyers, as well as damage to 
other ships, had been offset by the arrival of a number of replacement Royal Navy 
vessels from 26 May, including the destroyers HMS Bristol, HMS Cardiff and HMS 
Exeter as well as four Type 21 and three older Leander-class frigates.17 	However, the 
focus of the campaign had swung away from purely protecting the aircraft carriers and 
their ability to deliver control of the air as well as sea control.  These enduring roles 
remained important, but they were enabling functions rather than drivers to support the 
continued logistics build-up on the Falkland Islands.  Additionally, these functions 
would be required to protect the ground force as it moved eastwards from San Carlos 
to Stanley.  As a result, the aircraft carriers would remain a lucrative and relevant target 
for the remainder of the campaign.  Consequently, the British aircraft carriers seized 
the attention of the Argentine senior leadership as well as their air arms.  Nevertheless, 
and as discussed previously, the loss of an aircraft carrier in isolation during the last 
phase of the campaign was unlikely to have curtailed the British outcome.  This point is 
reinforced further post 5 June, when the small airstrip at San Carlos, capable of 
supporting Harrier operations, was declared operational.18  As a result, it could be 
argued that as the campaign developed there were more valuable British targets that 
would have yielded greater returns for the Argentines. 
 
With 3 Commando Brigade now safely ashore, Commodore Mike Clapp’s role as 
Commander Amphibious Warfare, was far from over.  Although the frantic pace of 
operations during the amphibious assault had reduced, there was a continuous 
demand for stores into San Carlos in order to sustain the force ashore.  Consequently, 
there was a continual flow on the British logistical supply chain that reached back to 
Britain and transited via Ascension Island, South Georgia, the Logistics Loitering Area, 
located at the edge of the Total Exclusion Zone, before heading to the beachhead at 
San Carlos.  With Moore considering his options for moving and sustaining the force 
closer to Stanley, there was increased pressure on the limited number of logistic supply 
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ships, landing craft and support helicopters.  With demand outweighing resource, risks 
had to be tolerated in order to meet the campaign needs.  As the British troops could 
not rely upon helicopters to cover the difficult terrain between San Carlos and the high 
ground surrounding Stanley, the alternative solution to walk was a difficult prospect but 
deliverable.  However, the equipment that the troops could not carry had to be airlifted 
due to the poor to non-existent road infrastructure.  As a result, lower priority 
equipment, such as personal equipment that could not be carried, was delayed and it 
took some time before rucksacks and spare rations could be reunited with their 
owners.19  Consequently, morale in the front-line troops diminished but, critically, was 
not destroyed.  As an example, commanders were given the option to retreat from their 
forward positions in order to provide their troops with respite.  However, this option was 
unanimously rejected as it was felt that this would have a detrimental effect on the 
troops.20  The net result was that the supply platforms, equipment and locations were 
all critical elements for supporting the British advance to Stanley.  Therefore, from an 
Argentine air power perspective, the British amphibious fleet remained profitable 
targets for the remainder of the campaign.  If Argentine air power had shut off or delay 
the onward flow of troops and stores to the front line then the progress of the British 
ground forces towards Stanley could have been interrupted or even halted.   
 
The arrival of 5 Infantry Brigade brought the British component up to a strength of 8500 
personnel.  Nevertheless, the Argentine land component still outnumbered its British 
counterparts.  Freedman suggested that of the 13 000 Argentine military personnel 
garrisoned on the Falkland Islands, two of the eight Argentine regiments were located 
on West Falkland at Port Howard and Fox Bay with 1000 personnel at each location.21  
Additionally, Freedman notes that the Argentine forces on West Falkland were 
‘effectively useless as they lacked the size, firepower and mobility to cope with any 
British operation on West Falkland.’22  With a garrison at Goose Green consisting of 
1007 military personnel, the remaining Argentine military personnel were located at 
Stanley and contained a bayonet-strength of between 5000 and 6000.23  However, 
although the number of soldiers remained in favour of the Argentines, they were a 
mixed group of poorly trained and led conscripts supported by a small cadre of 
professional soldiers.  Consequently, and despite opinions that the Argentines had 
many technical advantages and material comforts in comparison to their British 
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opposition, Moore believed that ‘the Argentineans lacked the “stomach” to fight in the 
“high, arid, bitterly cold area” beyond their outer defensive perimeter around Stanley.’24  
Moore’s views reflected those made during the 22 April War Cabinet when a Deputy 
Chief Defence Staff (Intelligence) briefing suggested,   
 
‘This leads me to the crux – morale ... the environment is inhospitable, the 
weather harsh, the people unfriendly, living conditions primitive and food barely 
adequate.  We now reckon 80 per cent are young – very young – conscripts ill 
prepared for the rigorous life they face.  If reverses elsewhere are rammed 
home and if, above all, the garrison is subjected to a vigorous campaign of 
harassment – from the ground (by special forces) and from the air – its will to 
fight will be sapped.  It will feel isolated and perhaps even abandoned.’25 
 
Nevertheless, if the British were to achieve their objectives they would have to break 
one of the basic tenets of defeating an enemy ground force.  Prudent planning 
suggested that an attacking force should outnumber the defending force by a ratio of 
3:1.26  At best, the British had parity in numbers but only if they were able to maintain 
their force size during the journey from San Carlos to Stanley.  Therefore, the 
outnumbered British ground forces could not tolerate significant casualties en-route to 
achieving their end-state.  As a result, there was an opportunity for Argentine air power 
to enhance their land force’s numerical advantage even further.  Even in the latter 
stages of the campaign, Argentine air power might have made a decisive contribution 
by finding and striking British fielded forces, their supporting equipment and logistics 
chain. It did not.  
 
The British plan to move their land forces from San Carlos with the stated intent ‘to 
secure Port Stanley’ was finally clarified by Moore at 0415 on 1 June.27  3 Commando 
Brigade would take a northerly axis via Teal Inlet and Mount Kent whereas 5 Infantry 
Brigade would take the southern approach via Fitzroy, Bluff Cove and Mount 
Challenger.  Both brigades would then contest the high ground to the west of Stanley 
before moving onto Stanley.  However, one of the eight British land units would be held 
in reserve at San Carlos – that task was bestowed upon a disappointed 40 
Commando.  45 Commando had actually started the move to Stanley several days 
earlier when at first light on 27 May they departed Port San Carlos on foot for Teal 
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26 United States of America, United States Army.  Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE): Progress Report 
(Washington DC: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, August 1986) 3-20. 
27 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 587.	
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Inlet.28  From a British viewpoint, the parallel lines of advance challenged an already 
stretched logistics chain.  From an Argentine air power perspective, the dispersal of 
British land forces across two lines of approach meant that they would be increasingly 
difficult to find, identify and strike.  The lack of intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance aircraft, and an army focused on static defence with a limited probing 
capability meant that Argentine combat air assets would be attacking with limited, 
dated or incorrect information on the British disposition.  Already handicapped, the 
Argentine attack aircraft would be forced to find, identify and attack camouflaged and 
concealed targets dispersed across East Falkland with limited assistance.  With aged 
and basic platforms that lacked organic sensors to cue the aircraft onto targets and a 
lack of precision weapons to deliver the required effects, the already battered 
Argentine combat air assets had a significant challenge ahead of them.  However, if 
the Argentines could locate and attack enemy troops or logistics then the British 
operational tempo could be adversely affected. 
 
From a British combat air perspective, they had lost one Sea Harrier and a single 
Harrier GR3 during Operation Sutton.  As a result, they would approach the final phase 
of Operation Corporate with a force of 24 Sea Harriers and five Harrier GR3s, as 
shown in Figure 5.1 below.  However, due to their high-risk, low-level attack missions, 
the number of Harrier GR3s routinely available for tasking suffered due to extensive 
battle damage and attrition.  Nevertheless, and unlike their Sea Harrier counterparts, 
the Harrier GR3 force deployed further aircraft in order to sustain its attack capability.  
On 1 June, two replacement Harrier GR3s flew an eight and a half hour mission from 
Ascension Island to HMS Hermes, supported by Victor air-to-air refuelling aircraft.29  A 
similar mission was also flown a week later.30  However, these missions were not 
without their detractors.  The commanding officer of HMS Hermes, Captain Linley 
Middleton, believed that Operation Bowsprit, the Harrier GR3 replacement plan, was 
merely a ‘publicity stunt by the RAF.’31  Despite Middleton’s reservations regarding the 
risk associated with the long over-sea transit, the missions went ahead.  So what 
benefit did the ‘RAF publicity stunt’ bring to the British campaign? 
 
The four new aircraft not only allowed the Harrier GR3 output to be increased but also 
introduced a number of new capabilities to the campaign.  Following the successful 
completion of Trial Puritan, the aircraft was cleared to use laser-guided bombs.32  
Additionally, an ALE-40 chaff and flare dispenser as well as a self-protection radar 
																																																								
28 Thompson, No Picnic, 79.	
29 TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
30 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 128.	
31 Marston, Harrier Boys Volume One, 95. 
32 TNA, AIR 24/3299.  HQ Strike Command (Falklands Conflict). 
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jammer were also cleared for use.33  Also, as part of Trial Athene, one aircraft was 
modified to use the Shrike anti-radiation missile, the same missile used on two of the 
Vulcan’s Black Buck missions. 34  Consequently, the British task force was able to 
deliver a sustainable and enhanced attack capability throughout the remainder of the 
campaign.  If the additional Harrier GR3s had been constrained to sea-based transport 
then the next opportunity for an increase in capability would have been the arrival of 
MV Contender Bezant.  However, the cargo ship and its consignment of a further four 
Harrier GR3s would not arrive until 14 June – the day of the Argentine surrender.35  In 
parallel, 3 (Fighter) Squadron was identified as the follow-on replacement for 1 
(Fighter) Squadron and, after some uncertainty, eventually commenced its deployment 




Figure 5.1 - Combat Air Participants Post-Operation Sutton. 
 
In contrast to the Harrier GR3 force, the Sea Harriers were fully committed to the 
Falklands Conflict and had little spare capacity in terms of generating fully trained 
manpower or equipment.  The loss of one of the few Sea Harriers left in Britain on a 
																																																								
33 Marston, Harrier Boys Volume One, 97; The jammer, known as ‘Blue Eric’, was housed within one of the two Harrier 
under-fuselage gun pods.  Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 154. 
34 TNA, AIR 24/3299.  Strike Command; TNA.  AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; Black Buck 5 and 6, the two Shrike-armed 
Vulcan missions, were conducted on 31 May and 3 June respectively.  Burden, The Air War, 365-7. 
35 Ibid., 382-5. 
36 TNA, AIR 27/3527.  3 Squadron. 
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test and evaluation sortie at Yeovilton on 17 May only compounded matters further.37  
Consequently, preserving the Sea Harrier force by avoiding the high-risk, low-level 
attacks was an astute move.  The assured and enduring attack capability provided by 
the Harrier GR3 community allowed the smaller Sea Harrier force to concentrate on its 
primary role – control of the air.  However, both Sea Harrier units conducted attack 
missions but predominantly from the safer confines of medium level.  The Sea Harrier’s 
contribution to the attack role will be covered in Chapter 7. 
 
Despite a number of successes during Operation Sutton, Argentine air power was on 
the precipice of a rapid decline in capability.  In addition to the seven aircraft lost in the 
three weeks prior to the amphibious assault, the Argentines lost a further 19 mainland-
based combat aircraft during Operation Sutton.38  However, as shown in Figure 5.1 
above, the total number of Argentine aircraft deployed in Southern Argentina on 27 
May was not significantly different from that  at the start of Operation Sutton.39  
Although replacement aircraft could be generated to replace shot down and battle-
damaged aircraft, the resource was finite and fewer aircraft were returning to the front 
line as the campaign progressed.  Exacerbating the Argentine air power situation even 
further, and reminiscent of the British experience during the Battle of Britain in 1940, 
the loss of campaign-hardened and experienced aircrew was rapidly becoming a 
pertinent issue.40  Since the start of Operation Corporate, the Argentines had lost 21 
aircrew.  The Sea Harrier pilot fraternity, and typical of the global fighter community, 
was rife with black humour and one of its number suggested that any silent period 
could be described ‘as quiet as a Mirage crew room.’41  Ironically, the Sea Harrier pilot 
attributed with the comment would himself be killed during the latter stages of 
Operation Sutton.42   
 
As the number of combat air platform began to dwindle, the Argentines belatedly co-
located their combat air assets.  The remaining A-4B and A-4C Skyhawks were 
merged into a single unit based at San Julian from 9 June.43  In a similar timeframe, the 
surviving Daggers were brigaded together at Rio Gallegos.44  However, the benefit of 
the move was never realised as the campaign only had five days to run until the 
Argentine surrender.  Moreover, the endeavours to simplify Argentine logistics and 
concentrate their combat air capabilities were limited to a single Service rather than an 
																																																								
37 Burden, The Air War, 226. 
38 Consisting of ten A-4 Skyhawks and nine Daggers. 
39 See Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 for further details. 
40 Wood, The Narrow Margin, 212. 
41 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 276. 
42 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 90. 




air component perspective.  An earlier and joint perspective on co-located combat air 
operations could have benefitted the Argentines in the delivery of efficient air power. 
 
In an endeavour to offset the losses of the main Argentine attack assets, some of the 
perceived less capable aircraft were re-introduced to the air battles.  After a sabbatical 
that encompassed the period 4 - 20 May, the Canberra returned to combat operations.  
The platform’s vulnerability had been exposed during the initial raids on 1 May.  
Consequently, the temporary withdrawal from operations allowed the aircraft to focus 
on training for night attacks that included both low and medium-level attack options.  
However, of the eight aircraft in the fleet, only three aircraft were equipped with radar.45  
Without night vision goggles, forward-looking infra-red sensors, precision navigation 
systems or fleet-wide embodiment of radar, the Canberra’s new night attack capability 
was going to be, at best, a token effort.  Despite the benefits of a large payload, the 
Canberra’s outputs were of limited value.  During the 33 Canberra missions planned 
during the last, and the most intensive, phase of Operation Corporate, the Canberra 
planned to drop 162 weapons against British forces.46  Moro suggested that a number 
of attacks were successful.  However, it would appear that not one of the Canberra 
weapons struck a British target.47  Indeed, on watching one of the Canberra’s night 
attacks on 4 June, Southby-Tailyour commented on the Canberra’s lack of precision as 
‘a delightful waste of their ordnance.’48  Much like the medium-level Sea Harrier 
bombing runs against Stanley airfield, the Canberra raids, at best, caused a nuisance 
effect against British forces by applying pressure outside the normal daytime working 
hours of Argentine air power.  Consequently, the parochial and naïve Argentine 
approach to the application of air power limited their outputs and, as we will be 
demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, their desired outcome. 
 
Defining The British Operational Centre of Gravity Post-Operation Sutton  
 
During the last of the three phases of Operation Corporate, the Argentines had three 
distinct sets of targets to choose from: the carrier battle group, the amphibious assault 
force or the land force making its way from San Carlos to Stanley.  However, only one 
of them could constitute the centre of gravity.  It is the contention of this thesis that at 
this stage of the campaign the British strength lay with their ground force, a capability 
																																																								
45 Ibid., 29 and 86. 
46 See Annex H for further details. 
47 Moro suggested that in the early hours of 27 May, two Canberras destroyed ‘a brand new earth satellite station 
antenna’ and damaged a hospital facility at Ajax Bay.  Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 252.  Likewise on 31 May, two 
Canberras damaged the 846 Naval Air Squadron dispersal area.  Ibid., 281.  However, Burden reported that the first 
raid ‘did not cause any damage or casualties to the British forces.  With regard to the second raid at Fern Valley Creek, 
it also caused no serious injuries or damage although the bombing created a good deal of alarm.’  Burden, The Air War, 
91. 
48 Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, 250.	
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that could physically seize and hold Stanley and therefore deliver the British end-state 
of repossessing the Falkland Islands.  However, the aircraft carriers and the 
amphibious assault force both enabled the British land forces and, as a result, they 
should not be discarded as an irrelevant target set.  Damage or destruction of either 
would damage the British campaign, albeit the impact would vary depending on the 
breadth and depth of the attack.  The waning importance of the previous centre of 
gravity, the amphibious assault force, was highlighted by Southby-Tailyour when he 
returned to San Carlos during the last phase of the operation to see that it ‘was fast 
becoming a mere maintenance and stores area.’49  The reduced relevance and activity 
levels at San Carlos are a far cry from its centrality during Operation Sutton.  However, 
some participants suggested that the amphibious assault ships still retained primacy 
over the land forces during the last phase of the operation.  Even as late as 5 June, 
Captain Dingemans, the commanding officer of HMS Intrepid, believed that his ship, 
one of the two Landing Platform Docks, was more vital to the campaign than his cargo 
– the 600 men of the Second Battalion, Scots Guards.50 
 
Land Forces Falkland Islands 
Major General Jeremy Moore, Royal Marines 
3 Commando Brigade 
Brigadier Julian Thompson, Royal Marines 
5 Infantry Brigade 
Brigadier Tony Wilson 
40 Commando, Royal Marines Second Battalion, Scots Guards 
42 Commando, Royal Marines First Battalion, Welsh Guards51 
45 Commando, Royal Marines 
First Battalion, 
7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles 
2 PARA52  
3 PARA  
 
Table 5A – British Land Forces Falkland Islands – Task Group 317.1. 
 
With the British land force now identified as the centre of gravity for the last phase of 
Operation Corporate, it is now important to understand the infantry units that would 
provide its strength.  Consequently, Table 5A identifies the command team, the two 
Brigades and the eight subordinate fighting units deployed to the South Atlantic that 
would make up the key element of the British land component and the last of the three 




50 Ibid., 262. 
51 Transferred to 3 Commando Brigade on 9 June.  Thompson, No Picnic, 143. 
52 Transferred from 3 Commando Brigade to 5 Infantry Brigade, upon their arrival, until 9 June.  Ibid., 112 and 143. 
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For the British to achieve their desired end-state they had to defeat the Argentine 
fielded forces that held Stanley.  The only component that could achieve this outcome 
was the British land forces.  Consequently, these attributes can be distilled, as shown 
in Table 5B below, as the operational centre of gravity and critical capability for the 
post-Operation Sutton phase of the Conflict.  In keeping with previous chapters, by 
analysing the critical capability further, the critical requirements and critical 
vulnerabilities can be deduced.  The land force needed to be supported by the other 
components in order to bring additional firepower to bear against the enemy.  
Therefore, artillery, close air support as well as naval bombardment would be needed 
in order to offset the deficit in force size.  
 
Additionally, sustaining the force’s logistical needs would also be vital to maintain the 
tempo of operations and pressure upon the Argentine forces.  Lastly, control of both 
the air and sea was required to provide the other components with the necessary 
freedoms to conduct operations when and where required.  The associated risks with 
the British scheme of manoeuvre were considerable.  Force size, range, reach, speed 
and capability were all attributes that influenced Sea Harrier availability.  This critical 
vulnerability had to be understood, masked and mitigated in order to achieve the 
desired British campaign end-state.  However, did the Argentines understand the 
British needs and associated issues?  If so, could they exploit them deliberately or 
were the Argentines purely reliant on luck and arbitrary targeting to see them through 
to the end of the campaign? 
 
Following the first two phases of Operation Corporate, Argentine air power switched 
from a predominantly maritime to a mixed target set that encompassed both land and 
maritime-based targets.  As they were doctrinally restricted from training in the counter-
maritime role, it is perhaps not surprising that the Fuerza Aérea Argentina stumbled 
through the first two phases of the campaign.  However, the introduction of counter-
land operations as part of the latest phase of the operation was an area that should 
have been more familiar and successful for the Fuerza Aérea Argentina.  Therefore, 
was a paradigm shift in Argentine outputs and outcomes about to occur as a result of 
the new series of emerging targets?  Alternatively, were the issues that beset the 
previous phases of the Conflict simply too large to rectify?   
 
Although the Argentine plan to deal with the amphibious assault was set and 
distributed a month prior to the actual execution of Operation Sutton, there seems to 
have been less rigour applied to the use of Argentine air power following the 
amphibious assault.  Indeed, neither Rivas nor Moro highlighted the likely targets or 
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priorities let alone the planned apportionment between maritime and land-based 
targets.  Moro suggested that in order to preserve its aircraft the Argentine Air Force 
South Command deliberately avoided using its aircraft in the high-risk ground support 
missions.53  However, Moro’s remarks contradict the Argentine operational order that 
suggested that the secondary target set included the fielded force.54   
 
Centre of Gravity 
 
 




1.   The ability to defeat Argentine 
fielded forces on the Falkland Islands in 




1.1.1.   Force size in comparison to opposition. 
1.1.2.   Predictable direction of approach to 
Stanley. 
1.1.3.   Reduced speed of manoeuvre. 
1.1.4.   Approaching Austral winter. 
1.2.1.   Limited reach of artillery. 
1.2.2.   Significant artillery logistics burden. 
1.3.1.   Vulnerability of frigates during naval 
gunfire support. 
1.4.1.   Lack of precision strike. 
1.4.2.   Lack of night attack capability. 
1.4.3.   Reduced Harrier GR3 availability. 
1.4.4.   Limited Sea Harrier attack capability. 
1.4.5.   Forward Air Controller capability 
restricted. 
1.5.1.   Limited Sea Harrier availability. 
1.5.2.   Lack of intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance. 
1.5.3.   Limited Maritime Force Air Defence 
capability. 
1.5.4.   Ground-Based Air Defence limitations. 
1.6.1.   Lack of support helicopters. 
1.6.2    Long and vulnerable lines of 
communication. 




1.1.  A land force with tactical and moral 
advantage over Argentine counterparts. 
1.2.  Artillery Support. 
1.3.  Naval Gunfire Support. 
1.4.  Close Air Support 
1.5.  Control of the Air. 
1.6.  Logistical support. 
1.7.  Sea Control. 
 
 
Table 5B – British Operational Centre of Gravity Post-Operation Sutton. 
 
The Argentine command’s view is coherent with the philosophy of not attacking the 
enemy’s strength, or centre of gravity, directly.  However, it appears that Argentine air 
power outputs were predominantly reactive and increasingly low-risk in nature with little 
or no thought given to the more vulnerable and easier to strike targets that made up 
the critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities of the British ground forces.  By 
fighting a series of sporadic, bespoke, tactical engagements rather than a series of 
integrated, deliberate, planned attacks, achieving the desired outcome became an 
																																																								
53 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 299. 
54 Ibid., 227. 
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ambitious, if not an impossible, goal for the Argentines.  So what did Argentine air 
power actually achieve during the British advance to Stanley? 
 
Post-Operation Sutton Outputs  
 
Despite the static Argentine ground defences, the British build-up, breakout from the 
beachhead and transit to the hills surrounding Stanley was a slow affair.  Even with a 
full complement of support helicopters, the build-up of forces at San Carlos was 
planned to take seven days.  The loss of the MV Atlantic Conveyor and its support 
helicopter payload slowed both the offload and the onward movement of troops and 
their equipment to the key battles.  Additionally, Argentine air raids only compounded 
the slower than anticipated offload as non-essential supply ships sought the safer 
waters outside of the Total Exclusion Zone.  The perceived lack of activity and 
progress caused concerns at the strategic level.  The net result was that 2 PARA under 
the command of Lieutenant Colonel ‘H’ Jones was dispatched to capture, rather than 
raid (the initial plan), Goose Green.  The battle was controversial as it committed one 
of the five available British battalions to a battle that was not directly supporting the 
end-state of the campaign and, as Thompson himself argued, was ‘off the line of 
march.’55  However, the command team back in Britain believed that ‘the capture of 
Goose Green and Darwin was essential to protect the beachhead from a flanking 
attack.’56  From a strategic perspective, and cognisant that Moore and the force 
required to deliver the investment of Stanley were still days away from the Falkland 
Islands, the battle for Goose Green maintained campaign momentum and public 
support. 
 
As with the previous phases, the weather was a constraining factor in the planning and 
execution of missions.  However, and as shown in Annexes A and B, it was not an 
asymmetric advantage to either air component as the weather affected both 
participants in equal measure and only for a brief period in early June.  Beyond the 
period of 2 - 4 June, the weather was generally acceptable to conduct the various 
missions.  Ultimately, the weather was not a major constraint in generating combat air 
outputs for either participant. 
 
The period between the completion of Operation Sutton and the eventual Argentine 
surrender on 14 June saw a number of Argentine air power events – some successful, 
																																																								
55 The three battalions that encompassed 5 Infantry Brigade had yet to arrive on the Falkland Islands.  Clapp, 
Amphibious Assault Falklands, 170. 
56 TNA, AIR 20/13054.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): proposed official history of the campaign; Air Historical 
Branch article on the RAF's roles. 
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some less so.  However, did the Argentine air arms make the best use of their air 
power?  Analysis of Annex A shows that the Argentines flew 213 combat air sorties 
over the period of 27 May – 14 June, which equates to an average daily sortie rate of 
11 per day, although the daily profile varied considerably ranging from zero to 36.  The 
average Argentine daily flying rate following the amphibious assault was significantly 
less than the 24 sorties per day flown over the period of Operation Sutton and less 
than a third of the sorties flown by the British during the last phase of the Conflict.57  
Once again, and despite having the larger inventory, the Argentines were unable to 
better the British in terms of pure output.  Moreover, although there was only a minor 
difference in the number of Argentine combat air assets deployed between the start 
and the end of Operation Sutton, the daily outputs reduced by over fifty per cent.  The 
change in these levels reflected initial British intelligence assessments that ‘aircraft 
availability would drop sharply after a short period of intensive operations.’58  However, 





Figure 5.2 – Argentine Attack Weapon Apportionment Post-Operation Sutton. 
 
Complicating the Argentine attack plan further was the expansion of its target set.  With 
the British now ashore and advancing towards Stanley, the counter-land campaign was 
the prime target for Argentine air power.  Consequently, the amphibious force and the 
carrier battle group were still relevant targets but should have been viewed as 
secondary and tertiary targets.  As shown in Figure 5.2, the 213 combat air missions in 
																																																								
57 Derived from Annex B data, the British flew 654 combat air missions over the period 27 May-14 June, which equates 
to a daily sortie rate of 34. 









the last phase of Operation Corporate generated 550 weapons.  The weapons were 
split 207 (38 per cent) towards maritime targets with the remaining 343 (62 per cent) 
allocated to land-based targets.  Given the fact that the British weight of effort was now 
focused on the land campaign, it would seem that the Argentines could have 
apportioned additional assets to support the counter-land campaign.  During the last 
phase of the Falklands Conflict, five Argentine attack missions stand out in terms of 
their achievements and lessons against the prosecution of the British centre of gravity.   
 
The first event to consider took place on 27 May on the same day that 2 PARA 
advanced from Sussex Mountains for its upcoming battle at Goose Green.  Argentine 
air power was to make the first of a number of successful raids during the last phase of 
the Conflict.  Two formations each comprising three A-4B Skyhawks were tasked to 
attack ground targets in the San Carlos area and in a rare case it was cued by 
photographic reconnaissance from an earlier Learjet mission.59  Four of the six 
allocated aircraft reached the intended target area.  Two aircraft attacked the eastern 
shore and achieved some success against 40 Commando’s echelon area, killing one 
Royal Marine and wounding several others.60  In contrast, the A-4B Skyhawks that 
attacked the western shore of San Carlos struck the Brigade Maintenance Area, which 
was concentrated around the old refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay and consisted of an 
equipment dump, a cookhouse and a hospital complex.61  Although a number of the 
weapons did not explode, including two bombs that embedded themselves in the 
refrigeration plant housing the medical facility, several weapons hit their targets and 
detonated.62   The net result of the raid was six killed and 30 injured.63  Beyond the 
human casualties, the material damage was minimal, although the destruction of the 
weapons stockpile was spectacular.  However, the destroyed mortar ammunition that 
had been allocated to support the imminent Goose Green attack was quickly replaced 
and its substitution did not impede the tempo of operations.64  From an Argentine 
perspective, the intelligence-led attack proved to be successful, if costly.  Argentine air 
power delivered a strong and effective attack against a British critical vulnerability.  
However, the attack in the San Carlos area of operations was belated and had limited 
impact.  Moreover, the loss of one aircraft and damage to the remaining three A-4B 
Skyhawks applied further pressure on aircraft availability and aircrew morale.   
 
																																																								
59 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 101. 
60 Thompson, No Picnic, 91. 
61 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 160. 
62 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 229. 
63 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 563. 
64 Thompson, No Picnic, 91.	
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The second notable event took place during the 36-hour battle for Goose Green, the 
only major land battle of the campaign that took place during daylight.65  As neither the 
British nor the Argentines had a robust night attack capability, Goose Green was the 
only battle where air power directly supported the land battle.  Although poor weather 
affected air power’s early contribution to the battle, air power did play a significant role 
in the latter stages of the battle.  From a British perspective, and viewed through the 
eyes of one of the participants, the introduction of the Harrier GR3 in the latter stages 
of the battle was:  
 
‘A textbook example of a close air support mission: a hard-hitting attack against 
a target of great importance to the enemy.  Launched at a crucial time in the 
land battle, whose results were clearly seen by the ground troops – thus 
strengthening the resolve of those on one side and demoralising those on the 
other.’66   
 
Major Chris Keeble, who commanded 2 PARA during the latter stages of the battle 
following the death of its commanding officer, commented that ‘the attack gave a great 
boost to the morale of our troops.’67  While the British air power contribution was timely, 
accurate, effective and impacted on the morale of both sides; the Argentine air power 
contribution was less effective.  Prior to the British attack, two Comando de Aviación 
Naval Aermacchi MB-339s and two Fuerza Aérea Argentina Pucaras endeavoured to 
conduct close air support missions.  However, in contrast to the later Harrier GR3 
mission, the Argentine missions were ineffective, weapons missed their intended 
targets, two of the four aircraft were shot down and one pilot killed while the other was 
captured.68  Compromised by attrition during continued air raids at Stanley and the 
successful special forces attack at Pebble Island, Argentine air power was unable to 
deliver effective close air support missions and failed to deliver the required level of 
support to the land component.  Consequently, the credibility of Argentine air power 
was compromised. 
 
The next Argentine mission is the most contentious of the campaign in the eyes of 
Argentine commentators.  On 30 May, a formation of two Comando de Aviación Naval 
Super Etendards were supported by four Fuerza Aérea Argentina A-4C Skyhawks.  
This unique, joint mission intended to use the last remaining Exocet missile to strike 
one of the British aircraft carriers and use the Skyhawks to provide additional 
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66 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 116.	
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firepower.  The controversy regarding the mission was not about the only joint 
Argentine mission or its intended target but its outcome.  The Argentine version of 
events suggests that the formation of six aircraft attacked and sank HMS Invincible.  In 
contrast, the British narrative is that the last Exocet missile in the Argentine inventory 
missed its target, and the follow-on force of four A-4C Skyhawks attacked a Type 21 
frigate.  During the attack, two A-4C Skyhawks were shot down by Sea Darts fired from 
HMS Exeter and the two remaining aircraft, both flown by relatively junior and 
inexperienced pilots, untrained in maritime operations or ship recognition, dropped their 
weapons against - but missed - HMS Avenger.  The fact that HMS Invincible returned 
to the United Kingdom after the Conflict has not prevented some Argentine 
commentators from believing that HMS Invincible was sunk, and the loss covered up 
by the British. 
 
Irrespective of this bizarre controversy, it illustrates that there was a continued 
Argentine fascination with the British aircraft carriers, which at this late stage in the 
campaign was an unnecessary effort.  The aircraft carriers played host to many of the 
British critical vulnerabilities and any successful attack would have damaged the British 
campaign as well as providing the Argentines with a propaganda coup.  As discussed 
previously, any attack on the British aircraft carriers was unlikely to have been a fatal 
blow to the British campaign, particularly in the period after Operation Sutton.  
Consequently, precious Argentine air power resources could have been used to strike 
more appropriate and weaker critical vulnerabilities rather than a well-defended aircraft 
carrier.  As a result, the last Super Etendard/Exocet mission was a poor allocation of 
resources that ultimately neutered the Super Etendard capability as well as being 
responsible for the loss of two A-4C Skyhawks and their experienced pilots.69 
 
The most significant event during the phase, and the single largest loss of British life 
during the entire Conflict, occurred at Fitzroy on 8 June.  According to Southby-
Tailyour, the attacks on RFAs Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were entirely avoidable.70  
Nevertheless, the loss of 54 sailors and soldiers and a further 57 wounded was felt at 
both the military and political levels.71  In her memoirs, Thatcher’s reaction to the news 
of the attack was ‘how many more?’72  From a military perspective, amongst those on 
board the vessel were elements of the First Battalion, Welsh Guards, a key component 
of the 5 Infantry Brigade’s southern push towards Stanley.  Consequently, the attack by 
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five A-4B Skyhawks meant that although the battered Welsh Guards remained as a 
fighting unit following the attack it had to be bolstered by two companies of Royal 
Marines from 40 Commando.73  Even so, the unit was held initially in reserve.74  
However, at the operational level, the Welsh Guards were only one of the eight British 
battalions allocated to the land campaign and one of the seven battalions allocated to 
the upcoming battles around Stanley.  Although all seven units were allocated 
Argentine hilltop positions to capture, the more important and first battles were 
allocated to the strongest and most capable units with the weaker or more politically 
sensitive units allocated to the later and least likely to occur battles.  As a result, 
neither the Welsh Guards nor the Gurkha Rifles had to fight for their designated 
objectives, Mount William or Sapper Hill, as the Argentines capitulated before the battle 
for the last two hills surrounding Stanley.75  Ultimately, the Argentines, once again, 
attacked an element of the British operational centre of gravity but it was not struck 
with sufficient ferocity to do anything more than delay the British advance by two 
days.76  
 
From a broader campaign perspective, the British operated two Forward Brigade 
Maintenance Areas: one at Fitzroy supporting 5 Infantry Brigade on the southern flank 
and the other at Teal Inlet dedicated to 3 Commando Brigade and its northerly 
approach.77  Consequently, and as previously stated, the relevance of San Carlos 
diminished as the campaign progressed.  Although San Carlos and Fitzroy were 
attacked, the support base at Teal Inlet appeared to have been neither identified nor 
attacked.  The lack of emphasis on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance once 
again denuded Argentine planners with an opportunity to strike British critical 
vulnerabilities.   
 
The last attack to consider occurred on the penultimate day of the Conflict and was 
targeted against the 3 Commando Brigade headquarters on the western slopes of 
Mount Kent.  In fact, the headquarters was subject to two air attacks on 13 June, one 
by a Canberra in the early hours of the morning and the second later in the day by 
seven A-4B Skyhawks.78  Neither raid caused casualties but there is a disparity 
regarding the physical damage caused by the A-4B Skyhawk attack.  Cervera, one of 
the Argentine pilots involved in the raid, claimed to have seen four or five helicopters 
																																																								
73 40 Commando had been held in reserve for such an eventuality.  In contrast, the Argentine reserve had been 
committed and captured during the Battle for Goose Green.  Gardiner, The Yompers, 101. 
74 Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 283-4. 
75 The Gurkha battalion had been allocated to attack Mount William but the Argentines retreated from the hilltop prior to 
the assault.  Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 647. 
76 Specifically, several of the critical vulnerabilities shown in Table 5B; Thompson, No Picnic, 253. 
77 Privratsky, Logistics in Falklands War, 163. 
78 See Annex H for further details. 
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destroyed.79  Moro, in a more reflective mood, suggested that only three helicopters 
were obliterated.80  In contrast, making use of official British figures, Freedman states 
that three light helicopters were damaged.81  Irrespective of the number of helicopters 
damaged or destroyed during the attack, the proximity of the helicopter park to the 
headquarters compromised the 3 Commando Brigade’s command team.82  The 
numerous helicopter movements in the area provided Argentine observers with an 
insight into the importance of the area.  Although the headquarters only suffered a 
shredded tent, the damage could have been severe as the 3 Commando Brigade 
command team were due to hold a meeting at the time of the attack.83  However, as 
Freedman pointed out, the raid ‘was generally inconsequential.’84  The Argentines were 
able to find and attack the 3 Commando Brigade headquarters but it did so on the 
evening of the last of the already prepared land battles – too late for the desired effect 
to be campaign winning.  Unable to deliver the desired outcome, Argentine air power 
was, again, guilty of delivering too little, too late. 
 
Although all seven variants of Argentine combat air assets participated in the last 
phase of the Conflict, their ability to sustain their outputs varied considerably.  Due to 
their enforced sabbaticals following their losses on 1 May, the Mirage III and the 
Canberra forces were able to maintain a level of output until the end of the Conflict.  
After 1 May but before their reintegration into the campaign during Operation Sutton, 
the Mirage III force concentrated on defensive counter air missions over the southern 
Argentine air bases rather than sweep and escort sorties over the Falkland Islands.85  
However, several forces were not so fortunate.  The small but potent Super Etendard 
force flew its last mission and fired its last Exocet missile on 30 May, over two weeks 
before hostilities ceased.  On completion of its last mission, the Super Etendard force 
recovered north to its home, Base Aeronaval Commandante Espora, on 1 June in 
order to conduct night training.86  According to Rivas, the Super Etendards received 
orders on 13 June to deploy to Rio Grande for an attack mission with bombs.87  
However, the end of the Conflict prevented further Super Etendard involvement.  The 
issue of combat air sustainability for the Comando de Aviación Naval worsened when 
the A-4Q Skyhawk force flew its last mission on 12 June, on the day that the critical 
night battles around the hills of Stanley commenced.  
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The responsibility for the delivery of Argentine combat air now fell solely to the Fuerza 
Aérea Argentina.  However, were the units ready for the challenge?  Given the heavy 
attrition of its assets during Operation Sutton and the enduring serviceability issues 
across the fleets, it is not surprising that these issues started to take its toll on the 
force’s outputs.  With the Mirage III force dedicated to the control of the air role, the 
responsibility for the remaining attack missions fell to the Canberra, A-4 Skyhawk and 
Daggers.  However, despite fair weather over their airfields and operating area, no 
attack missions were flown from the Argentine mainland on 11 June.  However, were 
the Argentines preserving and repairing their force once again for a surge of activity 
during the latter stages of the campaign?  Activity levels for 12 and 13 June would 
suggest that this was the case.  Despite poor weather on the morning of 12 June, the 
Argentines mustered 18 sorties.  A further 28 missions were flown on 13 June, 
significantly more than the average of 11 missions per day for the phase of operations.  
Moreover, the Argentine combat air output over the last few days of the campaign 
appears all the more impressive given the fact that four of the seven combat air units 
were unable to participate.  However, this figure must be seen in the context of what 
the Argentine combat air arms delivered just three weeks prior.  On 21 May, the 
Argentines achieved a campaign peak of 72 combat air missions in a single day.  
Additionally, what did the surge in the last few days actually achieve? 
 
Analysis of Annex H shows that the missions over the period 12 and 13 June, with one 
notable exception that was described earlier, achieved very little in terms of getting 
Argentine weapons onto their designated or vital targets.  Indeed, there was a sharp 
increase in the number of Argentine aircraft being deterred by British defences.  
However, given the fact that the British defensive contribution had not increased 
significantly in terms of capability or volume, it leads to the assumption that the 
Argentine risk appetite had decreased significantly from that seen earlier in the 
campaign.88 
 
One of the enduring perspectives of the Falklands Conflict is the view that Argentine 
pilots were brave, utterly dedicated and a direct reflection of Argentine pride, ethos and 
culture.  Vaux’s view is a typical statement on the virtues of Argentine aircrew; ‘few 
assessors had anticipated that the Argentine pilots would prove as resolute and 
tenacious as they turned out to be.’89  However, their reduced performance in the latter 
stages of the Falklands Conflict sheds a slightly different, and more human, view of 
them.  Perhaps Clapp offers a more balanced and accurate view when he suggests 
																																																								
88 As shown in Annex B, Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 sorties over the period 12-13 June stood at 45 and 31 – which 
when aggregated over the two days is slightly higher than the norm for the phase that stood at 34 missions per day. 
89 Vaux, March to the South Atlantic, 56. 
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that ‘if their aircrew were any guide to the rest of their armed forces there was certainly 
determination but there was an equally clear will among some of the pilots to survive ... 
they would be a patchy enemy.’90  Therefore, had the reduction in Argentine combat air 
participants, British campaign advances as well as cumulative aircraft and aircrew 
losses finally taken its toll on the Fuerza Aérea Argentina moral component?  This 
issue will be addressed below. 
 
Analysing the Outcomes Post-Operation Sutton  
 
As in previous Chapters, this section seeks to identify the causal factors, in priority 
order, for the failure of Argentine weapons to reach their intended targets.  Figure 5.3, 
below, shows pictorially the data contained within Annex H and demonstrates that the 
Argentines planned to use a total of 550 weapons over the period 27 May to 14 June.  
In response to the British break out from San Carlos, the Argentines launched 506 of 
the planned weapons (or 92 per cent), a minor six per cent improvement over the 
activities during Operation Sutton.  During the transit to the Falkland Islands, the 
number of weapons reduced to 442, which equated to 80 per cent of those planned 
and 87 per cent of those weapons that managed to get airborne (an improvement of 17 
per cent and 14 per cent respectively when compared with the same activities during 
the amphibious assault).  Nevertheless, 361 weapons managed to breach the British 
defences (equating to 71 per cent, also a major improvement in comparison to 
Operation Sutton, of those bombs that were launched successfully and 82 per cent of 
the weapons that reached the Islands).  The improved performance, although marginal, 
is perhaps surprising given the parlous state of the mainland-based combat air 
capability.  However, the introduction of the Canberra in the low-level night attack role 
could account for the difference in performance between the two phases.  Moreover, 
the British targets were geographically dispersed rather than focused in the San Carlos 
area leading to a more diffuse defensive coverage.  Nevertheless, could the Argentines 
sustain this level of improvement through to successful weapon delivery? 
 
In the target area, 178 weapons were employed against the fleet with only 18 hitting 
the target or target area (three per cent of the weapons planned, four per cent of the 
bombs that managed to get airborne and 10 per cent of those dropped).  In contrast to 
the earlier figures for this phase of operations, the weapon employment data shows a 
marked decrease in performance when compared with Operation Sutton.  So, if the 
Argentine targeting was ineffective during the last phase of Operation Corporate, what 
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were the causal factors behind failing to deliver the weapons against their intended 
targets? 
 
Drawn from analysis of Annex H, Table 5C, shown below, identifies the reasons why 
Argentine bombs failed to strike their intended targets.  When compared with the 
analysis in the previous chapters it can be seen that of the top five factors, three of 
them are repeated in all three phases of the campaign: missed their target (31 per 
cent), failed to drop their weapons (27 per cent) and air aborts (16 per cent).  All three 
factors were solely within the gift of the Argentines to resolve and are not influenced by 
external factors such as the British defence of their centres of gravity.  Moreover, 
neither of the common perceptions regarding the Conflict - Sea Harrier dominance and 




Figure 5.3 - The Utility of Argentine Weapons Post-Operation Sutton. 
 
Of note, the Sea Harrier’s ability to generate a ‘soft kill’ is included in the list of top five 
factors for the third phase of the campaign.  Consequently, it can be determined that 
the Sea Harrier’s performance throughout the campaign was inconsistent.  Following a 
strong showing during the first phase of the campaign, the Sea Harrier’s 
accomplishments ebbed significantly during the second phase.  Nevertheless, the Sea 






550 Weapons Planned 
Weapons Airborne 
Weapons Reach Islands 
Weapons Employed Against UK Targets 
Weapons Hit Targets 
Weapons Breach Defences 
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Harrier did produce a stronger performance during the third and last phase of the 
campaign where it was able to influence eight per cent of the planned Argentine 
weapons.  Some commentators, such as Ward, argued that the Sea Harrier’s 
performance reflected its dominance throughout the campaign.  However, the evidence 
suggests an alternative narrative.  During the latter stages of the third phase, it is clear 
that Argentine aircrew were reluctant to engage or press home their attacks in a 
contested environment.  Realising that their cause was rapidly becoming lost, 
Argentine aircrew understandably adopted a low-risk, life-preserving approach to their 
air operations.  As a result, many Argentine aircrew elected to abort their missions 
rather than face an opposed attack – whether that be from Sea Harrier combat air 
patrol or from the variety of ground and maritime-based air defence systems.  
Therefore, it could be argued that many of the ‘soft kills’ attributed to the Sea Harrier 
community were not a reflection of the Sea Harrier’s dominance or reputation but the 
self-preservation of a cadre of self-aware and soon to be defeated Argentine aircrew.    
 
 
Table 5C - Causal Factors for Failure to Deliver Weapons Post-Operation Sutton. 
 
With the British armed forces moving inexorably towards their desired end-state, the 
Argentine aircrew continued to fly their tasked sorties.  However, with failing equipment 
and significant losses in terms of both aircraft and personnel, Argentine aircrew morale 
Ranking Causal Factor 
Scale 
(out of 550) 
Percentage 
1 Weapon Employment - Missed Target 171 31 
2 Weapons not Dropped 149 27 
3 Serviceability - Air Abort 88 16 
4 Sea Harrier – Soft Kill  44 8 
5 Serviceability - Ground Abort 22 4 
6 Maritime Force Air Defence – Soft Kill 20 4 
7 Mission Cancelled  16 3 
8 Serviceability – Weapon Employment 13 2 
9 Weapon Employment – Hit and Detonates 11 2 
10 Weapon Employment – Unexploded Bomb 7 1 
11 Maritime Force Air Defence – Hard Kill 6 1 
12 Sea Harrier – Hard Kill 3 <1 
 Total 550 100 
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appeared to be waning.  Consequently, in the last few days of the campaign, Argentine 
aircrew may have been unable or unwilling to accept the risks required to turn these 
last few missions into the required outcomes.  As a result, mission aborts due to 
inability to find the target, aircraft serviceability issues and the presence of Sea Harrier 
combat air patrols increased significantly.  This change in ethos sits uncomfortably with 
the macho, passionate and proud Argentine culture as well as the global perception of 
the brave and heroic Argentine fighter pilots.  Although Moro highlighted the criticism 
that ‘the air force failed to operate during the last days of the conflict,’ he failed to rebut 
or provide evidence to counter the allegation.91  Consequently, Moro is content to retain 
the common perception of Argentine aviators as the valiant vanquished.  The 
perception is reinforced in an Operational Research Branch report from Headquarters 
RAF Strike Command from September 1983 that stated, ‘though they sustained 
considerable damage, it is fair to say that their air forces were not beaten and 
remained a viable force at the end of hostilities.’92  However, the evidence tells a 
different story.   
 
In an endeavour to capture the state of the Argentine air arm’s moral component it is 
useful to exploit the Argentine Army’s views on what doctrinally constituted a broken 
military force.  During the latter stages of the Conflict General Galtieri, the Argentine 
leader, told his Military Governor in the Falkland Islands, ‘that the Argentine military 
code stipulated that a commander should fight until he has lost 50 per cent of his men 
and used 75 per cent of his ammunition.’93  The Argentine leader’s view chimed with 
the measurement of effectiveness figures used during Operation Desert Storm to 
assess Coalition success against the Iraqi Republican Guard.94  Although the model is 
Army-centric it does have utility in the air environment, particularly if the term 
‘ammunition’ is replaced by the term ‘aircraft and weapons.’  The model provides a 
suitable comparison to articulate the level of attrition in the physical component of 
Argentine air power as the campaign drew to a close.  However, the model, as 
demonstrated in Annex I, is not without its flaws.  First, it assumed that each air unit 
was fully manned and equipped at the start of the Conflict.  Second, it does not take 
into account the quality of the pilots nor their platforms.  Consequently, each pilot and 
aircraft is assessed to deliver the same capability and does not take into consideration 
individual experience, currency levels or aircraft performance and payload.   Last, from 
an engineering perspective, the logistics challenges faced by many of the platforms are 
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not accounted for.  Nevertheless, there are a number of useful deductions that can be 
drawn from the data contained within Annex I.   
 
The first issue identified in Annex I is that no Argentine combat air unit flew on the last 
day of the Conflict, the last four remaining units flew their last missions the day prior.  
Of the seven Argentine combat air units that flew during the Conflict, only five were 
available for the start of the critical hill top battles on the evening of 11 June.  Of note, 
one of those five units, the A-4Q Skyhawk squadron, would cease operations on 12 
June, in the midst of the key land battles. 
 
It can also be noted that aircraft and weapon availability, rather than manpower, was 
the major constraint for all Argentine combat air units.  Indeed the parlous aircraft 
figures shown in Annex I are optimistic as they show the number of airframes available 
rather than aircraft that were physically capable of being used on operations.  Indeed, 
Rivas suggests that at the end of the Conflict, of the eight available A-4C Skyhawks 
only two were operationally capable.95  Analysis of Annex I shows that by the end of 
Operation Sutton, three of the seven combat air units were already below the critical 
aircraft level of 75 per cent.  This trend continued, by 1 June only the Canberra unit, 
courtesy of its enforced sabbatical, had more than 75 per cent of its airframes 
available. 
 
The Argentine units were well manned, and although the vast majority of units suffered 
losses, only one unit, the A-4C Skyhawk unit, came close to reaching the critical 
manning level of 50 per cent before ending its flying operations on 9 June, five days 
before the surrender and three days before the land battles for Stanley commenced.96  
However, the downside of a well-manned unit with limited flying assets was the lack of 
flying opportunities.  Consequently, and in sharp contrast to the British situation, 
analysis of Rivas’ work suggests that over 60 per cent of Argentine aircrew only flew 
three missions or less during the campaign; some way short of the Sea Harrier pilots 
who had each flown, on average, 45 missions during the Conflict.97  Moreover, further 
analysis of Rivas’ work shows that the maximum number of operational missions flown 
by any Argentine combat air pilot during the Conflict was nine.  In contrast, Flight 
Lieutenant Ted Ball flew the most Sea Harrier missions during the Conflict with 64 
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96 Some commentators, such as Burden, suggested that Grupo 4 de Caza, the A-4C Skyhawk unit, flew its last 
operational mission on 8 June and ended the Conflict with only four airworthy aircraft.  Burden, The Air War, 116. 
97 Figures encompass most of the Sea Harrier pilots who flew during the Conflict including those who arrived belatedly 
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missions.98  The Argentine flying rate was notably below the level which formed the 
mandate for the United States Air Force Exercise Red Flag.  Based on Vietnam War 
experiences, where it was shown that ‘the first ten missions a pilot flew were his most 
dangerous, and that if he could survive this without getting shot down, then his chance 
of survival significantly increased.’99  Consequently, the Nevada-based exercise aimed 
to provide aircrew with those first ten combat missions but in a peacetime training 
environment.  The net result from an Argentine combat air perspective was that its 
corporate knowledge and experience levels during the Conflict were significantly lower 
than its British adversary.  Argentine performance and survivability suffered as a result. 
 
The evidence presented would suggest that the established image of brave Argentine 
pilots pressing home their attacks with vigour, while valid for the period of Operation 
Sutton, exaggerates the Argentine aircrews’ contribution during the last days of the 
campaign. 
 
Over the last three chapters, the focus has been on Argentine air power’s ability to 
prosecute British forces during the three distinct phases of the Falklands Conflict: the 
initial preparation of the battle-space, the amphibious assault and, ultimately, the 
campaign to capture Stanley.  The next chapter will look at the British contribution to 
the defence of the various centres of gravity throughout the campaign.  Encompassing 
the air, maritime and land contributions to the British delivery of control of the air, it 
builds on the issues already identified regarding the challenges of delivering the 
required level of control of the air.  Consequently, many of the claims and lessons 
identified in early British official accounts of the Falklands Conflict are challenged.100 
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Defending the British Operational Centres of Gravity – Sea 
Harrier: The Decisive Factor? 
 
 
‘It is now clear that a very high percentage of the Argentine attack missions never got 
through to their targets, and all of the credit for this deterrence must fall to the outer 
ring of defence, that is the three [Sea Harrier] Combat Air Patrols.’ 
 
Lieutenant Commander Nigel Ward, 
Commanding Officer 801 Naval Air Squadron.1 
 
The previous chapters have looked specifically at the Argentine prosecution of British 
forces throughout the campaign.  The analysis so far highlights that the British 
defensive influences on the campaign were not as convincing as many observers, such 
as Ward, have suggested.  Consequently, this chapter reviews the British defence of 
their various centres of gravity throughout the campaign in greater depth and in 
particular their ability to deliver the required level of control of the air.  As a result, this 
chapter will initially focus on the Sea Harrier’s performance.  Specifically, this chapter 
considers the much-repeated assertion that the Sea Harrier and the AIM-9L variant of 
the Sidewinder were fundamental to the defeat of the Argentines.  However, the Sea 
Harrier was not the sole contributor to control of the air.  Thus, the chapter will also 
examine the contributions of both British ground-based and maritime force air 
defences.  
 
The dominance of the Sea Harrier with its rapidly introduced AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-
air missiles during the air battles is a much-quoted factor in explaining the successful 
British outcome of the Conflict.  The notion permeated the strategic, operational and 
tactical views of the Conflict.  For example, at the grand strategic level, Thatcher 
suggested that ‘without the [Sea] Harriers, with their extraordinary manoeuvrability, 
flown with superb skill and courage, and using the latest version of the Sidewinder air-
to-air missile supplied by Caspar Weinberger, we could not have retaken the 
Falklands.’2  Likewise, at the operational level and used as the conduit to apprise the 
political level, participants such as Woodward concluded that ‘it is now perfectly clear 
to me that without those AIM-9L [Sidewinder missiles] the Sea Harriers would not have 
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been good enough.’3  Moreover, within the land domain and embracing Ward’s 
maritime and air viewpoint, key leaders such as Ian Gardiner, a company commander 
with 45 Commando during the Falklands Conflict, suggested that ‘they [the Argentine 
air forces] could have won the war for Argentina, had it not been for the outstanding 
performance of our Harriers, and the Royal Navy ships, which stopped many aircraft 
from getting as far as us and our logistics.’4  The perception of Sea Harrier and AIM-9L 
Sidewinder dominance has not been limited to the British.  The apologue has 
subsequently percolated to the United States.  For example, T.R. Milton, a retired 
United States Air Force General, is quoted as saying:  
 
‘It was the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile that caused the most envy.  In 
the opinion of the Argentines, almost any airplane becomes something to be 
taken seriously if it has the AIM-9L [Sidewinder].’5   
 
Adding weight to the argument is the Argentine Dagger pilot, Horacio Mir Gonzales 
who said that ‘our main enemy was the Sidewinder; our main enemy was the Sea 
Harrier.’6  Indeed, the Dagger force lost ten aircraft during the period of the landings, 
which included eight aircraft lost to the Sea Harrier and AIM-9L Sidewinder 
combination.  The balance of the narrative is overwhelming in favour of the Sea Harrier 
and AIM-9L Sidewinder dominance.  However, does the evidence support the 
assertion?  
 
Supporting the established position, and as shown in Chapter 3, the Sea Harrier and 
AIM-9L Sidewinder combination made an impressive debut on 1 May.  As a result, the 
Sea Harrier was the second most influential factor in stopping Argentine weapons 
during the prelude to the amphibious assault.  However, the evidence suggested that 
the Sea Harrier’s dominance in the air war was short-lived and the aircraft’s influence 
dwindled as the campaign progressed.  Indeed, and as shown in Chapter 4, the 
aircraft’s sway fell significantly during Operation Sutton to the joint fifth most influential 
factor in stopping Argentine weapons.  Moreover, and as highlighted in the previous 
chapter, during the third, and final, phase of the campaign the Sea Harrier’s dominance 
marginally improved to the fourth most influential factor.  Nevertheless, this latter 
position may have been driven by Argentine ambivalence rather than Sea Harrier 
dominance.  Throughout the three phases of the Conflict, the Sea Harrier was 
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demonstrably the most influential British factor affecting the prosecution of Argentine 
weapons.  However, the Sea Harrier’s performance was some way short of fulfilling the 
post-Conflict praise heaped upon it.  In order to understand the disparity, this chapter 
will review the effectiveness of the Sea Harrier capability as well as the broader British 
contribution to control of the air during Operation Corporate. 
 
It can be argued that three elements of the Sea Harrier capability must be considered 
in order to understand its strengths and weaknesses during the prosecution of 
Operation Corporate.  As shown in Figure 6.1 below, the elements to be considered 
are the three key equipment components which make up the Sea Harrier capability: the 
platform, the sensor and the weapon.  All three components must be optimised and 
integrated seamlessly if the capability’s full potential is to be exploited.  In isolation, a 
single component cannot deliver the required effect.  By way of example, the recently 
introduced Super Etendard capability achieved an effective balance across all three 
components.  However, the Super Etendard lacked the necessary numbers to sustain 
its outputs throughout the Conflict.  Consequently, the Super Etendard was unable to 




Figure 6.1 - The Sea Harrier Equipment Triumvirate. 
 
The platform, or aircraft in this instance, should incorporate, at the very least, the core 
air power attributes of height, speed and reach as specified in the United Kingdom Air 
and Space Doctrine.7  In contrast, the weapon must be reliable, numerous, easy to 
use, lethal and have a broad operating envelope in order to optimise its utility.  Lastly, 
the purpose of the sensor is to aid situational awareness, prosecute the target to the 
																																																								





attacker’s advantage and enable the full potential of the weapon to be brought to bear 
against the enemy.  Although the three components have an equipment focus, each 
component must also be supported by the remaining Defence Lines of Development in 
order that the full capability can be fielded and used.  Each component will be 
discussed in turn in the context of the Sea Harrier and its impact on the prosecution of 
Operation Corporate. 
 
Delivery of control of the air through manned fighters is not merely a function of the 
platform’s capability.  The aircraft must be supported by a number of enabling 
functions.  However, the British Task Force deployed to the South Atlantic with a finite 
resource of Sea Harriers but, critically, no airborne early warning capability.  The 
situation in 1982 was the polar opposite of the position desired by the Royal Navy in 
the mid-1960s following the CVA01 debacle.8  Airborne early warning was perceived to 
be the priority capability furnished by future aircraft carriers.9  However, a lack of 
hangar space and accommodation led to the airborne early warning capability being 
deleted from the staff requirement during the detailed design phase for the new 
Invincible-class of aircraft carriers, a decision that would be lamented in the South 
Atlantic during 1982.10  Nevertheless, the rapid introduction of a Sea King airborne 
early warning capability benefitted from the retention of early Sea King-based airborne 
early warning designs.  Consequently, after early scoping meetings on 13 May, the 
Sea King airborne early warning capability was fielded on 30 July.11  The rapid 
introduction into service was an impressive feat but it was too late to influence the 
Falklands Conflict. 
 
Unlike the previous generation of British naval aviation, the most recent batch of 
aircraft carriers had no indigenous air-to-air refuelling capability to provide the Sea 
Harrier combat air patrols with greater persistence.  The lack of enablers meant that 
the Sea Harrier force was also operating at a higher tempo and with limited situational 
awareness.  An opponent who was willing to contest the air battle could have exploited 
the increased level of risk placed upon the Sea Harrier force.  However, the Argentine 
planners elected to focus on the attack role to the detriment of control of the air and 
discarded one of their stipulated five campaign priorities – active air defence against 
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airborne early warning was the most important embarked role.  D. Hobbs, The British Carrier Strike Fleet After 1945 
(Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2015), 419. 
10 Ibid., 464. 
11 Ibid., 517. 
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aircraft and helicopters.  Consequently, the Sea Harriers were able to intercept 




Figure 6.2 – AIM-9L Sidewinder Employment during the Falklands Conflict.13 
 
From a weapons perspective, Figure 6.2, shown above and based on the data 
contained within Annex J, is a pictorial representation of the various Sea Harrier and 
AIM-9L Sidewinder engagements against Argentine aircraft throughout the Conflict.  
The aircraft image in the centre of the diagram represents the Argentine aircraft and 
the blue zone surrounding the target aircraft signifies the area where a Sea Harrier 
could effectively engage the target with the AIM-9L Sidewinder.  When compared with 
the grey zone, the stern only AIM-9G Sidewinder engagement zone, it can be seen 
that the AIM-9L Sidewinder provided significant kinematic and tactical advantages 
over its predecessor.14  The evolutionary technological change that enabled the 
expanded weapon envelope of the AIM-9L Sidewinder was the introduction of a new 
seeker that allowed the missile to ‘detect the longer wavelengths associated with 
warm aircraft parts, such as nose cones, giving the missile “all-aspect capability”, 
including the long desired head-on shot.’15  The level of success achieved reinforced 
the dominance of the Sea Harrier weapon system over Argentine aircraft.  However, 
																																																								
12 There were two documented occasions where Sea Harriers were vulnerable to attack by Argentine aircraft.  On 21 
May, while attacking a formation of three Daggers, Ward’s Sea Harrier was subject to an unsuccessful gun attack by a 
Dagger.  Ward, Sea Harrier, 265.  On 8 June, Morgan’s Sea Harrier flew in front of an unseen A-4B Skyhawk.  
However, due to a jammed cannon the Argentine pilot was unable to fire.  Morgan, Hostile Skies, 267. 
13 Diagram derived from R. Shaw, Fighter Combat.  (Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1985), 47 and TNA, DEFE 
69/1112.  Air Matters.  The numbers contained within each coloured circle reflect the Annex J serial number of each 
AIM-9L Sidewinder firing. 
14 TNA, DEFE 69/1112.  Air Matters. 
15 R. Westrum, Sidewinder, 192.	
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the Sea Harrier’s ability to exploit the new generation of AIM-9 Sidewinder was limited 
by two key factors: the Sea Harrier’s radar and training.   
 
The Sea Harrier’s radar was designed for airborne interception as well as surface 
attack.  In both roles, the radar was designed to detect, track and engage targets 
allowing the chosen weapon to be quickly cued and launched against its intended prey.  
Although the Blue Fox radar was effective in the clutter-free environment of medium to 
high altitude operations, it struggled in high clutter environments.  The key 
environments where the system toiled to detect targets occurred during operations at 
low altitude overland or when facing a significant height difference between the Sea 
Harrier and a target aircraft operating at a significantly lower altitude.  However, the 
radar’s practical performance had a direct correlation to the system’s performance 
specification.  The radar was optimised to operate between 15 000 and 35 000 feet as 
well as functioning effectively down to 5000 feet.16  In other words, the system was 
focussed on the expected operating environment of its anticipated nemesis, the Soviet 
‘Bear D’ reconnaissance aircraft.  Moreover, each aircraft needed to have its own radar 
set in order to be effective.  Nevertheless, and not for the first time in the Sea Harrier 
programme, there was a deficit in the number of radars available as ‘3 of the re-
inforcement [Sea] Harriers that will be embarked on [MV] Atlantic Conveyor have a 
severely degraded air combat capability due to the lack of Blue Fox radars.’17  
Fortunately, the requisition of Blue Fox radars intended for the Indian Sea Harriers 
mitigated the deficits in radar numbers.  Despite its inadequacies, advocates of the Sea 
Harrier believed that those who did not fully understand the system overstated the 
radar’s limitations.18   
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, only two of the twenty successful AIM-9L Sidewinder 
engagements were fired from beyond the AIM-9G Sidewinder engagement envelope.19  
Nonetheless, elements of the Sea Harrier force had adapted its tactics in an endeavour 
to exploit the new enhanced head-on capability that the AIM-9L Sidewinder provided.20  
Consequently, the new tactics were used successfully on 1 May when two Sea 
Harriers engaged two Mirage III fighters.  With both sets of aircraft operating in the 
clutter-free environment of medium altitude, the Sea Harriers executed their new radar-
based tactics.  As the aircraft rapidly closed towards each other, the lead Sea Harrier 
pilot attempted to achieve a missile lock.  However, due to simple, but effective, 
																																																								
16 TNA, DEFE 72/257.  Sea Harrier Specification.	
17 TNA, DEFE 69/1112.  Air Matters. 
18 Ward, Sea Harrier, 173. 
19 Both of the engagements outside of the traditional AIM-9G Sidewinder weapon envelope were due to late target 
aircraft manoeuvre rather than the Sea Harrier exploiting the tactical advantage of its new weapon system. 
20 TNA, DEFE 69/836.  801 Naval Air Squadron flight report. 
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Argentine countermeasures the Sea Harrier pilots were unable to use the AIM-9L 
Sidewinder in the head-on engagement.  Nevertheless, the Sea Harrier tactics were 
sufficiently flexible that the pilots quickly converted to a successful stern sector attack.21 
 
Following the lessons of the first air battles on 1 May, the Argentines rapidly changed 
their operating procedures by focusing on attack missions using low-level, high-clutter 
overland routes.  As a result, British air defences had limited situational awareness of 
incoming raids.  Post-Conflict analysis shows that the British detected 109 of the 
ingressing high altitude Argentine raids and scrambled or provided initial vectors for 
Sea Harriers against the intruders.22  Despite the early warnings, the raids would 
descend into the high clutter, low altitude environment for their final approach and 
attacks.  The evolving Argentine tactics meant that the Sea Harriers struggled to detect 
the low-flying raids on their radars and, as a result, had few opportunities to achieve a 
full weapon system kill.  Consequently, and as demonstrated in Figure 6.2, the Sea 
Harrier pilots were forced into a visual acquisition of the target that tended to lead to 
stern engagements using visually assessed and less precise ranges, rather than the 
more accurate radar-deduced ranges to employ their weapons.  
 
Ward argued that even at low level the Sea Harrier’s radar remained effective.  By way 
of an example, Ward cited his successful prosecution of an Argentine C-130 Hercules 
on 1 June.23  However, analysis of the attack demonstrates both the good and the bad 
of the Sea Harrier capability.  There is little doubt that the skilful manipulation of the 
Blue Fox radar allowed Ward to detect and close on his prey.  Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that the pilot’s range awareness diminished as he quickly closed on the large 
and slow-speed C-130 Hercules.  Ward was aware that he was critically short of fuel 
and may have become visually fixated on the target to the detriment of monitoring the 
range to the target presented to him by his radar.24  The net result was that Ward’s first 
missile failed to intercept the target; it is highly likely that the weapon was fired beyond 
its maximum range.  After rapidly closing on the C-130 Hercules, his second 
Sidewinder successfully found its target.  However, the injured C-130 Hercules 
remained airborne.  Consequently, Ward was forced to deliver the coup de grace with 
his 30mm Aden cannon.25  During his attack, Ward may have been swayed by the 
guidance offered that morning in a signal from Commander Task Force which 
suggested that ‘shooting opportunities are at best fleeting. If you think you are in range 
																																																								
21 TNA, DEFE 67/135. Operational Evaluation Group Report Number 2/83, Operation Corporate: Reconstruction of 
AAW Conflict, Volume 1 – 1 May 1982.	
22 TNA, DEFE 48/1162.  Reconstruction and analysis of the air war during Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict). 
23 Ward, Sea Harrier, 302.	
24 TNA, AIR 8/3112.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
25 See Annex J Serials 22 and 23 for further details. 
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always fire something.  It might hit.’26  The same signal then offered contradictory 
advice when it informed that in respect of the missile stockpile, ‘conservation vital.’27   
 
The Sea Harrier force was well versed and trained in fighter versus fighter tactics.  
Indeed, Ward informed readers of his memoir that the Sea Harrier achieved 
considerable success against the latest US fighters.  During training missions against 
US Navy F-14 Tomcats and USAF F-15 Eagles, the Sea Harriers dominated their 
opposition and reputedly achieved kill ratios of 40:1 and 3:1 respectively.28  However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the Sea Harriers trained against a more eclectic 
and physically larger target set such as the C-130 Hercules or Canberra.29  As 
highlighted by Ward, the reason for this change in emphasis may be attributed to the 
lack of Blue Fox radars during the early days of Sea Harrier operational training.30  
Forced to focus on visual manoeuvring against a fighter aircraft, where the use of radar 
is of secondary importance, the Sea Harrier pilots were able to hone their basic fighting 
skills.  Conversely, the counter-argument would imply that the lack of access to the 
Blue Fox radar might have compromised the Sea Harrier’s ability to prosecute a larger 
target set more efficiently.  At the maximum range of a missile, a large aircraft can 
appear to be significantly closer to the launch aircraft than a smaller fighter size target.  
As a result, unless the pilot is using accurate ranging from his sensor or is well trained 
and experienced in large aircraft intercepts, there is a possibility that weapons can be 
employed outside of the kinematic envelope of the missile.  Given that the Sea Harrier 
was specifically designed to counter the large Soviet ‘Bear D’ threat, it is perhaps 
surprising that the Sea Harrier capability performed poorly against the larger Argentine 
aircraft.  Consequently, reliance on inaccurate pilot-assessed, rather than sensor-
deduced, distances between the fighter and its prey could account for the poor 
performance of the six AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles fired against larger Argentine 
aircraft for a return of only one kill.  With much of the Sea Harrier’s previous training 
focussed against fighter aircraft, it is perhaps not surprising that the Sea Harrier 
capability performed poorly against the Argentine Canberra formation on 1 May and 
the sole C-130 Hercules on 1 June.  This issue may well be a case of a relatively new 
platform entering service with insufficient time to train for the full gamut of tasks that it 
was designed to conduct.  However, the alternative view would suggest that the Sea 
Harrier pilots correctly focused their training on the most dangerous threats and 
achieved, when able, considerable success against their fighter-sized counterparts.   
																																																								
26 TNA, DEFE 72/271.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): includes intelligence summaries. 
27 Ibid.	
28 Imperial War Museum, “Ward, Nigel David ‘Sharkey’ (Oral History)” 
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80012551 (accessed 28 November 2018). 
29 Ward, Sea Harrier, 93.	




The relatively small warhead contained within the Sidewinder missile further 
compounds the issue of engaging larger aircraft.  Although effective against a small 
and agile fighter aircraft, the Sidewinder’s warhead struggled to achieve a single shot 
kill against a larger aircraft which has the benefit of numerous levels of redundancy 
such as engines, electrical and hydraulic systems.  Therefore, the fighter must be 
prepared to deliver multiple missiles in order to achieve the desired result – a ‘hard kill.’  
Consequently, for a fighter aircraft, the quality and quantity of its weapon payload is a 
key parameter.  This is a lesson that the Sea Harrier community quickly rectified post-
Conflict, rather than during as Corum suggested, when it doubled the aircraft’s payload 
of AIM-9L Sidewinders from two to four following the introduction of a dual-missile 
pylon for each wing.31  The issue was not only a payload concern but also the 
implications of multiple shots against a formation could cause a drain on the limited 
deployed AIM-9L Sidewinder stockpile.  The last point was reinforced by a signal on 3 
June from HMS Hermes that stated that one of its lessons learned was ‘do not fire 
second missile unless sure first has missed.’32 
 
As shown in Annex J, a total of 26 Sidewinders were fired during the Conflict, leading 
to 20 hits and 17 kills and resulted in a probability of kill of 65 per cent.  This figure is 
significantly less than the 87 per cent success rate quoted initially by Westrum who 
then contradicted himself and broadly agreed with this thesis’ analysis.33  The airborne 
reliability of the AIM-9L Sidewinder was impressive; only one missile misfired.34  
However, on board the aircraft carriers the extended exposure of the missile to the 
vagaries of the South Atlantic weather systems caused issues where: 
 
‘Corrosion of fins, canards and their mountings was soon evident and the 
inadequacy of the missile covers soon became apparent.’  The issue was 
significant and forced HMS Invincible to return 11 of their first batch of 20 AIM-
9L [Sidewinders].’35 
 
Despite the relatively minor issues, the effectiveness of the AIM-9L Sidewinder during 
the Falklands campaign is significantly greater than the early generation of 
Sidewinders used during the Vietnam War.  During the conflict in South-East Asia, 
Sidewinders were fired on 454 occasions but achieved only 81 kills, resulting in a 
dismal probability of kill of a mere 18 per cent.36  To a certain extent, the limited training 
																																																								
31 J. Corum, Argentine Airpower, 62. 
32 TNA, DEFE 58/274.  Headquarters Strike Command Intelligence Branch: Operation Corporate Historical Record.	
33 R. Westrum, Sidewinder, 197 and 218. 
34 TNA, DEFE 58/273.  Actions against UK Forces. 
35 TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
36 M. L. Michel, Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam 1965-1972.  (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 287. 
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that the United States Navy and Air Force pilots had in weapon employment can 
account for a large proportion of the discrepancy.  However, the performance of the 
later model AIM-9M Sidewinder with its improved countermeasure capability during the 
1991 Operation Desert Storm is perhaps more surprising.37  Despite the creation of the 
Top Gun programme and Exercise Red Flag to improve United States Navy and United 
States Air Force training capabilities, the eleven AIM-9M Sidewinders employed during 
Operation Desert Storm led to only six kills, and not the twelve kills as claimed by 
Westrum, leading to a relatively disappointing probability of kill of 54 per cent.38  The 
difference in performance reflected the more extensive array of countermeasures and 
tactics employed by the Iraqi air force jets.  Nevertheless, the 1991 AIM-9M Sidewinder 
performance was disappointing when compared with the 1982 accomplishment.  
 
Concerns were raised during the Falklands Conflict regarding Sea Harrier pilots’ 
knowledge of the new variant of Sidewinder’s performance and its integration onto the 
platform.39  Nevertheless, and despite exposure to the harsh climatic operating 
environment of the South Atlantic, the Sea Harrier/AIM-9L Sidewinder combination was 
effective when the target could be detected and intercepted.  Analysis of Figure 6.2 
demonstrates that the vast majority of the Sea Harrier AIM-9L Sidewinder firings were 
within the kinematic envelope of the legacy AIM-9G Sidewinder.  This point reinforced 
the RAF’s Central Tactics and Trials Organisation’s view that one of the tactical 
lessons from the Conflict was that ‘most missiles were fired from a visual acquisition in 
boresight and almost all were fired from close to the line astern position.’40  An initial 
deduction would be that the older AIM-9G Sidewinder may have achieved a similar 
level of success as the recently integrated AIM-9L Sidewinder.  This deduction is 
contrary to Woodward’s assertion to Fieldhouse on the evening of 1 May that ‘Mirage 
kills to date have been with AIM-9L with firings at extremities or outside expected [AIM-
] 9G [Sidewinder] brackets.  Live combat has proved that SHAR [Sea Harrier] needs 
improved performance of AIM-9L [Sidewinder] to counter Mirage speed superiority.  It 
is essential that further Sidewinders supplied are Lima variant.’ 41  However, 
Woodward’s view is endorsed in the post-Conflict report by the Scientific Evaluation 
Team who on reflection on the ultra-low altitudes flown by the Argentines suggested 
that ‘it is unlikely that AIM-9G would have guided and fuzed to within a lethal distance 
																																																								
37 R. Westrum, Sidewinder, 197. 
38 E.A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume 4 – Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations. 
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 116 and R. Westrum, Sidewinder, 219.	
39	It is suggested that incorrectly cooled AIM-9L seeker heads and associated false audio tones may have led to 
confusion prior to the Canberra engagement on 1 May.   TNA, DEFE 67/135.  Reconstruction of AAW Conflict.  Also, an 
experienced Harrier GR3 pilot with previous air defence experience on the Lightning, Flight Lieutenant John Leeming 
was rapidly converted onto the Sea Harrier at the start of the Conflict.  His transition was so rapid that he was not shown 
how to correctly select the weapons on the Sea Harrier.  Morgan, Hostile Skies, 175.	
40 Air Historical Branch, CTTO/26/2/Ops.  Tactical Lessons. 
41 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 287.	
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in all of the circumstances under which the AIM-9L was successful.’42  Therefore, the 
Sea Harrier was only able to exploit one element of the AIM-9L Sidewinder’s capability.  
Ultimately, the enduring lesson is that when procuring a new weapon system the user 
must be capable of exploiting it fully through an effective integration of both the 
platform and sensor. 
 
The air-to-air kills against Argentine combat aircraft highlighted to date reflects those 
that were engaged prior to reaching their intended targets.  However, as yet, no 
account has been taken of the Argentine aircraft shot down during the egress from the 
target area.  From Ward’s perspective, his sister squadron’s tactics did not deliver the 
required deterrent effect and its engagements occurred following weapon release and 
with the Argentine aircraft escaping to the mainland.43  However, the data contained 
within Table 6A, refutes this claim.  While it would be advantageous to engage 
Argentine attack aircraft prior to striking their intended targets and in particular, the 
centres of gravity, there was a clear benefit to intercepting aircraft that were returning 
home following their attacks.  Likewise, the ability to deter the ingressing force and 
achieve a ‘soft kill’ by forcing the opposition to jettison its weapons and abort its 
mission prior to reaching its intended prey were also advantageous.  This ‘soft kill’ 
effect could be achieved by the mere presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  
Indeed Ward suggested that ‘with respect to “frightening the intruders away”, this is 
considered by the squadron to be the next best thing to shooting him down.’44  As 
shown in the previous chapters, the number of ‘soft kills’ achieved is an indicator of the 
confidence, experience levels and will to fight of the opposition.   
 
In contrast to the ‘soft kill’, the fighter pilot nirvana was the ‘hard kill’ and historically a 
highly prized result.  However, the timeliness of the ‘hard kill’ must be considered.  For 
example, a ‘hard kill’ against an egressing Argentine aircraft that had already dropped 
its weapons did not assure the protection of a potentially critical British asset.  
However, the benefit of an egressing kill was that further attacks by that aircraft and its 
crew were stopped.  Moreover, such attacks sent a strong message to subsequent 
strike missions, particularly if they were from the same unit or operating base.  In 
contrast, it could be argued that a ‘soft kill’ against an ingressing Argentine bomber 
protected the British operational centre of gravity.  Additionally, the ‘soft kill’ sent an 
equally strong message to the enemy.  However, the ‘soft kill’ did allow the attacking 
force to be reconstituted for a subsequent attack and lessons to be disseminated 
across the force to negate the threat.  
																																																								
42 TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
43 Ward, Sea Harrier, 270. 
44 TNA, DEFE 69/836. 801 Naval Air Squadron flight report. 
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Table 6A, below, shows the Sea Harrier kills broken down between the two Sea Harrier 
squadrons over the periods of Operation Corporate as well as Operation Sutton.   
Despite Ward’s protestations, the evidence shows that 800 Naval Air Squadron scored 
twice as many air-to-air kills during Operation Corporate and Operation Sutton than the 
HMS Invincible-based 801 Naval Air Squadron commanded by Ward.  At first glance, 
the difference in performance could be attributed to the larger number of Sea Harriers 
embarked on HMS Hermes.  However, by reviewing the activity levels or the outputs of 
both squadrons, as shown in Annex B, suggests that 801 Naval Air Squadron flew 598 
sorties vice 800 Naval Air Squadron’s 737 flights.  Although the weight of effort of the 
outputs (55 per cent of the 1335 Sea Harrier sorties during the Conflict) rests with, as 
expected, the larger of the two Sea Harrier squadrons it is not as significant a margin 
as the number of air-to-air kills would suggest.  Consequently, 801 Naval Air Squadron 
were more efficient at launching its aircraft on operational missions.  Indeed, 801 Naval 
Air Squadron achieved a very impressive serviceability rate of 99.7 per cent and 
beyond the 93 per cent reliability requirement set in Naval Staff Requirement 6451.45  
Ultimately, 801 Naval Air Squadron provided 40 per cent of the Sea Harrier force but 
flew 45 per cent of the total missions: an achievement that the unit can be justifiably 
proud of. 
 
Table 6A - Sea Harrier Squadron Air-to-Air Kill Comparison.49 
 
However, 800 Naval Air Squadron was more efficient in turning its outputs into ‘hard 
kills’ by achieving 14, or 67 per cent, of the 21 Sea Harrier kills, which included two kills 
against Argentine aircraft egressing from the target area.  All the more impressive 
																																																								
45 Ogilvy, 801 Naval Air Squadron, 123; TNA, DEFE 72/257.  Sea Harrier Specification. 
46 On 21 May, Leeming achieved a guns kill on an egressing A-4Q Skyhawk.  Burden, The Air War, 41.  Additionally, on 
23 May, Morgan engaged a formation of 4 helicopters near Shag Cove and achieved a guns kill on an Agusta A-109.  
Morgan, Hostile Skies, 195. 
47 On 1 June, and after damaging the enemy aircraft with an AIM-9L Sidewinder, Ward destroyed a C-130 Hercules with 
a guns kill.  Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 175. 
48 On 21 May, Ward achieved a guns kill against Tomba’s Pucara over Lafonia in East Falkland.  M. Middlebrook, The 
Falklands War 1982.  (London: Penguin, 2001), 222. 















800 Naval Air 
Squadron 
12 2 6 246 2 0 
801 Naval Air 
Squadron 
5 247 3 148 0 0 
TOTAL 17 4 9 3 2 0 
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given the fact that, and as shown in Annex K, 800 Naval Air Squadron was responsible 
for the vast majority of the Sea Harrier attack missions.  Therefore, the disparity in the 
squadrons’ operating procedures did not impact on the campaign outcome.  However, 
the different operating procedures did generate friction between both Sea Harrier 
squadrons.   
 
The AIM-9L Sidewinder is only one, albeit the main, weapon that allows the Sea 
Harrier to deliver its air-to-air capability.  The aircraft was also equipped with two 30 
mm Aden cannons and, as shown in Table 6A, accounted for four kills during the 
Conflict.  The cannon provided a level of weapon effect resilience and utility particularly 
if the pilot is low on weapons, had serviceability issues or was unfamiliar with his 
primary weapon system. 
 
The effectiveness of the Sea Harrier force could have been bolstered further if both 
squadrons had adopted a common set of tactical procedures.  The 800 Naval Air 
Squadron preference for medium altitude combat air patrols meant that the Argentine 
radars around Stanley could detect them.  Consequently, Argentine attack aircraft may 
have been influenced to abort their missions due to the presence of the exposed Sea 
Harriers.  Likewise, early detection of the Sea Harriers operating at altitude and onward 
communication to the Argentine ingressing forces could have allowed the Argentine 
aircraft to modify their route away from the area of high-density British aircraft 
operations.  In contrast, 801 Naval Air Squadron favoured the more difficult to detect 
low altitude patrols.  The low altitude combat air patrol gave the Sea Harrier pilot 
greater control as many of the on board and external sensors as well as 
communication systems offered limited assistance while operating in the low level 
arena.  Therefore, the low-level combat air patrol was reliant on the pilots visually 
acquiring, identifying and prosecuting their prey.  Moreover, the low altitude operating 
environment was more fuel-intensive and, as a result, the fighters' on task time was 
reduced considerably when compared with operations at higher altitudes.  Also, air 
operations at low altitude, which were reliant on the Sea Harrier seeing its prey first, 
are a high-risk proposition.  If the attacking force saw the defending fighter first, they 
could dictate the subsequent engagement, particularly if they were trained and 
equipped to contest the air battle.    
 
The Argentines did provide a very limited control of the air capability during the 
Conflict.  In the latter stages of the campaign, Mirage IIIs and Daggers flew on 
missions to decoy rather than engage the Sea Harriers.  Post-Conflict analysis would 
suggest that Sea Harriers were successfully lured away by these missions on a 
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number of occasions.50  For example, on the morning of 8 June, Argentine fighters 
lured the Sea Harrier combat air patrol away from its Fitzroy patrol area.  
Consequently, a breach in the British defences was opened up that allowed the RFAs 
Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad to be attacked.51  Later the same day, the intervention of 
a decoy mission saved the last remaining A-4B Skyhawk egressing from Fitzroy.52  
Despite modest gains in the latter stages of the campaign, the Argentine investment in 
dedicated control of the air missions compromised their air campaign.  Indeed, only 85 
of the 535 Argentine combat air missions were dedicated to control of the air, with 51 of 
the sorties flown by the Mirage III fighter aircraft.53  Ultimately, the Mirage III was limited 
in capability as well as output and failed to make a definitive contribution throughout 
Operation Corporate. 
 
The A-4C and A-4Q Skyhawks as well as the Daggers were capable of carrying air-to-
air missiles (albeit weapons which were at least a generation behind the AIM-9L 
Sidewinder) and were carried by some of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina aircraft during 
the initial air battles of 1 May.54  However, for the remainder Operation Corporate, the 
Argentines apportioned the vast majority of their assets towards the attack role and 
failed to provide their aircraft with adequate air cover.  While recognising that the attack 
mission was the main effort, it was not the sole effort.  A more prudent strategy would 
have been to provide a sweep or escort capability for attack missions.  Air forces with 
platforms with a limited payload must choose wisely between the control of the air and 
attack roles.  Operating at the extremities of their operating range, with limited air-to-air 
refuelling assets as well as a finite number of weapon stations on their fleet of attack 
aircraft, the Argentines’ ability to re-role into the counter-air mission would mean that 
there were fewer weapons available to strike the British ships.  However, the deficit in 
the number of available attack weapons must be balanced against the need to 
preserve their own force and effectively contest the air battle.   
 
The Sea Harrier provided an impressive level of output throughout Operation 
Corporate.  The key factor in its ability to furnish its outputs was the reliability of the 
Sea Harrier despite the harsh and unpredictable operating environment.   Annex B also 
reinforces the point that the Sea Harrier was able to sustain its surged operating tempo 
throughout Operation Sutton and maintain its outputs throughout the broader Operation 
Corporate.  In contrast, and as shown in Annex A, the Argentines were simply unable 
																																																								
50 TNA, DEFE 48/1162.  Reconstruction of Air War. 
51 Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 251. 
52 Ward, Sea Harrier, 321. 
53 See Annex A for further details. 
54 The Argentines had an eclectic inventory of air-to-air missiles.  All of the Mirage IIIs could carry a single Matra 530F 
but only a few aircraft could also carry two Magic 1s; both missiles were French built.  The Daggers and A-4C Skyhawks 
could carry a pair of Israeli-manufactured Shafrirs whereas the A-4Q Skyhawks carried a pair of AIM-9B Sidewinders.  
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to sustain the required level of output even for the limited duration of Operation Sutton.  
Therefore, Argentine outcomes were compromised by their inability to maintain the 
tempo of operations.  
 
Although the AIM-9L Sidewinders used during Operation Corporate proved statistically 
more effective than their Operation Desert Storm counterparts, the outcomes of both 
campaigns were very different.  Unlike the 1991 campaign, the Sea Harriers had 
insufficient numbers or available time on task to saturate the Falkland Islands airspace 
and deliver a decisive victory before, during and after the critical battle around San 
Carlos.  Consequently, the Sea Harrier force achieved a partial outcome which was 
constrained to a localised favourable air situation due to: an inadequate force density, 
a lack of organic airborne early warning, on board sensor restrictions as well as limited 
range and payload.  
 
As shown in Table 6B and contradicting the belief that the Sea Harrier ‘represented the 
single most effective deterrent to [Argentine] attack plans,’ the Sea Harrier capability 
was responsible for stopping 106 (or nine per cent) of the 1146 weapons planned 
during the campaign.55  As a result, the Sea Harrier is rated as the joint fifth highest 
influence on the Argentine prosecution of Operation Corporate.  So, if the Sea Harriers 
were not as effective as predicted, did British planners miss an opportunity by not using 
the Harrier GR3s to support the Sea Harrier in delivering the control of the air task? 
 
The Harrier GR3 could have bolstered the number of aircraft on combat air patrol in a 
number of ways: creating a dedicated Harrier GR3 combat air patrol thus giving greater 
coverage, adding a Harrier GR3 to each pair of Sea Harriers on combat air patrol to 
give additional firepower or by providing resilience by intermittently inserting a pair of 
Harrier GR3s into the existing three Sea Harrier combat air patrol plan.  With limited 
exposure to carrier-based air defence operations, these measures would have been 
unwise.  The Harrier GR3s were, correctly, dedicated to the support of land forces for 
the remainder of the campaign.  In particular, British planners were keen to attack 
Argentine helicopters in the lead up to the landings in order to deny the ability of 
Argentine forces to rapidly deploy forward and conduct a counterattack against the 
British assault.56  Therefore, relieving the Harrier GR3 of the control of the air task was 
a prudent measure and ensured that: the Harrier GR3 attack expertise was fully 
exploited and a balanced apportionment between the attack and control of the air roles 
was established.  This meant that multiple Argentine critical vulnerabilities could be 
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targeted simultaneously.  Chapter 7 discusses the Harrier GR3’s contribution to the 
attack air power role during Operation Corporate in further detail. 
 
The Sea Harriers were demonstrably the most significant contribution to the British 
control of the air role.  It is perhaps not surprising given the Sea Harrier’s ability to 
exploit the core air power attributes of speed and reach that allowed it to operate freely 
across the Falklands battle-space for the entirety of the campaign.  However, ground-
based air defence and maritime force air defence also helped deliver control of the air.   
 
The Royal Navy’s air defences operated from the first day of the campaign and in large 
numbers.  Unlike their airborne brethren, the maritime systems were constrained to 
ships that operated at relatively slow speeds and often in vessels that were prioritised 
for other campaign tasks.  Moreover, the maritime force air defence capability was 
made up of a number of different weapon systems and host platforms each with their 
own strengths and weaknesses including range, serviceability and lethality.  
Nevertheless, the maritime force air defence capability was active throughout the 
campaign as the ships carrying it were a focus of Argentine air attacks.   
 
The Royal Navy deployed to the South Atlantic with four different air defence missile 
systems: Sea Slug, Sea Cat, Sea Dart and Sea Wolf.  Initial British official reports 
suggested that the missiles accounted for 21 kills and two probables.57  Additionally, 
initial Carrier Task Group assessments of the missiles’ capabilities suggested that Sea 
Wolf and Sea Cat were rated as ‘successful’ and Sea Dart as ‘reasonably successful.’58  
However, and in contrast to the accurate reporting made by the Sea Harrier aircrew, 
the ship-based air defence results suffered from optimistic reporting.  Consequently, 
the initial assessment was eventually pared back to seven kills with a further four kills 
allocated to multiple weapon systems (including ground-based air defence systems).59  
 
The legacy missile systems, Sea Slug and Sea Cat were both used during the Conflict.  
However, both missile systems were obsolete and ineffective in their primary role.  As 
a result, the only effective area defence weapon deployed by the Royal Navy was the 
Sea Dart on the Type 42 destroyers, the bespoke Type 82 destroyer, HMS Bristol, and 
the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible.  However, when operating in the enclosed waters of 
Falkland Sound and San Carlos, the Sea Dart was constrained.  As with the Sea 
Harrier/Sidewinder combination, Sea Dart struggled to exploit its kinematic advantage 
when denied the long-range situational awareness from its own sensor due to the 
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constraints of the surrounding terrain.  Nevertheless, 31 Sea Dart missiles were fired in 
16 engagements during the Conflict.60  Preliminary evaluations suggested that Sea 
Dart was responsible for between seven and nine kills (equating to a probability of kill 
between 22.5 and 29 per cent).61  This appraisal was refined in the Ministry of 
Defence’s formal assessment of the campaign to eight kills (25.8 per cent probability of 
kill).62  Although Ethell and Price’s subsequent analysis suggested that kills attributed 
to Sea Dart were as low as five (16.1 per cent probability of kill), deeper analysis 
shows that the Sea Dart was responsible for 6 Argentine kills.63  Demonstrably, Sea 
Dart’s actual performance during the Conflict was significantly less than its theoretical 
pre-Conflict predictions.  Nevertheless, prior to the start of the Conflict, the Sea Dart 
was held in high regard by the Argentine air arms.  Mir Gonzales suggested that ‘really 
our main concern, before 1 May was the Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile system on board 
these ships.  Every night, our dreams and nightmares were about the Sea Dart.’64  
Fuelling these fears was the ‘conversations with Navy pilots who knew about the 
destroyers and frigates, they explained to us to attack a Type 42 destroyer would 
require at least seven aircraft going in together, and half of these aircraft would survive 
the attack – maybe!  That made our calculations very easy.’65  In contrast, Freedman 
suggested that the poor lethality issues with Sea Dart became well known as the 
campaign matured.  As a result, with an assessed probability of kill of 35 per cent, it 
was recommended to use a salvo of two Sea Darts for each target aircraft.66  Yet, 
limited embarked stockpiles meant that not all ships could adhere to this guidance.  For 
example, HMS Exeter arrived with only 13 warshot missiles and was forced to adopt a 
single shot firing policy.67 
 
With the Sea Dart’s lethality issues understood and mitigated, the missile system 
proved to be particularly useful against a wide range of targets that operated at high 
and low altitudes.  For example, on 9 May, HMS Coventry successfully engaged a 
Puma helicopter.68  On the morning of 25 May, she also destroyed an A-4 Skyhawk 
flying at medium altitude and at long-range with Sea Dart.69  HMS Exeter, one of the 
replacement Type 42 destroyers, used its Sea Darts on a number of effective 
engagements.  On 30 May, Exeter destroyed, at long range, two out of the four low 
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altitude A-4C Skyhawks that were supporting the last Super Etendard/Exocet attack.70  
Over a week later, on 7 June, Exeter conducted another successful long-range Sea 
Dart engagement against a high altitude Learjet undertaking a reconnaissance 
mission.71  In the early hours of 14 June, a Sea Dart employed against a medium 
altitude Canberra would claim the last kill of the Conflict.  However, there is some 
debate regarding which ship launched the successful missile.  HMS Exeter and, 
another of the Type 42 replacements, HMS Cardiff both fired weapons.  Freedman and 
Brown allocated the kill to HMS Cardiff. 72  In contrast, Burden and Hobson stated that 
HMS Exeter was responsible for the victory.73 
 
Despite its successes, Sea Dart was also responsible for a number of issues that had 
campaign-wide implications.  Indeed, Admiral Fieldhouse ‘made no bones ... about the 
short-comings of the Sea Dart air defence missile system.’74  For example, during the 
12 May engagements, HMS Glasgow was left practically defenceless when a salt-
encrusted micro-switch failed.75  On 25 May, HMS Coventry was attacked while 
operating alongside HMS Broadsword to the north of Pebble Island.  However, the Sea 
Dart system was unable to detect the four attacking A-4B Skyhawks that approached 
at low altitude over land.76  Consequently, and after the ship elected to prioritise the 
Sea Dart engagement over the fast approaching Sea Harrier combat air patrol, the 
protection of the Type 42 destroyer, one of the British critical vulnerabilities, was 
delegated to the Type 22 frigate and its modern point defence system – Sea Wolf.    
 
Designed to meet Naval Staff Requirement 6522, the Sea Wolf missile system was 
required to deliver a 70 per cent probability of kill against a Mach 2 missile at a range 
of five kilometres as well engaging a second target within five seconds.77  Although the 
Sea Wolf was responsible for the only maritime force kill during Operation Sutton, it 
had a poor campaign.78  There were only five Sea Wolf engagements during which 
seven missiles were fired.79  Initial assessments suggested that the five engagements 
led to five kills.80  Once again, these figures were shown to be optimistic.  Further 
research by Ethell and Price reported that Sea Wolf was actually responsible for only 
three kills.81  Moreover, Sea Wolf was found to have ‘little use inshore, contrary to 
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expectation.’82  As an example, HMS Broadsword’s Sea Wolf weapon employment on 
25 May was complicated by a number of factors, including failure to maintain clear 
fields of fire in a congested maritime environment, software glitches and inability to 
track aircraft flying in close formation.83  Consequently, HMS Broadsword was unable 
to engage the A-4B Skyhawk raid that attacked her and HMS Coventry.  Although HMS 
Broadsword was damaged in the attack, HMS Coventry was less fortunate – she would 
become the second Type 42 destroyer to be sunk during the campaign.  Many of the 
issues identified during the loss of HMS Coventry on 25 May were similar to those 
identified 13 days earlier during the attack on HMS Glasgow.  Even before the loss of a 
second Type 42 destroyer, Woodward was clearly frustrated with the Sea Dart 
performance.  ‘I despair.  The GWS 30 [Sea Dart] system appears to be totally 
unreliable.  Altogether we are in a fairly desperate situation until Rapier comes good … 
No vital part of our capability has been lost (yet).  But we still have a very long way to 
go before we can be sure the back of the Arg [Argentine] air force is broken.’84    
 
Unlike their air and maritime compatriots, the Rapier, Blowpipe and Stinger surface-to-
air missiles would not make their campaign debut until a beachhead was established 
on 21 May.  Moreover, the ground-based air defence systems were operated in 
relatively small numbers, constrained by limited range and mobility due to terrain and 
limited transport infrastructure.  Consequently, the ground-based air defence assets 
were used predominantly in the localised point-defence role.  Nevertheless, much was 
expected of them.  As Thompson points out, ‘Rapier was seen in some quarters as the 
main defence of San Carlos Water against Argentine air attacks from soon after first 
light on D-Day.’85  However, would Rapier be able to deliver on Woodward and 
Thompson’s aspirations? 
 
On the morning of 21 May, and following the disembarkation of the spearhead infantry, 
priority was given to deploy the twelve Rapier fire units operated by T Battery (Shah 
Sujah’s Troop) from 12 Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery in order to provide a 
protective umbrella over the beachhead.  Consequently, ten of the 12 fire units were 
flown into their carefully computer-modelled firing positions surrounding San Carlos 
Water during 21 May.86  However, the theory and reality soon diverged as it was soon 
discovered that the system ‘could not cope with the fast, low-flying, crossing targets, 
very difficult to see against a land background, and often several degrees below the 
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horizontal so the Rapier was shooting at a sharp angle downhill.’87  Consequently, 
‘several days were spent re-siting most of the launchers to make best use of their 
limited capability.’88  The bedding in and refining the location of the Rapier capability 
took time and resource.  Due to the nature of the Falklands terrain, a valuable 
helicopter had to be dedicated to move the units, irrespective of the fact that the new 
location was yards or miles away.  However, the Rapier’s woes were not over yet, the 
journey south on board RFA Sir Geraint meant that the ‘system had been exposed to 
the rigours of a long sea voyage and was without its second-line support’ which had 
been left at Ascension Island.89  Therefore, the serviceability of Rapier was 
questionable.  Additionally, Rapier was a significant logistics burden.  At a time when 
helicopter support was limited, one support helicopter had to be devoted to the Rapier 
sites in order to supply them with 160 jerry cans of fuel per day in order to keep the 
generator-powered Rapiers running.90  Moreover, although the unit deployed with the 
Field Standard A version of Rapier it did not deploy with the associated Blindfire 
surveillance radar.  With no sensor, the operators were unable to exploit the full 
capability of their system.   
 
Ultimately, the Rapier capability fielded in San Carlos did not marry with the 
expectations placed upon it due to a number of factors.  Woodward had put great faith 
in the Rapier capability.  His diary entry on 20 May recorded that ‘Rapier remains the 
king of trumps, I just hope the pack does not turn out to be missing that card.’91  
However, by 22 May the reality was somewhat different, the capability was still days 
away from becoming fully operational, there were desperate pleas for spares and that 
first system ashore only managed to fire one missile which malfunctioned.92  This was 
an early indicator of the performance that Rapier would deliver for the remainder of 
Operation Corporate.  This disparity between expectation and the reality of the Rapier 
capability caused friction between Woodward and Thompson.93  This would not be the 
first time that concerns regarding localised air superiority and Rapier availability would 
be the subject of senior officer engagement. 
 
The lack of air defence cover during Operation Sutton concerned Woodward and Clapp 
sufficiently during the planning stages of the amphibious assault that the deployment of 
an additional Rapier unit was requested.  The request was approved on 16 May but the 
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second unit would not arrive until 5 June.94  The arrival of an additional Rapier unit that 
specialised in fixed defence of high-value assets, such as airfields, was an ideal 
opportunity to move the new arrivals into the role of protectors of the newly opened 
Forward Operating Base at Port San Carlos.  However, with the operational focus and 
tempo moving away from San Carlos and towards Stanley, the site saw no action at 
the airstrip during the tenure of 63 Squadron, RAF Regiment.    
 
Now freed from its San Carlos tasking, T Battery split its resources to cover the two-
pronged infantry advance.  Four fire units moved forward with 5 Infantry Brigade to 
Fitzroy and a further 4 fire units supported 3 Commando Brigade at Teal Inlet.  The 
transfer between locations was protracted and problematic due to the distance, difficult 
terrain and paucity of support helicopter assets.  The delay in generating air cover 
caused Thompson sufficient angst to inform Moore of the situation.95  However, 
Thompson’s risk never became an issue as his window of vulnerability was brief and 
the Argentines never challenged his predicament.96  In sharp contrast, 5 Infantry 
Brigade would require the immediate use of its ground-based air defence assets at 
Fitzroy. 
 
The Rapier Fire Units allocated to 5 Infantry Brigade were moved from San Carlos to 
Fitzroy on board RFAs Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad during the night of 7/8 June.97  The 
importance of achieving localised air superiority was well understood and priority was 
given to unloading the Rapiers from the ship.  However, the helicopter transfer from 
ship to shore was still continuing when the A-4B Skyhawk raid attacked the RFAs Sir 
Tristram and Sir Galahad on 8 June.  Despite the early offload, only two of the Rapier 
Fire Units were operational at the time of the raid.  One of the two units had a 
temporary defect whereas the other Fire Unit was situated in a less than ideal 
location.98  Hobson suggested that the poor location of the Rapier Fire Unit was due to 
the fact that the Rapiers had been positioned to protect the Brigade Headquarters.99  
However, Southby-Tailyour added that the unit with the temporary defect was located 
specifically to safeguard the ‘eastern sea approaches.’100  With the overhead Sea 
Harrier combat air patrol decoyed, the British simply did not have a resilient layered 
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defence to protect their critical vulnerabilities.101  As the Egyptians learned during their 
push east into the Sinai Desert in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, operating outside of an 
assured control of the air umbrella is fraught with risk.102   
 
Freedman noted that ‘initially [Rapier] came out of the campaign with a strong 
reputation.’103  Indeed, official British post-Conflict analysis suggested that Rapier was 
accountable for 14 kills and 6 ‘probables’ from 61 firings giving a probability of kill of 
25.5 per cent (or 36.4 per cent if the ‘probables’ are incorporated).104  However, this 
performance was significantly below the initial requirement, GASR 3132/1, for a Rapier 
Single Shot Probability of Kill of 50 per cent.105  Further analysis established that the 
missile’s performance was significantly worse than expected and that only one kill 
could be solely attributed to Rapier.106  The net result was a rather dismal probability of 
kill of less than two per cent.  Rapier was not the panacea that many had thought it 
would be.  Indeed, the Battery Commander’s assessment that ‘Rapier more than 
proved its worth’ was woefully optimistic.107  The Rapier capability was fragile and 
compromised by a long sea passage, failed to field its Blindfire radar sensor as well as 
poor mobility, sighting and reliability.  Nevertheless, could the Rapier’s shortfalls be 
compensated by their smaller, lighter man-portable air defence systems?  
 
In addition to the Rapier capability, the British used two further ground-based air 
defence systems during the Conflict: the Blowpipe and Stinger man-portable air 
defence systems.  The latter United States-built system was used exclusively by British 
special forces and accounted for the downing of a Pucara over Sussex Mountains on 
21 May.108  The Blowpipe missile was used by both Argentina and Britain during the 
Conflict.  In British hands, the weapon was used by three units operating 32 fire units: 
Royal Marines embarked on a number of Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, 2 PARA as well 
as the Royal Marine Air Defence Troop.109  Between the three British units, 90 
Blowpipes were fired during the Conflict.110  However, and as with the Rapier 
capability, Blowpipe operators over-estimated their performance by initially claiming 
nine kills as well as two ‘probables.’111  As the system had an expected twenty per cent 
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probability of kill against approaching targets, the Royal Artillery’s initial assessment of 
Blowpipe’s probability of kill was ‘no cause for alarm.’112  However, subsequent 
analysis confirmed that Blowpipe would only be credited with a single kill (representing 
one per cent probability of kill) during the Conflict, an Aermacchi MB-339 downed 
during the battle at Goose Green.113  Again, and in keeping with the other ground-
based and maritime force air defence systems, Blowpipe’s performance was 
disappointing; it failed to deliver against its performance specification and it failed to 
deliver the required campaign effect.  
 
Despite the poor ‘hard’ kill performance by British air defence systems, there is a 
possibility that the volume of defensive fire may have contributed to a number of 
attackers being distracted during their bombing runs by forcing them to abort, fly too 
low or miss their intended targets.  However, very few mission reports mentioned any 
detrimental effect of British ground fire on Argentine attack runs.114  Therefore, British 
ground fire can only be assessed as a contributing factor.  
 
In order to be truly efficient and effective, each environment’s contribution to the control 
of the air task must be coordinated centrally.  The coordinating function falls under the 
auspices of the air command and control role.  In a sharp contrast to the reality faced in 
the South Atlantic in 1982, contemporary British doctrine highlights that,  
 
‘Effective command and control is essential to delivering air power.  We vest 
command (of a force element, organisation or operation) in an individual to 
assign direct authority, responsibility and accountability.  Control describes the 
coordination of the activities necessary to achieve the commander’s intent. We 
can facilitate command and control by using common procedures and doctrine 
and by adopting communication systems that enable us to share information 
simply and quickly.  Command and control is a human, not technical activity.  
Only individuals can be held to account for their actions.  This means that the 
air commander’s leadership, initiative, imagination, knowledge, judgement and 
professionalism will ultimately determine success or failure.’115 
 
In addition to coordinating and controlling the kinetic elements of the control of the air, 
the air command and control role looks to establish and utilise a theatre-wide air 
picture that aims to provide an accurate, real-time situational awareness picture.  
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Normally, the air picture would fuse a number of inputs from a variety of sources such 
as intelligence, airborne early warning aircraft, air traffic control systems, as well as 
ground-based and maritime air defence radars.  With an understanding of what is 
happening in the broader area of interest, the tasks to be conducted and available 
assets, effective command decisions can be made regarding tasks, priorities, 
apportionment and rules of engagement.  Contemporary best practice would suggest 
that the Air Component Commander should be the single individual accountable for the 
air command and control function and direct the control of the air requirements along 
with the other air tasking requirements.  However, if there are gaps or discrepancies in 
the air picture, the quality of decisions can be compromised which may have campaign 
consequences.  So, did air command and control operate effectively and efficiently in 
the Falklands Conflict?  The following paragraphs will highlight two factors that had a 
direct influence on British air command and control: picture and process. 
 
The Air Commander’s ability to make timely and correct decisions was compromised 
by the lack of a unified, real-time and accurate view of what was occurring across the 
theatre of operations.  From an air power perspective, the lack of airborne early 
warning capability and fleeting maritime reconnaissance assets only compounded the 
issue further.  Despite mitigation factors such as access to United States satellite 
imagery and Chilean radar systems, the British had an incomplete understanding of 
what was happening, or about to happen, on, over and around the Falkland Islands.116  
In order to offset the poor British situational awareness, stringent processes had to be 
implemented, enforced and understood in order to ensure that effective control of the 
air could be established and maintained.   
 
Although many processes were put in place to establish clear boundaries and 
responsibilities, not all of them were successful.  Many of the tactical procedures were 
well established after years of practice and experience in the NATO/Cold War 
environment.  For example, the scrambling Sea Harriers from the aircraft carriers to 
meet incoming raids was a well-honed drill.  However, at the operational level, 
processes were needed to ensure cohesion and understanding, particularly when 
units, environments and components were operating simultaneously in time and space.  
As an example, deconfliction procedures were implemented between the maritime, 
land and air elements overhead San Carlos during Operation Sutton in order to 
minimise the chances of fratricide.117  However, when understanding, processes and 
deconfliction broke down, calamity often ensued in the form of fratricide.  On 5 June, 
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HMS Cardiff shot down an Army Air Corps Gazelle with a Sea Dart missile.118  
Although HMS Cardiff had complied with the extant rules of engagement, the ship was 
unaware of Argentine and British dispositions at the time of the engagement.119  The 
incident was avoidable, as Moore’s staff on board HMS Fearless knew of the Gazelle’s 
flight but the information had not been passed on to HMS Cardiff.120  The lack of a 
common, live and accurate awareness of friendly activities meant that the British lost a 
valuable helicopter and four lives.  Additionally, there were a number of other British 
near-fratricide incidents all stemming from a lack of understanding and subsequent 
poor communication regarding what the other components or force elements were 
tasked to do.121 
 
From a control of the air perspective, British air command and control was unable to 
offset the deficits in the three environmental areas.  Despite a number of mitigating 
factors, the British were unable to furnish a real-time and accurate picture of events.  
Ineffective operational level processes further restricted outputs.  Consequently, timely 
decisions by British military commanders had to be made utilising applied military 
judgement.  Despite the vast experience of many of the British operators, poor 
decisions, made with best intentions, led to painful mistakes.  One of the key lessons 
identified by the RAF was that ‘the Command and Control organisation was not as 
practiced in peace-time exercises which caused confusion at unit level.’122  Beyond the 
highlighted control of the air issues, British air command and control will be reviewed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
The British ability to overcome their opposition was not as convincing as some 
commentators would depict.  3 Commando Brigade’s concerns over the lack of Rapier 
and Blowpipe assets can be expanded to encompass the majority of British control of 
the air assets.123  Consequently, the high reliability of some British assets was 
insufficient to mitigate the lack of mass.  As a result, the British were unable to cover, 
never mind saturate, the airspace throughout the period of Operation Corporate.  The 
topography of the landing area and the surrounding high ground, while screening the 
amphibious force, also highlighted sensor limitations that compromised the ability to 
detect, identify, intercept and fully exploit the kinematic advantages of the various 
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weapons used by the British forces.  Ultimately, the British were unable to assure 
control of the air throughout Operation Sutton or the broader Operation Corporate. 
 
Ranking Causal Factor 
Scale 
(out of 1146) 
Percentage 
1 Weapons not Dropped 291 25 
2 Weapon Employment - Missed Target 272 24 
3 Serviceability - Air Abort 162 14 
4 Mission Cancelled 131 11 
5 Sea Harrier – Soft Kill 87 8 
6 Serviceability - Ground Abort 37 3 
7 Serviceability – Weapon Employment 33 3 
8 Maritime Force Air Defence – Soft Kill 32 3 
9 Navigation Errors 21 2 
10 Weapon Employment – Hit and Detonates 20 2 
=11 Weapon Employment – Unexploded Bomb 19 2 
=11 Sea Harrier – Hard Kill 19 2 
13 Maritime Force Air Defence – Hard Kill 8 <1 
14 Ground-based Air Defence – Soft Kill 7 <1 
15 Aircraft Crashed before Dropping Weapon 2 <1 
16 Target Mis-Identified 5 <1 
 Total 1146 100 
 
Table 6B - Causal Factors for Failure to Deliver Weapons during Operation 
Corporate. 
 
Although Table 6B gives an aggregation of Argentine performance across all three 
phases, it is also an accurate reflection of the campaign with many of the trends and 
issues remaining consistent.  As a result, it can be seen that Table 6B is dominated by 
Argentine failures rather than British victories.  However, and given the disappointing 
performance of ground-based air defence and maritime force air defence, it is not 
surprising that the Sea Harrier was the most effective British contribution to the 
defence of Operation Corporate.  However, the Sea Harrier only ranks as the fifth most 
effective source of negating the number of enemy weapons which reached the Task 
Force.  Of note, the Sea Harrier’s ‘soft’ kill capability performed better than its ‘hard’ kill 
capability.  It could be argued that the perception of the capability thus trumps the 
reality.  Consequently, an active deception plan that feeds the enemy with a false 
171 
 
perception of your capability or exploits their concerns and weaknesses will help to 
deliver the campaign end-state.  
 
When the three environmental elements of British control of the air are combined, the 
British defence of their centres of gravity accounts for the destruction or deterrence of 
13 per cent of the 1146 weapons.  Ultimately, the outcome of Operation Corporate was 
assured, not by a dominant British defence of their centre of gravity against enemy 
efforts, but by Argentine air power failing to understand, find and attack the British 
centres of gravity.  With the British ability to defend their centres of gravity now 
understood, the next chapter will assess the ability to understand, find and strike 
effectively the Argentine operational centre of gravity.  Additionally, Chapter 7 will also 






Prosecuting the Argentine Operational Centre of Gravity – The 
British Fascination with Stanley Airport. 
 
 
‘Argentine use of Port Stanley airfield and its surveillance radars constrains all 
our operations, enables redeployment and resupply of Argentine forces and 
maintains Argentine morale.’ 
 
Initial Plan for Operation Sutton, 
Presented to Chiefs of Staff, 
2 April.1 
 
From the outset of the Falklands campaign, British military planners placed significant 
focus on neutralising Stanley airport as soon as possible.  Despite notable British 
efforts to hinder air operations at Stanley airport throughout the campaign, damage to 
the runway surface was light.  Consequently, the Argentines were able to use the 
airport right up until the evening prior to their surrender.  Indeed, in the days 
immediately after the Conflict, it was reported that ‘inspection of Port Stanley airfield by 
RAF LO [Liaison Officer] indicates full runway length of 4100 feet to be serviceable but 
fuel handling equipment, ATC [Air Traffic Control] tower and hangars badly damaged.’2  
The British tactical failure to close down the airport led to significant post-Conflict 
debate.  In response to a question from a Member of Parliament, the Permanent Under 
Secretary of State for the Armed forces stated that ‘it is true that the attacks were not 
as successful as one would have wished, all the bombs dropped in its immediate 
vicinity and caused immense disruption and casualties to the Argentines.’3  The limited 
success of the airfield attacks has led to substantial argument, most of it, focussed on 
the tactical utility of specific platforms.  The debate does little to lessen inter-Service 
rivalry.  However, perhaps a more fundamental question should have been posed 
during the initial planning phase of the campaign.  Was there a need to attack the 
airfield throughout the campaign or could the British attack resources have been put to 
better use on a different set of targets? 
 
In his initial response to the proposed airfield attack, Admiral Leach said that it ‘would 
be vital to deny Port Stanley airfield to the Argentines as soon as possible, and 
																																																								
1 TNA, FCO 7/4472.  Falkland Islands Conflict: Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Meetings. 
2 TNA, AIR 20/13113.  Bombing Raids.	
3 Ibid. 
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certainly before the Carrier Battle Group arrived.’4  Therefore, the initial aspiration was 
for the battle for control of the air to start from the very outset of the campaign.  
Moreover, Leach’s view also highlighted that the control of the air battle should 
commence even before the aircraft carriers had arrived in theatre and beyond the 
reach of the embarked Sea Harriers.  However, Leach’s aspiration for a short, sharp 
decisive blow against Stanley airport failed to take into consideration aircraft availability 
and capability.  The inability of the combined Vulcan and Sea Harrier airfield attacks on 
1 May to achieve this task meant that ‘the decision to mount a further Vulcan attack 
was taken because reconnaissance had revealed that while the runway at Port Stanley 
was cratered, it was still possible for light aircraft, such as the Pucara, to use it.’5  
Consequently, the small airport became the target for a large number of British combat 
air attacks that lingered throughout the campaign.   
 
Attacks on the airfield were not limited to those from the air.  Significant effort was also 
invested in naval bombardment starting on the afternoon of 1 May with HMS 
Glamorgan, Arrow and Alacrity firing 154 rounds at the airfield infrastructure.  As with 
the air attacks, the naval bombardment would continue throughout the campaign.6  
Nevertheless, the cost of the naval gunfire support effort would be significant.  During 
the 63 bombardments, the ships were subjected to 12 air attacks resulting in one ship 
sunk, five severely damaged and four slightly damaged.7  Despite the combined British 
effort, the airport remained operational.  Notwithstanding the effectiveness of British 
endeavours, was the British strategy appropriate and balanced? 
 
In order to answer the question, this chapter reviews the key British combat air 
participants and their weapons.  The following section articulates the various elements 
that constituted the Argentine operational centre of gravity, before reflecting on British 
air-to-ground weapon employment, and then analysing the British combat air outputs 
as well as identifying the challenges in meeting the desired campaign outcomes.  The 
chapter concludes with a look at the Argentines’ ability to defend their operational 
centre of gravity.  
 
The Key British Attack Participants 
 
In addition to the Vulcan, Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 the contribution provided by the 
British helicopter force to the attack role is also recognised.  However, helicopter attack 
missions were infrequent and minor in terms of outputs and outcomes.  Therefore, 
these missions have been discarded from this thesis.   
																																																								
4 TNA, FCO 7/4472.  Chiefs of Staff Meetings. 
5 TNA, AIR 20/13113.  Bombing Raids. 
6 TNA, DEFE 69/791.  Operation Corporate, Falklands Conflict: concept of operations and lessons learned. 
7 Ibid. 
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With the Vulcan in the twilight of its career, its utility in Operation Corporate was by no 
means obvious.  However, the Vulcan’s unique advantages were its range and large 
payload.  Nevertheless, these positive attributes had to be offset by the Vulcan’s lack 
of precision, limited crew training and experience in both the tactical bombing role and 
air-to-air refuelling.  At the strategic level, the utility of the Vulcan was also 
contemplated.   
 
In addition to the airfield attack against Stanley airport, the British also considered the 
use of the Vulcan to strike Argentine mainland targets.  As highlighted by Sheffield, the 
real value of the Black Buck missions ‘lay in alerting Argentina to a possible threat to 
the mainland, and thus tying down air assets that could have been deployed against 
the Task Force.  It has also been suggested, although Freedman does not mention 
this, that the use of a nuclear-capable V bomber in the tactical role was a means of 
tightening the pressure on the Junta, by hinting at Britain’s power and resolve.’8  
Despite the potential deterrence benefits of forcing Argentine air assets to defend their 
homeland, the concept did not become reality.  On 12 May, the Foreign Secretary 
concurred with the Defence department’s view that it should rule out the expansion of 
the Vulcan’s role in the campaign due to concerns over the continued need to maintain 
international support for the British position.9  Additionally, there were more practical 
concerns including Vulcan survivability and the ability to actually deliver the required 
tactical effect, a view based on the poor performance to date of the strikes against 
Stanley airport.10  The decision to not strike the Argentine mainland was never made 
public.  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office felt that ‘the MODs reluctance to 
renounce the option publicly is comprehensible, but it would be wise if the landing goes 
ahead to convey reassuring signals to the moderates in Latin America.’11   
 
Nevertheless, even as late as 25 May, four days after the British amphibious assault at 
San Carlos, an internal RAF report reinvigorated the discussion.  The granting of 
clearance on 21 May for the Vulcan to carry and release three 1000lb laser-guided 
bombs, coinciding with the Argentinean combat air surge to counter the British 
amphibious assault may have resurrected interest in exploiting the Vulcan’s potential.12  
The report suggested that ‘attacks by Vulcan aircraft on the airfields at San Julian, Rio 
Gallegos and Rio Grande are feasible, and that attacking aircraft could recover to 
Ascension if a reduced 1000lb bomb load or three laser-guided bombs were carried.’13  
																																																								
8  Sheffield, From San Carlos to Stanley, 373. 
9 TNA, FCO 7/4506.  The political costs of retaking the Falkland Island. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 




The assessment of the plan is not noted.  However, with Operation Sutton about to 
culminate and waning Argentinean combat air power, the extant risks at the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels are likely to have significantly outweighed the benefits.  
Nevertheless, the Vulcan’s broader campaign utility of delivering strategic effect was 
understood and considered but neither exploited nor denied in the public domain.  
 
As for attacking Stanley airport itself, Beetham originally favoured the Sea Harrier 
option but soon became ‘an extremely hawkish proponent of the idea’ that the Vulcan 
should be used during the campaign.14  However, Beetham’s biographer perceived that 
the argument was not a Vulcan vice Sea Harrier debate but merely reflected 
Beetham’s desire to see the full gamut of combat air missions being used rather than 
solely focus on the defensive counter air mission.15  At the initial Chiefs of Staff 
presentation on attacking Stanley airport, even the First Sea Lord suggested, ‘only the 
Vulcan could do this, and in case, the Sea Harriers should be conserved to support the 
landing.’16  However, there was a different naval perspective developing in the South 
Atlantic.  The Sea Harrier force had developed its own plan to attack Stanley airport 
using ten aircraft in a joint night/dusk raid with the intent of rendering ‘the majority of 
aircraft based at Port Stanley unserviceable or destroyed and to crater the main 
runway making it unusable for Argentine attack aircraft.’17  Moreover, rather than 
seeing the Vulcan mission as an opportunity to preserve their small and outnumbered 
Sea Harrier force for the vital defensive counter air role, the deployed Fleet Air Arm 
pilots saw the Vulcan raid as an ‘expensive and cumbersome effort to achieve an 
uncertain result.’18  The lack of trust, understanding and cooperation between the RAF 
and Fleet Air Arm that had been highlighted in the 1965 Templer Report had 
manifested itself again.  
 
Nevertheless, on 30 April, the British Task Force was informed that the Vulcan raid 
would precede the Sea Harrier attack.19  Consequently, and with its retirement from 
service within sight, the Vulcan was about to have its baptism of fire.  The mission, as 
specified in the Operation Corporate Air Operation Order 3/82, was to ‘impede 
Argentine air operations from Stanley airfield.’20  The term ‘impede’ is perhaps a 
realistic reflection on the difficulty in delivering the task on a small target, thousands of 
miles away in an ageing bomber with a crew unfamiliar with the conventional role.  
																																																								
14 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 281. 
15 Jacobs, Stay The Distance, 235. 
16 TNA, FCO 7/4472.  Chiefs of Staff Meetings. 
17 TNA, DEFE 69/836.  801 Naval Air Squadron flight report. 
18 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 282. 
19 Ibid., 284.	
20 TNA, AIR 20/13046.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Vulcan aircraft operations, including Black Buck 
operations.  The second issue of the Operation Order was released on 27 May and the mission aim became, ‘to impede 
the conduct of Argentine Operations in Falkland Islands Area.’  TNA, AIR 20/13049.  Operation Corporate (Falklands 
Conflict): Vulcan aircraft operations, including Black Buck operations. 
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Nevertheless, most analysts seemed to infer that the Vulcan was required to deliver a 
more robust effect such as ‘deny’ or ‘destroy.’21  It would appear that the British 
practitioners were approaching the same task with two patently different views on the 
outcome that was to be achieved; there was a distinct lack of understanding and unity 
of effort between the planners in Britain and those in the South Atlantic when it came to 
the task and purpose of curtailing Argentine air operations from Stanley airport. 
 
A small cadre of crews from across the three remaining Vulcan squadrons was 
selected to undergo specific training in order to prepare for potential South Atlantic 
missions.  The requirement for Vulcan air-to-air refuelling missions had lapsed in the 
post-Polaris and ‘East of Suez’ period.  Therefore, the crews had very limited 
experience in air-to-air refuelling and the aircraft required modification to refresh the 
lapsed capability.22  Consequently, day and night tanking missions were conducted 
with the RAF Marham-based Victors from mid-April, supported by experienced air-to-
air refuelling instructors.23  Likewise, newly re-acquired conventional attack techniques 
were practiced in a similar timeframe.24 
 
After years of neglect, and in addition to regenerating the Vulcan’s air-to-air refuelling 
capability, the aircraft also required attention.  The long over sea transit meant that the 
traditional method of radar navigation using ground features was not a viable option.  
Similarly, astro-navigation was deemed to be too inaccurate to deliver the level of 
precision navigation required.  Carousel navigation systems scavenged from former 
British Airways Vickers VC10s, held in storage at RAF Abingdon, provided the required 
solution.25  Another equipment area that required immediate attention were the on 
board jamming systems.  Although the system was effective against legacy Soviet 
equipment it was ineffective against emerging Soviet threats and the more modern 
Western systems such as those used by the Argentines.  The solution was to borrow a 
more modern AN/ALQ-101D jamming pod, as used by the RAF’s Buccaneer force, and 
then to integrate it onto the aircraft via the defunct Skybolt missile external hard 
points.26  
																																																								
21 In addition to Leach, Woodward suggested that the Vulcan raid had, ‘one specific purpose – to blast a bloody great 
hole in the middle of the runway of Port Stanley airfield ... prevent the Args [Argentine] fighter/attack aircraft getting off 
the ground from Port Stanley to bomb my ships has my automatic “unqualified support.’”  Woodward, One Hundred 
Days, 185-186.  Likewise, Beetham’s biographer stated that, ‘it was considered essential to deny the airfield at Stanley 
to the Argentine Air Force.’  Jacobs, Stay The Distance, 234. 
22 Only one of the chosen Vulcan aircrew had previous air-to-air refueling experience but this dated back to 1962, a 20-
year sabbatical.  R. White, Vulcan 607. (London: Bantam Press, 2006), 101. 
23 The experience and knowledge of the instructors was deemed so beneficial that it was decided that they would join 
the 5-man Vulcan crew on the Black Buck missions.  M. Withers, “The Vulcan Bomber in Action – Operation Black 
Buck.”  RAF Historical Society – The Vulcan (2014).  107.  See also Air Commodore (Retired) ‘Paddy’ Teakle’s 
Viewpoint in Air Power Review for a personal insight.  I. Teakle, “Viewpoint.”  Air Power Review.  Volume 20, Number 2 
(2018). 
24 TNA, AIR 27/3577.  44 Squadron. 
25 Burden, The Air War, 363.   
26 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 41. 
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After an intensive training and engineering period, two Vulcans departed RAF 
Waddington and arrived at Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island at 1800 on 29 
April.27  Aircraft parking space at the airfield was at a premium throughout the 
campaign.  Air Vice Marshal George Chesworth, the Chief of Staff (Air) at 18 Group, 
noted that ‘because of a shortage of parking space at Wideawake it was necessary to 
limit aircraft numbers based there.’28  Therefore, the number and type of aircraft held at 
Ascension Island had to be carefully orchestrated in order that the priority missions 
could always be delivered on time.  As a result, the Vulcans were not permanent 
residents at Ascension Island throughout Operation Corporate.29  When not in use the 
aircraft would be flown back to RAF Waddington in order that the airfield could be 
exploited by higher priority tasks such as Nimrod maritime radar reconnaissance 
missions and Hercules air drops, both of which required extensive use of the limited 
number of Victor air-to-air refuelling aircraft.30  Consequently, the Vulcan’s output was 
limited by two factors: available ramp space at Ascension and access to the required 
number of Victor air-to-air refuelling aircraft. 
 
The second British aircraft type to conduct offensive combat air operations during the 
Conflict was the Sea Harrier.  Although the Sea Harrier’s focus was the defensive 
counter air role, it was designed from the outset as a multi-role combat aircraft and was 
also used in the attack role during the Conflict.  However, and deliberately, there was a 
less than equitable split in the apportionment of attack missions across the Sea Harrier 
community.  Ward said that ‘the [HMS] Hermes air group would be biased towards 
ground/surface attack whereas [HMS] Invincible would act as the Anti-Air Warfare 
Control ship.’31  As a result, 800 Naval Air Squadron on board HMS Hermes bore the 
significant brunt of the Sea Harrier attack missions.32  According to Ward, the different 
modus operandi of the two Sea Harrier squadrons reflected the individual squadron’s 
experience levels.33  Additionally, there may also be more practical reasons why the 
two Sea Harriers adopted different approaches.  First, the HMS Hermes-based Sea 
Harrier squadron was physically larger than its counterparts on board HMS Invincible 
and as result could take on the additional tasking.  Moreover, the physical design and 
capacity of the aircraft carrier is another reason why 800 Naval Air Squadron were 
allocated the attack role. 
 
																																																								
27 Burden, The Air War, 363. 
28 RAF Historical Society, Journal 30.   
29 For example, following the Black Buck 2 mission, both Vulcans returned to RAF Waddington on 7 May with two 
Vulcans returning to Ascension Island on 14 and 15 May in time to meet the Black Buck 3 task. Burden, The Air War, 
365. 
30 Extended range Nimrod missions using Victor air-to-air refueling commenced on 9 May.  Ibid., 395; Long-range 
Hercules air-drop missions started on 16 May.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 70. 
31 Ward, Sea Harrier, xxiv. 
32 See Annex K. 
33 Ward, Sea Harrier, 108. 
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NSR 7097, the Naval Staff Requirement for the Invincible-class of aircraft carrier, 
stated that the air weapons stockpile requirement was ‘40 AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air 
missiles, 18 air-to-surface guided missiles, 18 conventional 1000lb bombs and 24 
Lepus flares.’34  The small combat air weapon stockpile requirement is a reflection that 
the new class of aircraft carriers was focused on anti-submarine warfare.  Moreover, 
the stockpile requirement matched the limited combat air capability embarked, both in 
terms of the number of aircraft on board and the relative importance of the combat air 
role.  By way of comparison, ‘stowage in the volumetrically-similar [HMS] Hermes was 
750 conventional 500lb bombs and considerably more guided weapons.’35  As with the 
available ramp space at Ascension Island that affected Vulcan operations, the 
available infrastructure, whether land or sea-based, dictated and constrained the ways 
and tempo of working.  Limiting the requirements at an early design stage, whether 
driven by lack of vision, cost or political constraint will ultimately constrain the utility of 
the platform as it endeavours to adapt to the challenges of the contemporary 
environment beyond the drawing board. 
 
The original specification for the Sea Harrier reflected that the aircraft was being 
procured in order ‘to provide the Fleet with an organic capability for air intercept, 
reconnaissance, probe and limited surface attack.’36  However, the surface attack 
capability was to support an anti-ship strike using air-to-surface guided weapons, 
rockets, bombs, 30mm cannon.37  Of note, and reflecting the maritime focus of the 
aircraft, there is no mention of a counter-land attack requirement in the original Sea 
Harrier specification.  In order to facilitate the surface attack mission, the Sea Harrier’s 
radar was designed to have an ‘air-to-surface search capability against targets ranging 
in size from FPB [Fast Patrol Boats] to large cruisers.’38  However, the requirement 
document also stated that the surface attack requirement ‘should not be to the 
detriment, in cost or weight of the AI [Air Intercept] radar design.’39  The last caveat, 
again, reflected that the Sea Harrier was to be optimised for the air-to-air role. 
 
Despite recent software updates for the weapon-aiming computer, such as the ‘Falk 
Loft 82’ programme, the Sea Harrier lacked a precision attack capability.40  However, 
many considered the Sea Harrier to be an effective attack platform.  At the strategic 
level, the Chief of the Air Staff suggested that ‘the Sea Harrier would be the most 
effective means of putting Port Stanley Airfield out of action; the Vulcans would also be 
																																																								
34 Hobbs, The British Carrier Strike Fleet, 467. 
35 Ibid. 
36 TNA, DEFE 72/257.  Sea Harrier Specification.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 49. 
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effective, but carry a higher risk of causing civilian casualties.’41  At the start of the 
Conflict, none of the deployed British combat air assets had a precision attack 
capability.  Moreover, each aircraft type had limitations employing their ‘dumb’ 
weapons.  Indeed, the Scientific Evaluation Team in its post-Conflict report noted that 
‘neither the Sea Harrier or [Harrier] GR3 were designed for [high altitude] attack and no 
appropriate bomb ballistic data was available.  The drop accuracy achieved could not 
have been compatible with the damage radius of the bomb.’42  In contrast, Ward states 
that the Sea Harrier could use its Blue Fox radar to update the NAVHARS [Navigation 
Heading Attitude Reference System] in order to conduct an effective medium-level 
attack.43  Nevertheless, Ward played down the accuracy of such an attack when he 
suggested that the Sea Harrier was just as capable as a Vulcan.44  However, this view 
of the Sea Harrier’s effectiveness as an attack aircraft was not shared throughout the 
Sea Harrier community.  Indeed, 800 Naval Air Squadron aboard HMS Hermes had 
less confidence in the Sea Harrier’s capabilities than its counterparts on board HMS 
Invincible.45   
 
The lack of faith in the Sea Harrier’s ability to operate effectively in the medium-level 
attack role is a reflection of the results that it was able to achieve.  On listening to the 
radio communications of his sister squadron during medium level bombing raids 
against Stanley airport, Ward had ‘heard calls of “1 mile short”, “2 miles over” from the 
[HMS] Hermes boys.’46  Pook also suggested that other Sea Harrier attack techniques 
were ineffective.  ‘In spite of the peacetime boasts of the Sea Harrier operators, their 
weapon system at that time was not capable of hitting a runway 4000 feet long and 90 
feet wide from a toss-bombing attack.’47  Pook’s view is reflected in the Sea Harrier 
requirement document that stipulated that a bomb dropped from a Sea Harrier during a 
low level or toss attack should have a CEP (Circular Error of Probability) of 140 feet 
and 500 feet respectively.48 
 
Ward’s contention that the Sea Harrier was a more efficient platform than the fuel-
intensive Black Buck missions is a difficult proposition to counter.  Noting that he used 
different figures in his book and his official report, Ward suggested that for a single 
Vulcan bombing raid the equivalent fuel could have been used to allow Sea Harriers to 
																																																								
41 TNA, FCO 7/4472.  Chiefs of Staff Meetings. 
42 TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
43 Ward, Sea Harrier, 207. 
44 Ibid. 
45 TNA, DEFE 69/836.  801 Naval Air Squadron flight report.   
46 Ward, Sea Harrier, 297.	
47 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 72.	
48 TNA, DEFE 72/257.  Aircraft Specification. 
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drop between 500 and 1300 bombs.49  However, Ward is guilty of simply measuring 
outputs and failed to take into consideration the operational effect required.  
Additionally, Ward does not highlight that a Sea Harrier with a full weapon payload 
would necessitate the removal of the external fuel tanks to cater for the additional 
weapons.  Consequently, the Sea Harrier would be significantly short of fuel and suffer 
from a limited operating range.  As a result, the aircraft carrier would have to be 
positioned unpalatably close to the Argentine threat to offset the deficit in aircraft 
range.  Moreover, the Sea Harrier’s focus on control of the air meant that it did not 
have sufficient aircraft, pilots or time to fly the additional attack missions.  Also, the 
extensive logistical support needed, both in terms of weapon stockpile and Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary ships to supply the additional fuel, was not available.  Ultimately, Ward’s 
assertion makes for an impressive headline but falls short when scrutinised more 
closely. 
 
Nevertheless, the argument that the Sea Harrier was a more accurate attack platform 
has some theoretical basis.  David Castle, a Vulcan navigator who participated in two 
Black Buck missions, stated that the CEP of a Vulcan medium-level radar attack was 
1900 feet, some 700 feet greater than the Sea Harrier, as declared by one of the RAF 
exchange officers.50  Additionally, primary source evidence also claimed that the 
Vulcan had a significantly poorer CEP during low-level attacks than the Sea Harrier.  
During the Vulcan work up training that a 750 foot CEP ‘is a reasonable estimate of 
delivery accuracy based on the trial results from Jurby and Garvie Island for low level 
delivery.’51  However, the Sea Harrier operational analysis opined that ‘four aircraft 
attacking the centre of the runway with five 1000lb bombs, 15 degrees off the 
centreline, would have a 95 per cent chance of cutting the runway given a delivery 
error of 100 feet CEP.’52  Nevertheless, the reality would prove to be a very different 
prospect.  Consequently, analysis of the British attack outputs and what they actually 
achieved will provide some form of clarity on the success or otherwise of the British 
attacks against Stanley airport. 
 
The last British attack platform to be considered is the Harrier GR3.  The RAF carrier-
based attack capability was a belated, but timely, arrival in the Operation Corporate 
order of battle.  Unlike the multi-role Sea Harrier, the Harrier GR3 was a dedicated 
attack platform.  As part of its routine Cold War tasking, the Harrier GR3 was employed 
																																																								
49 In his official report, Ward suggested that the four Vulcan bombing missions equated to 665 Sea Harrier missions in a 
3-bomb fit dropping 2000 weapons.  TNA, DEFE 69/836.  801 Naval Air Squadron flight report.  In his book, Ward 
informed that the fuel used during the Black Buck 1 mission was the equivalent of 260 Sea Harrier attack missions, in a 
maximum 5-bomb fit, resulting in 1300 weapons.  Ward, Sea Harrier, 206. 
50 T. Blackman, Vulcan Boys.  (London: Grub Street, 2014), 175. 
51 Jurby and Garvie Island were both bombing ranges in the United Kingdom and TNA, AIR 20/13048.  Vulcan Aircraft 
Operations. 
52 TNA, DEFE 72/271.  Intelligence Summaries. 
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‘in the classic offensive air support role providing close air support, battlefield air 
interdiction and tactical air reconnaissance for the relevant army units.’53    
Consequently, the Harrier GR3 was predicted to attack targets that were ‘second 
echelon Warsaw Pact armoured formations and mobile first echelon equipments where 
a rapid response for close air support was needed.’54  By 1976, and in order to assist 
them with its task, the Harrier GR1 force was upgraded with the introduction of a laser 
ranging marked target seeker that provided accurate ranging between the target and 
aircraft.55  However, and unlike the Sea Harrier, there was no sensor to cue the pilot 
onto the target itself.  Therefore, the pilot was reliant upon seeing and identifying the 
target with his own eyes.  This was a significant challenge for a single-seat aircraft 
operating in a benign environment.  During the Falklands Conflict, the challenge was 
even greater as the pilots were operating in contested airspace, at low-level, in poor 
weather and high speed against concealed as well as camouflaged targets.  As a 
result, pilots were frequently unable to detect the target on their first pass.  The lack of 
on board sensor also meant that the Harrier GR3 had no night or all-weather attack 
capability.  Consequently, it is not surprising that, and as pointed out in a Number 38 
Group report following the Conflict, medium-level and loft attacks in concert with a Sea 
Harrier and simultaneous dropping of weapons ‘provided the better deliveries.’56  As a 
result, the Harrier GR3 force was rarely able to provide effective support to British land 
forces during the critical battles as its attacks ‘were little more than nuisance value.’57   
 
The Sea Harrier and the Harrier GR3 both had five weapon stations in addition to the 
two under-fuselage 30mm Aden cannon pods.  However, the inboard wing pylons were 
routinely allocated to 100-gallon fuel tanks.  Consequently, a maximum of three 
weapon stations were available to carry weapons.  Nevertheless, if the Harrier GR3 
was carrying a reconnaissance pod on the centreline fuselage pylon or if there was 
limited time to re-arm the aircraft, the payload was usually limited to two weapons, one 
on each of the outboard wing pylons.58  The British used five different air-to-ground 
weapons during the offensive air operations phase of the Falklands Conflict: the 1000lb 
bomb, the Royal Navy 2-Inch rockets, the BL755 cluster bomb, the Paveway laser-
guided bomb and the AGM-45A Shrike anti-radiation missile.  The latter two weapons 
were precision-guided weapons and rapidly introduced into service during the latter 
stages of the Conflict.   
 
																																																								
53 RAF Historical Society, “Journal 35A – The RAF Harrier Story.”  
http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-35A-Seminar-the-RAF-
Harrier-Story.pdf (accessed 17 January 2016). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 185. 
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The 1000lb bomb was the only weapon carried by all three British attack platforms 
during the Conflict.  Moreover, and as shown in Figure 7.1, the 1000lb bomb was also 
the most widely used British weapon.  The 1000lb bomb could be fitted with one of a 
number of fuse settings in order to optimise the effect the weapon delivered against its 
intended target.  The various fuses would allow the weapon to detonate: on impact, at 
a pre-determined height above the ground or at a pre-set time after impact.  The 
1000lb bomb could be further adapted by fitting it with either a free-fall or parachute 
retard tail, the latter for low-level delivery.59  Consequently, the 1000lb bomb had a 
broad utility if it could be delivered accurately.  Low altitude and laydown attacks 
offered the most accurate results but meant that the bomb would strike the target at a 
sub-optimal angle and speed if penetration of the target was required; for example, 
breaking through a runway surface.  Moreover, the attacking aircraft was more 
vulnerable to ground fire if it had to overfly the target area at low altitude.  In contrast, 
medium altitude, high-angle dive and loft attacks provided greater survivability for the 
attacking aircraft and a better penetration angle but this was to the detriment of 
precision.  
 
Establishing the total number of weapons dropped by each of the British aircraft types 
was a relatively straightforward affair.  Archival evidence clearly shows that 800 Naval 
Air Squadron dropped the greatest number of 1000lb bombs during Operation 
Corporate; 144 in total.60  In contrast, 63 1000lb bombs were dropped during the three 
Vulcan bombing raids, the Harrier GR3s used 59 1000lb bombs and a further 56 
bombs were employed by 801 Naval Air Squadron.61  However, and despite the recent 
release of primary source material including combat mission reports, the specific 
weapon loads and usage per mission is more complicated to break down.  
Consequently, establishing the exact employment of each of the 322 British 1000lb 
weapons used during the Conflict is difficult to determine.  
 
Adapting the 1000lb bomb into a laser-guided weapon was a relatively straightforward 
process from an engineering perspective.  The host bomb had to be coupled with the 
‘well-proven American “Paveway” seeker head and guidance unit bolted on the front 
end.  A set of flip-out stabilising fins was bolted on at the rear of the bomb.’62  The 
conversion turned ‘dumb 1940-vintage bombs into a piece of cutting-edge 
technology.’63  However, the integration and employment of the new weapon were far 
more problematic.  Prior to the Conflict, the Paveway laser-guided bomb was not part 
																																																								
59 Ibid., 190. 
60 TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
61 Harrier GR3 1000lb weapon employment can be further broken down to 31 free-fall and 28 retard 1000lb bombs.  
TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
62 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 196. 
63 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 230. 
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of the Harrier GR3 inventory.  Nevertheless, the weapon was rapidly introduced in 
order to allow the Harrier GR3 to attack with greater precision.  The Paveway 
modification kits were air-dropped by C-130 Hercules flown from Ascension Island to 
the Task Force on 24 May.64  Harrier GR3s used the weapons against Argentine 
targets six days later.65  However, the lack of understanding of, and experience with, 
the new weapon soon became evident.  For example, there was confusion regarding 
how to effectively deliver the required laser reflection from the designated target.  As a 
result, many of the initial weapons missed their target.66  Nevertheless, once 
procedures had been refined by both air and ground parties, the weapon was more 
effective during the latter stages of the land campaign.  1 (Fighter) Squadron dropped 
eleven laser-guided bombs during the Conflict but only four guided successfully.67  
Ultimately, the weapons were responsible for direct hits on an artillery piece and a 
company headquarters.68  Additionally, the use of laser-guided bombs was trialled by 
both the Vulcan in the United Kingdom and the Sea Harrier over the Falkland Islands.69  
However, neither platform employed the weapons operationally. 
 
The Hunting Engineering BL755 cluster bomb was designed in the early 1970s to 
counter lightly armoured targets and unprotected troops.70  The cluster bomb 
incorporated seven bays each containing 21 sub-munitions, thus creating a total of 147 
munitions per weapon.  However, the weapon’s usefulness was disputed.  The Air 
Commander’s Report highlighted that the weapon’s ‘utility was degraded against well 
dug-in defensive positions.’71  In contrast, a post-Conflict Scientific Evaluation Team 
reported that ‘interrogation of prisoners established quite unambiguously that air burst 
ammunition sapped their will to fight and that damage to weapons, machine guns was 
substantial.’72  Nevertheless, both units on board HMS Hermes used the BL755 cluster 
bomb during Operation Corporate.  Despite losing 240 cluster bombs, 30 per cent of 
the deployed stockpile, during the sinking of MV Atlantic Conveyor, 1 (Fighter) 
Squadron alone dropped 83 cluster bombs during the Conflict. 73 In contrast, the HMS 




64 P. Squire, “Harrier goes to War.” http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/TheHarrierGoestoWar.cfm (accessed 8 January 2016). 
65 TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
66 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 196. 
67 TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
68 See Annex K for further details. 
69 RAF Historical Society, Journal 20; See entry for 31 May 1982 in Annex K for further details. 
70 Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 196. 
71 TNA, DEFE 58/282.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Air Commander's Report; Report of Proceedings, 
October 1982. 
72 TNA, DEFE 69/791.  Concept of Operations. 
73 TNA, AIR 20/13109.  Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): RAF involvement; TNA.  AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
74 TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
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During routine land-based operations, the Harrier GR3 force normally used the 68mm 
SNEB (Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt) rocket pod.  The SNEB 
rockets were particularly effective against armoured fighting vehicles, bunkers or soft 
targets.  However, due to high electro-magnetic forces on board ship, the SNEB rocket 
capability was not cleared for carrier-based operations.75  Consequently, the Harrier 
GR3s had to rapidly adapt to the Royal Navy’s equivalent capability – the Royal Navy 
2-inch rocket pod.76  As a result, a hasty clearance to carry and fire the alternative 
weapon was received on 26 April.  Pre-deployment training was limited to one Harrier 
GR3 pilot deploying to Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton to carry out a brief trial sortie 
only a few days prior to the Squadron’s deployment to the South Atlantic.77  However, 
the Royal Navy 2-Inch rockets were deemed to perform in a very similar manner to the 
SNEB rockets albeit with a wider ‘shotgun-like’ distribution following launch.78  Despite 
the lack of familiarity with the new weapons system, the Harrier GR3 force was 
compelled to use the Royal Navy 2-Inch rockets due to the shortage of cluster 
bombs.79  Although the Royal Navy 2-Inch rockets gave the Harrier GR3 force a degree 
of stand-off from the target, the weapon had a smaller footprint than the BL755 cluster 
bomb and suffered from a significant number of misfires.80  Nevertheless, as the sole 
user of the capability during the Conflict, the Harrier GR3 force employed 52 pods of 
Royal Navy 2-Inch rockets.81 
 
In order to negate the Argentine surveillance radar systems, in particular the 
Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 radar that provided long-range detection and early warning 
of British air activity to the Argentine attack force, the British required an effective 
suppression of enemy air defence capability.  A secondary target set were the radars 
that supported the anti-aircraft artillery.  The Vulcan was deemed to be the most likely 
launch platform for the new mission.  However, the weapon choice proved to be more 
problematic.  Trials conducted in early May with the Martel anti-radiation missile, as 
used by the RAF’s Buccaneer fleet, proved to be unsuccessful.82  Therefore, the British 
requested United States permission to access and use their stockpile of AGM-45A 
Shrike anti-radiation missiles.  As each AGM-45A Shrike had a specific seeker 
dedicated to searching a defined band of the radar spectrum, there was a number of 
missile variants to choose from.  The ‘Dash 10’ variant looked at the part of the 
spectrum where AN/TPS-43 early warning radar resided.  In contrast, the ‘Dash 9’ 
variant of the AGM-45A Shrike specifically searched for the Skyguard and 
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Superfledermaus radars that supported the anti-aircraft artillery.83  As a result, the 
Vulcan had to carry a mix of ‘Dash 9’ and ‘Dash 10’ AGM-45A Shrikes in order that the 




Figure 7.1 – British Attack Weapons Usage by Weapon Type. 
 
The supply of missiles, as well as aircrew and engineer training, was supported by the 
visit of AGM-45A Shrike-equipped USAF F-4G Phantoms from Spangdahlem Air Force 
Base in West Germany over the period 19 - 23 May at RAF Waddington.84  
Additionally, technicians from Naval Air Station China Lake, Nevada assisted the 
endeavour.85  The Vulcans were rapidly modified to carry a pair of AGM-45A Shrikes 
under each wing on the Skybolt wing pylons.  However, due to the lack of time, aircrew 
training was minimal.  Castle suggested that his crew’s training was limited to testing 
the missile seeker against the air traffic control radar at RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall as 
they flew from RAF Waddington to Ascension Island on 26 May.86  Nevertheless, a 
second Vulcan crew were more fortunate as ‘the Shrike ARM [anti-radiation missile] 
was test fired on 27 May after a rapid feasibility study, and deployed to Ascension 
Island on the same day.’87  After an aborted attempt on 28 May, the first of two 
successful Vulcan suppression of enemy air defence missions, Black Buck 5, was 
launched on 30 May.88  Of the eight AGM-45A missiles flown over the Falkland Islands 
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during the Conflict by the Vulcan, four were fired with two missiles hitting or damaging 
targets.89 
 
The AGM-45A Shrike capability was not solely intended for use on the Vulcan.  The 
Harrier GR3 was also planned to be an AGM-45A Shrike platform.  One of the 
replacement Harrier GR3 aircraft that arrived on board HMS Hermes on 8 June had 
been modified to carry AGM-45A Shrike missiles.90  However, the Harrier’s AGM-45A 
Shrike capability was hampered by a lack of missiles, as the original weapons were not 
offloaded from a VC10 transport aircraft at Ascension Island as intended.  The 
weapons were ‘subsequently found by the Uruguayan authorities and impounded’ 
following the inspection of the aircraft after it had been re-tasked with aeromedical 
duties to Montevideo.91  Nevertheless, eight missiles, four launchers and associated 
equipment were parachuted to the Task Force on 10 June by a C-130 Hercules on a 
25-hour re-supply mission from Ascension Island.92  As a result, the Harrier force was 
AGM-45A Shrike–capable only from 13 June.  The Argentine surrender 24 hours later 
thus precluded the missile’s use during Operation Corporate.    
 
As shown in Figure 7.1, the vast majority of weapons employed by the British during 
the Falklands Conflict were non-precision weapons.  Of the 493 weapons employed 
during the Conflict, only 15 precision weapons were used.  Of note, both types were 
rushed into service at short notice.  Consequently, the success rate of the precision 
weapons was low and reflected the limited time the crews had to train and familiarise 
themselves with the nuances of their new systems. 
 
Defining the Argentine Operational Centre of Gravity during Operation Corporate 
 
It was imperative that the British attack forces understood their opposition’s critical 
vulnerabilities and attacked the most susceptible and valuable targets.  In contrast to 
the British forces that had to deploy, shape and strike the Argentines in order to 
recover the Falkland Islands, the Argentines had the much simpler role of protecting 
and holding Stanley.  The only forces that could achieve this task were the Argentine 
land forces.  As a result, it can be deduced that the Argentine operational centre of 
gravity throughout the Conflict was the Argentine land force located in and around 
Stanley.  Table 7A below shows the Argentine operational centre of gravity analysis.  
Of note, analysis of the Argentine operational centre of gravity shows that the airfield at 
Stanley is a recurring critical vulnerability.   
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Centre of Gravity 
 
 




1.   The ability to hold ground. 
2.   The ability to defeat British 
land forces. 





1.1.1.   Morale of land force. 
1.1.2.   Quality of troops. 
1.1.3.   Quantity of troops. 
1.1.4.   Shelter from environment. 
1.2.1.   Sea control to deliver goods by ship. 
1.2.2.   Stanley Airport to receive goods. 
1.2.3.   Freedom of manoeuvre on land to move goods.  
1.2.4.   Transport aircraft to deliver goods to the Islands. 
1.2.5.   Support helicopters to deliver goods around 
Islands. 
2.1.1.   Effective support weapons. 
2.1.2.   Shelter from enemy fires. 
2.1.3.   Quantity of troops. 
2.1.4.   Quality of troops. 
2.1.5.   Morale of land force. 
2.2.1.   Stanley Airport to support fast jet attack aircraft. 
2.2.2.   Available Argentine attack capability. 
2.3.1.   Reach of Argentine artillery and heavy weapons. 
2.3.2.   Effective Communications. 
3.1.1.   Fuerza Aérea Argentina to contest control of the air. 
3.1.2.   Ground-based air defence capability beyond 
Stanley. 
3.1.3.   Stanley Airport to support fast jet combat aircraft. 
3.2.1.   Surveillance radars for air command and control. 
3.2.2.   Strong leadership. 
3.2.3.   Effective communications. 
3.2.4.   Situational awareness.  
Critical Requirements 
 
1.1. Disciplined, well-led 
soldiers. 
1.2. Sustainable logistical 
support. 
2.1.  Strong defensive positions 
outside Stanley. 
2.2.  Attack capability. 
2.3.  Land fires capability. 
3.1.  Control of the air capability. 
3.2.  Effective command and 
control. 
 
Table 7A - Argentine Operational Centre of Gravity during Operation Corporate. 
 
The airfield at Stanley was the hub for Argentine logistics capabilities within the 
Falkland Islands, it was also the home to some, albeit limited, attack aircraft and had 
the potential to house more capable combat air assets.  Consequently, it is right and 
proper that the British should attack the airfield during the campaign.  Denying the 
airfield at Stanley would eventually bring about the demise of the Argentine land force 
as it slowly ran out of resources to feed, fuel and fight its various deployed capabilities.  
Moreover, during the early stages of British military planning, it was identified that ‘Port 
Stanley airfield is most vulnerable to air attack.’93  However, in parallel, it was apparent 
that ‘a cardinal factor affecting operations will be the need to avoid, as far as possible, 
heavy fighting in the Port Stanley area.  Severe loss of life among the small population, 
and widespread property destruction would defeat the operation’s objective.’94  
However, any fears of collateral damage were quickly quashed when operational 
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analysis suggested that ‘there was no significant chance of a stray bomb impacting in 
Port Stanley Town.’95 
 
However, the focus of British operations on Stanley airport was neither a quick nor a 
decisive solution to a campaign that faced significant time pressures.  As shown in 
Table 7A, Stanley airport was not the sole critical vulnerability.  Consequently, any 
subsequent analysis of the British prosecution of the Argentine operational centre of 
gravity needs to reflect on the number, efficiency and relative importance of the other 
critical vulnerabilities that were targeted. 
 
British Attack Outputs and Outcomes 
 
Generating and articulating the British attack outputs and subsequent outcomes have 
proven to be more problematic than originally anticipated.  Moreover, and perhaps 
surprisingly, it was a more complex process than the creation of its Argentine 
equivalent.  The key issue is that British primary source material is incomplete.  For 
example, squadron authorisation sheets, flying logs and operational record books are 
piecemeal, not available, lacking the required detail or contradictory.  Although the 
Vulcan and 801 Naval Air Squadron missions and weapon usage are well supported by 
detailed primary source material, there is no definitive set of Sea Harrier mission 
reports that are accessible at The National Archives or the Fleet Air Arm Archives.  
Moreover, although the Harrier GR3 mission reports are available they appear to have 
been written post-Conflict and contain a number of subtle inconsistencies with the 
Scientific Evaluation Team’s subsequent work.96  Consequently, the broad spectrum of 
secondary source material has had to be used to fill in some of the voids left by the 
lack of primary source material.  Even so, there are a small number of missions where 
the weapon used in the attack remains unresolved.  The issue is relevant but its impact 
is small.  Of the 493 air-to-surface weapons used by the British during the campaign, 
20 weapons, or 4 per cent, cannot be attributed to a specific strike.  As a result, it is 
likely that there are omissions, errors and frictions contained within the list of British 
attack weapons employed during Operation Corporate and shown in Annex K.  While 
the annex is likely to contain oversights and be contested, it still provides the most 
comprehensive list of data to date.  It also provides a clear and auditable foundation 
that can be tested and challenged as future narratives on the air war are generated.  
Accordingly, analysis of Annex K highlighted several noteworthy points.   
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First, due to the lack of Argentine combat air patrols and ground-based air defences 
focused around Stanley, it is clear that British attack aircraft had the luxury of freedom 
of manoeuvre from the aircraft carrier to the target area.  When coupled with superior 
aircraft serviceability than the Argentines, British aircraft had a significantly stronger 
probability of reaching their assigned targets than their Argentine counterparts.  As a 
result, the British fast jet combat air assets were able to employ 493 weapons during 
the Conflict.  Of note, the British weapon usage is significantly larger than the 301 




Figure 7.2 – British Attack Weapons Usage by Platform. 
 
The second point to comment on is the apportionment and balance of the weapons 
amongst the British platforms.  As mentioned previously, the Hermes-based 800 Naval 
Air Squadron flew the vast majority of the Sea Harrier attack missions.  On board HMS 
Invincible, 801 Naval Air Squadron, in addition to its routine ‘combat air patrol bombing’ 
missions, only flew two dedicated attack missions.  However, in terms of output, and 
despite arriving three weeks after the start of the campaign, 1 (Fighter) Squadron was 
the most prolific British attack unit.  During the campaign, the Harrier GR3 dropped 
205, or 42 per cent, of the British attack weapons.  Collectively, the combined efforts of 
both Sea Harrier squadrons dropped marginally more weapons than the Harrier GR3 
force.  The reality of the Harrier GR3 force performance is contrary to the view of 
Lieutenant Commander Tim Gedge, the commanding officer of 809 Naval Air 
Squadron during the Conflict, that the Sea Harrier dropped three times the number of 
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weapons of the Harrier GR3 force.97  As shown in Figure 7.2, both the Sea Harrier and 
Harrier GR3 each delivered three times the number of weapons of the Vulcan.  
Nevertheless, what outcomes did the Vulcan achieve?  During the course of the 
Conflict, the Vulcan employed 67 weapons.  While the Vulcan’s output is significantly 
less than that of the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 communities, and as validated in the 
Scientific Evaluation Team’s post-Conflict analysis, the Vulcan was the only aircraft 
that was to deliver a weapon that penetrated the runway at Stanley.98  Although the 
result delivered by the Vulcan was greater than that produced by the combined efforts 
of the Harrier and Sea Harrier force, the joint British combat air tactical efforts failed to 
deliver the required operational outcome – impeding the use of Stanley airport.  
 
The third point to note, and despite the numerical advantage in terms of outputs, is that 
the results of many attack missions have been difficult to identify.  Notwithstanding the 
debate regarding the Vulcan’s utility, little has been written in either primary or 
secondary sources regarding the success or otherwise of the British attack missions.  
The lack of understanding of the effects achieved by the British attacks reflects the lack 
of battle-damage assessment conducted.  The point was reiterated to the Chief of the 
Air Staff by Harrier GR3 pilots who flew during the Conflict when they stated that 
‘weapon effects were difficult to judge.’99  With limited timely feedback from British 
ground forces and a lack of on board sensors to record the results of their attacks, the 
British were unable to assure themselves that their attacks achieved the mission aims.  
As a result of inadequate battle damage assessment, targets would have had to been 
repeatedly attacked to ensure that the required effect was achieved.  A lack of 
investment and understanding of the broader and more nuanced air power roles meant 
that finite resources were used in an inefficient, repetitive and high-risk manner.    
 
The fourth point to broach is that significant effort was put into conducting medium-
level bombing of Stanley airport by the Sea Harrier force during transits to its combat 
air patrols.  From 14 May, and as highlighted in Annex K, Sea Harriers dropped at least 
31 bombs against the airfield during their over-flights.  However, the intended target of 
these missions was not the runway but the wider airfield operating area – a pragmatic 
reflection on the limitations of medium-level bombing by the deployed British combat 
air assets.  Consequently, the effect was not to destroy the airfield but to merely apply 
pressure onto the manpower, infrastructure and equipment located at the airfield by 
causing ‘damage and demoralisation in and around military installations and troop 
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emplacements.’100  As a result, the bombs were fitted with the airburst fuse rather than 
the ‘Direct Action’ fuse required for runway penetration.101  As Ward suggested the 
value of the raids was limited to ‘damage [to] thin-skinned targets and keeping the 
enemy awake.’102  In essence, the attacks impacted on the morale of those located in 
and around the airport.  However, measuring the effects achieved was recognised as a 
difficult proposition.  As stated in the Scientific Evaluation Team Report, ‘it is not 
possible to quantify secondary psychological or harassment effects on the enemy.’103 
However, perhaps a more astute move would have been to disrupt those critical 
Argentine soldiers and marines located on the hilltops to the west of Stanley and, 
importantly, also identified as a critical vulnerability in Table 7A. 
 
The fifth deduction is that the lack of precision achieved from medium-level attacks 
meant that low-level attacks were required to deliver the necessary precision.  
Moreover, operating within range of enemy ground-based air defences increased the 
risk to the attacking aircraft.  As a result, the attacking force needed to be able to 
detect, identify and counter any emerging ground-based air defence system.  However, 
the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 lacked the fleet-wide embodiment of radar-warning 
receivers, chaff and flares and jamming pods.104  Consequently, and as with the Sea 
Harrier’s control of the air ability, it can be argued that there were deficits in the British 
attack capability that could be linked back to the triumvirate of platform, sensor and 
weapon.  As a result, low-level attacks had to be supported by dedicated aircraft 
tasked to suppress enemy air defences.  Therefore, precious attack resources were 
diverted to toss-bombing air burst weapons against enemy defences.  For example, 
four of the nine Sea Harriers that conducted the initial raid against Stanley airport on 1 
May were dedicated to suppression.  As a result, 12 of the 27 bombs dropped were not 
employed directly against the airfield infrastructure.  Moreover, as the vast majority of 
the British suppression weapons were area, rather than precision, weapons, there was 
no guarantee that the suppression mission would achieve a ‘soft’, never mind a ‘hard’, 
kill.  Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that suppression aircraft attacked 
the stipulated critical vulnerabilities effectively.  Even the Vulcan armed with its 
precision AGM-45A Shrike weapons was of limited value.  As Curtiss suggested, ‘these 
Vulcan sorties were not spectacularly successful, as the enemy operators were quick 
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to switch off their radars.’105  The demand for precision attack despite being limited to 
non-precision weapons came with the burden of suppression that generated a heavy 
weapons bill from a precious resource. 
 
The last, and key, issue, to review is the weight of effort placed by British planners and 
attack aircraft against Stanley airport.  As shown in Table 7A, the airport at Stanley was 
a critical vulnerability and supported the Argentine operational centre of gravity.  
However, the vast majority of the identified critical vulnerabilities were not located 
around the heavily defended Stanley airport.  Therefore, the British focus on attacking 
the airfield throughout the campaign is perhaps surprising.  As demonstrated in Figure 
7.3 below, the majority of British attack weapons were targeted against the airport 
infrastructure – accounting for 249 or 51 per cent of British attack weapons.  When the 
counter-air attacks beyond Stanley airport are also taken into consideration, this figure 
increases to 67 per cent of the total weapons.  From a doctrinal perspective, the need 
to deliver an assured level of control of the air in order to provide the other 
environments with their required freedoms is well established.106  However, the British 
failed to achieve the required outcome.  Consequently, control of the air was 
continually contested throughout the campaign; neither side had assured access to the 
air environment, it was at best fleeting and localised.  Nevertheless, the British were 
relentless in the pursuit of denying Stanley airport.  As a result, British air power 
planners could be accused of planning and executing a parochial counter-air 
programme to the detriment of a more balanced and effective air campaign that was 
coherent with the wider, joint campaign requirements. 
 
The relatively low importance paid to British air attacks against the Argentine troops 
dug-in to the hills surrounding Stanley is a significant oversight.  As shown in Figure 
7.3, only 28 per cent of British attack weapons were apportioned to the counter-land 
campaign.  While the emphasis on the attack role grew as the British troops closed 
towards the defended mountains surrounding Stanley, it could be argued that a 
counter-land attack plan could have been integrated from the very outset of the 
campaign.  Although elements of the Argentine centre of gravity were attacked, it failed 
to target the fighting strength of the Argentine force.  Bicheno suggests that as of 30 
May, the Argentine force in and around Stanley was in the order of 10 000 military 
personnel.107  The Argentine force disposition showed an extensive defensive outer 
perimeter of combat arms protecting a much smaller inner ring in Stanley containing 
the various headquarters and their enabling functions including communications, 
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logistics and engineering support.108  Although elements of the inner ring were 
attacked, the bulk of Argentine military fighting strength ensconced in the hills 
surrounding Stanley was not attacked until the latter stages of the campaign.   
 
The prosecution of the Argentine operational centre of gravity was not solely the 
responsibility of air power; naval bombardment and artillery were also used 
extensively.  Indeed, the Scientific Evaluation Team post-Conflict report informed that 
‘General Menendez is reported to have stated that the concentration persistence and 
accuracy of the 105mm Light Gun artillery fire and naval gunfire support constituted the 
principal cause of the break down of his troops’ morale and will to fight.’109  Indeed on 
12 June, ‘returning Sea Harrier pilots tell of the impressive sight to be seen over Port 





Figure 7.3 – British Attack Weapons Usage by Target.111 
 
Naval gunfire support was used throughout the campaign and fired an impressive 7916 
rounds of ammunition.112  However, and in a similar vein to the air environment, its 
initial focus was on the airfield at Stanley.  The first naval bombardment against 
Argentine forces protecting Stanley’s western approaches came on the night of 27/28 
May when HMS Glamorgan, Alacrity and Avenger engaged enemy positions at Mount 
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Harriet, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge with 259 high explosive shells, 11 star shells 
and two Sea Slug surface-to-air missiles used in the surface-to-surface mode.113  As 
with the air attack campaign, the focus of naval bombardment switched belatedly to 
support the land campaign with the second naval gunfire support task against the 
hilltops occurring four nights later.114 
 
From a British land perspective, the army deployed thirty 105mm Light Guns during the 
Conflict and fired approximately 17 600 rounds of ammunition - over twice the number 
of rounds of its naval counterparts.115  However, the limited range of the weapons as 
well as the problem of moving and supporting the land-based assets severely 
constrained their utility.  The 105mm Light Gun had a maximum range of 20 kilometres.  
As a result, the gun had to be flown into position once its intended firing position had 
been secured.116  In order to support such a move, Thompson suggested that it would 
take ‘60 - 70 Sea Kings to move one battery of artillery [6 guns] plus all its ammunition’ 
from San Carlos forward to the Mount Kent area.117  Complicating the issue even 
further was the poor weather that delayed the forward deployment of some of the 
105mm Light Guns until 3 June.118  As a result of range, logistics, weather and timing 
constraints, the 105mm Light Guns were only used against Argentine land forces 
during the latter, but critical, stages of the Conflict.   
 
Although the combat air events were significantly fewer in number than their land and 
maritime counterparts, combat air had the advantage of being able to deliver effect 
throughout the campaign at a time and a place of the attackers choosing; air power 
could mitigate the inherent disadvantages of the other two environments.  As a result, 
air power’s advantages of speed, reach and lethality could have been exploited earlier.  
Moreover, all elements that constituted the Argentine operational centre of gravity 
could have been put under significant pressure from the outset of Operation Corporate.  
While the focus on the counter-air war applied pressure on the Argentines, it was a 
slower and less direct route to undermining the Argentine operational centre of gravity.  
While this indirect approach certainly agreed with Liddell Hart’s views on warfare, the 
directness of the approach has to be balanced against the time available to deliver the 
required outcome.119  However, a more direct, joint and collegiate approach may have 
been a more efficient and effective way of achieving the British end-state.  It can be 
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could deliver it could have been used to provide a more equitable balance towards the 
counter-land role.  By directly targeting the Argentine troops, weapons and positions on 
the hilltops to the west of Stanley earlier, and more aggressively, it may have offered a 
path to a quicker British victory and put greater strain on Menendez’s fielded forces.  
Additionally, a change in air power focus may have offered an opportunity to reduce 
the amount of British blood and treasure expended during the battles on Mount Harriet, 
Tumbledown, Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Wireless Ridge.  However, and 
discussed later in the thesis, the deficits in planning, personality and process all 
hindered the effective and efficient use of the attack air power role. 
 
During pre-Conflict planning, British air planners suggested that the Harrier GR3s 
‘should be used as early as possible on reconnaissance/ground attacks.’120  The paper 
also recognised the diverse capabilities of the Sea Harrier but stated that ‘air 
superiority over the task force must not be prejudiced by other tasking.’121  
Consequently, in the pre-landing phase Harrier GR3 and Sea Harrier, if available, 
would be tasked to conduct reconnaissance sorties to determine concentrations of 
enemy forces that could then be exploited in the post-landing phase.122  Although the 
plan was robust and prioritised tasks by platform and time it was not implemented.  The 
Scientific Evaluation Team report is stark, ‘there was no co-ordinated pre-planned 
programme in support of land operations.’123  The reality of the situation was captured 
in Squadron Leader Pete Harris’ paper, ‘Operation Corporate – A Worm’s Eye View.’  
Harris, a Harrier GR3 pilot during the Conflict, suggested that ‘very few reconnaissance 
sorties were tasked.’124  Harris continued by informing that ‘had more air 
reconnaissance sorties been flown earlier in the conflict, numerous high value targets 
would undoubtedly have found which could have been subsequently tasked for air 
attack, artillery bombardment or naval gunfire support.  The lack of understanding of 
the value of air reconnaissance could have had disastrous consequences had the 
Argentinean will to fight been stronger.’125  The disparity between the theoretical plan 
and the reality in the South Atlantic is clear but what were the causal factors for the 
failure to implement the plan? 
 
In Curtiss’ own report on the Conflict, he highlighted several command and control 
problems that influenced how the campaign was executed.  Contrary to its actual role 
during the Conflict, Curtiss suggested that ‘HMS Hermes was not established or 
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equipped as an attack carrier.’126  This is not a reflection on the capacity of the ship’s 
magazine but a statement on the personnel and equipment available to conduct the air 
planning task.  It was clear to the Harrier GR3 pilots that ‘aboard ship, there was no 
adequate system for tasking sorties or monitoring missions.’127  Curtiss also noted that 
HMS Hermes only had a single air tasking officer who was not only responsible for 
planning combat air missions but was also responsible for helicopter and 
replenishment at sea tasking.128  As a result, mistakes were made.  Squire informed 
‘that on occasions we responded to air requests rather than air tasks.’129  Moreover, 
Harris highlighted an example of the inefficient process in place.  ‘On 26 May, Brigade 
Staff asked for low level photographic cover of the Argentine defensive positions west 
of Port Stanley, an area of approximately 70 square kilometres.  The task reached the 
Squadron during the afternoon of 9 June and required the photographs to be at the 
front line army units by the morning of 11 June.’130  The manpower issue was further 
complicated by the lack of Intelligence Officer or Ground Liaison Officer to support the 
understandably parsimonious 1 (Fighter) Squadron deployment.131  Moreover, 
inadequate communications between the key agencies and dislocation of the 
intelligence cell from the squadron complicated matters further.132  Ultimately, the lack 
of trained manpower was compromising the process and utility of the embarked attack 
assets. 
 
Compounded by the late arrival of the land component commander, the slow build up 
and break out from San Carlos and the release of the land scheme of manoeuvre, the 
British lacked a definitive plan to support the land component.  Consequently, in the 
post-Operation Sutton hiatus, British attack missions were predominantly retained in 
the offensive counter air role.  Although counter-land attack missions started on 19 
May, it was not until ten days later that the first raids against the Argentine forces on 
the hills surrounding Stanley took place.  Although a greater number of counter-land 
missions took place over the remainder of the campaign, the planning and intelligence 
associated with these raids led to significant frustration.  The lack of attack missions 
planned and executed against the Argentine ground forces was, arguably, a missed 
opportunity.  Consequently, British air power, and contrary to contemporary doctrine, 
was unable to coerce its adversary into changing or maintaining its behaviour to the 
benefit of the attacking force.133  Even when the British eventually attacked the 
Argentine hill top forces, it was in a near-term, reactive manner.  The results were poor.  
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As highlighted by Squire in his Operation Corporate report, ‘many of the targets were 
… well dug in and camouflaged, thus difficult if not impossible to see at weapon 
release ranges ... there is no doubt, as proved by the few recce [reconnaissance] 
sorties flown, there were many lucrative targets in the Stanley area and the use of pure 
recce would not only have identified them but given the pilots much more acquisition 
data.’134  Wing Commander Trowern’s signal to the Air Officer Commander in Chief on 
the subject highlighted the frustration within the Harrier GR3 community, ‘in the heat of 
battle our limited assets must be firmly husbanded; if not they will be squandered 
against low value and difficult to acquire targets.’135  Although armed reconnaissance 
missions were tasked and flown by both Sea Harrier and the Harrier GR3, they had 
limited utility when compared to dedicated and focussed reconnaissance missions that 
the Harrier GR3 community desired.  The Scientific Evaluation Team’s report 
suggested that armed reconnaissance was ‘over emphasised’ and ‘does not produce 
detailed intelligence and it is wasteful to employ expensive aircraft against targets of 
opportunity which are often of questionable value in any event.’136 
 
A more prudent method would have been to use British combat air assets in a 
coordinated, pre-emptive manner that exploited air power’s strengths and allowed the 
land battle to be shaped to the advantage of the attacking force.  Noting that the vast 
majority of land battles were fought at night, the Harrier GR3 had an added 
disadvantage as it had no night attack capability.137  In order to maximise its utility, the 
Harrier GR3 needed pre-emptive reconnaissance and sufficient time during daylight to 
prosecute Argentine fielded forces.  As a result of its misuse, the utility of British attack 
missions was neutered, as it became an equal partner alongside naval bombardment 
and artillery.  Moreover, by delaying its use in the land battle, it could be argued that 
the utility of the Harrier GR3 was in fact severely hampered and subject to increased 
risk.  The limited exploitation of the Harrier GR3 during the Conflict is reflected in the 
38 Group post-Conflict report that informed, ‘it is remarkable that [Number] 1 Squadron 
achieved any success at all.’138  
 
The Harrier GR3 pilots were exasperated that their attack and reconnaissance 
capabilities were neither understood nor exploited.139  In addition to the lack of 
understanding across the embarked joint air wing, there were also issues regarding the 
command and control of the embarked Harriers.  The designated Air Commander for 
Operation Corporate was Curtiss.  However, he remained in the United Kingdom for 
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the majority of the campaign, although he did venture as far south as Ascension Island.  
However, operational command of the Harrier GR3s was delegated to Woodward as 
the Carrier Task Group commander with operational control allocated to the Captain of 
HMS Hermes.140  As a result, the de facto Air Commander in the South Atlantic was 
Captain Linley Middleton.  In his post-Conflict report, Peter Squire suggested that ‘in 
[HMS] Hermes, the Captain himself exercised a very tight control on flying operations 
and the Squadrons’ programme was totally dictated by the ship.’141  Moore’s RAF 
liaison officer also commented in his post-Conflict analysis that tasking of sorties, 
‘differed from the RAF/NATO system by depending more on the intuitive wishes of the 
Admiral and the Captain.’142  Due to Middleton’s authoritarian command style, once a 
decision was made it was difficult to countermand it.  Pook highlighted the implications 
of one of the command’s decisions by suggesting that ‘several times we found 
ourselves attacking targets with unsuitable weapons which were wrongly fused.’143  
Middleton’s directives were not just limited to the junior Service.  Much to Ward’s 
vexation, the Sea Harriers of 801 Naval Air Squadron were also subject to Middleton’s 
robust, tactically focussed leadership style.144  In an endeavour to rectify the issue, the 
Central Tactics and Trials Organisation’s report into the Conflict suggested that 
‘specialist advisors with adequate authority should be deployed with RAF assets, if 
operational control is to exercised by another Service, to ensure effective operational 
employment.’145   
 
British air planners were guilty of fighting a parochial counter-air war to the detriment of 
the wider joint campaign.  Although attack missions were conducted, it can be seen 
that: they failed to strike the critical vulnerabilities efficiently, embarked capabilities and 
requirements were not understood, mission command was not employed and the lack 
of planning staff compromised attack missions.  As a result, British attack missions 
were inefficient and often less than decisive.  With the British air power unable to 
undermine the Argentine operational centre of gravity, what could the Argentines do to 
defend their military strength? 
 
Defending the Argentine Operational Centre of Gravity 
 
With no maritime force air defence capability operating in and around the Falkland 
Islands as well as no dedicated manned fighters conducting defensive counter air 
missions, the Argentine ability to defend their operational centre of gravity was left to 
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their ground-based air defences.  However, with no area air defence system, the 
Argentines were limited to localised, point defence of the populated areas: Stanley, 
Goose Green and Port Howard.  Consequently, and as shown in Annex K, it is 
unsurprising that the vast majority of British attack missions reached their intended 
target areas with little enemy interference.  As a result, and like their Argentine 
counterparts, the key reason for British aircraft failing to reach the target area was 
caused by infrequent aircraft failures and poor weather rather than Argentine 
intervention.   
 
On arrival at the target area, British attack assets lacked a precision stand-off attack 
capability.  Therefore, in order to enhance identification and precision, the British attack 
assets were forced to enter the Argentine umbrella of ground-based air defences.  As a 
result, the Harrier GR3s and Sea Harriers faced an eclectic array of co-located ground-
based air defence systems operated by a number of different organisations.  For the 
Argentines, as with the British, the difficulty of coordinating the pan-Service assets 
would soon become apparent. 
 
The provision of Argentine ground-based air defence was a joint affair and focused on 
the protection of Stanley.  Grupo de Artillería de Defensa Aérea 601 was the main anti-
aircraft artillery unit.  The Argentine Army unit operated a single Roland 2 surface-to-air 
missile fire unit, a dozen Oerlikon twin 35mm anti-aircraft guns, three Oerlikon twin 
20mm anti-aircraft guns and three Tigercat surface-to-air missile launchers.146  
Although the majority of the fire units were used to protect Stanley, one 35mm anti-
aircraft gun was deployed to protect Goose Green.147  A second, smaller army unit also 
conducted ground-based air defence.  Grupo de Artillería de Defensa Aérea 101 were 
armed with eight Hispano HS-831 30 mm cannons. The latter unit operated solely in 
the vicinity of Stanley.148 
Supporting its Army colleagues, Grupo 1 de Artillería Antiaérea from the Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina operated nine Rheinmetall twin 20mm anti-aircraft guns and four Oerlikon 
twin 35mm anti-aircraft guns.149  In contrast to its land counterparts who operated the 
Skyguard fire control radar, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina used the Superfledermaus fire 
control radar to cue its guns.150  As with Grupo de Artillería de Defensa Aérea 601, the 
focus of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina unit’s efforts was the protection of Stanley but six 
of the 20mm anti-aircraft guns were deployed to Goose Green.151  Number 1 Marine Air 
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Defence Battalion provided the naval contribution to the protection of Argentine key 
positions.  The unit operated three Tigercat launchers and 12 Hispano HS-831 30mm 
cannons in and around Stanley.  Lastly, the smaller and more difficult to reach 
positions of interest, such as Port Howard and the hills surrounding Stanley were 
protected by man-portable air defence systems such as the British-provided Blowpipe 
and the Soviet SA-7 ‘Grail’ recently acquired via Peruvian sources.152  
Consequently, the British faced a broad range of Argentine ground-based air defence 
systems.  The most modern and effective weapon system operated by the Argentines 
was the Franco-German Roland 2 surface-to-air missile system.  After initial confusion 
regarding whether or not the Roland 2 system had been deployed to the Falkland 
Islands, a second and more fundamental question was raised – what was the system’s 
maximum operating height?153  The Roland 2 system was almost unknown to British 
operators, who found it ‘difficult to obtain a definitive assessment of the engagement 
envelope of this missile.’154  Consequently, the British under-estimated the Roland 2 
capability.155  In late April and early May, British assessments of Roland 2’s maximum 
operating altitude varied from 11 500 feet to 17 600 feet.156  This ambiguity regarding 
the Roland 2’s true capability would percolate south to the task force and the various 
combat air units worked with different Roland 2 engagement envelopes.  
Consequently, the needless disparity in figures would lead to the loss of a precious 
combat aircraft 
 
If the Argentines were to maximise the attrition of British attack aircraft they had to 
ensure the utility and coordination of their various weapon suites.  However, Moro 
himself admitted, ‘that joint action was not one of the Argentine armed forces’ greater 
virtues.’157  Despite their ad-hoc arrangement, and as shown in Table 7B, Argentine 
ground-based air defences caused several losses to British combat air platforms 
throughout the campaign. 
 
The causal factors behind the loss of the five British aircraft were driven by three 
considerations.  First, the lack of a comprehensive suite of defensive aids to detect and 
counter ground threats caused the loss of the first Sea Harrier.  Lieutenant Nick 
Taylor’s aircraft was originally a development aircraft for the Sea Eagle missile.  As a 
result, the Sea Eagle weapons control panel had been fitted in lieu of a radar-warning 
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receiver.158  Without the radar-warning receiver, Taylor was ‘blind’ to the threat posed 
by the Goose Green radar-laid guns and he paid with his life before reaching his 
intended target.    
 
Table 7B – British Combat Aircraft Losses to Argentine Air Defences.159 
 
The next two losses fell to the Harrier GR3 force.  Operating in the low-level, high-
speed environment without sensors, the Harrier GR3 pilots found it difficult to detect 
and strike their, often concealed, targets on their first pass.  Forced to reattack the 
target, sometimes on multiple occasions, the Harrier GR3s were increasingly exposed 
to enemy ground fire.  Iveson and Glover both fell prey to ground fire during reattacks, 
although both survived the ordeal.  The Harrier GR3 reattack tactic was controversial 
both within the Squadron and outwith.  Pook was criticised by his wingman on 26 May 
following multiple passes over the same target in the Mount Kent area.160  Commodore 
Mike Clapp, himself an experienced naval aviator, suggested that ‘second passes over 
enemy positions were inviting disaster.’161  The culture evident amongst the Harrier 
pilots was that achieving the task was important.  This was at times contrary to 
accepted good practice and at odds with the Argentine approach to their attack sorties.  
As evidenced in the previous chapters, the Argentines tended to favour only attacking 
when the advantage was stacked in their favour.  Consequently, and unlike the British, 
the Argentines had a tendency to preserve their force to the detriment of achieving the 
goal. 
 
The causal factor for the loss of the Harrier GR3 on 30 May is disputed.  Due to the 
lack of warning, tracer or smoke trail of a surface-to-air missile, Pook assumed that it 
was a small calibre weapon that brought down his aircraft.162  Others suggest that 
radar-laid anti-aircraft artillery was responsible for downing the Harrier GR3.163  
Irrespective of which weapon system was accountable for bringing down Pook’s 
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Date Aircraft Unit Pilot Location Air Defence 
4 May Sea Harrier 800 NAS Lt Nick Taylor Goose Green 35mm Cannon 
21 May 
Harrier GR3 1(F) Sqn 
Flt Lt Jeff Glover Port Howard Blowpipe Missile 
27 May Sqn Ldr Bob Iveson Goose Green 35mm Cannon 
30 May Sqn Ldr Jerry Pook      Stanley Small Arms 
1 June Sea Harrier 801 NAS Flt Lt Ian Mortimer Stanley Roland Missile 
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Harrier, operating in the low-level and high-threat environment was a high-risk 
proposition.  As a result, the British tolerated the risks and accepted that losses were 
inevitable.  It could be argued that the British maintained their high-risk strategy 
throughout the campaign.  As this thesis has shown, the Argentine risk appetite ebbed 
and flowed throughout the campaign. 
 
The last British combat air asset loss highlighted the different operating procedures 
across the community.  Despite a recently imposed 20 000 feet minimum altitude for 
combat air patrols, Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer was flying at around 15 000 feet in 
the vicinity of Stanley when he was shot down by a Roland surface-to-air missile.164 
Although Mortimer was aware of the missile launch, he believed, along with his fellow 
aviators on board HMS Invincible, that he was flying above the maximum height of the 
missile system.165  However, Morgan inferred that Mortimer was flying as low as 10 000 
feet when he was engaged.166  If true, Mortimer was flying below the 13 000 feet safe 
height previously used by his squadron and significantly below the more restrictive 
minimum altitude of 18 000 feet formerly used by the Sea Harriers on board HMS 
Hermes.167  Of note, Mortimer’s operating altitude reflected the Vulcan force’s belief 
that they ‘should be safe from the triple A [anti-aircraft artillery] and Roland as long as 
they remained above 10 000 feet.’168  The Cold War focus on countering Soviet threats 
meant that British forces did not understand the capabilities of a Franco-German 
produced weapons system.  Moreover, and as they rapidly adapted to the new threat, 
the lack of communication and coordination between both aircraft carriers and 
Ascension Island-based assets led to the needless loss of a valuable Sea Harrier. 
In addition to the aircraft lost to Argentine ground-based air defences, numerous British 
aircraft were also damaged due to ground fire.  In particular, the Harrier GR3 force was 
particularly affected as its low altitude attack profiles left them vulnerable to ground fire.  
The situation was so extreme, that at one point, 1 (Fighter) Squadron only had one 
serviceable aircraft.  Consequently, a combined Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 formation 
was flown on 1 June in order to maximise the combat air output as well as provide the 
minimum level of mutual support between the aircraft.169  The situation was quickly 
remedied with effective battle damage repair of the wounded Harrier GR3s.  Indeed, 
Squire suggested that ‘no aircraft spent longer than 48 hours in the hangar before it 
was flying again.’170  Moreover, the arrival of replacement aircraft, flown directly from 
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Ascension Island on 1 and 8 June, also alleviated the pressure on the Harrier GR3 
force.171  
However, the Argentine ground-based air defences believed they were even more 
successful.  In claims that reflected the initial optimism of British ground-based air 
defences, the Argentines had a tendency to exaggerate their ground-based air defence 
performance.  For example, during the initial Sea Harrier Stanley airport attack on 1 
May, the Argentines claimed four kills and a further two aircraft damaged.172  However, 
this is at odds with the reality, expressed in BBC reporter Brian Hanrahan’s famous 
phrase, ‘I counted them all out and I counted them all back.’173 
 
In addition to over-estimating the number of kills achieved, the Argentine ground-based 
air defences were involved in two fratricide incidents.  The first event occurred on 1 
May, when a battle-damaged or fuel-starved, accounts differ, Mirage III was attempting 
to make an emergency landing at Stanley.  The aircraft was shot down by Argentine 
ground fire as it approached the airport.174  Poor command and control of the eclectic 
mix and organisations of Argentine ground-based air defences led to the needless loss 
of one of their own assets.  However, this was not the only Argentine fratricide incident.  
Eleven days later, an A-4B Skyhawk was shot down as it overflew Goose Green while 
returning to the Argentine mainland after an effective attack against HMS Glasgow.175  
On both occasions, the pilots were killed.  However, poor communication and inability 
to identify friendly assets were not the sole preserve of Argentine forces.  The Scots 
Guards were involved in an incident at Tumbledown when they endeavoured to 
engage a bomb-dropping Harrier GR3.176  It is clear that the ‘fog of war’ pervaded both 
sides during the Conflict. 
 
Just as the Argentines’ had a fascination with attacking the British aircraft carriers it 
could be argued that the British were beguiled with Stanley airport.  Consequently, the 
inter-Service bickering regarding the utility and success of the various platforms 
attacking the Stanley airport throughout the campaign is, in reality, a smoke screen that 
masks the real issue.  Rather than focussing on a counter-air campaign, the British 
should have been concentrating on the counter-land campaign, particularly in the 
period immediately after Operation Sutton.  
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With the lack of a coherent joint campaign plan and a late insight into the land scheme 
of manoeuvre, it is easy to see why air planners planned and fought an independent, if 
not incoherent, air campaign.  The result was a series of tactical bespoke set pieces 
that had few opportunities to blend into the operational campaign.  From an operational 
and joint perspective, the air planners appear to have been mesmerised by what they 









‘What is it today that I will wish tomorrow that I had done yesterday?’ 
 
Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward, 
Carrier Task Force Commander1 
 
Woodward’s comment is an apposite reminder for commanders to continually reflect 
and critically analyse decisions made, outputs produced and progress achieved 
towards delivering the required campaign outcomes.  The process of continuous 
campaign reflection is necessary in order to ensure that the lessons are captured, 
learned and not repeated.  Indeed, both participants captured many lessons from the 
Conflict ranging from the grand strategic lessons of the Franks Report and the Informe 
Rattenbach to the tactical lessons of individual units.  However, the production of many 
of the documents was rushed.  As a consequence, many documents contained a 
number of inaccuracies.  Other campaign reflections took a more parochial approach, 
highlighting a national, Service or individual bias and agenda.  Additionally, other 
reports lacked an appropriate balance by focusing on the tactical level rather than a 
broader air environment viewpoint or on the joint and operational level of warfighting.2  
Nevertheless, many of the lessons produced in the immediate aftermath of the Conflict 
were used to reinforce the validity of the extant and funded UK Defence procurement 
projects such as the JP233 runway denial weapon.3   
 
Although it would be overly simplistic to compare the Falklands Conflict narrative with 
Deighton’s views of the Battle of Britain chronicle, there are elements that do indeed 
resonate.   Deighton argued that ‘it became clear that the egos of the victors had 
started to obscure historical fact.  It was time to untwist the record.’4  While Deighton 
focused on the victors, it could be reasoned that for the Falklands Conflict the narrative 
should also include the vanquished.  Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to review the 
operational level air power lessons.  However, the intent is not to limit these lessons to 
the British air campaign - Deighton’s victors.  As a result, the chapter will review the 
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common operational level themes that affected both the British and Argentine air 
campaign.    
 
As shown in Table 8A below, there are a number of common operational level air 
power lessons that applied to both sides during their planning and execution of their 
respective air campaigns.  This chapter analyses each of the themes as well as looking 
at the contemporary relevance and the ramifications of each of the lessons.   
 
Lesson 1 Generate and Distribute a Coherent Joint Air Campaign Plan  
Lesson 2 Understand the Theatre 
Lesson 3 Understand the Capabilities 
Lesson 4 Deliver Outcomes, not Outputs 
 
Table 8A – The Operational Level Lessons of the Falklands Air Campaign. 
 
Lesson 1 – Generate and Distribute a Coherent Joint Air Campaign Plan.   In 
order to produce and deliver an effective air campaign plan, a clear understanding of 
who is responsible for the planning, execution and assessment of the plan should be 
required.  Therefore, a simple and logical command and control structure must be 
established, and one which has ideally been honed during peacetime.  Although the 
focus of thesis is upon air power, this has to be set in a joint context in order to 
understand its true utility.  Consequently, ‘Joint Action’ needs air power and air power 
needs ‘Joint Action.’5  Contemporary United Kingdom defence doctrine would offer the 
concept of Joint Action as the exemplar model for delivering the required effects during 
joint operations.   In order to deliver Joint Action, and as shown in Figure 8.1, a single 
Joint Task Force Commander is accountable for each of the five subordinate 
components that sit below the commander.  However, both participants in the 1982 
Falklands Conflict adopted very different command and control arrangements.  
Consequently, the products and outcomes achieved by both sides were far from ideal.   
 
From an Argentine viewpoint, the military Junta separated its subordinate units under 
geographic and Service lines.  As a result, even before the Conflict started, the utility of 
Argentine air power was compromised as it was unable to mass its collected firepower 
efficiently.  Prior to the Conflict, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina was comprised of a staff 
headquarters and five commands - air defence, air operations, training, material and air 
regions command through four geographical areas.6  However, and in order to meet 
																																																								
5 Joint Action is defined as deliberately using and orchestrating military capabilities and activities to realize specific 
physical and/or psychological effects. United Kingdom, UK Defence Doctrine, 43. 
6 Burden, The Air War, 158.	
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the demands of the emerging situation in the days leading up to the Falklands Conflict, 




Figure 8.1 – Contemporary United Kingdom Joint Command and Control.7	
 
Although Air Defence Command, Comando Aereo de Defensa, led by Brigadier 
Hughes, ‘simply expanded its area of activity’ to cover the Falkland Islands remit, a 
new command was generated in early April.8  Strategic Air Command, Comando Aereo 
Estrategico, was created in order to take responsibility for ‘planning their reaction to the 
British Task Force, monitoring the size and progress of the fleet as it sailed south, 
assessing British preparations for war and the creation of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s 
own battle plans.’9  However, the relationship between the strategic coordination staffs, 
such as the Estado Mayor de Coordination, and their subordinate, deployed 
headquarters was troubled.10  The challenge appeared not to be one of integrating new 
organisations under difficult timescales but one of authority.  It seemed that the 
subordinate units believed that the plans generated by the coordination staffs were of 
limited utility and created by individuals who lacked credibility.  Perhaps more 
surprisingly, on 30 April the Comando Aereo Estrategico, ‘was stood down, its task 
completed.’11  So, on the eve of battle, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina elected to devolve 
all responsibility for planning and execution of its air war to the subordinate, operational 
level headquarters, Comando de la Fuerza Aérea Sur. 
 
For day-to-day operational control of the air battle across the Teatro de Operaciones 
Atlantico Sur, both the Comando de Aviación Naval and the Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
had individual deployed headquarters located in southern Argentina.  However, the 
deployed headquarters were geographically divorced from each other by several 
hundred miles.  At Comodoro Rivadavia, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina adapted its 
																																																								
7 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence.  Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00: Campaign Execution.  (Shrivenham: The 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009), 1A-1.  
8 Burden, The Air War, 19.	
9 Ibid. 
10 R. Schiena, Argentine Jointness, 99. 














existing regional air force headquarters, Comando de Fuerza Aérea Sur.  Although the 
organisation existed prior to the Conflict it was manned by only five personnel in early 
April and lacked plans, communications as well as an in-depth knowledge of the 
situation.12  However, the headquarters was bolstered in order that it could ‘be 
entrusted with the implementation of tactical missions’ and was commanded by 
Brigadier Ernesto Crespo, the IV Brigada Aérea commander.13  As a result, the A-4C 
Skyhawk unit was devoid of its most senior leader; the decision did not aid the unit who 
were demonstrably the least successful Argentine combat air unit during the Conflict.  
Moreover, the Comando de Fuerza Aérea Sur had neither command nor control over 
the usage of Fuerza Aérea Argentina assets based on the Falkland Islands.  Under the 
command of the Garrison Commander and Military Governor, the contingent of 
Falkland Islands-based aircraft came under the control of Brigadier Castellana who 
operated from the joint headquarters in Stanley.  The net result was that command and 
control of Fuerza Aérea Argentina air power was divided across a number of ad-hoc or 
modified organisations that were neither trained nor equipped for the task at hand.  
Consequently, the synchronization and focus of Fuerza Aérea Argentina assets during 
the Conflict was compromised at the outset of the campaign by a convoluted command 




Figure 8.2 – Argentine Operational Command and Control.14 
 
																																																								
12 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 110.   
13 Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 78; Burden.  The Air War, 19.	
14 Adapted from Ibid., 18 and Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 78. 
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In contrast and over 500 miles further south at Rio Grande, the Comando de Aviación 
Naval air command and control function was not radically altered from its normal 
peacetime structures.  The Comando de Aviación Naval headquarters was co-located 
with its aircraft under the auspices of Fuerza de Tareas 80.15  Although there were 
attempts in early May to marry up certain elements of the Comando de Aviación Naval 
under Fuerza Aérea Argentina command and control, this aspiration never 
materialised.16  As a result, both the Comando de Aviación Naval and Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina headquarters issued their own set of targeting priorities and attack plans, 
which, as described previously, differed significantly from each other.  Consequently, 
the conceptual thinking between the two Services was never aligned during the 
Conflict.  The long-standing mutual distrust between the two Services meant that the 
physical interaction between the two Argentine air arms was also restricted.  Although 
there was evidence of some inter-Service training prior to the Conflict, the benefits 
garnered from these events were, at best, limited.17  During the Conflict itself, the two 
air arms only collaborated on one combat air mission, the combined Super Etendard 
and Fuerza Aérea Argentina A-4C Skyhawk attack mission conducted on 30 May.  The 
limited interaction in the conceptual and physical environments caused Argentine air 
power to prosecute what in effect were two separate air campaigns managed along 
Service lines of interest.  Ultimately, the Argentine air campaign lacked unity of effort.  
As a result, the Argentine operational advantage of a larger force size was squandered 
through its inefficient employment.   
 
However, as shown in Figure 8.3, the British ways of employing air command and 
control were equally disjointed.  Although an Air Commander had been appointed, his 
remit did not encompass the totality of the British air power. Air Marshal Curtiss had 
responsibility for United Kingdom and Ascension Island-based activities including 
launching Vulcan attack missions, Victor air-to-air refuelling sorties, C-130 Hercules air-
drops and Nimrod maritime reconnaissance flights into the South Atlantic.  However, 
the tasks required expertise beyond those that existed within his current peacetime 18 
Group Headquarters construct.  Curtiss stated, ‘obviously my staff, which in normal 
times deals almost exclusively with maritime patrol aircraft and SAR [Search and 
Recue] helicopter squadrons, had to be augmented with role specialists as different 
types of aircraft were drawn into the air order of battle.’18    
 
																																																								
15 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 54.	
16 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 177.   
17 As described in Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 29 as well as Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 54. 




Figure 8.3 – British Operation Corporate Command and Control.19 
 
In contrast, responsibility for the embarked air power on board the two British aircraft 
carriers was devolved to the Carrier Battle Group Commander.  In turn, Woodward 
empowered the commanding officer of HMS Hermes, Captain Linley Middleton, to act 
as the in-theatre Air Commander.  However, on board HMS Hermes, the air planning 
staff was woefully undermanned.  As a result, the product was underwhelming.  The 
British planning effort was reactive, rushed and failed to fully exploit its inherit deployed 
air power capability.  Consequently, due to the ad-hoc nature of many of the air 
planning requests, Middleton himself had to quickly assimilate, prioritise and decide 
how the tasks would be executed.  Nevertheless, Middleton’s management style was 
not appreciated by everyone.  Squire felt that Middleton ‘held a distorted view of the 
RAF.’20  Consequently, Squire described his relationship with Middleton as 
‘antagonistic,’ he was also warned by a senior Royal Navy officer that Middleton would 
‘go out of his way to make his life difficult.’21  Uncharacteristically, Squire did not hold 
back on his views on Middleton when he suggested that ‘he was a bully.’22  Moreover, 
Middleton’s wrath was not limited to the junior Service.  Due to his autocratic 
management style, Middleton’s decisions led to a set of disgruntled tactical operators, 
across both RAF and Fleet Air Arm aircrews, who justifiably felt that their tactical 
expertise and utility was being wasted.  Despite the ‘good relationship’ between the 
																																																								
19 Based on Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 32. 
20 Imperial War Museum.  “Squire, Peter (Oral History).” https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80025717 
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operators at the tactical level, both British combat air outputs and outcomes were 
compromised through the poor execution of air command and control.23 
 
The net result was that the British had two Air Commanders but instead of splitting the 
assets along single Service lines, the distinction was geographic.  While the Argentines 
air arms also had a geographic separation of their command and control teams 
measuring hundreds of miles, the British separation could be measured in thousands 
of miles.   
 
So far, we have reviewed air command and control has been within the confines of the 
air campaign.  However, that campaign must be considered as an integral part of the 
wider joint effort.  Both participants could be critiqued for planning and executing 
independent air campaigns that were not synchronised with the joint campaign.  Due to 
the ambivalent approach of the Argentine land and maritime components, the evidence 
shows that the Argentine air campaigns began to run out of impetus before the critical 
land battles on the hills surrounding Stanley.  From a British perspective, after a strong 
joint amphibious operation, the British had to wait for the arrival of the land commander 
and 5 Infantry Brigade.  The delay meant that British air power failed to exploit the time 
available between the landings at San Carlos and the assaults on the high ground to 
the west of the capital.  As a result, air power was used in an ineffective and reactive 
way rather than in a planned, deliberate, pre-emptive manner that could shape and 
enable the battlespace prior to land forces coming into contact.  The frustration was 
evident and highlighted by Wing Commander Trowern, the RAF liaison officer to the 
land commander, in his post-Conflict report when he suggested that ‘military folk still 
look on our ac [aircraft] as airborne arty [artillery].’ 24 
 
The lesson, therefore, is that in order to remain coherent and relevant, the co-location 
of the various component commanders must be seen as the exemplar to strive for as it 
enables joint understanding, ease of communication as well as synchronised, coherent 
planning.  If co-location of the command team cannot be achieved then empowered, 
knowledgeable and embedded liaison staff in sufficient numbers can mitigate the 
absence of senior leadership.  As a tertiary way of operating, secure communication 
systems and regular updates will be required in order to offset any deficits in face-to-
face communication.  From both a British and an Argentine perspective, not one of 




24 TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
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It is evident that both protagonists suffered due to convoluted and inefficient joint and, 
in turn, air command and control processes.  Geography, inter-Service rivalry, rushed 
implementation, poor infrastructure and lack of credible staff all conspired to generate a 
distinct lack of unity of effort from both participants.  However, could each side adapt 
their command and control flaws and build sufficient situational awareness to allow 
them to prosecute the conflict successfully? 
 
Lesson 2 – Understand the Theatre.  Critical to any campaign plan is the need to 
understand the operating environment, the enemy’s capability and its intent.  In 
contemporary British doctrine ‘Understand’ is defined as ‘the perception and 
interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and 
foresight required for effective decision-making.’25  In 1982, Britain’s main military effort 
was focussed on the Cold War.  Despite significant and accurate reporting by the 
British Embassy in Buenos Aires on military affairs over the years, little tangible 
knowledge about the Argentine military capability nor its intent appears to have 
percolated down to the British units as they rapidly deployed to the South Atlantic.  
From an Argentine viewpoint, they faced strategic shock as they failed to predict the 
British reaction to the Argentine invasion of the Islands.  Consequently, both 
participants needed to rapidly assimilate an understanding of what enemy force they 
faced and ensure they identified their opponents, as well as their own, strengths and 
weaknesses.  In essence, before decisive operations could take place, each 
protagonist endeavoured to understand and control the land, sea and air environments.  
From a British doctrinal perspective, the need to control the environments in order to 
generate the necessary freedoms of initiative and manoeuvre was well understood.  
Moreover, from an amphibious operations viewpoint, history has shown that the 
success of amphibious operations is predicated on effective sea control and control of 
the air prior to and during the amphibious assault.  So, how effective was each 
participant in controlling the environments? 
 
Although the Argentines lacked an airborne early warning capability, they had deployed 
a long-range surveillance radar and associated control organisation to support air 
operations in and around the Islands.  The Centro de Informacion y Control (CIC) unit 
based at Stanley used the Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F radar of Escuadron del Grupo 2 
de Vigilancia y Control Aereo, to successfully warn Argentine aircraft approaching the 
Islands from the mainland of the presence and proximity of Sea Harrier combat air 
patrols.26  As a consequence, and without the benefit of sweep and escort aircraft to 
																																																								
25 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence.  Joint Doctrine Publication 04: Understanding.  (Shrivenham: The Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010), 2-1. 
26 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 108. 
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protect them, several Argentine formations aborted their intended attacks based upon 
the information provided to them by their controllers.  Nevertheless, the British made 
concerted efforts to negate the Argentine early warning capability.  Despite several 
dedicated armed reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air defence missions to 
find and destroy the Argentine radars, the damage was minimal and the Argentine 
radar capability remained operational throughout the campaign. 
  
Beyond the air environment, the Argentines struggled to dominate the other 
environments.  There is little evidence to suggest that Argentine land forces adopted 
anything other than a static defensive position with localised reconnaissance taking 
place.  However, the limited reconnaissance effort was not without success.  Argentine 
forces conducting observation duties on Pebble Island and to the north of Fitzroy led to 
the attacks against HMS Coventry on 25 May and the RFAs Sir Tristram and Sir 
Galahad on 8 June. 27  Nevertheless, the Argentine ability to understand and influence 
the maritime environment was limited by a lack of appetite to commit their forces to 
battle following the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano on 2 May.  As a result, the 
British were able to approach the Falkland Islands unmolested throughout Operation 
Corporate. 
 
The lack of British airborne early warning is a well-documented lesson from Operation 
Corporate.28  Although valiant efforts were made to mitigate the capability gap these 
were of limited success.  The Sea King airborne early warning helicopters were 
modified, tested and deployed in an impressive timeframe but they did not arrive in the 
South Atlantic until the Conflict was over.  Consequently, a number of joint capabilities 
were used in an attempt to offset the critical gap in capability.  However, these 
endeavours came at a cost.  The loss of the two Type 42 destroyers that were placed 
up threat in an attempt to provide early warning of air attacks can be directly attributed 
to the lack of airborne early warning assets.  The insertion of special forces onto the 
South American mainland, the use of British-provisioned and manned radars in Chile 
as well as submarines poised off the Argentine mainland all provided valuable early 
warning to the Task Force and the timely launch of Sea Harrier combat air patrols.  
However, the British failed to grasp the scale and complexity of Argentine air 
operations.  For example, during the landings of 21 May, the Ministry of Defence 
believed, driven by overly optimistic kill assessments, that the Argentine mainland 
attack force had dwindled to 26 aircraft and was only able to generate 35 missions.29  
The reality was the force comprised 73 aircraft and was able to fly 74 missions.  The 
																																																								
27 Brown, Royal Navy, 221; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 611. 
28 As identified in the report, ‘Equipment Lessons from Operation Corporate’ contained within TNA, DEFE 58/260. 
Lessons Learned. 
29 TNA, FCO 7/4566.  Military Planning. 
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British significantly under-estimated the size of the Argentine combat air force, 
although the over-estimation of the Argentine air arms’ ability to turn their force size 
into outputs mitigated this oversight to some extent.30  Nevertheless, the British 
understanding of the Argentine combat air capability was far from perfect and it is no 
surprise that subsequent British claims were skewed. 
 
With the Argentine surface fleet constrained to Argentine littoral waters for the vast 
majority of the Conflict, the battle for sea control rapidly became an anti-submarine 
warfare task.  This was a role that the Cold War era Royal Navy was very familiar with 
and well equipped to deal with.  Even so, the embarked anti-submarine Sea King force 
had to expend significant effort in order to deliver assurance that the threat was 
minimised.  However, despite its significant commitment to the task, the Sea King force 
could not guarantee that the threat had been negated.  As a result, the Task Force had 
to respect the Argentine submarine threat throughout the campaign, despite the fact 
that the Argentine submarine force ‘had defects and could not get to the TEZ [Total 
Exclusion Zone.]’31  Consequently, the Operation Sutton plan was, ‘to confuse enemy 
submarines and reconnaissance aircraft, the amphibious group will use evasive routing 
with a superimposed zig zag.’32 
 
Although the British force was dominant in the maritime environment, the British 
struggled to understand the Argentine land environment in terms of its scale, location, 
capability and intent.  Despite the fact that British special forces had been inserted onto 
the Islands as early as 1 May and were able to provide a persistent presence, their 
reconnaissance capability was limited by their line of sight, distance from the target and 
the hostile environment.33  Consequently, the British estimate of the size of the 
Argentine garrison was inaccurate.  For example, their initial estimate of the size of the 
Goose Green garrison was 300 when in fact it was closer to 1000.34  If Harrier 
reconnaissance missions had been tasked, as requested by its operators, then the 
command team would have additional information that could have been blended with 
other intelligence sources to provide a more accurate picture of what was actually 
occurring on the ground.  However, the operational command team appeared to 
neglect this opportunity.  As a result, British attack missions lacked focus, were poorly 
planned and operated in highly defended areas with limited preparation and 
awareness.  In contrast, the strategic command team understood the utility of 
																																																								
30 The British assumed that the Argentine force had a 70 per cent availability and that each available aircraft could fly 
two missions per day.  TNA, DEFE 72/271.  Intelligence Summaries. 
31 Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 552. 
32 TNA, DEFE 69/855. Operation Corporate, Falklands Conflict: Commander Task Force 317; war diary, 1 May-15 June 
1982, section I, synopsis of policy, planning and principal events. 
33 R. Hutchings, Special Forces Pilot.  (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008), 60. 
34 Freedman informed that 961 prisoners of war were taken captive with a further 45 killed in action.  Freedman, Official 
History Volume 2, 581. 
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intelligence assets to gather information.  Although many of the files remain redacted, 
several RAF transport and reconnaissance squadrons participated in Operations 
Folklore and Acme during the Conflict.35  Once these files have been released by The 
National Archives, they may shed further light on intelligence gathering activities and 
their contribution to the Falklands Conflict.  
 
Ultimately, neither side was able to control the operating environments throughout the 
Conflict.  This situation would have long-lasting consequences.  As neither side 
achieved full situational awareness, the narrative becomes contested and a fertile 
ground for the myths to be nurtured and left to grow unabated.  The next lesson aims 
to analyse the fielded capabilities of both sides and looks at the operational level 
implications of fielding flawed systems.  
 
Lesson 3 – Understand the Capabilities.  
 
‘Bravery was no substitute for training, skill and experience.’36 
 
Deighton’s comment regarding the Battle of Britain hinted at the broader needs to 
ensure victory.  Bravery alone would not ensure victory; it had to be supported by a 
broader series of attributes.  However, training is only one element that defines military 
capability.  In turn military capability, articulated via Defence Lines of Development, is 
one element of the physical component of fighting power.  Moreover, the physical 
component cannot work in isolation and must be supported by the moral and 




Figure 8.4 - The Components of Fighting Power.37 
																																																								
35 Air Historical Branch article on the RAF's roles referred to the involvement of 10, 30, 39, 47 and 51 Squadrons in 
Operations Folklore and Acme.  TNA, AIR 20/13054.  Proposed Official History;  
36 Deighton, Fighter, 275.	








Current British doctrine states that ‘the moral component is generally viewed as 
constant, but when we are fiscally constrained, we must grow the conceptual 
component (how we fight) to compensate for shortfalls in the physical component (what 
we fight with).’38  During the Conflict, it could be argued that deficits in the physical and 
conceptual components degraded the moral component of at least one of the 
participants.  Lesson 3 will focus on the physical component and the implications for 
the moral component, whereas Lesson 4 will address the conceptual component of 
fighting power. 
 
The Physical Component.  The conundrum of quality versus quantity is a constant 
challenge for military planners.  With finite financial resource available, the desire to 
field and use capable forces in sufficient scale is an enduring challenge.  In contrast to 
the Argentine position, the strength and weaknesses of the British fielded capability are 
relatively well documented.  Consequently, this short physical component assessment 
will focus on the Argentine situation.  However, many of the issues faced by the 
Argentines resonated with the British deployed force. 
 
The Fuerza Aérea Argentina official history documents several equipment and logistic 
deficits that impacted its operations during the Conflict.  The limited number of Omega 
navigation systems and Canberra radars, the paucity of electronic countermeasure 
systems and fuel tanks all constrained Fuerza Aérea Argentina air operations.39  
Additionally, there were a number of weapons issues including type, numbers and 
locations.40  With a variety of aircraft and weapons scattered over a number of austere 
airfields in southern Argentina, there was a distinct lack of weapons support equipment 
to meet the operational tempo.41  This issue may explain why the Comando de 
Aviación Naval gave its air force counterparts access to its Mk 82 bomb stockpile.42  
However, there is no documented evidence of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina exploiting 
this opportunity.  Nevertheless, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina took advantage of their 
naval colleagues’ offer to mitigate its lack of sea survival equipment and salt corrosion 
procedures.43  
 
Although there was evidence of localised and tactical assistance, the support at the 
operational level was more limited.  As discussed previously, Argentine doctrine denied 
the Fuerza Aérea Argentina from conducting anti-maritime operations prior to the 
Conflict.  Consequently, the doctrinal oversight denuded the Argentine air power of a 
																																																								
38 United Kingdom, UK Air and Space Doctrine, 2-4.	
39 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 121.   
40 Ibid., 120.   
41 Ibid., 121.   
42 Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 79.	
43 Ibid. 
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significant capability.  As a result, there were attempts by the Comando de Aviación 
Naval to rapidly adopt a more joint and collegiate approach with the Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina.  During the early stages of the Conflict endeavours were made to train and 
organise the Argentine airmen in a more integrated fashion.  However, few of the 
concepts materialised either driven by ambivalence or lack of time and resources.  
Nevertheless, there were a few examples of a joint ethos.  For example, a team of four 
naval aviators joined the Fuerza Aérea Argentina planning team at Comodoro 
Rivadavia in order to develop joint operations.44  In particular, the Comando de 
Aviación Naval advisors discussed techniques and tactics for anti-surface warfare.45  
Moreover, this discussion materialised into a number of joint training sorties.  However, 
the success of the training missions was questionable due to Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
aircraft serviceability.46  Subsequently, the Comando de Aviación Naval tended to 
conduct bespoke and effective mission rehearsals in isolation.47  Nevertheless, during 
the Conflict itself, the Rio Grande-based Dagger pilots shared information and their 
experiences with their co-located Comando de Aviación Naval pilots.48  However, this 
sharing of corporate knowledge was a localised phenomenon and not one that was 
widespread practice across both air arms. 
 
Despite aircraft frailties during its rapid work-up period, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
continued to make requests to take command and control of the Comando de Aviación 
Naval combat air assets.49  Argentine air arm integration may have resolved a number 
of issues.  For example, the A-4Q Skyhawk’s initial response to Operation Sutton may 
have been more successful if it had adopted Fuerza Area Argentina pathfinder 
practices rather than rely on its own recently introduced Omega navigation system that 
had been installed into two of its aircraft.50  The inability to understand, use and exploit 
the new navigation equipment meant that the first wave of Comando de Aviación Naval 
A-4Q Skyhawks was unable to find and attack the British amphibious force when it was 
at its most vulnerable.  
 
However, it could be argued that capability is about more than simply looking across 
the Defence Lines of Development; scale has a significant role to play.  There is no 
point in having highly-advanced, expensive capability if it cannot sustain the required 
campaign effects throughout the campaign.  The Argentine Super Etendard force is an 
excellent example of this dilemma; once the limited Exocet stockpile was expended it 
																																																								
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 81. 
46 Ibid., 82. 
47 Ibid., 107 and 331. 
48	Ibid., 333.	
49	Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 295.  	
50 Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 377. 
 218 
became an ineffective force and retired from the battle two weeks prior to the 
culmination of the campaign.  The Sea Harrier was also deployed in limited numbers.  
However, the Sea Harrier force, despite losses early in the campaign and a high tempo 
of operations, had sufficient resilience to sustain its outputs throughout the campaign.  
Moreover, the Harrier GR3 force also had sufficient resilience to continue to add 
additional aircraft as well as new capabilities throughout the Conflict.  Argentine air 
power also increased the number of its deployed assets throughout the early stages of 
the campaign as aircraft that were unserviceable at the start of the campaign were 
rectified and subsequently deployed.  However, once this limited number of aircraft had 
been sent south, there was no further pool of resources to call upon.  Consequently, 
the deployed fleet size began to irreversibly diminish due to combat attrition.   
 
Despite its highlighted capability deficiencies, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina still believed 
that the ‘performance of maintenance personnel and the performance of the aircraft 
was optimised.’51  Is this statement a true reflection of Argentine air power or merely an 
endeavour to protect the reputation and morale of a brave force operating under 
significant losses for a limited reward?  However, the British were not immune from the 
pressures of the campaign.  Several incidents within the British cadre of pilots 
demonstrate that fatigue was creeping into the deployed force.  For example, 
Lieutenant Commander Neill Thomas, an experienced naval aviator embedded with 
800 Naval Air Squadron on board HMS Hermes, recalled how fatigue caused him to 
become distracted while making a cockpit switch selection that resulted in a rapid 
descent from 300 feet down to 150 feet.52  Dowding’s worst fear during the Battle of 
Britain was ‘the loss of quality that fatigue would bring.’53  So, how robust was the 
morale of each participant and as a result was history about to repeat itself in the South 
Atlantic in 1982?   
 
The Moral Component.  The British were keen to have a quick and decisive air battle 
prior to the amphibious assault.  Not only would control of the air allow the British to 
have the necessary freedoms to exploit the landing but also, as Clausewitz observed, it 
would reinforce that the battle was ‘rather a killing of the enemy’s spirit than of his 
men.’54  However, the Argentine air arms preserved their forces for the campaign’s 
critical move, Operation Sutton.  Nevertheless, once the Argentine air arms were 
committed, the air battle quickly became one of attrition that the Argentines were 
steadily losing.  Once Argentine air power resilience began to unravel, its sortie rates 
																																																								
51 Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 121.   
52 Imperial War Museum, “Thomas, Neill (Oral History).”  https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032984 
(accessed 29 November 2018). 
53 Deighton, Fighter, 166. 
54 Clausewitz, On War, 259. 
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and willingness to prosecute its targets fell rapidly as the moral component began to 
erode, even if Moro’s account rejects the claim that Argentine morale was being 
diminished.  Nevertheless, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina official history highlighted two 
cases of Argentine attack pilots being returned to their units during the Conflict; one 
during Operation Sutton and another in the final days of the Conflict.55  Indeed the 
commander at San Julian informed the official history that his work to maintain the 
morale of his subordinates was very difficult.56  The latter situation may well reflect the 
incident where an A-4C Skyhawk pilot who, on 24 May, ordered his wingmen to jettison 
their weapons and return to base.57  However, his wingmen questioned the order both 
in the air at the time and, subsequently, on the ground.  The issue was not an isolated 
event and five other officers were was also subject to an inconclusive post-Conflict 
military inquiry.  Nevertheless, the shadow cast by the incident precluded the individual 
from attaining promotion to Brigadier several years later.58 
 
The Argentines were under no illusion regarding the difficulty of the task that faced 
them during Operation Sutton.  The anticipated attrition rates were daunting.  During 
the pre-campaign training missions, the Comando de Aviación Naval advised its 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina counterparts that during anti-ship attacks, and based on its 
current equipment, training and experience against a modern British fleet they could 
expect 90 per cent losses.59  In contrast, the more experienced Comando de Aviación 
Naval faced no less of a task, they would expect to launch four aircraft, from a fleet of 
six, and lose two aircraft during the attack.60  Neither force expected to survive a long 
campaign.  Indeed, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina expected to lose 50 per cent of its 
attack aircraft on the first raid; it was anticipated that the remaining aircraft would be 
lost on the second, and last, attack.61  Ultimately, from the start of operations, the 
outlook was bleak for the Argentine air arms and it is no surprise that their fighting spirit 
collapsed during the latter stages of the Conflict. 
 
The moral component of the British pilots was also under pressure.  During the first 
phase of the campaign, the small cadre of Sea Harrier pilots was reduced by four 
following the loss of three aircraft and the removal of a pilot who struggled to come to 
terms with the events he had witnessed on the first day of fighting.62  With no respite in 
their tasking, the burden placed upon the remaining Sea Harrier pilots was significant.  
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Moreover, concerns were raised that the subsequent tasking was far from equitable, 
applying further strain on individuals and generating further friction between the two 
aircraft carriers.63  Additionally, the apportionment of risk was seen to a differentiator 
between the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR3 cadres.  Pook critiqued his Sea Harrier 
compatriots when he suggested that they had a ‘cushy job’ conducting air defence 
duties in contrast to the high risk, low altitude roles of the Harrier GR3 force.64  Despite 
the increased pressure, the British combat air pilots were a resilient group and no 
doubt bolstered by their successes, belief in their ability, equipment and cause as well 
as the news that additional aircraft and pilots would join them throughout the campaign. 
 
Lesson 4 – Deliver Outcomes, not Outputs.  
  
‘Göring found it convenient to stick to von Richtofen’s simplistic dictum that shooting 
down enemy planes was “the only important thing” and that “everything else is 
nonsense”.’65 
 
Even with deficits in both the physical and moral component, all is not lost in warfare.  
The conceptual component can be exploited in order to ensure that the activities a 
military force conducts with its available forces are focussed on achieving campaign 
goals.  Therefore, it is imperative that airpower is fixated on attacking enemy critical 
vulnerabilities while protecting its own.  Consequently, Göring’s philosophy during the 
Battle of Britain, where he was overly focused on outputs rather than the broader 
outcomes and effects that were needed to ensure victory, chimed with the 1982 
philosophy in the South Atlantic. 
 
After the initial air battles of 1 May, the Argentine strategy of preserving their force was 
a prudent measure and reflected the views of the former Minister for the Co-ordination 
of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, that during the Battle of Britain that, ‘the role of our Air 
Force is not an early knock-out blow … but to prevent the Germans from knocking us 
out.’66  However, when committed to the battle it was evident that the Argentines were 
unable to focus their air power on the critical components of British military capability.  
Although the Argentine operational order specified the correct targeting priorities to 
counter an amphibious assault, the Argentine tacticians failed to implement the correct 
targeting policy.  Analysis of Annexes F and G show that during Operation Sutton, the 
Argentines failed to breach the inner ring of British defences during the early stages of 
the amphibious assault.  As a result, no transport ship or associated critical 
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vulnerability was hit until 24 May and the only British transport ship to be sunk during 
Operation Sutton, MV Atlantic Conveyor, was struck during the latter, and less critical, 
stages of the operation.  Moreover, the sole focus of the Argentine attacks during 
Operation Sutton should have been the transport ships and the troops ashore around 
San Carlos.  However, several irrelevant targets were attacked during the period of the 
landings.  As shown in Annex G, the targets included non-existent radar sites, 
supposed troop concentrations and targets on West Falkland; the attacks were both 
unnecessary and unsuccessful.  More importantly, the attacks dragged precious 
resources away from the critical fighting area. 
 
Nevertheless, and despite the poor execution of the Argentine operational plan, there 
were several successes for Argentine air power during Operation Sutton – notably, the 
sinking of HMS Ardent, Antelope and Coventry as well as MV Atlantic Conveyor.  
Indeed, the Comando de Aviación Naval official history of the Conflict stated that two 
out of three sorties hit an enemy target.67  Consequently, the Comando de Aviación 
Naval would claim that for every aircraft its air arm lost would result in the sinking of 
4250 tonnes of British shipping during the campaign.68  However, this Argentine view 
assumes that each tonne of British shipping is equally important.  Therefore, the 
Argentine assessment is an output-based analysis of the campaign rather than the 
more astute effect-based result.  Consequently, the Argentine analysis is overly 
optimistic.  A more appropriate measure of effect would be to base the analysis on the 
tonnage of transport ships lost during 21 May or over the period of Operation Sutton.  If 
the Comando de Aviación Naval analysis was to reflect its total losses during the 
Conflict and compared to the loss of British transport shipping on 21 May and for the 
period of Operation Sutton the results would be zero and 1900 tonnes per aircraft 
respectively.69   
 
From a Fuerza Aérea Argentina viewpoint, despite a set of valid targeting priorities, 
and being cognisant of the limited prospects for survival, they felt that sinking a single 
frigate would be sufficient reward for its endeavours.70  The Fuerza Aérea Argentina 
was simply after a heroic reward for its efforts and not necessarily one that matched 
with its higher headquarters intent or prudent operational level planning. 
 
In a similar vein to the Argentine issues, the British narrative is dominated by the 
success of the Sea Harrier against the Argentine counterparts.  The 21 Sea Harrier air-
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to-air kills during the campaign for no loss is an impressive feat.  However, this is 
another output-based parameter.  Few commentators articulated the overall effect that 
the control of the air battle achieved.  Indeed, almost most every conceivable doctrinal 
term for control of the air has been used to describe the level of control achieved by the 
British during the Conflict.  While this thesis does not aim to provide another answer to 
that question, it is evident that throughout the Conflict, Argentine air power was 
capable of penetrating the British defences on a regular basis.   
 
From the perspective of British attack operations, it would appear that they were 
inefficient in the prosecution of the Argentine operational centre of gravity.  In addition 
to the fascination with Stanley airport, there were a number of attacks that were of 
questionable value, either from a location or preparation perspective.  Consequently, 
the utility of attacks on the grass airstrip at Dunnose Head on West Falkland by four 
Harrier GR3s on 23 May or the reactive nature of many missions in the latter stages of 
the campaign could be called into question.71  As a result, it is difficult to quantify the 
utility of the Harrier GR3 during the Conflict other than to measure the outputs of hours 
and missions flown and weapons employed.  This statement is not to decry the Harrier 
GR3 activities but is a reflection of how the platform was employed in a campaign that 
appears to be a series of tactical, component level attacks rather than a fully integrated 
joint operation. 
 
This chapter has looked at the campaign through five simple, straightforward and 
apparently obvious questions.  In essence, the questions posed are: Who is in charge? 
What is the plan?  What is the current situation?  What resources do we have? And, 
what do we need to achieve?  Despite their uncomplicated nature, analysis of the five 
questions demonstrates that neither side provided a clear set of answers.  Moreover, it 
could be argued that these questions are as relevant today as they were in 1982.   
Consequently, it is imperative that contemporary military planners understand the 
shortfalls and mitigate accordingly.  The United Kingdom’s approach to joint operations 
has developed significantly since their experiences in the South Atlantic.  As a result, 
the issues of complex and dislocated command and control have largely been 
overcome via the introduction of the Permanent Joint Headquarters in the late 1990s.  
However, no matter how much process and joint doctrine is put in place the role of 
personality remains an enduring variable.  Nevertheless, with greater dialogue, 
training, exposure and trust between single Service and joint units, individuals will have 
a better understanding of the needs, concerns and advantages of their own and other 
Services.  Nevertheless, culture and ethos can take generations to change.  The 
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animosity that was initiated in the early 1960s between the RAF and Royal Navy over 
the CVA01 aircraft carrier debacle was still evident and detrimental to the British 
campaign in the South Atlantic two decades later.  Nevertheless, as the United 
Kingdom looks to introduce new military capabilities into service it is clear that a joint 
approach rather than a parochial single Service perspective is needed.  By way of 
example, the Queen Elizabeth-class of aircraft carriers is a joint capability and one that 
needs the help and support of all three Services in order to ensure that it fulfils its roles.  
The Single Statement of User Need specified that the Carrier Enabled Power 
Projection provided an ‘integrated and sustainable joint capability, interoperable with 
NATO that enables the projection of UK Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre power, 
as well as delivering Humanitarian assistance and Defence Diplomacy, enabling joint 
effect across the maritime, land and air environments at a time and a place of political 
choosing.’72  In order to continue to deliver against national ambition, new military 
capabilities will need to embrace and inculcate the lessons of the Falklands Conflict if 
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‘War is mainly a catalogue of blunders.’ 
 
The Right Honourable Winston Churchill MP, 
British Prime Minister.1 
 
The premise behind this thesis reflected Deighton’s views on the Battle of Britain:  
 
‘There was a time when I believed that History was self-rectifying.  I believed 
that no matter how distorted the accounts of news and current events, in the 
course of time a more truthful and useful consensus would emerge.  Now I 
know better.  In fact it is the myths and fabrications that endure and become 
each nation’s historical reference.’2   
 
From the perspective of the Falklands Conflict, there are a number of competing 
narratives that are, frequently, at odds with each other.  The inability or reluctance to 
moderate the narratives has resulted in a variety of stakeholders adopting their own 
perspective of the Conflict.    
 
Churchill’s quote above is an excellent reminder that the combatant that makes fewer 
mistakes tends to be the victor.  Nevertheless, it is important that the victor and the 
vanquished both learn from their hard-earned errors.  However, some commentators 
have suggested that there is little to learn from the Conflict.  In their eyes, the 1982 
campaign was a Cold War aberration.  The Argentines simply misinterpreted the British 
desire to fight for a set of desolate islands thousands of miles away from their ‘mother’ 
country.  Despite the strategic mismanagement of the Falkland Islands during the 
prelude to the Conflict, the British had to rapidly adapt from their steady state 
configuration and focus on their NATO commitments in northwest Europe and the 
North Atlantic sea lanes. 
 
Nevertheless, the battle was not only a physical contest but as Nye suggested, ‘victory 
may sometimes depend not on whose Army wins, but on whose story wins.’3 Although 
Nye specifically talks about the Army, the lessons are equally relevant to the other 
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environments.  Consequently, the Conflict raised a significant number of air power 
lessons that remain relevant today. 
 
The British and Argentine Operational Centres of Gravity.   
 
The first research question opened by looking at the current perception of the British 
operational centre of gravity during Operation Corporate.  Contemporary British 
doctrine suggests that, due to their embarked control of the air capability, the two 
aircraft carriers were the British operational centre of gravity.  As control of the air was 
an enduring campaign requirement, particularly during the lead-up and execution of the 
amphibious assault, the aircraft carriers were undoubtedly important to British success.  
However, this thesis suggests that control of the air is an enabling and enduring 
function but not an end in itself.  The British could have achieved complete control of 
the air but they could not assure the delivery of the military end-state.  If, as decreed, 
the initial British operational aim was to ‘repossess the Falkland Islands as quickly as 
possible,’ the aircraft carriers and their embarked Sea Harriers delivering control of the 
air could not produce that requirement in isolation.4  Moreover, it is apparent that there 
were differing perspectives from the senior British commanders.  Despite operating in 
the same command chain, albeit at different locations and levels of warfare, 
Woodward, Fieldhouse and Leach had different risk appetites regarding losses to 
personnel and equipment at various stages of the Conflict.  It is now evident that the 
risk appetite was poorly communicated between the various levels.   
 
The contemporary and retrospective view of the British operational centre of gravity is 
flawed.  As a result, this thesis suggests that control of the air is, predominantly, a 
critical vulnerability and not an enduring centre of gravity.  The only force that could 
deliver the required end-state prior to the rapidly approaching austral winter was a 
ground force.  Therefore, the British operational centre of gravity was ultimately the 
British fielded land force that was able to seize and hold land, specifically Stanley.  
However, the British land force had to mount, deploy and be projected ashore before it 
could seize Stanley.  As a result, it is the contention of this thesis that there were three 
British operational centres of gravity that ran sequentially: the aircraft carriers, the 
amphibious force and lastly the land forces on the Falkland Islands.  The British 
centres of gravity are now reviewed in chronological order. 
 
The initial British maritime force to arrive in the South Atlantic was devoid of an 
embarked land force large enough to achieve the end-state.  As a result, and despite 
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Argentine rhetoric to the contrary, this force neither planned to nor was capable of 
conducting an amphibious assault against the Falkland Islands.  Nevertheless, the 
initial maritime force, including the two aircraft carriers was sufficient to prepare for the 
arrival of the amphibious force.  The British planners were acutely aware that ‘history 
has repeatedly shown the folly of operating with inadequate air support.’5  
Consequently, and enshrined in contemporary British amphibious warfare doctrine, the 
British command team knew that control of the air was critical to the success of the 
amphibious operations.  Therefore, the British planning staffs stated that ‘their objective 
will be to achieve complete air and sea control of the area, thereby isolating the 
Argentine garrison and reducing its will and capacity to resist a determined amphibious 
assault.’6  So, over the period 1 – 19 May, and prior to the arrival of the amphibious 
assault force, the British gambit was to entice the Argentine air and maritime forces out 
from the shelter of the Argentine mainland for a decisive air and maritime battle.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis proposes that the aircraft carriers, with their embarked Sea 
Harriers and Sea Kings, constituted the British operational centre of gravity during this 
initial phase and were critical to preparing the battle space prior to the amphibious 
assault.   
 
In order to project British land forces ashore in sufficient scale, the most efficient 
mechanism was via an amphibious assault.  Led by Commodore Mike Clapp, the 
British generated an initial amphibious assault force of 12 ships encompassing the two 
Land Platform Docks, HMS Fearless and Intrepid, seven Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships 
and three ships taken up from trade.  On board the vessels were the troops of 3 
Commando Brigade, Royal Marines supported by two battalions from the Parachute 
Regiment as well as the various key enablers to facilitate the securing of the 
beachhead.  Consequently, Chapter Four of this thesis suggests that during the period 
of the amphibious assault the British operational centre of gravity transferred from the 
aircraft carriers to the amphibious assault force.  The amphibious assault was activated 
on the morning of 20 May as the ships commenced their transit from the edge of the 
Total Exclusion Zone and culminated on 26 May when 2 PARA, left its positions on the 
Sussex Mountains to attack Goose Green.  Protecting the British operational centre of 
gravity was the responsibility of the Sea Harrier force as well as the seven frigates and 
destroyers that escorted the amphibious assault force during the transit from the edge 
of the Total Exclusion Zone to San Carlos.  Moreover, the escorts also provided a layer 
of protection to the 12 assault ships as they disembarked their troops and equipment 
onto the beaches at San Carlos.  However, if the Argentines could bypass the Sea 
Harriers as well as the escorts and strike the British amphibious assault force then they 
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would have either bought themselves more valuable time or even achieved a decisive 
victory.  
 
During the last phase of the Conflict, which spanned the period 27 May to 14 June, the 
British operational centre of gravity would transfer from the amphibious assault force to 
the British fielded land forces – the only military capability that was able to achieve the 
end state of recovering and holding Stanley.  With the beachhead at San Carlos now 
secured, the various elements of 3 Commando Brigade were waiting for the arrival of 5 
Infantry Brigade to strengthen the breakout from San Carlos and participate in the 
investment of Stanley.  Due to the size of the Argentine garrison, the need for 5 
Infantry Brigade to support 3 Commando Brigade during the land campaign was 
recognised by British planners from the outset of their planning.  Nevertheless, if the 
Argentine air force could find and strike the British force as it moved from the 
beachhead to Stanley then the British centre of gravity could, once again, be 
compromised.  
 
The Argentine operational centre of gravity is the last position considered.  In contrast 
to the British operational centre of gravity that changed as the emphasis of the 
campaign developed, the Argentine operational centre of gravity throughout the 
campaign was a constant – the Argentine fielded land forces.  Just as the last of the 
British operational centres of gravity was capable of seizing and holding the vital 
ground of Stanley, it was the same effect that meant that the Argentine operational 
centre of gravity rested with the Argentine troops located in and around Stanley.  
Although the Argentine garrison also had outposts at Goose Green and across West 
Falkland, the majority of the force, and the major interest of the British forces during the 
latter stages of the Conflict, were those positioned in and around Stanley.  
Notwithstanding that the Argentines outnumbered their opposition, the Argentine land 
force adopted a strategy that saw the majority of its land force remaining static on the 
high ground that protected the western approaches to Stanley.  The town itself 
contained a sizeable headquarters element that delivered the command and control 
function to all three Services garrisoned on the Islands.  At Stanley airport, situated 
several miles east of the town, all three Services ran their aviation and air assets from 
the small airfield that was protected by an eclectic force of ground-based air defence 
assets.  The British were faced with a dispersed enemy force that had the luxury of 
time and geography to plan and prepare for its defence of Stanley.  With each of the 
operational centres of gravity now articulated, the next section will look at how 
effectively each centre of gravity was attacked and defended. 
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Defending and Attacking the Operational Centres of Gravity  
 
The focus of the second research question addressed how British and Argentine air 
power was utilised during Operation Corporate.  As part of their work, several 
commentators identified the number of sorties flown by a specific platform or the 
number of aircraft that arrived in the target area.7  However, there is no single narrative 
that maps all of the planned sorties to the effect that they managed to achieve against 
the designated operational centre of gravity.  This thesis provides that single source of 
data.  In order to achieve that goal, the question clarified the types of aircraft involved, 
the weapon load that each aircraft carried and how each weapon was employed.  By 
adopting this methodology, a clear audit trail can be developed and scrutinised if 
required.  Additionally, this approach also allowed the causal factors for any notable 
failings to be identified and analysed further.  So, what state was the Argentine military 
in prior to the start of the Conflict?   
 
The friction between the various Argentine Services was well documented by the 
British.  During their early planning, British military planners noted that ‘each of the 
armed forces is autonomous and little if any experience of joint operations is available 
to them.  Control of exercises is vested in the individual arm’s Commanders in Chief 
and there has been no apparent co-operation and co-ordination.’8  In contrast, the 
British forces were more used to working as part of a collegiate NATO Cold War 
construct.  Consequently, although notionally more inclusive in their approach, the 
British had to quickly adapt to a crisis thousands of miles from home.  So, how effective 
were both sides in the prosecution of their air campaigns? 
 
The British air campaign to repossess the Falkland Islands commenced on 1 May.  In 
response to the Vulcan and Sea Harrier attacks on Stanley airport, the Argentine air 
arms endeavoured to respond in kind.  However, the Argentine counterattack was 
ineffective; they lost four aircraft to the Sea Harrier and AIM-9L Sidewinder 
combination for no substantial gains.  After a disappointing start, Argentine air power 
flew a limited number of missions during the opening phase of the Conflict.  This was a 
prudent move to preserve its force until the inevitable British amphibious assault took 
place.  Nevertheless, there were notable Argentine successes during this period.  Most 
conspicuously, on 4 May, the first successful Super Etendard attack took place that 
resulted in the loss of HMS Sheffield.  Eight days later, HMS Glasgow was attacked 
and damaged to such an extent that it had to be withdrawn from battle.  Through luck 
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rather than judgement the Argentines had negated two of the three Type 42 destroyers 
– key air defence ships that were needed to offset the lack of deployed airborne early 
warning within the British fleet.  However, the Argentine successes were themselves 
offset by the loss of seven aircraft during the initial phase.  Nevertheless, the losses 
were replaced and the Fuerza Aérea Argentina would start Operation Sutton with more 
aircraft than they had at the outset of its campaign.  Chapter Three identifies that of the 
206 planned Argentine weapons during the pre-amphibious assault phase only 15 
weapons were dropped, two of those hit their intended target but critically none were 
targeted against the British operational centre of gravity.  However, did the surge in 
Argentine air activity during the amphibious assault produce more effective results? 
 
With the Argentine maritime surface fleet confined to port and the land component 
fixed in situ in the hills surrounding Stanley, the burden of responsibility for attacking 
the British operational centres of gravity fell to Argentine air power.  However, the 
relationship between the two Argentine air arms was problematic and interaction 
between the two air arms was limited throughout the Conflict.  Chapter Four identified 
that the Argentine air arms surged their aircraft flying rates to counter the threat of the 
amphibious assault.  Consequently, the Argentines planned to use 390 weapons over 
the period of Operation Sutton.  Of those, only eight weapons detonated against the 
British ships.  During the amphibious assault, four British ships were lost including one 
destroyer, two frigates and a merchant ship.  The brunt of the Argentine air attacks was 
borne by the naval escorts acting as an outer layer of protection for the amphibious 
force.  Few Argentine aircraft and weapons penetrated into the inner sanctum of the 
British amphibious assault force.  Indeed, only four weapons struck at elements that 
constituted the British operational centre of gravity.  Of those four weapons, three hit 
and damaged Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships on 24 May – four days after the start of 
Operation Sutton.  The remaining weapon struck and sank MV Atlantic Conveyor on 25 
May along with its precious cargo of helicopters, weapons, airfield matting and tents.  
Although the supply ship was not the intended target, the attack constituted the biggest 
drawback to the British operation to retake the Falkland Islands.  Nevertheless, and 
despite a cogent Argentine operational plan that identified the correct target set to 
negate an amphibious assault, the fleeting opportunity to strike the British operational 
centre of gravity when it was in its most concentrated and vulnerable state had been 
lost.  The Argentine air attacks during Operation Sutton were also costly; they had lost 
26 aircraft and 21 aircrew since the start of the Conflict.  Although disputed by some 
commentators, the implications on the moral component were clear. 
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With British ground forces dispersing from the concentrated beachhead to their 
ultimate goal of Stanley, the task facing the Argentine air arms during the last phase of 
the Conflict was daunting.  Nevertheless, this period accounted for nearly half of the 
Argentine weapons used during the Conflict.  However, the weapons were used 
against a much broader set of targets residing in both the land and maritime 
environment.  Of note, Argentine weapon usage was biased towards the land 
environment but Argentine air power achieved little in terms of targeting the British 
fielded forces.  Although the maritime environment was not the focus of operations 
during this period, it did provide the most lethal Argentine attack of the campaign when 
on 8 June Fuerza Aérea Argentina A-4 Skyhawks attacked the RFAs Sir Tristram and 
Sir Galahad with the loss of 54 lives.  While the attack reduced the fighting capability of 
the First Battalion of the Welsh Guards, the British campaign was delayed by no more 
than two days as the Welsh Guards unit was bolstered by two companies of 40 
Commando, which had been held in reserve at San Carlos for such an eventuality.  
Notwithstanding the success of 8 June, Argentine air power again failed to strike the 
key British targets with the necessary weight to make a considerable difference.  As 
shown in Chapter Five, of the 550 weapons planned for the phase only 178 were 
dropped with 18 hitting targets.  In the latter stages of the battle, Argentine air power 
was unable to sustain its outputs.  As a result, sortie rates dwindled.  Moreover, those 
aircraft that did make it to the Islands appeared increasingly reluctant to prosecute their 
targets.  Consequently, Argentine air power was unable or unwilling to support the 
critical land battles.  Ultimately, the moral component of Argentine air power capitulated 
before Argentine land forces at Stanley surrendered.  
 
As shown in Figure 9.1, the Argentines planned to use 1146 weapons against the 
British force throughout the Conflict.  However, the scale and effectiveness of the 
weapon stockpile rapidly diminished as it closed on the enemy force.  As a result, only 
39 of those weapons struck a target, and these targets were rarely part of the centre of 
gravity construct.  
 
The majority of the burden and attention on protecting the British operational centres of 
gravity fell to the small fleet of 20 Sea Harriers that had initially deployed on board the 
two aircraft carriers.  The Sea Harrier had a problematic gestation from the drawing 
board to its arrival on the front line.  Indeed, it was perceived during its development to 
be, ‘a limited aircraft for a limited role.’9  Even during its early tenure in service, some of 
the pilots were still coming to terms with the Sea Harrier’s nuances.  As a result, there 
was a disparity between the two front line squadrons regarding the utility of some of the 
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aircraft’s systems.10  While some were ardent acolytes of the capability, others were 
less endearing.  Indeed, Middleton suggested that the Sea Harrier was ‘the Swiss 
watch of aircraft.’11  In contrast, one assessment reported that ‘the SHAR [Sea Harrier] 
lacked the range, speed, sufficient missiles and high speed dash and acceleration 
capability of a true AD [Air Defence] fighter.'12  Nevertheless, and in collaboration with 
ground-based air defence systems as well as embarked maritime force air defence 
capabilities, the Sea Harrier was responsible for the defence of the British operational 
centre of gravity and its associated critical vulnerabilities.  So, were the British air 
defence systems as effective as some have suggested? 
 
The British defences throughout Operation Corporate, and in particular Operation 
Sutton, were claimed by many to be the salient factor in the outcome of the Conflict.  
Indeed, after an impressive showing in the first day of air battles, the Sea Harriers had 
rightly garnered a dominant reputation.  The Sea Harrier and AIM-9L Sidewinder 
delivered impressive levels of platform and weapon reliability.  As a result, the Sea 
Harriers could, unlike their Argentine adversaries, sustain their outputs throughout the 
Conflict.  Archival evidence suggested that during the campaign there were ‘15 fighter 
engagements over 6 days from a total of over 1100 missions flown in 14 days but the 
deterrent value of the CAPs [combat air patrols] flown outweighed their cost.’13  While 
the record of Sea Harrier outputs may be broadly accurate, the deterrent value 
ascribed to the Sea Harrier appears to be overly optimistic when compared with the 
data highlighted within this thesis.  Ultimately, the Sea Harrier accounted for the 
destruction of 21 Argentine aircraft for no losses during air-to-air combat.  However, 
this impressive feat underscores the lack of Argentine investment, understanding and 
commitment in their control of the air capability rather than Sea Harrier dominance.  
Moreover, the one-sided kill ratio also masked the fact that the vast majority of 
Argentine aircraft were able to successfully breach the British defences on a routine 
basis throughout the Conflict.   
 
As shown in Figure 9.1, of the 849 weapons that reached the Islands throughout the 
campaign, 648 (or 76 per cent of the weapons that reached the Islands) breached 
British defences.  Of those weapons that were unable to breach the defences only 87 
Argentine weapons were deterred, or a ‘soft kill’ achieved, by the presence of Sea 
Harrier combat air patrols.  Of note, the number of ‘soft kills’ achieved peaked during 
the initial air battles of 1 May and during the latter stages of the Conflict.  However, 
																																																								
10 Ward, Sea Harrier, 129. 
11 Imperial War Museum.  “Middleton, Linley Eric (Oral History).” 
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032610 (accessed 29 November 2018). 
12 TNA, DEFE 72/271.  Intelligence Summaries. 
13 Ibid. 
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some commentators still dispute the effectiveness and limitations of the Sea Harrier.  
For example, there is a significant discrepancy between the data laid out in Figure 9.1 
and Ward’s assertion that ‘all Argentinean missions that were confronted by a Sea 
Harrier CAP [Combat Air Patrol] station were instructed to ditch their weapons and 
return home.  They further stated that approximately 450 such missions were aborted 
when the attackers found Sea Harriers “in the way” – and approximately 1800 bombs 
destined for use against our ships and landing forces were thrown away (these are 
Argentine figures).’14  In contrast to the 1146 planned Argentine weapons that this 
thesis identified, it is clear that Ward’s figures of 1800 jettisoned weapons exaggerated 
the scale of Argentine air operations.  This apparent oversight is to the benefit of the 
positive post-Conflict reputation of the Sea Harrier.  To reiterate, this thesis, based on 
British and Argentine primary and secondary source material, suggests that Sea 




Figure 9.1 The Utility of Argentine Weapons during Operation Corporate. 
 
Although the Sea Harrier was the most successful of the three British contributors to 
the control of the air function, the platform suffered from a number of limitations.  The 
Sea Harrier struggled with restrictive persistence, a limited fleet size as well as a small 
payload to be truly effective and secure control of the air during Operation Corporate.  
Moreover, the Sea Harrier was limited by its own Blue Fox radar which was not 
optimised for the preferred Argentine low level, overland ingress routes.  As a result, 
																																																								
14 Ward, Sea Harrier, xxvi.	
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neither the Sea Harrier nor its associated radar could fully exploit the advantages 
offered by the new generation of Sidewinder weapons.  Ground and maritime surface-
to-air missile employment around San Carlos also suffered due to sensor limitations.  
At the capability level, irrespective if the platform is land, sea or air-based, there is a 
need to create an equitable balance between the triumvirate of the sensor, platform 
and weapon.  This thesis has shown that a weakness in one attribute can have a 
detrimental impact on the total capability.  
 
In contrast to their Sea Harrier counterparts, the initial perceptions of ground-based 
and maritime force air defence performance were overly optimistic.  In reality, the 
output of the various surface-to-air missile capabilities had a limited impact on the 
outcome of Operation Corporate. 
 
The British prosecution of the Argentine operational centre of gravity is dominated by a 
tale of inter-Service rivalry and a fascination regarding Stanley airport.  The use and 
utility of the Vulcan raids against Stanley airport will always stimulate a debate 
regarding whether it achieved their intended aim.  Of the 63 bombs dropped by the 
Vulcan, only one weapon cratered the runway.  By the same token, it was also the only 
weapon to crater the runway despite the fact that Sea Harriers and Harrier GR3s 
collectively dropped more weapons against the airport.  Nevertheless, the runway at 
Stanley remained operational throughout the campaign.  However, the broader 
question was why so much effort was spent on a target that was only one of the many 
Argentine critical vulnerabilities.   
 
Although attacking the critical vulnerabilities is a prudent and indirect approach to the 
centre of gravity, it will take time to achieve the desired outcome.  Time was one thing 
that the British forces did not have in abundance – the approaching austral winter and 
a task force at the end of an 8000-mile logistics chain demanded a rapid campaign.  
So, why was Stanley airport the focus of the air campaign?  One of the key advantages 
of attacking Stanley airport was that it was easy to identify using an aircraft’s on board 
radar system.  Therefore, both the Sea Harrier and the Vulcan could strike the airport 
in inclement weather conditions and at night.  Moreover, the airport was geographically 
separated from the town and thereby minimised the risk of collateral damage.  
However, the Argentine fielded forces protecting the approaches to Stanley from the 
west were largely untouched by air power until the period directly leading up to the land 
battles.  A lack of foresight, understanding and influence meant that opportunities to 
exploit the unique attributes of British air power were squandered.  As a result of 
command and control frailties and limited investment in reconnaissance missions led to 
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ineffective and belated attack missions.  Instead, air power was used in a reactive, 
short-notice and inefficient manner.  If used more appropriately, British air power could 
have weakened the Argentine operational centre of gravity from the start of the 
campaign and could have made the capture of the high ground surrounding Stanley an 
easier proposition.  
 
From an Argentine perspective, its manned fighter control of the air capability was 
extremely limited as the Mirage III fighters were based on the Argentine mainland and 
unable to conduct air-to-air refuelling.  As a result, the Mirage IIIs had an extremely 
limited persistence over the Falkland Islands.  Consequently, the Argentine defence of 
their operational centre of gravity was limited to their ground-based air defence 
capabilities.  Nevertheless, the Argentines deployed a broad mix of units and 
equipment from across all three Services to conduct the role.  The Argentine ground-
based air defence capability was co-located with each of the main military units but 
focussed on Stanley airport.  During the campaign, the units had a number of 
successes but also suffered from a notable number of damaging fratricides.  In addition 
to improving efforts to contest control of the air, clear command and control, effective 
rules of engagement and joint training opportunities would have assisted in the defence 
of Argentine operational centre of gravity. 
 
Analysing the Factors Affecting the Prosecution of the Air Campaign  
 
Building on the information generated from the previous research question, the third, 
and last, research question analysed the causes, and the relative importance, of 
Argentine weapons that failed to strike their intended targets.  As shown in Table 9A, 
and contrary to popular belief, the top four factors are all influenced by Argentine 
activities and decisions rather than those imposed upon them by the British.  The most 
influential British factor is the Sea Harrier’s ‘soft kill’ capability that is ranked in fifth 
position.  Even if all the British air defence capabilities were combined, the British 
ability to influence the weapons’ journey would only be the fourth most influential factor.  
So, what stopped the Argentines from becoming a more efficient attacking force?  
 
It can be argued that Argentina’s Muerte Negra was not the Sea Harrier, as portrayed 
by some analysts, but a self-inflicted fatal potion of failure concocted of cancelled 
missions, weapons that missed their targets, poor aircraft serviceability and a failure to 
drop weapons.  Also, just as the British suffered from the lack of an airborne early 
warning capability, the Argentines also suffered from a shortage of enabling functions.  
In particular, the Argentines suffered from a lack of credible intelligence, surveillance, 
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and reconnaissance assets.  As a result, the Argentines were unable to find, never 
mind strike, the key British force during its most vulnerable periods.   
 
Despite the existence of a valid operational level concept of priority targets, the 
Argentine air arms were unable to turn this theory into a realistic tactical targeting plan.  
Complicating the picture even further was the lack of coordination and cooperation 
between the Fuerza Aérea Argentina and the Comando de Aviación Naval.  The net 
result was that the numerical superiority that the Argentine air arms had over their 
British counterparts was instantly squandered.  Additionally, doctrinal limitations and 
enforced limitations on what the Fuerza Aérea Argentina were allowed to train for 
during peacetime operations also constrained what it could achieve in wartime.   
 
 
Table 9A - Causal Factors for Failure to Deliver Weapons during Operation 
Corporate. 
 
The ad-hoc nature of mainland basing of Argentine combat air assets is also worthy of 
comment.  When coupled with the fact that Argentine air power was struggling to 
Ranking Causal Factor 
Scale 
(out of 1146) 
Percentage 
1 Weapons not Dropped 291 25 
2 Weapon Employment - Missed Target 272 24 
3 Serviceability - Air Abort 162 14 
4 Mission Cancelled 131 11 
5 Sea Harrier – Soft Kill 87 8 
6 Serviceability - Ground Abort 37 3 
7 Serviceability – Weapon Employment 33 3 
8 Maritime Force Air Defence – Soft Kill 32 3 
9 Navigation Errors 21 2 
10 Weapon Employment – Hit and Detonates 20 2 
=11 Weapon Employment – Unexploded Bomb 19 2 
=11 Sea Harrier – Hard Kill 19 2 
13 Maritime Force Air Defence – Hard Kill 8 <1 
14 Ground-based Air Defence – Soft Kill 7 <1 
15 Aircraft Crashed before Dropping Weapon 2 <1 
16 Target Mis-Identified 5 <1 
Total 1146 100 
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maintain its beleaguered force due to a number of arms embargos, Argentine air power 
was unable to produce the anticipated sortie rates.  Therefore, with a distinct lack of 
operational sovereignty over their air power it is perhaps surprising that Argentina 
elected to divide their aircraft and limited spares pool over numerous bases in southern 
Argentina.  Argentine air power also lacked precision, both in terms of delivering its 
weapons and in its ability to accurately navigate to the target area or rendezvous with 
enabling aircraft, such as air-to-air refuelling aircraft or pathfinders, particularly in poor 
weather conditions.  As a consequence of their own actions, the Argentine air arms 
were unable to exploit their numerical advantage and concentrate their mass against 
the enemy.   
 
Many of the lessons identified above are pertinent for the United Kingdom today and in 
the future.  In order to achieve success in future operations, the United Kingdom must 
be capable of deploying a balanced capability that embraces all of the Defence Lines 
of Development in sufficient strength.  Moreover, the force must be inherently joint in its 
outlook as well as being capable of working and communicating at the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels of warfare.  It is easily said, difficult to fund in austere 
times and will take time to train, educate and inculcate the correct ways of working into 
the future generation of warfighters.  However, if the United Kingdom fails to implement 
these attributes, the lessons of the 1982 Conflict will have to be learned once again. 
 
One of the notable omissions from the top five most influential factors was the 
perceived influence of the unexploded bomb.  It is often cited as one of the crucial 
factors of the Conflict.  However, as shown in Table 9A, it only resided in joint 11th 
place and equated to only 2 per cent of the planned weapons.  Consequently, it could 
be argued that the relevance of the Argentine unexploded bomb is one of the many 
enduring myths of the Falklands Conflict.  As will be demonstrated, most of these 
myths are based on partial truths; others are simply false.  Some of the myths ebbed 
and flowed throughout the Conflict; other myths make a fleeting appearance but, as will 
be discovered, none of the myths are valid throughout the entirety of the Conflict. 
 
Myth 1 - The Sea Harrier was decisive.  The Sea Harrier had an impressive first day 
on operations.  After successful raids on Stanley airport and Goose Green airstrip, the 
aircraft showed its multi-role prowess by rapidly adapting to its primary role of control of 
the air.  The subsequent air battle cost the Argentines four aircraft for no losses to the 
British in the air or on the sea.  As a result, the Sea Harrier was blooded in battle and 
acquired a strong reputation that would endure beyond the Conflict.  Strengthening the 
case for the Sea Harrier’s performance were its consistent ‘hard kill’ capabilities during 
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all three phases of the Conflict as well as achieving an undefeated record in air-to-air 
combat.  However, the Sea Harrier’s overall ‘hard kill’ performance only accounted for 
the negation of two per cent of the total Argentine weapons.  Furthermore, the Sea 
Harrier’s ‘soft kill’ capability was more erratic.  After a strong performance on 1 May 
that accounted for 34 per cent of the planned Argentine weapons, the ‘soft kill’ 
performance dropped to 16 per cent when averaged across the first phase of the 
Conflict.  Furthermore, the ‘soft kill’ performance bottomed out at three per cent during 
Operation Sutton before recovering to eight per cent during the final phase of the 
campaign and for the overall Conflict.  The inconsistent nature of the ‘soft kills’ may not 
be a reflection on Sea Harrier tactics and procedures but a manifestation of the 
Argentine pilots’ risk appetite; low at the start of the campaign in order to preserve the 
force, high risk during Operation Sutton to make a campaign-winning impact and low 
risk during the closing phase when there was an inevitability regarding the campaign’s 
outcome.  While the Sea Harrier may have had flaws as a thoroughbred air defence 
aircraft, with relatively few in number for the task in hand, it did have one key attribute; 
it was available and deployable.  As a result, the threat that it posed had to be 
respected by the opposition.  Consequently, it may have been a shrewd propaganda 
strategy by the Sea Harrier pilots to over-state their nascent capabilities.  However, the 
Sea Harrier was not as decisive as some have suggested. 
 
Myth 2  - The Sidewinder tipped the balance.  Linked to the previous myth, many 
have suggested that the rapidly introduced and dispatched AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-
air missile provided an unparalleled level of superiority over its opposition.  As shown in 
Chapter Six, the vast majority of the Sea Harrier Sidewinder firings were conducted in 
the rear hemisphere of the target, akin to the performance of the previous generation of 
Sidewinders.  However, in order to take advantage of the full AIM-9L Sidewinder 
capability the Sea Harrier had to find, identify, acquire and employ the weapon against 
the target.  In a dynamic head-on engagement this is difficult to achieve without 
recourse to the use of an on board radar.  However, and through necessity, the Sea 
Harrier’s Blue Fox radar was a cheap, low-risk option that had a limited performance in 
high clutter or look down situations.  Consequently, the Argentines, having learned the 
lessons from their unsuccessful tactics on 1 May, opted to attack in the low altitude, 
high clutter environment that rendered the Blue Fox radar almost useless.  As a result, 
most intercepts occurred when the Argentine aircraft were visually acquired that had a 
natural tendency to drag the Sea Harrier into the stern of the target aircraft.  Although 
the AIM-9L Sidewinder did not tip the balance as some have claimed, air-to-air missiles 
did provide the British with an asymmetric advantage as Argentine lacked fighters to 
act as escorts for the attack aircraft, who in turn did not carry air-to-air missiles for self-
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defence purposes.  As a result, during a fighter engagement the Argentines were 
immediately put onto the defensive.  The failure to contest the control of the air battle is 
another example of an Argentine self-inflicted wound – the former Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina mentor, Adolf Galland, would have been unimpressed. 
 
Myth 3 - Mirages diverted to defend Buenos Aires from potential Vulcan raids.  
From a British perspective, the utility of the Vulcan raids as a strategic option to strike 
mainland targets was considered during the early stages of the campaign.  However, 
the option was quickly discarded due to the need to keep the Conflict limited in nature 
to maintain global consensus.  However, the decision not to strike Argentina was never 
publically denounced.  Nevertheless, and from the outset of the campaign, the 
Argentines kept a small force of Mirage IIIs and Daggers at their home bases in and 
around Buenos Aires to conduct alert duties.  However, the myth could be generated 
by two activities.  First, on 29 April the Argentine radars located at San Julian detected 
what they suspected was a British air attack on southern Argentina.  As a result, a 
number of aircraft were quickly launched from the threatened airfield and landed at the 
safer Comodoro Rivadavia, but still located in southern Argentina.  After realising that 
the alert was a false alarm, the aircraft were subsequently recovered to their original 
airfields.  Second, throughout the campaign there was a steady flow of Argentine 
replacement and battle-damaged aircraft between their deployed operating bases in 
Southern Argentina and their home bases, most of which were clustered around 
Buenos Aires.  Ultimately, there is no evidence to suggest that the Argentines re-
deployed the Mirage fighters from southern Argentina to protect Buenos Aires. 
 
Myth 4 - Argentine pilots were brave until the end.  The Argentine pilots were given 
great credit for pressing home their attacks from ultra low level, particularly during the 
period of Operation Sutton.  They achieved a number of successes as well as 
generating angst amongst British commanders and troops alike throughout the 
campaign.  Consequently, it could be argued that an inexperienced force, flying 
infrequently, and in basic and aged aircraft delivered beyond what was expected of it.  
However, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s practical knowledge and understanding of 
higher command’s intent, operating procedures, local topography and the enemy’s 
capabilities was minimal.  As a result, the tactical execution of the operational plan was 
flawed.  It would appear that aircraft attacked the first ship they saw rather than focus 
on the key targets.  As a result, during Operation Sutton the critical amphibious assault 
ships were struck belatedly and without sufficient weight.  Moreover, the Argentines 
were losing a significant number of aircraft and aircrew, from a limited resource of 
manpower and equipment.  Ultimately, the Argentine air arms were losing the battle of 
239 
attrition, their outputs reduced significantly as the campaign progressed and in some 
cases stopped prior to the key land battles.  During the few missions that were flown 
over the Falkland Islands during the last days of the Conflict it is evident that the 
number of mission aborts due to the presence of Sea Harriers increased significantly.  
It is clear that, as with capability, bravery is a finite resource.  Once the physical 
component is compromised, the moral component also diminishes.  The Argentine 
position reflected Peter Lee’s view of the wider combat air fraternity when he described 
them as ‘Brave – yes.  Fearless - no.’15 
 
Understanding the Source of the Myths  
 
So, did either participant deliberately create the Conflict’s myths in order to deceive 
their counterparts into believing that the tide in the South Atlantic was turning against 
them?  Alternatively, was the target audience and the narratives orientated towards a 
different market more associated with the internal post-Conflict attempts to preserve 
reputations?  The issue will be viewed from two angles: during the Conflict and the 
post-campaign period. 
 
This thesis would suggest that during the Conflict the British and the Argentines were 
guilty of no more than believing the raw, unprocessed data that was being generated in 
the heat of the battle.  Both participants understood that there was a need and an 
appetite to inform their nations on the progress of the battle.  Of note, there was the 
odd, blunt and ineffective attempt to use propaganda during the Conflict to convey 
artificially escalated campaign progress and success.  The most notorious example 
was the Argentine press showing a manipulated picture of a burning British aircraft 
carrier.  From a British perspective, the Muerte Negra nickname allegedly attributed to 
the Sea Harrier force by the Argentine pilots was used in a similar manner; it reassured 
the British public but was refuted by their Argentine counterparts.  Neither side was 
able to compete effectively for the battle of the narrative.  Both sides suffered from a 
lack of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as well as ineffective 
command and control.  As a result, neither side had a full understanding of its 
opponent’s capabilities, outputs and levels of commitment to the battle.  Therefore, 
neither participant was able to understand or control the air environment.  
Consequently, there was insufficient evidence during or post the Conflict to refute the 
opponent’s claims.   
 
																																																								
15 P. Lee, Reaper Force. (London: John Blake, 2018.), 155. 
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In very simple terms, both participants failed to think and do.  Both sides failed to 
implement an operational level plan effectively.  The failure to conceptualise the war in 
the South Atlantic is perhaps not surprising given the Argentines lack of warfighting 
experience and the British focus on the Cold War.  Nevertheless, the lack of 
operational level planning is quite stark.  It is imperative that planners understand what 
constitutes both the friendly and enemy centres of gravity.  Consequently, planners 
must be capable of apportioning their limited resources to ruthlessly attack the various 
critical vulnerabilities associated with the enemy centre of gravity.  This activity must be 
conducted at the earliest opportunity and by utilising all its available energy before 
either the fleeting chance disappears or the potential energy dissipates.  In parallel, it is 
vital that the friendly centre of gravity and its critical vulnerabilities are defended 
appropriately.  Both participants focused on their deployed, and flawed, physical 
components to the detriment of the conceptual component and as a result were unable 
to maximise the utility and effectiveness of their forces.  Both sets of forces had 
insufficient agility to adapt to the scenario before them.  From a British perspective, 
they were constrained by their Cold War-focussed training and lack of conceptual 
thinking.  The Argentines were simply stepping into the unknown.  While understanding 
what constitutes your military main effort is vital, military planners must have sufficient 
resilience and freedoms to cater for tasks that sit outside the bounds of main effort.  As 
a result, if military force is being used in a unique environment and in finite numbers, 
military forces must be focused on what is vital.  As the Argentines found to their cost, 
if you only have one good punch, you must make it count. 
 
During the Conflict, both sides needed to assure their outputs in order to enable their 
mandated outcome.  However, both protagonists suffered from the lack of a balanced 
force.  The Argentines had a breadth of combat air power but it was limited in depth.  
As a result, the Argentines were unable to exploit their numerical advantage.  The 
Argentine opportunity for victory was for a decisive, coordinated mass strike at the 
centre of gravity when it was at its most vulnerable.  Therefore, and realising that they 
were limited to one powerful blow, it was imperative that the Argentines understood 
and were able to strike their enemy’s centres of gravity.  However, Argentine air power 
was an uncoordinated force that failed to prosecute the centres of gravity successfully.  
Ultimately, the Argentines ran out of time, energy and ideas. 
 
In contrast to the Argentine position, British air power lacked the breadth to saturate 
the area of interest but its depth of capability ensured that its focused, but limited, 
outputs could be sustained.  However, the limited outputs meant that the operational 
commander carried significant risk.  The risks rapidly translated into tangible problems 
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as Argentine aircraft penetrated British defences with ease.  Arguably, Operation 
Sutton was a successful joint campaign in terms of planning and execution.  However, 
once ashore jointery was less efficient with separate land, maritime and air campaigns 
becoming evident.  Limited time as well as poor coordination and communication 
compromised the joint campaign.  The British commanders failed to use air power 
efficiently to understand, influence and shape the battlespace.  It is imperative that air 
power subject matter experts are engaged in the planning process from the outset.  
Although RAF personnel were in situ with the campaign planners, they were insufficient 
in number and unable to influence the decision makers.  Consequently, there was a 
lack of understanding, a lack of a balanced capability and an inability to use the force in 
a coordinated and focussed manner.  Moreover, the errors in the use of air power 
during the Falklands Conflict are largely overlooked.  Why was this the case? 
 
Baron Tedder, a former Chief of the Air Staff, commented that ‘the most important thing 
is not to look back at the past but look to the future from the past.’16  This remains a 
valid proposition today.  Some would suggest that the Falklands Conflict was merely a 
Cold War sideshow.  However, this thesis has demonstrated that there were a number 
of operational level mistakes from both participants that a contemporary student of 
operational level planning would quickly identify as rudimentary and basic.  
Nevertheless, the errors were made.  General Vernon Walters, part of Haig’s shuttle 
diplomacy team in the prelude to the Conflict, suggested that the dispute was a ‘conflict 
of machismos’ and ‘a silly war and a conflict of egos.’17  While Walters’ statement may 
have been contentious it is to a certain degree based on reality.  Consequently, the 
egos and the machismos will have a desire to maintain their honour and preserve their 
legacy.  As a result, there can be poetic licence in how their version of the story is told, 
maintained and preserved whether at a national, Service, unit or individual perspective.  
Therefore, and in addition for the battle of reality, there is a second equally vicious 
battle to be fought and won: the battle for the narrative.   
 
It can be argued that the battle for the narrative is as important as the real battle itself.  
The first individuals to write their own perspectives on the Conflict set the benchmark 
that all other narratives are then subsequently compared to.  Their story becomes all 
the more compelling if they were a credible and central actor at the vanguard of the 
battle.  However, many of these stories tell the reader what happened rather than what 
should have happened.  As a result, many of the narratives focus on tactical and 
individual success rather than the operational level lessons from the Conflict.   
																																																								
16 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence.  RAF Operations during the Falklands Conflict.  (London: Air Historical Branch, 
1988), iv. 
17 TNA, PREM 19/627.   Relations with Argentina Position of the Falkland Islands - Part 18, 18-21 May 1982. 
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In the post-Conflict timeframe, the battle of the narrative truly blossoms.  Despite a 
significant lessons process within the United Kingdom, many of the lessons were self-
fulfilling prophecies linked to the funded future equipment programme.  As a result, 
analysis was at times Service-focused and with few perspectives that looked across all 
three Services and embracing the joint and operational levels of warfare.  As a result, 
different Services had different approaches to the task.   
 
It could be argued that the Falklands Conflict provided the Royal Navy with an 
exploitable opportunity to right the perceived wrongs of previous Defence Reviews.  
However, the RAF was arguably less proactive and perhaps focused on the rapid 
return to the more familiar and pressing Cold War context.  Indeed, Air Commodore 
Derek Bryant, the Senior Air Staff Officer at 38 Group during 1982, stated that ‘virtue is 
its own reward.’18  Bryant’s comments reflected his Service’s view that its participation 
and outcome did not need to be shaped to the same extent as the Royal Navy.  There 
is some validity in his comments; prior to the Conflict the RAF had already secured 
significant funding to procure a large force of Tornado multi-role combat aircraft.  
Moreover, and as a direct consequence of the Conflict, the RAF benefitted from new 
investment in air-to-air refuelling, strategic transport and air defence fleets.  However, it 
can be argued that the RAF’s ambivalent approach to the public narrative on the 
Falklands Conflict was approaching the same level of culpability as demonstrated by 
the Argentines’ failure to contest the control of the air battle.  By failing to actively 
contest the narrative, longer-term outcomes could be compromised.  For example, 
reflecting on the Air Commander’s post-Conflict comments suggests that the RAF 
misjudged the utility of fighting for an accurate narrative.  Air Marshal John Curtiss 
critiqued the United States Secretary for the Navy, John Lehman, on his paper to the 
United States Congress on the Falklands Conflict lessons, and in particular the 
disappointing results of the Vulcan raids, when he suggested that ‘as long as politicians  
refuse to be objective, we will never get our force mix structure right.’19  Ultimately, by 
failing to influence key stakeholders, in this case key foreign partners but the group 
could include politicians, journalists, the electorate, historians and biographers, the 
outcome that the Service desires may be disputed. 
 
The 1982 Falklands Conflict was many things.  Brave people doing extraordinary 
deeds was evident on both sides throughout the Conflict.  Nevertheless, the lack of an 
operational plan obscured campaign execution for both sides.  Complicating issues 
further was the lack of balance across the air power roles and capabilities.  While the 
battle was contested, it ended with a decisive victory for the British.  While the 
																																																								
18 TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations.  
19 TNA, DEFE 58/262.  Lessons Learned. 
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contemporary mantra of being ‘first with the truth’ appears to have been absent, the 
battle for the narrative remains contested driven by personal, Service and National 
agendas.  As a result, many of the Falklands Conflict myths may well remain an active 
battlespace for years to come.  Nevertheless, the joint and operational level lessons 
from the 1982 Falklands Conflict must be instilled into any future Defence operating 
model if it is to deliver against its considerable potential and meet Curtiss’ demand for 







Annex A – Argentine Combat Air Sorties Flown During the Falklands Conflict1 
	
	
May 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
A-4B Skyhawk 13 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
A-4C Skyhawk 14 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dagger 13 0 2 4 0 2 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Canberra 6 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mirage III 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A-4Q Skyhawk 2 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Super Etendard 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weather2 Falkland Islands Weather 
AM PM G F P F G P F G F P F G F P G F G F G F G 
 Argentine Airfield Weather 
AM PM F G P F G F G F G P G F G F G 
TOTAL 60 12 19 6 0 2 0 0 17 0 0 8 0 0 3 0 
May 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31  
A-4B Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 18 6 10 6 8 0 11 6 2 0 0  
A-4C Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 11 4 5 8 4 0 6 6 0 4 0  
Dagger 0 0 3 5 22 0 17 10 4 2 0 4 10 0 0  
Canberra 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 2 0 4  
Mirage III 0 0 0 0 6 5 5 2 1 2 2 0 4 0 0  
A-4Q Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 12 0 4 0 0 4 2 2 0 0 0  
Super Etendard 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0  
Weather Falkland Islands Weather  
AM PM G F P F P F G F G F P F G  
 Argentine Airfield Weather  
AM PM G F G F G F G F G F G F P F P  
TOTAL 0 0 3 5 72 15 43 26 19 11 23 18 18 6 4  
																																																								
1  Argentine combat air sortie data has been sourced from Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas. 
2 The table uses a Red, Amber, Green assessment to reflect Good (G), Fair (F) and Poor (P) 12-hourly weather assessments for both the Argentine airfields and the Falkland Islands as articulated in TNA, 
DEFE 67/128.  Meteorological Records. 
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June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total  
A-4B Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 4 0 8 14 3 0 0 8 8 0 141  
A-4C Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 86  
Dagger 0 0 0 4 8 0 3 12 3 2 0 0 12 0 155  
Canberra 3 0 0 5 3 0 4 0 0 2 0 6 4 0 53  
Mirage III 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 51  
A-4Q Skyhawk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 40  
Super Etendard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10  
Weather Falkland Islands Weather   
AM PM G F G P F P F G F G P G    
 Argentine Airfield Weather   
AM PM P F G P F G F G P G P G F P    





Annex B – British Combat Air Sorties Flown During the Falklands Conflict 
 
 
May 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Sea Harrier - Hermes1  30 16 2 23 2 4 0 13 10 0 0 12 0 10 15 22 
Sea Harrier - Invincible 20 19 3 24 5 3 2 8 14 0 0 0 0 13 9 14 
Harrier GR32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vulcan3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Weather4 Falkland Islands Weather 
AM PM G F P F G P F G F P F G F P G F G F G F G 
 Carrier Group Weather 
AM PM G F P F G F P G F P G P G 
DAILY SORTIES 51 35 5 48 7 7 2 21 24 0 0 12 0 23 24 36 
May 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31  
Sea Harrier - Hermes 14 12 22 12 26 36 24 30 28 32 16 8 18 26 20  
Sea Harrier - Invincible 10 11 12 6 28 25 25 26 24 25 18 10 21 21 22  
Harrier GR3 0 0 0 3 8 6 10 4 9 9 9 8 3 10 6  
Vulcan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
Weather Falkland Islands Weather  
AM PM G F P F P F G F G F P F G  
 Carrier Group Weather  
AM PM G F G F P G P G P G P F G  
DAILY SORTIES 24 33 34 21 62 67 59 60 61 66 44 54 42 57 49  
June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total  
Sea Harrier - Hermes 22 12 0 0 8 4 14 24 10 16 16 14 11 9 737  
Sea Harrier - Invincible 22 4 0 0 9 5 12 20 8 20 19 25 16 20 598  
																																																								
1 Sea Harrier daily flying rates are taken from TNA, DEFE 67/124.  Operation Corporate, Falklands Conflict: Harrier Aircraft Operations, April 1983.  Although Clapp/Southby-Tailyour’s (Clapp, Amphibious 
Assault Falklands), figures correlated with the stipulated archive figures, they do not match the data for 23 May as articulated by Freedman (Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 481.)  An independent 
analysis of Sea Harrier sortie rates using an amalgamation of: Fleet Air Arm Archives.  Fair Flying Log, 800 Naval Air Squadron and Fleet Air Arm Archives. 801 Naval Air Squadron Flying Authorisation 
Sheets, May 1982 failed to clarify the position.  Therefore, and despite minor flaws, the Operational Evaluation Group’s report has been used as a benchmark for British combat air sorties. 
2 The Harrier GR3 figures promulgated are taken from primary source material.  TNA, DEFE 67/124.  Harrier Aircraft Operations.  
3 Seven Black Buck missions were planned, comprising four airfield attack missions and three suppression of enemy air defence sorties.  However, only 6 missions were flown; one airfield attack mission 
(Black Buck 3) was cancelled prior to take off due to a severe weather forecast.  One suppression of enemy air defence sortie (Black Buck 4) was aborted 5 hours into the mission due to Victor tanker 
serviceability issues.  Burden, The Air War, 367. 
4 The table uses a Red, Amber, Green assessment to reflect Good (G), Fair (F) and Poor (P) 12-hourly weather assessments for both the Carrier Group and the Falkland Islands as articulated in TNA, DEFE 
67/128. Meteorological Records. 
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Harrier GR3 1 2 0 0 8 2 5 4 8 10 12 6 4 4 151  
Vulcan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6  
Weather Falkland Islands Weather   
AM PM G F G P F P F G F G P G    
 Carrier Group Weather   
AM PM G F P G F G F G    
DAILY SORTIES 45 18 1 0 25 11 31 48 26 46 47 46 31 33 1492  
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Planned Airborne Reached Island 
Breached 
Defences Dropped Hits 
OF.1092 





Oso2 A-4C Skyhawk 1400 2 x BRP 4 8 8 8 8 
Unable to find 
targets 
OF.1105 
Torno Dagger 1845 2 x BRP






Trueno A-4B Skyhawk 1900 3 x Expal 4 12 12 9
5 9 Unable to find targets 2
6 
OF.1111 
Ruta Canberra 1905 4 x Mk 17 3 12 12 12 0
7 HMS Brilliant & Yarmouth 
0 OF.1117 
Rifle Canberra 1920 4 x Mk 17 3 12 12 12 0
8 N/A 
OF.1112 A-4B Skyhawk 1929 3 x Expal 2 6 6 6 09 N/A 
																																																								
1 Topo flight were misidentified as fighter assets by their controlling agency, Malvinas CIC (Centro de Information y Control), and vectored to intercept a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  Consequently, Topo 
flight was forced to abort their intended mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 133.   
2 Ibid., 119 
3 Weapon type and number confirmed by Argentine primary sources.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina.  Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 186.  However, Rivas suggested that each aircraft carried three weapons. 
Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas. 168. 
4 The ships conducted a naval bombardment of artillery positions near Stanley.  Ibid., 172.  HMS Arrow was attacked by Dimeglio and hit by eleven 30mm rounds, while HMS Alacrity received minor damage 
from near misses by Roman’s attack.  Faget attacked HMS Glamorgan but neither of his weapons struck their target.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 174.  However, some Argentine commentators suggested 
that Faget’s weapons struck HMS Glamorgan.  Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 106. 
5 During the transit to the Islands, Carmano was forced to return to base due to a technical problem.  Burden, The Air War, 117.	
6 The formation attacked the Argentine cargo ship ELMA Formosa during their egress.  The ship was strafed and hit by two bombs: one failed to detonate whereas the other bomb ricocheted of the ship’s 
superstructure and fell overboard.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 119. 
7 The formation leader aborted the mission due to the difficulties in penetrating the target defences.  The British ships fired chaff clouds that were mistaken by the Argentine aircrew as missile launches.  The 
only damage to the Argentine aircraft was self-induced: during low level maneuvering to defeat the perceived missile threat, the leader’s wingtip struck the surface of the sea but the damage to the wingtip 
was superficial. Ibid., 90.   
8 One Canberra was shot down and the crew killed by an AIM-9L Sidewinder fired by Lieutenant Curtiss from 801 Naval Air Squadron.  Despite a further three AIM-9L Sidewinders being fired, the two 




Rubio A-4B Skyhawk 1930 3 x Expal 3 9 9 6
10 011 N/A 
0 0 
OF.1114 
Lana A-4C Skyhawk 1930 3 x BRP 4 12 12 12 0
12 N/A 
TBC 
TBC Super Etendard 1938 1 x Exocet 2 2 2 0
13 0 N/A 
TBC 
TBC Super Etendard N/A 1 x Exocet 2 2 0
14 0 0 N/A 




9 Foco formation was warned by Malvinas CIC of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol approaching their position.  As a result, Foca were forced to abort their mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 133. 
10 Sanchez’s aircraft was forced to return with a technical failure.  Ibid., 133. 
11 The two remaining aircraft were forced to withdraw once over the Islands.  In his narrative, Rivas did not allude to the reason for the aborted mission.  Ibid.  However, given the timing and location it is 
likely that the Sea Harrier combat air patrol that forced Lana formation to abort had the same effect on this formation.	
12 Rivas suggested each aircraft carried 3 weapons. Ibid., 119.  In contrast, the Official History of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina informed that each aircraft carried two bombs.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, 
Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 192.  Nevertheless, the formation aborted due to the presence of a Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol.  Burden, The Air War, 111. 
13 Columbo and Macheteanz were assigned a target 44 miles south of Stanley.  However, the mission was aborted during the transit to the Islands due to a fuel leak onboard one of the Super Etendards 
while tanking from the KC-130H Hercules aircraft.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 243.  Of note, no other source mentioned Super Etendard missions planned for 1 May 1982.  
14 Bedacarratz and Mayora ground aborted as their tanker aircraft was returning to base.  Ibid., 243.	
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Order Callsign Type 
Weapons 
Carried Planned Airborne Take-Off Land Results 
OF.1090 Fiera Mirage III 1 x R530 + 2 x Magic 2 2 0940 1138 
No targets found and unable to make contact with 
the ground controller 
OF.1101 Fierro1 
Dagger 2 x Shafrir 
2 1 1900 2140 Manoeuvred against Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol but no intercept occurred 
OF.1091 Toro2 2 2 1045 1245 
Manoeuvred against Sea Harrier Combat Air 
Patrol, jettisoned underwing fuel tanks but no 
intercept occurred 
OF.1093 Tablon3 Mirage III 1 x R530 + 2 x Magic 2 2 1159 1358 Manoeuvred against Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol but no intercept occurred OF.1099 Limon4 Dagger 2 x Shafrir 2 2 1300 1515 
OF.1098 Foco Mirage III 1 x R530 + 2 x Magic 2 2 1323 1513 No targets found 
OF.1100 Ciclon Dagger 
2 x Shafrir 
2 2 1530 1730 Manoeuvred against Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol but no intercept occurred 
OF.1103 Pampa A-4C 
Skyhawk 
2 2 1620 1910 
No targets found TBC TBC5 2 2 1700 1800 
OF.1106 Pampa 2 2 1820 2020 
TBC TBC A-4Q Skyhawk 2 x AIM-9B 2 2 1830 TBC 
Intercepted a Canberra formation returning to 
base following an attack mission 
OF.1109 Dardo Mirage III 1 x R530 + 2 x Magic 2 2 1845 N/A 
The Mirages jettison fuel tanks prior to 
engagement but only 3 of the 4 fuel tanks 
successfully leave the aircraft, leaving Perona 
																																																								
1 Faget in C-412 was unable to take part due to an engine problem.  Ibid., 166 
2 The mission planned to escort a Lockheed SP-2H Neptune that was due to fly a radar search mission off Stanley in an attempt to locate the British Fleet.  Ibid., 46.  However, the Neptune failed to make its 
planned take off time of 0850.  Burden, The Air War, 130.  Nevertheless, the escort mission took off as planned and was ultimately vectored against two Sea Harriers flown by Lt Cdr Kent and Lt Haigh from 
801 Naval Air Squadron.  Ibid., 210. 
3 Escorted Topo Flight (A-4B Skyhawks) during ingress, Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 207. 
4 Tasked with escorting Topo flight during their egress.  Ibid., 184. 
5 Although this mission has no Fragmentation Order or callsign, Rivas stated it was flown by Lopez in C-303 and Manzotti in C-310. Ibid., 119. 
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with a limiting asymmetric configuration to deal 
with.6  Engaged by Sea Harriers flown by Flt Lt 
Barton & Lt Thomas from 801 NAS.7 
OF.1107 Fortin 
Dagger 2 x Shafrir 
2 2 1905 2140 Vectored to chase Sea Harriers that were pursuing Torno flight during their egress.8 
OF.1113 Rubio 29 1 1854 N/A 
Ardiles jettisons both of his underwing fuel tanks 
prior to the engagement.10  However, Ardiles is 
shot down and killed by an AIM-9L Sidewinder 
fired from a Sea Harrier flown by Flt Lt Penfold at 
1941.11 
OF.1108 Buitre Mirage III 1 x R530 + 2 x Magic 2 2 1850 2050 
No targets found 





6 Ibid., 208. 
7 Perona was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder fired from Barton’s Sea Harrier; Peron ejected and survived.  Watson fired an AIM-9L Sidewinder at Cuerva and damaged the Mirage III.  With insufficient 
fuel to return to the mainland, Cuerva elected to divert to Stanley but was shot down and killed by Argentine ground-based air defences.  Burden, The Air War, 145.  See also Annex J Serial 2 for further 
details. 
8 Provided cover for Torno Flight, Fortin closed to within 2 miles of the Sea Harriers but was unable to achieve missile lock due to the sun.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 173. 
9 Leader ground aborted, Ardilles continued the mission on his own.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 49. 
10 Hobson and Burden both suggested that a missile was launched by Ardilles against Hale’s Sea Harrier.  However, Rivas informed that Ardilles jettisoned his fuel tanks.  Ibid., 49 and Burden, The Air War, 
131; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 184 
11 Ibid., 184.  Also, see Annex J Serial 3 for further details. 
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Planned Airborne Reached Island 
Breached 
Defences Dropped Hits 
2 May 1982 
TBC1 
TBC Canberra AM 4 x BRP 4 16 16 16 16 
Unable to find 
targets 0 0 
3 May 1982 
OF.1159 
Lince Canberra 1940 4 x Mk 17 2 8 8 8 8 
Unable to find 
targets 0 0 
OF.1150 
Fiera A-4B Skyhawk 1953 3 x Expal2 
4 12 12 
03 0 OF.1151 
Trueno 4 12 12 
OF.1152
Oso A-4C Skyhawk 
2007 
3 x BRP 
4 12 12 12 12 
OF.1153 
Dogo 2022 3 9 9 9 9 
4 May 1982 
Aries &  
Liebre Super Etendard 1345 1 x Exocet 2 2 2 2 2 HMS Sheffield 2 1 
9 May 1982 
OF.1175 
Puma Dagger 1700 2 x Expal 4 8 8 8 8 
Unable to find 
targets 0 0 OF.1174 
Trueno A-4C Skyhawk 1600 1 x Mk 17
4 4 4 4 2 05 Unable to reach targets 
																																																								
1 Although the sorties are not mentioned in the Argentine Official History, Rivas, following interviews with the crews, informed that the mission did indeed take place.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 92. 
2 Although not specified, it is assumed that the weapon load reflected the standard fit of 3 Expals. 
3 The mission was cancelled once it was realised that the intended targets were Argentine ships.  Ibid., 133. 
4 Argentine primary source confirmed payload.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 256.  




Condor 1815 3 3 3 3 3 
Unable to find 
targets 
OF.1178 
Fortin 1830 2 2 2 2 2 
OF.1176 
Jaguar Dagger 1900 2 x Expal 4 8 8 8 8 0 0 
12 May 1982 
OF.1177 
Cuna A-4B Skyhawk 
1620 
1 x Mk 176 




Oro 1630 4 4 4 4 4 4 1
9 
15 May 1982 
TBC 
TBC Dagger 2000 1 x Mk 17 3 3 3 3 3 
Unable to find 
targets 0 0 
19 May 1982 
TBC 
TBC Dagger 1945 2 x Expal
10 3 6 6 6 6 Unable to find targets 0 0 
Totals    5411 113 113 87 84  9 2 
  
																																																								
6 The weapon load carried by both formations is contested.  The adopted position reflected Freedman’s, Moro’s and the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website’s position that both formations carried a single 
1000lb weapon.  However, Hobson and Burden suggested that the formations carried a pair of 500lb weapons.  Bicheno confused the matter further by suggesting the aircraft carried a pair of 1000lb bombs.  
Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 441; Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 186 and Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may12.html accessed 22 January 2016); Hobson, Falklands Air 
War, 65 and Burden, The Air War, 108; Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 130. 
7 Nivoli and Iberluca are both successfully engaged by HMS Brilliant’s Sea Wolf.  Iberluca was able to drop his weapon but it missed HMS Brilliant.  Both pilots were killed.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 65. 
8 After dropping his weapon, which missed, Bustos was engaged by a Sea Wolf fired from HMS Brilliant.  In an attempt to evade the missile, he crashed into the sea and was killed.  Burden, The Air War, 
118. 
9 Gavazzi’s bomb passed through HMS Glasgow before it exploded in the sea.  On his return flight, Gavazzi was shot down and killed by Argentine ground fire at Goose Green.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 
66. 
10 The weapon load carried by the formation is not identified, it is assumed that the fit reflects the standard Dagger load of 2 x Expal. 
11 In addition to the 54 attack missions, Daggers flew 8 escort sorties while A-4Q Skyhawks flew 8 Alert missions.  Therefore, over the period 2-19 May the Argentines flew 70 combat air missions. 
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Annex F - Argentine Air Power During Operation Sutton: 21 May 
 
	







Planned Airborne Reached Islands 
Breached 






1 x Mk 17 
3 3 3 3 21 HMS Argonaut & Broadsword 2 0 
0 0 
OF.1182 
Perro2 3 3 3 3 3 HMS Antrim 
3 13 
OF.1183 
Leon  2 x EXPAL 
3 6 44 4 4 4 
0 
OF.1184 
Zorro 3 6 6 6 6 HMS Brilliant 0
5 
TBC 





Tero A-4C 1 x Mk 17 
2 2 2 17 08 0 
OF.1188 
Pato 3 3 3 2
9 010, 11 0 
OF.1189 A-4B 4 4 4 212 113 HMS Ardent 1 014 
																																																								
1 Bean was shot down and killed by a Sea Wolf missile fired from HMS Broadsword. Hobson, Falklands Air War, 79. 
2 The Argentine Air Force website informed that the Perro aircraft were armed with EXPAL not Mk 17 bombs.  However, Rivas and the Argentine official history both suggested that the aircraft were armed 
with the latter weapons system.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/May21a.html accessed on 22 December 2014; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 187 and Fuerza Aérea Argentina, 
Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 327 
3 The bomb hit HMS Antrim but failed to explode.  Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 153. 
4 Senn’s aircraft was unserviceable during start up.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 175. 
5 All bombs failed to release due to an electrical failure.  Ibid., 176. 
6 The mission was cancelled following navigation problems generated via the recently installed VLF navigation system.  Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 377. 
7 Castillo was forced to return to base during the air-to-air refuelling phase of the mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 121. 
8 Lopez joined Pato flight but he was shot down and killed by Sea Harrier/Sidewinder combination during ingress to the target – see Annex J Serial 9 for further details. 
9 Martinez was forced to return to base during the ingress phase of the mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 121. 
10 Manzotti was shot down and killed by Sea Harrier/Sidewinder during ingress to the target – See Annex J Serial 10 for further details. 
11 Almono was curtailed by a Sea Harrier combat air patrol during the ingress phase and aborted mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 121. 
12 Cacon and Rinke returned to base during the transit due to technical problems.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 81. 
13 Carmano attacked an abandoned cargo vessel.  Middlebrook, The Argentinean Fight, 155. 
14 Huertas claimed that Carballo hit the rear of HMS Ardent with his single bomb, which detonated causing extensive damage.  However, most accounts, including Rivas, suggested that Carballo missed his 




Pico 4 4 4 3
15 3 Unable to find targets 0 
0 
OF.1191 
Rondo A-4C 2 2 1
16 1 017 N/A 0 
OF.1194 
Libra Dagger 2 2 2 1
18 1 HMS Ardent 1 
OF.1196 
Orion A-4B 









3 3 3 3 220 HMS Ardent 2 2 1
21 
OF.1198 
Raton 1 x Mk 17 




Laucha 3 3 3 3 3 HMS Brilliant 2
23 
TBC 
Tabano A-4Q 4 x Mk 82 
3 12 12 12 12 
HMS Ardent 
12 2 224 
TBC 
TBC 3 12 12 12 12 12 1 1 
OF.1201 
Raspon A-4C 1 x Mk 17 3 3 2
25 2 2 Unable to find 
targets 0 0 0 OF.1202 3 3 3 3 3 
																																																								
15 One aircraft returned to base during transit with a technical issue.  Ibid., 137. 
16 Isaac’s aircraft was unserviceable during start-up.  Ibid., 121. 
17 During the ingress, Garcia joined Pato flight but aborted due to the presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol. Ibid. 
18 Cimatti’s aircraft had an oil leak after take-off and he returned to base.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	81.	
19 The formation leader’s aircraft became unserviceable after take off and he returned to base.  Consequently, Fillipini, the Leo flight lead, controlled both formations.  However, Hobson believed that all six 
aircraft made it to the target.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 137; Hobson.  Falklands Air War,	80. 
20 Luna was shot down by Sea Harrier/Sidewinder combination on ingress, he ejected and survived.  See Annex J Serial 11 for further details. 
21 One unexploded bomb was left on board the ship.  Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, 154. 
22 The formation was intercepted by a Sea Harrier combat air patrol prior to reaching the target area. All 3 Daggers were shot down by Sea Harrier/Sidewinder combination with all 3 pilots ejecting 
successfully and surviving.  See Annex J Serials 12-14 for further details 
23 One weapon failed to release from the aircraft.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 341.  
24 During egress, all 3 aircraft were shot down by a combination of ground fire as well as Sea Harriers using Sidewinder and cannons.  See Annex J Serials 15 and 16 for further details. 




Mate A-4B 4 4 4 4 4 
TBC 
TBC Canberra 8 x Mk 17 8 64 24 0
26 0 N/A 




26 The Canberra missions are not included in the Argentine Air Forces web page or the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s Official History.  Moreover, Hobson, Burden as well as Ethell and Price fail to mention the 
Canberra missions on 21 May 1982.  However, Rivas suggested that the mission were planned and were in the process of being executed when they were cancelled requiring the three airborne aircraft to 
recover to base.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/May21.html accessed on 22 December 2014; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 92. 
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Planned Airborne Reached Islands 
Breached 
Defences Dropped Hits Detonated 
Centre of 
Gravity 
20 May 19821 
OF. 
TBC2 Dagger 2 x EXPAL 
3 6 6 6 6 
Armed Recce 0 0 0 0 OF. 
TBC3 2 4 4 4 4 




Skyhawk 1 x Mk 17
4 3 3 3 3 3 Sussex Bay 05 
0 0 0 OF.1207 
Chispa 
A-4B 
Skyhawk 3 x EXPAL 6 18 18 6
6 6 Sussex Harbour 67 




2 x EXPAL 3 6 6 6 6 San Carlos 68 
0 0 0 OF.1205 Puma 1 x Mk17 
3 3 3 3 
09 N/A 0 OF.1206 
Potro 3 3 3 3 
																																																								
1 Although the various sources are inconsistent in their reporting of Argentine air activities on 20 May, it is clear that activity levels are very light.  The table reflects Rivas’ position.  Rivas, Wings of the 
Malvinas, 137.  
2 Although the formation callsign is unknown, the formation comprised: Piuma in C-432, Castillo in C-412 and Dimeglio in C-415.  Although not specified, it is assumed that the aircraft were armed with the 
usual San Julian weapon load of 2 x EXPAL.  Ibid., 175. 
3 The formation callsign remains unidentified.  Nevertheless, Rivas informed that the formation comprised: Donadille in C-404 and Puga in C-421.  Although not specified, it is assumed that the aircraft were 
armed with the standard San Julian weapon configuration of 2 x EXPAL.  Ibid. 
4 Assumed payload. 
5 Hobson suggested that only two A-4s Skyhawks conducted the bombing raid.  In contrast, Rivas informed that two separate formations were involved.   Nevertheless, both commentators agreed that the 
attacks were ineffectual.  In the case of Leon formation, they were unable to contact their controller.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 85; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 121 and 138. 
6 Four aircraft returned to base during the air-to-air refuelling phase of the mission. Ibid., 138. 
7 The formation dropped their weapons blind from medium level.  Ibid., 121. 
8 The aircraft dropped their bombs blind onto the pre-planned coordinates and were unable to assess how successful their strike had been.  Ibid., 179. 





3 3 3 
411 
2 Unable to find 
targets OF.1208 





Skyhawk 3 x BRP 








Skyhawk 1 x Mk 17 
3 3 214 2 2 HMS Antelope & Broadsword 2 0
15 
OF.1211 
Nene 3 3 2




Skyhawk 4 x Mk 82 4 16 16 12
18 12 HMS Antelope & Intrepid 7
19 120 
OF.1214 
Daga Dagger 1 x Mk 17 
3 3 3 221 2 




Punal 3 3 2
22 2 2 023 
TBC Super 1 x Exocet 2 2 2 2 2 024 
																																																								
10 This Fragmentation Order is the same as the one used for the Chispa formation of A-4B Skyhawks on the previous day.  Rivas and the Fuerza Aérea Argentina Official History both repeat the error.  
11 Lanza formation leader, Velasco, and the Tejo wingman, Bergamaschi, both returned to base with technical problems.  Ibid., 139.  
12 The aircraft from Oro and Plata formations were forced to return to base after failing to rendezvous with the C-130 refuelling aircraft.  Ibid., 122. 
13 Almono, the formation leader, ground aborted.  Ibid. 
14 Palaver ground aborted.  Burden, The Air War,120. 
15 Hobson and Huertas suggested that Gomez’s bomb struck the stern of HMS Antelope but it failed to detonate.  In contrast, Rivas informed that Gomez targeted HMS Broadsword, which was located 
nearby, but missed.  The latter position has been adopted.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	88 and S.M. Huertas, San Carlos: Insights into an Intense Battle (Air Enthusiast, 25); Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 
141 
16 Cachon fell off his aircraft’s ladder and was forced to abort the mission.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	88.  
17 Guadagnini hit HMS Antelope with his bomb but it failed to explode.  However, the combined effects of air defences brought down the aircraft during the attack.  His wingman failed to drop his bomb due to 
intense ground fire.  Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 481.	
18 One aircraft was forced to return to base during the air-to-air refuelling phase.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	89. 
19 Zubizerratta was unable to drop his weapons due to a technical failure.  On recovery, as his aircraft slid off the runway, Zubizerratta ejected using a time-expired rocket motor and was killed.  Additionally, 
one other bomb failed to release from another aircraft.  Middlebrook, The Argentinean Fight, 168; Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 379. 
20 HMS Antelope was hit by two unexploded bombs.  Some accounts suggested that the unexploded bombs were different types.  Consequently, one of the unexploded weapons may have been dropped by 
an A-4Q Skyhawk.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 261 
21 After take-off, Cimatti was forced to return to base following a technical problem.  Ibid., 189. 
22 Moreno ground aborted.  Ibid. 
23 Unable to find targets, the formation jettisoned their weapons and returned to base.  At this point, a Sea Harrier combat air patrol intercepted the formation and Volponi was shot down and killed by Sea 
Harrier/Sidewinder combination.  For further details, see Annex J Serial 17.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	89.   
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TBC Etendard 
24 May 1982 
OF.1223 
Chispa A-4B 
Skyhawk 1 x Mk 17 
3 3 3 225 2 RFA Sir Lancelot 
 Sir Bedivere  
Sir Galahad 
2 
3 0 326 OF.1224 




Skyhawk 3 x BRP 






TBC 2 6 6 6 6
28 
OF.1230 
Jaguar 3 9 9 9 9 







1 x Mk 17 4 4 4 4 4 RFA Sir Lancelot 3
30 131 1 
OF.1227 
Plata 2 x EXPAL 
3 6 6 6 6 Fuel Tanks 532 
0 0 OF.1228 
Oro 3 6 6 6 0
33 N/A 0 
25 May 1982 
OF.1232 A-4B 1 x Mk 17 4 4 4 234 035 N/A 0 0 0 0 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
24 The Super Etendards failed to detect a target and returned to base. Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 245. 
25 Berrier was forced to return to base post air-to-air refuelling after accidently dropping his sole weapon.  Burden identified Bolzan as the most likely culprit whereas Berrier was identified by Rivas as the 
individual responsible for the mistake.  Moreover, Rivas does not name Bolzan as one of the six pilots who participated in the Chispa and Nene formations.  Burden, The Air War, 120 and Rivas, Wings of 
the Malvinas, 142. 
26 The first attack on the British operational centre of gravity – 1615 on 24 May.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	92. 
27 The formation aborted prior to being intercepted by combat air patrol.  Burden, The Air War, 112. 
28 Although no formation callsign is stipulated, the formation compromised Lucero in C-319 and Cuello in C-301.  The aircraft subsequently aborted their mission due to heavy ground fire in the vicinity of the 
San Carlos.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 123. 
29 During recovery to base, Bono crashed and was killed.  Burden, The Air War, 112. 
30 Due to an electrical generator failure, Maffeis was unable to drop his weapon.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	91. 
31 The bomb failed to detonate, leaving an unexploded bomb on board RFA Sir Lancelot.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 145. 
32 One bomb failed to release from Callejo’s aircraft during the attack.  Ibid., 179. 
33 The formation was intercepted and engaged by a combat air patrol.  All three aircraft were shot down, 2 pilots ejected safely although the third pilot was killed.  For further details, see Annex J Serials 18-
20.	
34 Two aircraft are forced to return to base; one with a technical problem and the other was not visual with the other members of the formation.  Ibid., 144. 
35 The remaining two aircraft suffered from poor navigation and attacked an abandoned Argentine ship, Monsunen, near Goose Green.  Palaver was shot down during the egress by a Sea Dart missile fired 













3 x  
Mk 1737 3 9 6
38 6 6 HMS Broadsword 6 1
39 
OF.1237 
Zeus 3 x Mk 17 3 9 9 6




Etendard 1 x Exocet 2 2 2 2 2 
MV Atlantic 
Conveyor 2 1 1 1 
OF.1233 
Rango 
Dagger 1 x  Mk 1743 
2 2 2 2 2 Beauchene Radar Site 
0 0 0 0 OF.1234 






Puma 3 1 3 0
44 0 TBC 0 0 0 0 
26 May 1982 
OF.1240 
Odin Canberra 4 x Mk 17
45 3 12 12 12 046 San Carlos 0 0 0 0 
																																																								
36 Two aircraft failed to drop their weapons due to technical issues.  Lucero was shot down on egress due to ground fire but ejected safely.  Garcia was shot down and killed by a Sea Dart missile fired from 
HMS Coventry.  Middlebrook, The Argentinean Fight, 170. 
37 There is contradictory evidence regarding the weapon loads carried by Vulcano and Zeus flights on 25 May.  Rivas suggested that Zeus flight were each armed with a pair of EXPALs and the Vulcano 
formation had three Mk17s each.  The Argentine Air Force website was coherent with the Argentine Official History when it informed that Vulcano were armed with a single Mk17 but failed to mention the 
weapon load of Zeus other than the Zeus wingman registered his leader’s three hits on HMS Coventry.  Although eyewitnesses on board confirmed the three hits, they suggested that the aircraft dropped 
four weapons.  In contrast, Burden confused matters further by signifying both formations carried the three Mk 17 war load.  Hobson and Ramsey confirm the stipulated Vulcano weapon load.  Consequently, 
the table reflected the latter solution as the most rationale answer.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 145; Fuerza Aérea Argentina, www.faa.mil.ar/conlicto/dias/may25c.html accessed 22 December 2014 and 
Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 389; Hart-Dyke, Four Weeks in May, 156; Burden, The Air War, 121; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 96 and G. Ramsey, The Falklands War Then and 
Now (Old Harlow: Battle of Britain International, 2009), 256. 
38 Carmona, Vulcano 3, ground aborted.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 145. 
39 HMS Broadsword was hit by a bomb that failed to explode.   Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 486. 
40 Following take-off, Osses’ aircraft, Zeus 3, became unserviceable and was forced to recover to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 145.	
41 Velasco dropped three weapons and achieved three effective hits.  Barrineuvo had a technical problem and was unable to drop his weapons.  Middlebrook, The Argentinean Fight, 173. 
42 According to Briasco each Super Etendard aircraft had its own callsign rather than the more conventional approach of a formation callsign.  Briasco, Falklands – Witness of Battles, 227. 
43 Rango, Bingo and Pocker formations were based at Rio Grande and although not stipulated it is assumed that they were carrying their standard weapon load of a single Mk 17 bomb. 
44 According to the Official History, the aircraft launched from Rio Grande at 1300 but were recalled by their headquarters.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 1, 392.  Of note, Rivas 
makes no mention of this mission. 
45 The weapon fit is confirmed in the Fuerza Aérea Argentina Official History of the Conflict.  Ibid.  
46 Due to inclement weather over the Falkland Islands, the three Canberras were forced to abort their mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 92.  
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OF.1241 




Skyhawk 4 x Mk 82
48 
2 8 8 8 849 Armed Recce 
0 TBC 
TBC 2 8 8 0
50 0 Lively Island 




47 The wingman dropped his weapons blind into the San Carlos area from medium level.  The formation leader was later criticised by his commander for not replicating his wingman’s act.  Ibid., 181.	
48 Payload confirmed in the Official History.  Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 381.  
49 Unable to find suitable targets.  Ibid., 261. 
50 Mission aborted after one aircraft was unable to refuel from Hercules.  Ibid. 
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Planned Airborne Reached Island 
Breached 
Defences Dropped Hits 
27 May 1982 
OF.1240 
Odin Canberra 0720 
4 x BRP + 
2 Mk 17s 2 12 12 12 12 Ajax Bay 12 0
1 
TBC 
TBC A-4Q Skyhawk 1327 4 x Mk 82
2 2 8 8 8 8 Unable to find target 
0 0 
OF.1248 
Toro A-4B Skyhawk 
1330 
1 x Mk 173 
3 3 3 
04 0 Unable to confirm target OF.1245 
Trueno 1400 3 3 3 
OF.1246 
Tigre A-4C Skyhawk 1400 3 x BRP5 
3 9 9 66 6 Unable to find 
targets OF.1249 
Tanque 3 9 9 6
7 6 
OF.1244 
Pocker A-4B Skyhawk 1900 4 x BRP 3 12 12 8
8 8 Ajax Bay 8 79,10 
																																																								
1 Although some commentators suggested that the Canberra raid had minimal effect, others informed that they, ‘were viewed by the British as having morale-sapping qualities.’  Freedman, Official History 
Volume 2, 563; Burden, The Air War, 91.    
2 The Official History confirmed that the A-4Q Skyhawks were armed with their normal load of four Mk 82s.  Armada Argentina, Conflicto Del Atlantico Sur, 381.  
3 Rivas failed to mention the weapon load carried by Trueno.  However, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed that both Toro and Trueno formations carried a single Mk 17 bomb.  Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may27.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
4 Toro and Trueno were ordered to recover to base during air-to-air refueling.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 150.	
5 Rivas suggested that the Tigre aircraft were each armed with three LAU-61 Rocket pods.  In contrast, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website informed the more traditional fit of three BRPs were carried by 
both Tanque and Tigre.  The latter position has been adopted.  Ibid., 125 and Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may27.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
6 One aircraft was forced to return due to problems encountered during air-to-air refueling.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 125.	
7 One Skyhawk returned to base due to problems while conducting air-to-air refueling. Ibid. 
8 During the transit, Carmona is forced to return to base.  Ibid., 151. 
9 Burden suggested that the attack caused several casualties and a fire in an ammunition dump, while other bombs failed to detonate.  Freedman provided further detail, when he informed that six are killed 
and 30 wounded with two unexploded bombs located within the Field Hospital.  Privratsky identified that 5 of the 16 bombs exploded.  As a result, it can be deduced that 9 of the 16 bombs missed their 
targets. Burden, The Air War, 122; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 563; Privratsky, Logistics in Falklands War, 134 
10 Following his attack, Velasco was hit by small arms fire and was forced to eject.  Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 253. 
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OF.1247 
Truco 1930 3 12 8
11 8 8 8 
28 May 1982 
OF.1256 
Pocker Dagger 1400 2 x BRP
12 4 8 8 8 8 







Cuna A-4B Skyhawk 
1530 
3 x BRP13 
3 9 9 614 6 
OF.1258 
Nene 1530 3 9 9 6
15 6 
OF.1259 
Chispa A-4C Skyhawk 
1700 
1 x Mk 1716 
3 3 3 217 2 
OF.1253 
Toro 1710 3 3 3 3 3 
TBC 
TBC A-4Q Skyhawk TBC 4 x Mk 82
18 2 8 8 8 8 
29 May 1982 
OF.1260 
Charrua Canberra 0500 4 x Mk 17 2 8 8 8 8 




Oro A-4B Skyhawk 1200 3 x BRP 2 6 6 6 6 
Unable to find 
targets 
0 0 OF.1264 Patria Dagger 
1400 
2 x BRP20 
3 6 421 4 022 Unable to reach target 
OF.1266 
Nandu 1530 2 4 4 4 4 
Unable to find 
target23 
																																																								
11 Robledo ground aborted.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 150.	
12 It is assumed that the Dagger formation carried two BRP.	
13 The Official History confirmed that Nene and Cuna formations carried three BRPs per aircraft.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 2, 429. 
14 One aircraft was forced to return due to technical issues.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 153. 
15 Nene 3, flown by Cervera, returned to base with a technical problem.  Ibid. 
16 It is assumed that Chispa and Toro carried a single Mk 17 per aircraft. 
17 The lead aircraft was forced to return when he inadvertently dropped his weapon when arming his armament panel.  Ibid., 125. 
18 The A-4Q Skyhawk fit is assumed to be three Mk 82 bombs. 
19 The attack caused no serious injuries or damage.  Burden, The Air War, 91. 
20 As stated in the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may29.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
21 Faget ground aborted due to an oxygen system problem.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 181. 
22 The mission was cancelled as the Argentine garrison at Goose Green had surrendered.  Ibid. 




3 6 6 6 
024 Unable to reach target OF.1270 
Leon 2 4 4 4 
30 May 1982 
OF.1268 
Zonda A-4C Skyhawk 1630 




Ala Super Etendard 
1 x 
Exocet27 2 1 1 1 1 1 
31 May 1982 
OF.1269 
Charrua Canberra 080028 4 x Mk 17 




Odin 2 8 8 8 8 8 
1 June 1982 
OF.1273 
Huinca Canberra 0759 3 x Mk 17 3
31 9 9 632 6 Mount Kent 6 033 
4 June 1982 
OF.1277 
Pina Dagger 1900 4 x BRP 4 16 16 16 16 Mount Kent 
1434 
035 OF.1275 
Lince Canberra 2123 
4 x BRP + 
2 Mk 17s36 3 18 18 18 18 18 
																																																								
24 Both formations aborted due to the presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 181. 
25 Prior to reaching their target, two Skyhawks were shot down by HMS Exeter’s Sea Darts.  Both pilots were killed.  Hobson, Falklands Air War,	110. 
26 Although Argentine sources claimed that HMS Invincible was attacked, British sources suggested that the Type 21 Frigate, HMS Avenger, was attacked. 
27 Only one Exocet remained in the inventory.  Although two Super Etendards flew the mission, the second aircraft was unarmed and served as a back-up in case the primary aircraft had a radar issue. 
28 As shown in the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/may31.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
29 The wingman lost contact with his leader and was forced to return to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 93. 
30 Burden informed that the attack caused no serious injuries or damage.  However, Beeny provided evidence that suggested that two members of the 846 Naval Air Squadron forward operating base were 
injured and required` casualty evacuation.  Burden, The Air War, 91; S. Beeny, The Canberra Experience (United States: edocPublish.com, 2016), 245. 
31 In contrast to Rivas’ view that each aircraft carried three weapons, Segat, the lead Canberra navigator confirmed that each aircraft carried four weapons.  Ibid., 246. 
32 One Canberra returned to base due to a technical issue.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 93. 
33 Neither Rivas nor Burden commented on the success of the raid.  Therefore, it is assumed that the military impact of the raid was, at best, minimal.  Ibid.; Burden, The Air War, 91. 
34 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina Official History suggested that only two of the 16 weapons failed to release.  In contrast, Rivas reported that the remaining 13 weapons failed to release. The former position 
has been adopted.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 2, 487; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 182. 
35 Neither Rivas nor Burden commented on the success of the raid.  However, Southby-Tailyour’s diary entry for 4 June described the event, ‘Canberra bomber attack on the Brigade area in the north but 
apparently they were off target and bombed down Berkeley Sound which is a delightful waste of their ordnance.’  Burden, The Air War, 91; Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, 250.	
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OF.1276 
Puma 2 12 12 12 12 12 
5 June 1982 
OF.1278 
Pato Canberra 0900 5 x Mk 17 
2 10 10 10 





38 10 10 10 
OF.1281 
Puno A-4B Skyhawk 1730 3 x BRP 4 12 12 12 12 





1730 2 x BRP39 3 6 6 6 6 
OF.1280 
Fierro 1800 Nil 2 0 0 0 0 
OF.1283 
Nene 1840 2 x BRP 3 6 6 6 6 
King George 
Bay area 6 
7 June 1982 
OF.1286 
Potro A-4B Skyhawk 
1230 
3 x BRP40 
3 9 9 9 9 
Unable to find 
targets 0 0 
OF.1282 
Trueno 1330 4 12 12 12 12 
TBC 
TBC Dagger 1845 2 x BRP
41 3 6 6 6 6 
8 June 1982 
TBC 
TBC A-4Q Skyhawk TBC 4 x Mk 82
42 2 8 8 8 8 Building on Broken Island 5
43 0 
TBC Canberra 1530 2 x Mk 17 2 4 4 4 4 MV Hercules 2 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
36 Beeny suggested that the formation composition and weapon load was different to that stipulated by Rivas.  Beeny informed that Puma formation comprised three aircraft; one Canberra was armed with 
five weapons the other two aircraft were armed with eight bombs each.  Additionally, Lince formation constituted two aircraft each armed with five bombs.  Beeny, The Canberra Experience, 247. 
37 Due to the intensity of missile defences, the Canberras were forced to abort their mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 94. 
38 Rivas suggested that only one Canberra participated in this mission.  However, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina’s Official History provided a compelling case for two aircraft being involved in the mission.  Ibid.;  
Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 2, 492. 
39 Assumed payload.  Only Rivas mentioned this sortie.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 190. 
40 The Official History only confirmed the number of weapons carried by Trueno formation.  However, The Fuerza Aérea Argentina website suggested that both Trueno and Potro formations were both 
carrying a bomb load of 3 BRPs. Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 2, 505; Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun7.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
41 It is assumed that the Dagger formation was carrying two BRPs. 
42 The A-4Q Skyhawk fit is assumed to be four Mk 82 bombs. 




TBC 1540 2 4 4 4 4 2 1
44 
OF.1289 
Mastin A-4B Skyhawk 
1530 
3 x BRP45 
4 12 12 646 6 RFA Sir Tristram  6 2
47 
OF.1290 
Dogo 4 12 12 9





2 x BRP 




Gato 3 6 4
53 4 4 4 
OF.1293 
Carta 1720 Nil 
3 
0 0 0 0 Diversionary mission 0 0 OF.1294 
Sobre 3 
OF.1296 
Mazo A-4B Skyhawk 1900 3 x BRP 




Martillo 3 9 9 6
56 6 0 
OF.1298 A-4C Skyhawk 1936 4 12 12 12 12 British troops 557 0 
																																																								
44 One bomb hit the Liberian-registered vessel, which had no connection with the Conflict.  However, the bomb failed to detonate.  Burden, The Air War, 92. 
45 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed that both Mastin and Dogo carried the same payload – three BRPs.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun8.html accessed 24 
January 2016. 
46 Two aircraft were forced to return to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 154. 
47 Two of Galvez’s bombs hit the ship while his wingman missed.  RFA Sir Tristram is severely damaged and withdrawn from the campaign.  Burden, The Air War, 124. 
48 Carballo in the lead aircraft is forced to recover to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 154. 
49 Carmona’s bombs failed to release.  Ibid., 155. 
50 Rinke’s bombs missed but Cachon hit RFA Sir Galahad with all three of his bombs.  Sir Galahad subsequently sank.  The raid cost the life of 49 soldiers and sailors, the largest loss of British life in a single 
event during the war.  Burden, The Air War, 124; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 613. 
51 One bomb failed to release.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 192. 
52 None of the 4 bombs that hit the ship detonated.  Burden, The Air War, 138. 
53 Following a birdstrike, one Dagger is forced to return to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 192. 
54 Dellepaine returned to base with an engine problem.  Ibid., 156. 
55 LCU4 is hit by a single bomb drop and sank with the loss of five lives.  As the A-4 Skyhawks attacked, they were intercepted by a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  The net result was three Skyhawks were 
shot down by AIM-9L Sidewinders with the loss of all three pilots.  Sanchez jettisoned his weapons and recovered to the mainland as the sole survivor from his formation.  Freedman, Official History Volume 
2, 613; Morgan, Hostile Skies, 269. 
56 The Martillo leader, Berrier, is forced to return with an oxygen problem.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 156. 
57 Two aircraft had problems attempting to drop their weapons while another had a ‘hung’ bomb.  Ibid., 131. 
267 
Yunque at Fitzroy 
9 June 1982 
OF.1303 
Cobra A-4C Skyhawk 1800 3 x BRP58 




Piton A-4B Skyhawk 1800 3 9 9 9 9 
TBC 
TBC A-4Q Skyhawk TBC 4 x Mk 82
60 2 8 8 8 061 Unable to reach targets 
OF.1304 
Coral Dagger 1845 2 x BRP
62 3 6 6 6 6 Unable to find targets 
10 June 1982 
TBC 
TBC Dagger 1800 2 x BRP
63 2 4 4 4 4 Unable to find targets 
0 0 OF.1308 Tigre Canberra 0040 
5 x Mk 17 2 10 564 5 
065 Unable to reach targets OF.1309 
Leon 2 x Mk 17
66 2 4 2 2 
12 June 1982 
OF.1310 
Tauro Canberra 
0130 4 x Mk 17 2 8 867 0 0 Unable to reach target 0 0 
OF.1311 
Acuario 0420 2 x Mk 17 2 4 4 2
68 2 Bluff Cove 2 069 
OF.1312 A-4B Skyhawk TBC 3 x BRP 4 12 670 6 071 Unable to 0 0 
																																																								
58 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed that aircraft in both the Cobra and Piton formations were armed with 3 BRPs. Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun9.html 
accessed 24 January 2016. 
59 One aircraft was forced to return to base shortly after take-off.  During refueling another Skyhawk also returned.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 131. 
60 The A-4Q Skyhawk fit is assumed to be four Mk 82 bombs. 
61 Due to the presence of Sea Harrier combat air patrols, the mission was aborted.  Ibid., 262. 
62 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed that the Daggers were armed with two BRPs. Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun9.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
63 Neither Rivas nor the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website indicated what the Dagger formation’s weapon load was.  It is assumed that it is a standard twin BRP fit.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, 
http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun10.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
64 Both formation wingmen ground aborted.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 95. 
65 Both Canberras aborted due to the presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  Ibid. 
66 Beeny suggested that both formations were armed with five bombs in each aircraft.  Beeny, The Canberra Experience, 250. 
67 One aircraft was unable to jettison its fuel tank.  As a result, both aircraft aborted the mission.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 95. 
68 One aircraft returned to base with a technical problem.  Ibid. 
69 Neither Rivas nor Burden identified the outcome of the strike.  Therefore, it is assumed that there was limited effect delivered by this attack. Ibid.; Burden, The Air War, 92. 
70 Post air-to-air refueling, two aircraft were forced to recover to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 160. 
268 
Alfa reach targets 
OF.1314 
Paris 1920 3 x BRP 4 12 3
72 3 3 Unable to find targets 
TBC 
TBC A-4Q Skyhawk TBC 4 x Mk 82
73 2 8 8 8 074 Unable to reach targets 
OF.1315 
Roma Canberra 2301 4 x Mk 17 2 8 8 8 0
75 Unable to reach target 
13 June 1982 
OF.1316 
Berlin Canberra 0300 4 x Mk 17 2 8 8 4




2 x BRP79 
3 6 480 4 081 Unable to 
reach targets 0 0 OF.1318 
Gaucho 1310 3 6 4
82 4 483 
OF.1319
Nene A-4B Skyhawk 144184 3 x BRP 4 12 12 9
85 9 Mt Kent area 9 0
86 
OF.1320 4 12 12 12 12 12 087 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
71 Of the remaining pair of aircraft, one Skyhawk developed an engine problem and both aircraft elected to return to base.  Ibid. 
72 The second aircraft suffered an engine fire on take-off and aborted his take-off.  As the aircraft had taken the arrestor cable, the two aircraft behind the damaged aircraft were unable to take-off.  
Nevertheless, the leader continued his mission. Ibid. 
73 The A-4Q Skyhawk fit is assumed to be four Mk 82 bombs. 
74 The formation aborted the mission due to the presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol in the vicinity of the target – artillery positions to the north of North Basin.  Ibid., 262. 
75 Both aircraft were forced to return to base due to bad weather and serviceability issues.  Ibid., 95. 
76 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina Official History informed that one aircraft returned to base due to serviceability issues.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Historia, Tomo VI, Volumen 2, 550.   
77 Burden suggested that there was no damage reported by British forces.  However, Hobson and Moro both informed that the weapons fell in proximity to General Moore’s Field Headquarters on the 
western side of Mount Kent.  Burden, The Air War, 92; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 134 and Moro, South Atlantic Conflict, 309. 
78 Neither Rivas nor the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed the formation callsign.  However, Rivas informed that the aircraft and pilots are as follows: Maffeis, Valante and Callejo.  Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun13.html accessed 24 January 2016; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 182. 
79 The Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed both Dagger formations’ bomb load.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun13.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
80 Callejo returned to base with a landing gear problem.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 182. 
81 Due to the presence of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol, the formation aborted.  Ibid., 183. 
82 Faget aborted with a brake problem.  Ibid. 
83 Both aircraft aborted due to the proximity of a Sea Harrier combat air patrol.  Ibid. 
84 Although not mentioned by Rivas, the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website confirmed the Skyhawk take-off time. Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun13.html accessed 24 January 
2016. 
85 The Nene flight lead was forced to return to base.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 161. 




Zeus Dagger 1845 2 x BRP88 
3 6 489 4 4 Unable to find 
targets 0 0 OF.1324 
Vulcano 3 6 4
90 291 2 
OF.1326 
Bacon Canberra 0130 5 x Mk 17 2 10 10 10 10 
7 kms west of 
Stanley 10
92 093 




87 Rivas suggested that the formation attacked a British helicopter park.  However, Burden informed that the formation mistakenly dropped its weapons early and caused no significant damage.  In contrast, 
Freedman identified that three light helicopters were damaged in the raid.  As the damaged helicopters were in the vicinity of the 3 Commando Brigade headquarters, it is likely that Nene’s weapons 
damaged the helicopters whereas the Chispa weapons were ineffective.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 162; Burden, The Air War, 125; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 637 
88 The Dagger payload is confirmed by the Fuerza Aérea Argentina website.  Fuerza Aérea Argentina, http://www.faa.mil.ar/conflicto/dias/jun13.html accessed 24 January 2016. 
89 Moreno ground aborted.  Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 193. 
90 Robles aircraft was unserviceable during start up and he failed to participate in the mission.  Ibid. 
91 Antonietti is forced to recover with an engine problem.  Ibid. 
92 After releasing its bombs, the lead Canberra was hit by a Sea Dart fired from HMS Cardiff.  The navigator was unable to eject and was killed.  However, the pilot ejected and survived.  Hobson, Falklands 
Air War, 138. 
93 No damage reported by British forces.  Burden, The Air War, 92. 
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1 21 26 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Canberra 
Aircrew 39 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36  




Pilots 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18  




Pilots 16 15 14 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12  
Aircraft & Weapons 112 10 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6  
A-4B 
Skyhawk 
Pilots 36 36 32 30 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 26 26 26 26 26 26  
Aircraft & Weapons 28 28 24 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 18 18 18 18 18 18  
A-4C 
Skyhawk 
Pilots 22 22 18 14 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12      
Aircraft & Weapons 17 17 13 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      
A-4Q 
Skyhawk 
Pilots 12 12 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10   
Aircraft & Weapons 8 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5   
Super 
Etendard 
Pilots 10 10 10 10 10                
Aircraft & Weapons 43  4 4 4 4                
																																																								
1 All figures taken from S. Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas. 
2 The figure does not include the 4 aircraft (C-401, C-410, C-415 and C-430) that were used at both Dagger bases during the Conflict. Those 4 aircraft are included in the San Julian figures. 
3 Although all 4 Super Etendards survived the Conflict, the red scoring reflected the use of their complete Exocet weapon stockpile.  Two missiles were expended on 4 May against HMS Sheffield; a further 
two on 25 May against MV Atlantic Conveyor and the last missile was fired on 30 May. 
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Key 100% >100-<75% >75-<50% >50% 
Aircrew/Pilots     
Aircraft & Weapons     
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Annex J - Sea Harrier/AIM-9L Sidewinder Employment During Operation Corporate 
 
	



































13k’1 20° off Tail2 1 
Gentle left 
turn Kill 
Perona ejected but survived, 
















The damaged Mirage 
diverted to Stanley but was 
shot down by Argentine 









35k’ 20° off Tail6 3 Nil Kill 









50’ 10° off Tail8 1 Nil Kill 
Crew ejected but killed in 
action.9 




100’ Canberra B-110 50’ 
10° off 
Tail 1 Nil Hit 
Same target as above, first 
missile impacted and crew 
ejected as the second missile 
intercepted target.10 
6 Lt Cdr 100’ Canberra Captains 50’ 10° off 211 Nil Miss Undetermined Canberra.  
																																																								
1 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Hobson, Falklands Air War,	48; Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 65 and Burden, The Air War, 212. 
4 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
5 Hobson, Falklands Air War,	48; Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 209.  Archival evidence suggested that the missile was fired from the 4 o’clock position at 1000 yards.  However, the weight of evidence would 
suggest that the missile was fired from a rear aspect.  TNA, DEFE 67/135. Reconstruction of AAW Conflict. 
6 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
7 Hobson, Falklands Air War,	49; Burden, The Air War, 95 and TNA, DEFE 67/135.  Reconstruction of AAW Conflict. 
8 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
9 Although Ward suggested that the first missile was fired just aft of the beam, primary source material informed that the firing is a stern aspect engagement.  Ward, Sea Harrier, 203; TNA, DEFE 67/135.  
Reconstruction of AAW Conflict. 
10 Burden, The Air War, 214. 












Tail Fired at 2 nautical miles, out 
of range.12 




Tail 2 Nil Miss 























Level Tail Unknown Nil Miss 
Speculative shot against an 
egressing formation (Callsign 











15 Nil Kill 









200’ Tail 800 yards Nil Kill 
Missile flight time was 5 
seconds. Manzotti ejected 









250’ Tail Unknown Nil Kill 






250’ Dagger C-404 
Major 
Piuma 100’ Tail 
1000 
yards19 Nil Kill 
Piuma ejected and 
survived.20 










right turn Kill 
Donadille ejected and 
survived.22 
																																																								
12 TNA, DEFE 67/135.  Reconstruction of AAW Conflict. 
13 Burden suggested that the missile detonated under the aircraft, damaging the wing.  Hobson inferred that the aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing at San Julian.  However, Rivas informed 
that the remaining aircraft were undamaged and recovered to Trelew as planned.  The apparent confusion was clarified by Rivas who reported that an earlier Canberra formation (Ruta flight) diverted Ruta 1 
in airframe B-105 to Puerto Deseado after their wingtip impacted with the sea during low level manoeuvring against a perceived British attack.  Burden, The Air War, 212; Hobson, Falklands Air War,	49; 
Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 90 and 92. 
14 Ibid., 187; Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 109 and Burden, The Air War, 197. 
15 TNA, AIR 8/3112.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
16 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 113. 
17 TNA, AIR 8/3112.  Scientific Evaluation Team; Burden, The Air War, 197 and Hobson, Falklands Air War,	81. 
18 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 115; Burden, The Air War, 197 and Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 188. 
19 TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.   












50’ 10° off Tail Unknown Nil Kill 










75’ Tail 800-1000 yards24 Nil Kill 
Philippi ejected and 
survived25 




75’ Tail 800-1000 yards26 Nil Miss 
Missile initially hangs up then 
fires but missed target.  
Arca’s damaged aircraft 
diverted to Stanley where he 
ejected and survived.27 




100’ Dagger C-437 
Teniente 
Volponi 50’ Tail 0.5 Nil Kill 




Lt Cdr  
Auld 
800 NAS 







29 Nil Kill Castillo killed in action.
30 






















Diaz ejected and survived.34 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
22 Burden, The Air War, 217. 
21 TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.  	
23 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 178. 
24 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
25 Burden, The Air War, 199 and Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 256. 
26 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
27 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 123 and Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 255. 
28 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 134 and Burden, The Air War, 200. 
29 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
30 Hobson, Falklands Air War,	92.	
31 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
32 Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 180. 
33 Air Combat Mission Report contained within TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
34 Burden suggested that Puga was in C-419 and Diaz in C-430 both pilots, who were shot down by Auld, ejected successfully whereas Castillo in C-410 who was engaged by Smith, was killed.  More recent 
analysis suggested that the pilots, airframes and outcomes are incorrect.  The table reflects the contemporary viewpoint. Burden, The Air War, 200. 
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36 Nil Miss Running short of fuel so fired early.37 
23 Tail 1.2538 Nil Hit 
Damaged, kill completed 








200’ A-4B C-226 
Teniente 
Arraras 100’ Tail 
1000 
yards39 Nil Kill 
Arraras ejected but is killed.40 






















50’ Tail 2-345 Nil Kill 
‘after some seven seconds of 
flight there was a brilliant 
white flash’46 
																																																								
35 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 236 and Ward, Sea Harrier, 288. 
36 TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.   
37 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 175. 
38 TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.  	
39 Briasco, Falklands – Witness of Battles, 128. 
40 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 267. 
41 Ibid.,  
42 Briasco, Falklands – Witness of Battles, 128.	
43 TNA, AIR 8/3112.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
44 Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 196 and Rivas, Wings of the Malvinas, 156. 
45 Burden, The Air War, 204.  The range bracket stipulated is significantly outside of the low level operating envelope for the Sidewinder and is therefore a dubious figure.  In the official Air Combat Mission 
Debrief, Smith suggested that the missile is fired, ‘at extreme range 2nm+.’  TNA, AIR 8/3112.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
46 Morgan, Hostile Skies, 270.  A Sidewinder missile time of flight of seven seconds equated to a more realistic and credible firing range.	
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Aircraft Weapons Mission 
Unit Type Number Load Planned Airborne Reaching Target 
Breaching 
Defences Dropped Hit Counter Task Target 
1 May 1982            
2350* 44 Sqn Vulcan 1 1000lb 21 21 21 21 21 11 
Air 
Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 1048 800 NAS Sea Harrier 
5 Mixed2 3 15 15 15 15 23 
4 1000lb 3 12 12 12 12 ?4 Suppression 
1058 3 Mixed5 3 9 9 9 9 96 Airfield Attack Goose Green Airstrip 
3 May 1982            
0500 815 NAS Lynx HAS2 2 Sea Skua 2 4 4 4 4 47 Sea Anti-Surface Warfare Alferez Sobral 
4 May 1982            
2345* 44 Sqn Vulcan 1 1000lb 21 21 21 21 21 08 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 1530 800 NAS Sea Harrier 3 Mixed9 3 9 9 9 610 611 Goose Green Airstrip 
9 May 1982            
1119 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 1000lb 1 2 2 2 2 112 Sea Anti-Surface Warfare Narwhal 
12 May 1982            
1155 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 1000lb 1 2 2 2 2 013 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
																																																								
1 ‘The next day Woodward reported that photographic reconnaissance now showed that: Vulcan attack made single crater with first bomb halfway down runway just south of centre, remaining bombs landed 
over to SW [south west] over 1000m [metres] run without further damage.’		Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 285	
2 The weapons used against the airfield comprised twelve BL755 cluster bombs and three 1000lb bombs.  Brown, Royal Navy, 120. 
3	In addition to attacking the wider airfield infrastructure, two of Penfold’s bombs hit the runway.  However, Freedman highlighted that Woodward believed that all three of Penfold’s bombs had hit the runway.  
Burden, The Air War, 194; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 285.	
4 Four aircraft and twelve 1000lb bombs were dedicated to the suppression of enemy air defences.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 45.   
5 The Goose Green attack comprised six BL755s and three 1000lb bombs.  Brown, Royal Navy, 120. 
6 The initial British strike assessment was, ‘vague but recorded “fires burning but no secondary explosions.”’  However, subsequent analysis confirmed that during the attack, one Pucara was destroyed 
killing its pilot and eight groundcrew.  Two further Pucaras were damaged, a further seven individuals were wounded and the maintenance tent destroyed.  Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 285; Rivas, 
Wings of the Malvinas, 105. 
7 The Lynx HAS2 helicopters came from the embarked flights of the Type 42 destroyers HMS Coventry and Glasgow.  All four missiles hit and damaged the Argentine vessel but failed to sink it.  In contrast, 
Brown suggested, incorrectly, that two vessels were attacked; one was sunk the other believed to be the Alferez Sobral’s sister ship Comodoro Somerella was damaged.  Additionally, Brown informed that 
three out of the four missiles fired were successful.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 52; Brown, Royal Navy, 138. 
8 Hobson, Falklands Air War, 53. 
9 Two aircraft carried three BL755 each whereas the other aircraft carried three 1000lb bombs.  Brown, Royal Navy, 144. 
10 Lieutenant Taylor’s aircraft was shot down prior to weapon release, killing the pilot.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 56. 
11 Burden informed that the results of the raid were not particularly impressive.  Although further disruption was generated no further aircraft were destroyed in the raid.  Burden, The Air War, 195. 
12 This was the first planned use of Sea Harrier to bomb Stanley Airport during their transit to their Combat Air Patrol area.  However, the weather was too poor to drop their bombs against Stanley airport as 
planned.  Nevertheless, the Sea Harrier’s detected the Narwhal on their radar and following identification and approval, the ship was attacked from low level.  One bomb hit but failed to detonate, due to the 
seven second fusing required for its original task of medium level bombing, the other bomb missed.  Ward, Sea Harrier, 237; Morgan, Hostile Skies, 124. 
13 Brown informed that by noon, four 1000lb bombs were dropped by radar aiming during routine combat air patrol.  However, Hobson suggested that none of the bombs did any damage.  Brown, Royal 
Navy, 159; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 65. 
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1545 2 1 2 2 2 2 114 
1640 2 2 4 4 4 015 0 
15 May 1982            
TBC 801 NAS Sea Harrier 5 1000lb 1 5 5 5 5 ?16 Land Air Interdiction Troops North West of Stanley 
16 May 1982            
N/A 44 Sqn Vulcan 1 
1000lb 
21 21 017 0 0 0 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
1603 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 2 4 4 4 4 0
18 Sea Anti-Surface Warfare Rio Caracana 1646 2 2 4 4 4 019 0 Bahia Buen Suceso 
19 May 1982            
1215 801 NAS Sea Harrier 4 1000lb 2 8 8 8 8 020 Land Air Interdiction Helicopters at Mt Kent 
20 May 1982           
1430 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 3 BL755 321 9 9 9 9 922 Land Air Interdiction Fuel dump at Fox Bay 
21 May 1982            
1100 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
2 
BL755 
2 4 4 4 223 0 
Land 
Air Interdiction Helicopters at Mt Kent 
1156 2 224 4 4 225 0 026 
SCAR27 
Port Howard 
1345 2 2 4 4 4 0 028 San Carlos/Dunnose Head 
1900 2 229 4 4 4 0 030 Dunnose Head 
																																																								
14 The attack resulted in no significant damage: one bomb was seen to hit the target but there was no explosion. Two bombs missed and the other weapon was unsighted.  Burden, The Air War, 196. 
15 Assumed payload.  Mission aborted due to their controlling ship, HMS Brilliant, coming under attack by Argentine aircraft.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 65.	
16 801 Naval Air Squadron were tasked at short notice to conduct strikes against troop dispositions north west of Stanley and a radar at Sapper Hill.  The aircraft were in combat air patrol configuration with a 
single bomb.  The outcome of the mission is not discussed.  TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.   
17 Due to forecast strong winds the mission was cancelled.  Burden, The Air War, 365. 
18 The four bombs straddled the ship but they failed to hit their target.  Morgan, Hostile Skies, 140. 
19 Although not stipulated, it is assumed that both aircraft were carrying two weapons.  Due to proximity of the nearby settlement, the pilots decided not to drop their bombs but instead strafed the ship.  
Burden, The Air War, 196. 
20 Due to poor weather, the weapons were dropped blind from medium level.  Burden suggested that although explosions were seen there was no damage to the helicopters despite Ward’s confirmation that 
all twelve weapons hit their intended target position.  The Squadrons Record of Proceedings informed, and supported by photographic evidence, that the aircraft were armed with two weapons each.  Brown, 
Royal Navy, 172; Burden, The Air War, 215; Ward, Sea Harrier, 253 and TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.   
21 Ethell suggested that each aircraft carried only two weapons.  However, Squire’s account in the RAF website informed that the aircraft carried three weapons each.  Squire’s account is coherent with the 
Combat Mission Report.  Ethell, Air War South Atlantic, 98; Squire, Harrier goes to War and TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations.  
22 The Combat Mission Report only reported on the fall of the leader’s weapons.  However, Pook confirmed that all three aircraft hit the target.  Ibid.; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 52. 
23 The Combat Mission Report confirmed the take-off time and payload.  Pook dropped his weapons beyond the target and Hare's bombs failed to release from the aircraft.  Consequently, the helicopters 
were strafed. Brown confirmed that the attack destroyed a Chinook and a Puma while damaging another Puma.  Pook suggested his bombs dropped long rather than short and that the damaged helicopter 
was a Huey.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 78; Brown, Royal Navy, 184; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 60.   
24 Assumed payload. The Combat Mission Report only confirmed that the aircraft did not employ weapons on this mission.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations.   
25 Due to an aircraft serviceability issue, Squire was forced to return to HMS Hermes. Squire, Harrier goes to War. 
26 A Blowpipe missile at Port Howard shot down Glover during a reattack.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron. 
27 SCAR or Strike, Coordination and Reconnaissance is one of the three counter-land attack missions and can be tasked in order to allow aircraft to seek-out and attack enemy targets beyond the battlefield 
area. SCAR allows aircrews to be directed into areas where potential targets exist.  RAF, “Attack.”  http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/attack.cfm (accessed 13 October 2016). 
28 Harris and Rochfort were unable to find targets and returned to the aircraft carrier with their weapons.  Rochfort had a landing mishap and photographs of the event confirmed that the aircraft were each 
armed with two BL755s.  Burden, The Air War, 375 and 374. 
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22 May 1982            
1701 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
4 
BL755 
2 8 8 8 6 631 Air Airfield Attack Goose Green Airstrip 
1942 2 2 4 4 4 0 032 Land SCAR Weddell Island/Dunnose Head 
23 May 1982            
1216 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 4 Mixed
33 2 or 3 10 10 10 10 1034 Air Airfield Attack Dunnose Head Airstrip 
1530 2 BL755 2 4 4 4 0 035 Land SCAR Chartres/Port Howard 
1600 815 NAS Lynx HAS2 2 Sea Skua 2 4 4 4 2 236 Sea Anti-Surface Warfare Rio Carcarana 
1854 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 2 BL755
37 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Air Airfield Attack 
Pebble Island Airstrip 
2 1000lb 3 6 6 3
38 339 0  
2250 800 NAS Sea Harrier 4 3 12 12 640 6 041 Stanley Airport 
24 May 1982            
1203 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 4 1000lb 
3 12 12 12 12 342 
Air 
Airfield Attack 
Stanley Airport 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 3 6 6 6 5 0
43 Suppression 
2045 2 3 6 6 6 6 044 Airfield Attack 
25 May 1982            
1415 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 1000lb 3 6 6 6 6 045 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
29 Assumed payload and weapons. 
30 There was some debate regarding who was the second pilot in this mission.  Burden suggested Hare was the second pilot.  In contrast, Pook, the mission leader, informed that Harper was his wingman.  
Regardless, neither aircraft dropped its weapons during the mission.  The Combat Mission Report confirmed that Pook and Harper flew the mission but ‘found neither military activity nor evidence of recent 
use.’  Ibid.; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 62; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
31 One aircraft’s bombs hang.  Hobson suggested that the pilot was Harris.  The Combat Mission Report concurred with Hobson and also suggested that only 8 BL755s were carried.  In contrast, Burden 
believed that Iveson was the pilot.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 86; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations; Burden, The Air War, 375 
32 Assumed payload.  Pook suggested that neither Squire nor Harper dropped their weapons.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 70. 	
33 The weapon load comprised four BL755s and six 1000lb bombs.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 87. 
34 Hare dropped his weapons late; the subsequent explosion wounded an Islander.  Additionally, one bomb from Hare’s aircraft failed to explode.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 74.   
35 Assumed weapons. Rochfort and Pook found suitable targets but were unable to bring their weapons to bear.  Ibid., 77. 
36 HMS Argonaut’s Lynx was unable to lock its radar onto the ship.  Consequently, HMS Antelope’s Lynx attacked the ship with two missiles.  Both missiles hit their target and detonated which caused the 
vessel to sink.		Hobson, Falklands Air War, 88.	
37 The Combat Mission Report informed that the formation comprised three aircraft each carrying two BL755.  In contrast, Pook offered that the formation comprised four aircraft with numbers 1 and 3 in the 
formation carrying BL755s whereas the other aircraft carried three 1000lb bombs each.  Pook’s position is endorsed in Scientific Evaluation Team’s Report, which shows an updated version of the Combat 
Mission Report.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack – Falklands, 77; TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
38 Hare air aborted with an undercarriage problem.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 77.	
39 Due to a persistent weapon systems problem with his aircraft, Rochfort jettisoned his three 1000lb bombs and his fuel tanks during the run-in to the target.  Ibid. 
40 Batt crashed following take-off and was killed.  Ibid., 72. 
41 Morgan informed that one aircraft returned to the aircraft carrier early with a technical issue and, as a result, was forced to jettison its weapons.  Morgan also suggested that the other two aircraft 
successfully completed their mission.  Brown recorded that the weapons were delivered accurately.  However, Pook informed that there was no evidence of a bomb impact on the runway.  Morgan, Hostile 
Skies, 204; Brown, Royal Navy, 211; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 72.  
42 The RAF website suggested that 3/4 of the weapons hit the runway.  However, the 1 (Fighter) Squadron F540 informed that the runway was hit three times.  Nevertheless, although the bombs scarred the 
runway surface the attack caused no significant damage.  Squire, Harrier goes to War; TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; Brown, Royal Navy, 211. 
43 A suppression of enemy air defences mission in support of Harrier GR3 sortie.  Thomas landed with a hung bomb on the fuselage centreline weapons pylon.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 80. 
44 Due to a system failure, the bombs dropped into the sea 1.5 miles short of the target.  Brown, Royal Navy, 216; TNA, AIR20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations.	
279 
1420 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
4 3 12 12 12 12 
1631 2 BL755 2 4 4 4 0 046 Land SCAR Not stipulated 
1728 2 
1000lb 
3 6 6 6 6 047 
Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 1927 1 3 3 3 3 3 0
48 
800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 3 6 6 6 6 0
49 
2155 3 3 9 9 9 9 ?50 
26 May 1982            
1233 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
2 BL755 2 4 4 051 0 0 Land 
SCAR Stanley 
1240 2 BL755 2 4 4 4 4 452 Air Interdiction Port Howard 
1659 1 1000lb 3 3 3 3 2 053 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
1756 2 BL755 2 4 4 4 2 254 Land SCAR Teal Inlet/Stanley 
27 May 1982            
1420
55 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
2 1000lb 3 6 6 6 6 056 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
1400 2 
BL755 
2 4 4 4 4 257 
Land Air Interdiction Goose Green 1545 2 2 4 4 4 0 058 
1612 2 2 4 4 4 4 059 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
45 Of note, the 800 Naval Air Squadron weapon analysis contained within the Scientific Evaluation Report failed to mention this mission.  The medium level toss attack caused little significant damage.   Pook 
suggested that the first formation’s bombs landed beyond the end of the runway.  In contrast, the second formation’s weapons impacted not far off the side of the runway.  TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific 
Evaluation Team; Burden, The Air War, 376; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 84.   
46 Assumed weapons and payload.  Squire and Rochfort flew an uneventful mission and did not drop their weapons.  Ibid., 85. 
47 According to Burden, at least three of the six bombs missed the target.  Pook was less optimistic and assessed the mission as a particularly useless exercise.  The Combat Mission Report informed that 
the bombs were dropped singly and that the fall of only 3 bombs was seen and these fell in Yorke Bay.  Burden, The Air War, 376; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 85; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft 
operations. 
48 The 1(Fighter) Squadron F540 suggested that there were no hits on the runway on 25 May 1982.  The Combat Mission Report informed that all three bombs dropped by Harris fell short of their intended 
target.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
49 The Sea Harrier bombs were seen to drop short of their target.  Burden, The Air War, 201. 
50 Outcome not stipulated but ‘results looked very impressive’.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 99; TNA, AIR 20/13126. Harrier aircraft operations.	
51 Assumed weapons.  The Identification Friend or Foe system was not serviceable on either aircraft.  Subsequently, both aircraft were forced to air abort.  However, Burden suggested that only Pook 
returned.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 102; Burden, The Air War, 376. 
52 Pook informed that the mission was effective.  However, Hobson describes the mission as uneventful.  The Combat Mission Report confirmed the payload and the effectiveness of the attack.  Pook, RAF 
Harrier Ground Attack, 102; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 99; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations.  
53 One bomb failed to release and the fall of weapons was not seen.  Moreover, there are no hits on the runway.   Ibid.; TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron.  
54 Only Pook conducted a successful attack with two BL755s on a Puma helicopter at Mount Kent.  However, the helicopter had been damaged in a previous attack. Moreover, Morgan and Pook disagreed 
over the number of weapons carried by each Harrier GR3; Morgan suggested that each aircraft carried three bombs.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack – Falklands, 104; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 99; 
Morgan, Hostile Skies, 225.   
55 Freedman confirmed the take-off time of the Stanley raid.		Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 491.	
56 No direct hits on runway.  The Combat Mission Report informed that smoke was seen to the west of the runway and that Harper’s bombs landed in the water to the south.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron 
TNA; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
57 All weapons were dropped but, due to late detection of the target, the weapons were dropped on multiple passes.  Hare dropped on a group of approximately 15 troops while Iveson dropped on a line of 
foxholes.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 101; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
58 Assumed payload.  Pook suggested that Squire and Rochfort were unable to find a suitable target to attack.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 108.   
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1902 1 2 2 2 2 060 0 
28 May 1982            
1330 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
3 Rockets 2 6 6 6 4 461 
Land 
Air Interdiction Ammo dump, Mt Kent 
1600 2 BL755 2 4 4 4 0 062 SCAR Armed Recce 
1905 3 Mixed63 2 6 6 6 6 664 Close Air Support Goose Green 
<2359 101 Sqn Vulcan 1 Shrike 2 2 2 065 0 0 Air Suppression Stanley Airport Radars 






3 6 6 6 
24 1466,67 
Air Airfield Attack 
Stanley Airport 1430 2 3 6 6 6 1555 2 3 6 6 6 
TBC 801 NAS 2 3 6 6 6 
1238 800 NAS 2 3 6 6 6 12 168 Pebble Island 1737 2 3 6 6 6 
1545 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 0
69 Land Close Air Support Mount Kent 
1700 2 BL755 2 4 2 2 0 070 Land SCAR Stanley Radars 
30 May 1982            
1130 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 
2 1000lb 3 6 6 6 6 ? 71 Land SCAR Mount Kent 1150 2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 ?72 
1435 2 Mixed73 2 4 4 4 4 ?74 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
59 According to Middlebrook, the initial cluster bomb attacks caused little or no damage. Iveson was shot down by small arms fire during a reattack post-bomb drop.  Middlebrook, The Argentinean Fight, 180; 
Burden, The Air War, 376.  
60 Assumed weapons and payload.  Mission was tasked for medium level reconnaissance in an attempt to locate Iveson who had been shot down earlier that day.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft 
operations. 
61 Harper did not fire his rockets due to poor weather in the target area.  However, secondary explosions were seen during the attack.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 112.   
62 Pook and Rochfort were unable to find suitable targets and returned to their aircraft carrier with their weapons.  However, Brown suggested that the attacks were performed by the other formations: one 
pair of rocket-armed aircraft conducted reconnaissance of Douglas settlement, whereas the bomb-armed aircraft attack troop positions at Mount Kent.  Ibid.; Brown, Royal Navy, 246. 
63 Two aircraft carried two of BL755s, while the third is armed with two Royal Navy 2-Inch rocket pods.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
64 The attack was, ‘quite decisive.’  Brown, Royal Navy, 247. 
65 A technical problem with one of the Victor air-to-air refuelling aircraft forced an air abort 5 hours into the mission.   Hobson, Falklands Air War, 106. 
66 The Squadron Record of Proceedings confirmed the payload and that three of the weapons detonated prematurely.  TNA, DEFE 69/1085.  801 Naval Air Squadron.  Record of Proceedings.   
67 Brown informed that at least 14 of the bombs landed in the runway area.  Brown, Royal Navy, 251.  
68 Burden, The Air War, 218. 
69 Hobson informed that Squire and Hare flew the first mission against Argentine position in the Mount Kent area.  Brown added further detail when he suggested that the mission was in support of an SAS 
patrol.  The intervention appeared to have been successful, for the troopers continued their possession of the vital feature.  However, at the time, the pilots saw nothing at the target locations.  Hobson, 
Falklands Air War, 108; Brown, Royal Navy, 251; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
70 Brown suggested that the Harrier GR3s only flew one mission on this day.  However, Pook disagreed, and although Rochfort ground aborted, Harris continued to look for radar sites but without success.  
Assumed weapons and payload.  Ibid.; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 117. 
71 Pook dropped his weapons on target coordinates but did not report the outcome.  However, the Combat Mission Report informed that two locations were attacked but the pilots did not see military targets 
or activity at either location.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 119; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
72 Pook suggested that Squire and Hare attacked troop positions in the Mount Kent area but he did not report the outcome.  However, Freedman informed that enemy positions were successfully engaged. 
Again, the pilots did not see anything at the target location.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 118; Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 590; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
73 The Harrier GR3s had an unusual configuration encompassing one Paveway laser-guided bomb and one 1000lb weapon.  Brown, Royal Navy, 253.  
281 
2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 475 Land Air Interdiction Mount Wall 
1717 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 1000lb 3 6 6 6 6 076 Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
1750 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 ?77 Land Air Interdiction Mount Kent 
31 May 1982            
<2359 101 Sqn Vulcan 1 Shrike 4 4 4 4 2 178 
Air 
Suppression Stanley Airport Radars 072079 801 NAS Sea Harrier 1 1000lb80 3 3 3 3 3 0 
0810 1 3 3 3 3 3 0 
1130 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 3 Mixed
81 2 6 6 6 4 082 Airfield Attack 
Stanley Airport 1452 
2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 ?83 
800 NAS Sea Harrier 
2 1000lb 3 6 6 6 6 Suppression 
1647 
1 Paveway 2 2 2 2 2 084 Airfield Attack 2 1000lb 2 4 4 4 4 
1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 1 Rockets 2 2 2 2 2 ?85 Land Air Interdiction Hills West of Stanley 
1 June 1982            
1700 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 1 Rockets 2 2 2 2 2
86 ? Land SCAR Bluff Cove/Goose Green 800 NAS Sea Harrier 1 1000lb 2 2 2 2 287 
2 June 1982            
AM 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 0 088 Air Suppression North of East Falkland 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
74 In the first Paveway laser-guided bomb attack, Hare and Harper dropped the weapon from a 60-degree dive with the weapon being laser designated by the wingman.  The results of the attack were 
unseen by the pilots.  Pook suggested that the pilots saw no impacts anywhere on the airfield.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 120.   
75 An artillery position was attacked at Mount Wall but the outcome is not reported.  However, after taking ground fire, Pook ran out of fuel 40 miles short of the carrier and successfully ejected from the 
aircraft.  However, Pook informed that he was hit prior to the target area.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 109; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 122.   
76 Burden suggested that Thomas and Ball’s attack led to poor results.  Brown mentioned that a second Sea Harrier attack on Stanley airport took place on 30 May 1982.  However, Hobson and Burden 
informed that at 1915, two Sea Harriers took off to conduct an uneventful photographic reconnaissance mission over East Falkland.  Burden, The Air War, 202; Brown, Royal Navy, 257; Hobson, Falklands 
Air War, 110 and Burden, The Air War, 202.  
77 Squires and Hare were initially tasked to attack the artillery position at Mount Wall but were unable to find the targets.  They attacked enemy defensive positions on northern slopes of Mount Kent.  
Additionally, Brown confirmed that the mission was in support of the SAS.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations; Brown, Royal Navy, 257.   
78 The Vulcan mission, Black Buck 5, caused a near miss and minor damage to the TPS-43F radar.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 111. 
79 No specific take-off times are noted other than pre-dawn and one hour later after the first mission.  Brown informed that the take-off times were 0320 and 0410 (equating to 0720 and 0810 Greenwich 
Mean Time).  However, Brown suggested that the missions were flown as singletons and not as pairs, as inferred by Hobson.  Ibid.; Brown, Royal Navy, 258. 
80 The 801 NAS Sea Harriers were tasked to stimulate the Argentine radars ahead of the Shrike-armed Vulcan mission.  Ibid., 259. 
81 One aircraft was armed with Paveway laser-guided bombs, one with 1000lb bombs and the other with rockets.  Burden, The Air War, 379.  
82 Burden does not mention the outcome of the attack other than there was no forward air controller available to guide the Paveway laser-guided bombs. Hobson suggested that the mission results were 
disappointing.  Pook informed that not a single bomb impact was observed.  Ibid.; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 111; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 127.   
83 The mission was flown at short notice following reports of ‘Super Etendards’ at the eastern end of the Stanley airport.  The outcome of the mission has not been noted. 
84 Morrell flew a trial mission with a Paveway-armed Sea Harrier.  The payload for the Sea Harriers has been assumed.  However, the trial failed and was not repeated.  Burden inferred that the weapons 
were employed but the results were unconfirmed.  Burden, The Air War, 379; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 112; Burden, The Air War, 379. 
85 Pook informed that Harris flew a rocket attack against troops in the hills to the west of Stanley.  However, there is no mention of the mission success.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 130.   
86 Rockets fired at grid reference but Pook makes no comment on results.  The Combat Mission Report suggested that the target area was strafed but nothing was seen.  Ibid., 131; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  
Harrier aircraft operations. 
87 Assumed payload and weapons.  The Sea Harrier attacked a suspected radar site at Mount Usborne.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 113. 
88 Pook and MacLeod were tasked against a suspected radar site.   However, due to poor weather the mission was aborted.  Ibid., 115; Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 135. 
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5 June 1982            
1530 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 2 Rockets 2 4 4 4 4 ?
90 
Land 
Air Interdiction Two Sisters 
1850 2 2 4 4 4 4 4
91 SCAR South West of Stanley92 800 NAS Sea Harrier 2 1000lb 2 4 4 4 0 093 
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9 June 1982            
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1300 
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89 The Shrikes successfully homed into an Argentine Army Skyguard anti-aircraft gun-control radar rather than the TPS-43F surveillance radar that the crew aimed at.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 116. 
90 Mission flown by Harris and Rochfort, the outcome of the mission is not articulated.  Brown confirmed take-off time, weapons and that the mission was flown from the forward operating strip at San Carlos. 
There is no associated Combat Mission Report for this sortie.  Ibid., 118; Brown, Royal Navy, 283; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
91 Squire and Beech attacked the previously damaged Pucaras at Pebble Island.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 119. 
92 Burden suggested that the aircraft were searching for ground-launched Exocet missiles.  Burden, The Air War, 379. 
93 Morrell and Slade joined the Harrier GR3s on the armed recce.  However, Burden informed that the Sea Harriers found nothing on their mission.  Ibid., 202. 
94 Only Squire dropped his BL755s on briefed troop positions south of Stanley but Beech did not see his battlefield radar target and did not drop his weapons.  No outcome is noted.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  
Harrier aircraft operations. 
95 Brown suggested that two attacks were tasked against suspected artillery positions. However, Pook explained that due to ground aborts only two of the planned four Harrier GR3s launched.  Moreover, 
once in the target area, the anticipated artillery pieces were not there.  Nevertheless, both aircraft fired into the target area but the outcome of the attack is unknown.  Brown, Royal Navy, 290; Pook, RAF 
Harrier Ground Attack, 142; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
96 Again, Brown informed that fours pairs were tasked to rocket artillery.  However, analysis suggested that two pairs were actually launched.  The Combat Mission Report informed that the aircraft fired at 
the target position although nothing was seen.  Brown, Royal Navy, 307; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
97 Weapons fired at coordinates but no target present.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 147 
98 Squire and Hare dropped their BL755s in the target area.  The Combat Mission Report informed that post-flight film analysis identified heavy artillery and enemy troops in both target areas.  Ibid., 152; 
TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
99 Due to the carrier re-scheduling its flying programme, the Harriers were forced to take off two hours earlier than planned and the ground-based forward air controller was not ready to provide the essential 
target marking for the aircraft.  Consequently, Burden suggested that neither aircraft drops their weapons.  The Combat Mission Report informed that only Harper’s aircraft was armed with laser-guided 
bombs while the wingman’s role was for cross cover support only.  As a result, Squire informed that the weapons were jettisoned before landing.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 130; Burden, The Air War, 380; 
TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations and Squire, Harrier goes to War. 
100 Assumed payload.  Special forces support mission at Port Howard but unable to contact the Forward Air Controller. TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
101 Briefed target area attacked and several secondary explosions seen from Squire’s weapons.  Ibid. 
102 11 of 12 bombs were seen to explode on the airfield.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 131 
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103 Both AS-12 missiles missed, one by only a few yards while the other missile fell into the sea at Stanley harbour.  Ibid. 
104 An SAS team planned to mark the target but the battery of their laser target marker failed.  So, the aircraft dropped their bombs on Wireless Ridge.  The outcome of the attack was not recorded.  Ibid., 
132 
105 Due to an Identification Friend or Foe failure, Pook and Beech were forced to abort their mission once airborne.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 155.	
106 The original 1(F) Squadron Combat Mission Reports suggested that the aircraft were armed with BL755.  However, the Scientific Evaluation Team’s report informed that the aircraft were armed with 
rockets.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations; TNA, DEFE 19/276.  Scientific Evaluation Team. 
107 Rochfort was forced to jettison his stores post take-off in order to prevent him crashing into the sea.  However, he continued on his mission.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 132. 
108 Pook and Beech could not see their target but weapons were dropped at their allocated grid reference.  However, the Combat Mission Report informed that Beech saw a vehicle at his target position.  
Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 155; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
109 Although Burden confirmed that Harris and Gilchrist flew the mission, there is no mention of the outcome.  Burden, The Air War, 380. 
110 The expected targets were not at the target location.  Nevertheless, the weapons were dropped.  However, the retard tails failed to deploy and the bombs missed.  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 154. 
111 During the last Vulcan mission, Black Buck 7, the weapons’ fuses were incorrectly set for impact rather than airburst.  As a result, little damage was done.  Freedman, Official History Volume 2, 638; 
Hobson, Falklands Air War, 133. 
112 Boyens and Beech attacked their allocated target area but nothing was seen.  TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
113 Although Hobson does not confirm the outcome of Harris and Mcleod’s mission, Argentine sources suggested that a 155mm howitzer was lightly damaged and six soldiers injured. Hobson, Falklands Air 
War, 133; H. Rodríguez Mottino, La Artillería Argentina en Malvinas. (Buenos Aires: Clio, 1984), 91.  
114 Although Burden confirmed that Harper and Gilchrist dropped their weapons, the success of the attack was not recorded.  The Combat Mission Report informed that troops in the open were attacked.  
Burden, The Air War, 380; TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
115 Only one aircraft was armed with a pair of Paveway bombs, the other aircraft acted as a ‘surface-to-air missile lookout.’  Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack, 160. 
116 During the first attack, the target was designated too early and the bomb dropped short, the second bomb scored a direct hit on a company headquarters.  The wingman also dropped his BL755s onto the 
target.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron; Hobson, Falklands Air War, 136. 
117 One weapon fell short whereas the other bomb scored a direct hit on an artillery piece. The Combat Mission Report suggested that Beech, not Rochfort, acted as the wingman for the mission.  Ibid.;  
TNA, AIR 20/13126.  Harrier aircraft operations. 
118 Gun emplacements and troops.  No outcome was stipulated.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 138.   
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1500 1(F) Sqn Harrier GR3 1 Paveway 2 2 2 2 0 0120 Sapper Hill 1 BL755 2 2 2 2 
Combat Air Patrol Bombing from 14 May121           
N/A 801 NAS Sea Harrier 31122 1000lb 1 31 ?? Air Airfield Attack Stanley Airport 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																					
119 Ibid. 
120 The Argentine surrender cancelled the mission.  TNA, AIR 27/3525.  1 Squadron.   
121 Not all combat air patrols dropped weapons on Stanley airport.  For example, on 28 May only four of the 18 patrols dropped 1000lb bombs against the target.  Hobson, Falklands Air War, 106.   
122 According to their Record of Proceedings, 801 Naval Air Squadron dropped a total of 54 bombs during the Conflict.  However, although the data within the document is correct the total is wrong.  Burden 
correctly identified that the figure is 56.  HMS Invincible’s Campaign Diary concurred with Burden’s assessment.  Analysis informed that 801 Naval Air Squadron dropped 31 bombs during combat air patrol 
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